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Abstract 
This thesis examines the development of Russian nationalism under 
Gorbachev, with special reference to new political organisations. 
Nationalism is defined as a combination of sentiment, political principle 
and movement. The political principle 'holds that the political and 
national unit should be congruent'. For Russia, this was not a 
straightforward matter: some considered the political unit to be a greater 
(imperial) Russian state; whilst others considered it to be a Russian 
national state (based on the RSFSR). In addition, the Russian language has 
two terms to define the national unit: russkii androssiiskii narod. 
Russian nationalism existed to a limited degree in the Soviet Union before 
1985. Glasnost and perestroika reduced the limitations on expressions of 
Russian nationalism and provided an opportunity for opinions to 
coalesce, resulting in the appearance of organised movements. At first, 
most Russian nationalists welcomed this change, although some soon 
started to display elements of caution - they were worried about possible 
threats to their conceptions of the Russian state. This work aims to show 
that Russian nationalism under Gorbachev was not a unified movement, 
but a collage of opinions attempting to define the Russian state and its 
national values. 
The thesis examines: the development of new groups connected with 
Russian nationalism; the relationship between Russian nationalism and 
the centre; the issues which became Russian nationalist causes; and the 
tendencies which became apparent in Russian nationalism. 
The thesis contends that Russian nationalism can be divided into three 
tendencies: imperialist nationalism, concerned with the maintenance of a 
greater Russian/Soviet state; isolationist nationalism, which sought to 
establish a specifically 'Russian' state, untainted by foreign influence and 
separated from the non-Russian Union republics; and liberal nationalism, 
which respected other republics' independence, was receptive to 
foreign 
influence and, yet, was concerned with the Russian national identity of a 
new Russian state. 
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Introduction 
The aim of this work is to show how Russian nationalism manifested 
itself in Russia during the Gorbachev period (1985-91) with particular 
reference to the groups which adopted it as a political cause. 
I believe that there are three tendencies within Russian nationalism 
which were given the opportunity to express themselves clearly under the 
influence of glasnost and perestroika: imperialist, isolationist and liberal 
Russian nationalism. 
One or two texts have referred to the terms 'imperialism', 'isolationism', 
'separatism' and 'liberal democracy' in relation to Russian nationalism, 
but no one has made this exact distinction between the tendencies in 
Russian nationalism. 
I start with a discussion of nationalism, which seems to be frequently 
ignored when Russian (or any) nationalism is discussed. There is no 
agreement as to what constitutes nationalism, but Gellner's idea that it is a 
political principle uniting a political and national unit seems to be 
popular. Examining the various ideas on the subject, I agree with 
Gellner's definition, but also believe that a definition should mention the 
sentiment and the movement which pursue the principle. It is upon 
these three elements that I base my examination of Russian nationalism. 
The second chapter looks at the work of other scholars on the subject and 
enumerates some of the terms which they have used. It concludes with 
the three divisions of Russian nationalism. 
The third section of the thesis describes the development of Russian 
nationalism from 1985-1991, with an emphasis on the organisations and 
parties which arose. It divides the Gorbachev years into four different 
time periods, representing: the initial intellectual debate and the 
appearance of Pa m is t'; the emergence of new organisations connected 
with Russian nationalism; the combination of Russian nationalism with 
both democratic and conservative forces in opposition to the centre; and 
Russian nationalism in the aftermath of the attempted coup of August 
1991. 
The issues listed in Chapter 4 represent a fairly broad look at the variety of 
concerns affecting Russian nationalism. The chapter 
by no means goes 
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into each issue in great depth, for each issue might merit the examination 
of a thesis. Some issues might be subject to a deeper analysis than others, 
but the work only wishes to illustrate the variety of ways in which 
nationalism was expressed. The section on 'national character and 
identity' may seem to cover many of the other issues in the chapter, but I 
have tried to avoid repitition. The search for national identity does link 
many of the issues, but it also presents some new information. I therefore 
felt it necessary to include it as a separate category in the middle of the 
chapter. 
The last three chapters introduce the reader to a number of groups which 
expressed or used Russian nationalism as a conviction or a political tool. 
Chapter 5 deals with the organisations which are connected with 
imperialist Russian nationalism. This tendency represents the largest area 
of activity in Russian nationalism and encompasses the largest number of 
groups, some of which were fairly significant in size and some of which 
were very small. The groups represent a variety of political views, 
including: support for Marxism-Leninism; reintroduction of the 
monarchy; increasing the importance of Russian Orthodoxy in Russian 
life; and extreme right-wing views. However, all the organisations are 
guided by their desire to maintain or re-institute the greater Russian 
state/Soviet Union. 
Chapter 6 examines briefly the organisations which were most closely 
linked to liberal Russian nationalism. This includes groups which 
pursued liberal democracy and a civil society, whilst trying to establish 
specific Russian features within that society. It also includes the umbrella 
movement, Democratic Russia, and constituent members, which fought 
for the institution of a Russian [rossiiskii] national identity through the 
establishment of Russian state structures. 
Chapter 7 looks at the most marginal tendency, isolationist Russian 
nationalism. This tendency combined both separatism and isolationism 
to create the idea of a specific Russian path untainted by foreign influence 
and the concerns /burdens of the non-Russian(/Slavic) periphery. It gives 
a summary of Solzhenitsyn's programme for Russian recovery in 
isolation from the rest of the world and lists three. organisations for whom 
a belief in the innate qualities of the Russian people was paramount. 
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Chanter 1: The Meaning of Nationalism 
Nation and Nationality 
It is impossible to discuss nationalism without having a vague idea about 
what constitutes a 'nation' or a 'nationality'. Many nationalists believe 
that humanity is naturally divided into nations, whose peculiar 
characteristics can be readily identified. However, there are problems with 
this approach: firstly, today's studies of nationalism indicate that the 
emergence of nations is a relatively recent political phenomenon and 
discredit the idea that they might be 'natural' or 'preordained'; secondly, it 
is difficult to distinguish the unique, collective characteristics of a 
particular nation or nationality - one cannot imagine a situation in which 
every member of a nation conforms to a strict set of characteristics (it is 
quite possible that elements within a nation have more in common with 
elements of other nations than with all the members of their own nation). 
It is wiser to assume that nations form over time by the actions of men 
and through the mechanism of consensus. Man's communicative and 
gregarious nature has led to a tendency to identify with a group, be it the 
family, clan or tribe. As the media of communication have grown and 
developed, so too has man's capacity to identify with a larger group. 
Affiliation to a group identity requires the recognition of shared 
similarities and common values. When a number of peoples can be 
convinced that they share common values, which are perceived to be 
distinct from another/other groups, there is a basis for the 
nation /nationality to exist and develop. Membership depends very 
much upon subjective affiliation to the nationality and the reciprocal 
acknowledgement of membership by others within it. 
Usage of terms 'nation' and 'nationality' 
I should point out here that the terms 'nation' and 'nationality' are 
frequently used synonymously. However, the usual difference between 
the terms is that 'nation' refers to a group which possesses, or seeks to 
possess, a more or less defined territory and government, whereas 
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'nationality' refers to an ethnic group within a larger (political) unit. For 
instance, the Oxford English Dictionary describes a nationality as: 
A nation; freq. a people potentially, but not actually, a nation' 
and the Longmans dictionary gives: 
a NATION... ban ethnic group within a larger unit. 2 
As both 'nation' and 'nationality' refer to groups which are recognized as 
identifiable groups with common characteristics, we can, at this stage, 
speak of them in the same breath. Therefore, it would be reasonable to 
refer to either the 'Russian nationality' or the 'Russian nation'. 
In 1939 the Royal Institute of International Affairs conducted a study on 
nationalism, which began by trying to define the usage of terms such as 
'nation', 'people', 'national' and 'nationalism'. The study group 
immediately pointed out the difference between the English terms, their 
various and changing uses, and their counterparts in other languages. 
The term 'nation' was given two usages in English: 
(i) synonymously with 'State' or 'country' to mean society united under one government... 
But the implications of 'nation' are never precisely those of 'State', since 'nation' calls to 
the those persons who compose a political community, 'State' to the sovereign power to 
which they owe an allegiance and which holds sway over the territory which they 
inhabit. 
(ii) 'Nation' is also used to denote an aggregation of individuals united by other, as well as 
political, ties - ties commonly of race, religion, language, or tradition. 
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It was pointed out that the English usages did not completely coincide 
with nation and Nation in French and German or nazione and nacion in 
Italian and Spanish. The RIIA believed that: 
In French, nation does possess the same two meanings as in English, but tends to be used 
rather more frequently in the purely political sense. Whereas peuple means either the 
masses of the population, as distinct from the middle and upper classes, or else a community 
united by a common origin, and pa trie signifies the territory inhabited by the nation, 
nation signifies the community of men linked in the present by the tie of a will to live 
together. 4 
This illustrates how language itself can confuse common understandings 
of terms such as 'nation' and 'people'. However, 'nation' and 
'nationalism' are relatively new terms in the international vocabulary and 
have developed with greater common usage and examination over this 
century. With the changing nature of language it has become possible to 
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translate many of these terms and their equivalents in foreign languages 
synonymously. At the same time, we should not ignore the significance 
of different terms in different languages, and how they might be 
manipulated by those who use them. For example, I will explain later 
how terms such as 'na ro d' and 'pa triotiz m' have been used in Russian not 
to express 'people' or 'patriotism' in the English sense, but as subtle 
surrogates to promote a new 'nation' and 'nationalism'. I will also point 
out that the Russian word 'natsiona1iz m' was normally only used in a 
pejorative sense. 
Origins of nations 
The most popular view amongst scholars of nationalism today is that the 
modern concept of a nation only started to develop with the advent of the 
French Revolution, when nation was taken to mean the country, people 
and the state as a moral and political unit - popular will organized in the 
state. 
As Don Luigi Sturzo puts it: 
the word nation became the assertion of a moral and political personality acquired by the 
people. ' 
Or, in the words of Hugh Seton-Watson: 
from the Revolution of 1789... it was increasingly claimed that the interests of whole 
nations (interpreted of course by those who claimed to represent their will) should have 
first priority in political life, both domestic and international. Nationalism, in fact, 
provides a new principle of legitimacy for government, an alternative to the traditional 
legitimacy of monarch and religion. 6 
From this point on the 'nation' developed a collective interest and, yet, 
comprised a multiplicity of units working within the national framework. 
It would be difficult to believe that all Frenchmen were bonded together at 
this point by a system of values which were common to them only. The 
revolutionary values of liberty, equality and fraternity were only the first 
building blocks in constructing the edifice of the French nation. 
I agree with the point of view that nations developed along with the 
advancement of communication and education. Ernest Gellner 
believes: 
It is nationalism which engenders nations and not the other way round. 
Admittedly, 
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nationalism uses the pre-existing, historically inherited proliferation of cultures or 
cultural wealth, though it uses them very selectively, and it most often transforms them 
radically. 7 
The French Revolution was followed by a programme of education which 
reached all the people within its national state. It instilled in those who 
had a new-found importance the idea that they shared common values 
and a shared destiny. To continue Gellner's observation: 
Dead languages can be revived, traditions invented, quite fictitious pristine purities 
restored.... ... The cultural shreds and patches used by nationalism are often arbitrary 
historical inventions. " 
The idea that nationalists propagate myths and interpret reality in order to 
establish the nation is echoed by Shafer: 
Nationalism is what the nationalists have made it; it is not a neat, fixed concept but a 
varying combination of beliefs and conditions. It may be in part founded on myth but myths 
like other errors have a way of perpetuating themselves and of becoming not true but real. 
The fact is that myth and actuality and truth and error are inextricably intermixed in 
modern nationalism. 9 
It was the bundle of new ideas and newly-packaged old ideas which 
transformed the French-speaking peoples into the new political we-group 
known as the nation. Similarly, the same principles were applied by 
movements trying to promote their conception of the Russian nation 
during the Gorbachev period. 
Characteristics of nations 
The main characteristics which seem to 'bond' nations or nationalities 
together are language, history and culture. At the same time, I must 
mention other common values which are contained within these three 
elements, namely, economic and political relationships, religion and the 
issue of territory. 
Carlton Hayes describes a nationality as: 
any group of persons who speak a common language, who cherish common 
historical 
traditions, and who constitute, or think they constitute, a distinct cultural society in 
which, among other factors, religion and politics may 
have played important though not 
necessarily continuous roles. 
'° 
Hayes puts quite an emphasis on language, but it cannot be regarded as a 
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constant yard-stick. It is true that for men to feel a degree of common 
ground, they must have the facility to communicate. Language is one of 
the first requirements of human communication, but it does not follow 
that all those who speak the same language belong to the same nationality 
(for example, Germans and Austrians, English and American, etc, ). Some 
believe a language is also central to nurturing and expressing a particular 
culture - for instance, a language may contain certain words which can 
express rituals, customs, objects and, arguably, concepts, which are unique 
to a certain group of people. This reflects a view held by some 
nationalists, who believe that only they, as native speakers of their 
language, can understand the true uniqueness and essence of their own 
culture. 
Kedourie describes language as: 
the means through which a man becomes conscious of his personality. Language is not only 
a vehicle for rational propositions, it is the outer expression of an inner experience, the 
outcome of a particular history, the legacy of a distinctive tradition. " 
The German philosopher, Johann Fichte, believed: 
The test, then, by which a nation is known to exist is that of language. A group speaking 
the same language is known as a nation, and a nation ought to constitute a state. 12 
This observation is not true, but it dates back to the early nineteenth 
century when nationalist thought was beginning to develop and it 
illustrates the important consideration which must be given to language 
when examining nationalities and nations. Its role can be central, but 
language is not equated with nationality. 
The second distinguishing element of nationality referred to by Hayes, and 
mentioned also by Kedourie, is that of common historical tradition. 
Language brings with it the ability to pass on memories and record 
outstanding events of the past. The result is that the 'we-group' can trace 
what is perceived to be a common experience dating back many years. 
Solidarity within the group and explanations for the group's present 
situation can be established by delving into history and selecting those 
elements or events which suit their interpreters. In this way, a common 
history and national identity can be constructed and passed as a 
continuous process related to the present. As Hayes puts it: 
there is a tendency to personify the group, to view the nationality as an historic 
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personage. 
This process of personification may highlight historical figures whose 
actions may well have had some influence or bearing upon the current 
situation of many of the individuals of a nation or nationality, but it 
would be wrong to suggest that the actions of historical heroes and figures 
were committed in the interests of the nation. 
Nationalists take outstanding figures and events from history and apply to 
them a national role. Thus the suffering and victory of Russians over the 
Tartar-Mongols become relevant to the Russian of today and the bogatyri 
of Russian legend became an inspiring national symbol for Russians 
during the Second World War. Under Gorbachev, various pre- 
revolutionary Russian heroes and figures, from St. Sergii of Radonezh to 
Aleksandr Nevskii and even Petr Stolypin, were used as symbols of the 
Russian national renaissance. 14 
Common history must be considered not only from the legacy of heroes 
and events (or myths) that it has provided, but also from the territorial, 
political and economic legacy. Nationalities tend to inhabit a certain area 
which they consider to be theirs by historical right. It was a place in which 
their forefathers lived and becomes a vital issue to nationalists when 
trying to establish the nation-state. Boundaries become a topic of 
contention, for the nation cannot exist without its sovereign territory, and 
territory will depend upon which groups are united under the banner of 
the 'nation'. 
The political authority of the past can provide a basis upon which both 
territory and nationality will be considered. Certain ethnic groups in the 
past were brought together as political units as a result of conflict. These 
groups could later become parts of one nation, despite the fact that they 
were once distinct and independent. For example, the RIIA gives three 
ways in which conflict managed to extend the range of political units: 
1. The government of one group conquers another group or groups, as the Norman King 
conquered the Anglo-Saxons. 
2. Several groups are united under the leadership of one government in a war of aggression, 
as the German States were united under the King of Prussia in 1870. 
3. Several groups, moved by a common fear, unite to resist attack or constraint, as in 1526 
fear of the Turks caused the union of Hungary with the lands already possessed 
by 
Ferdinand Habsburg. " 
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Once these groups were united under one political authority, there was an 
opportunity for them to assimilate. Unification was not always a 
permanent feature, but, where it was, it served as a basis upon which 
nationalists could 'justify' the existence of (and forge) a nation or 
nationality. 
Economic and commercial differentiations are also a possible factor 
affecting the make-up of a nationality. Economic undertakings had been 
conducted at one time by cities, but the Middle Ages witnessed the practice 
of 'national mercantilism', in which 'the government of every national 
state sought to make it a self-sufficing economic entity'. " Even before 
commerce was conducted on a national scale, there was a social and 
economic relationship between people with similar values and needs 
which fostered a sense of community and group, particularly between 
people who lived in close proximity to one another and who spoke the 
same or similar tongue. 
Economic life could also affect the third characteristic mentioned by Hayes, 
that of culture. A distinct cultural society could be characterized by a 
number of different elements - its institutions, its customs and habits, its 
art and other forms of expression. Every group has its own ways of doing 
things which, individually, may be indistinguishable from the ways of 
other groups, but, collectively, form something very distinctive. A 
nationality is a group which shares perceived common cultural 
characteristics. The larger the body of people, the less likely it is that they 
will all share these common cultural characteristics, unless they have a 
system of communication which enables the culture to be absorbed or 
adopted by others. Nationalism seeks to assert a recognized uniform 
culture (identified or constructed by nationalists themselves) as that of 
the nation or nationality, which ought to be upheld within an 
independent political framework. But not every perceived nationality 
will be able to assert itself to the point when it will become a self- 
governing 'nation': 
Most potential nationalisms must either fail, or, more commonly, will refrain 
from even 
trying to find political expression... 
... most of 
them go meekly to their doom, to see their culture (though not themselves as 
individuals) slowly disappear, dissolving into the wider culture of some new national 
state. Most cultures are led to the dustheap of 
history by industrial civilization without 
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offering any resistance. 17 
Gellner analyses what constitutes culture and how it is affected by 
nationalism. He explains that he uses the term 'culture' in an 
anthropological and not a normative sense: 
... what is meant by the term is the distinctive style of conduct and communication of a given 
community. The term 'culture' on its own is never used in this discussion in its other sense, as 
Kultur, high culture or great tradition, a style of conduct and communication endorsed by 
the speaker as superior ... 
18 
Gellner talks about high and low forms of culture. He points out that, in 
an industrialized society, diversified, locality-tied low cultures are replaced 
by standardized, formalized and codified, literacy-carried high culture: 
... nationalism is, essentially, the general imposition of a high culture on society, where 
previously low cultures had taken up the lives of the majority. 19 
For Gellner, the culture of a nation is the culture of a mass society, which 
in many cases, has been imposed upon society by an educated, literate 
minority. Nationalism actually creates a new culture, albeit based upon 
elements of the plethora of existing local 'folk' cultures: 
It is the establishment of an anonymous, impersonal society, with mutually substitutable 
atomized individuals, held together above all by a shared culture of this kind, in place of 
a previous complex structure of local groups, sustained by folk cultures reproduced locally 
and idiosyncratically by the micro-groups themselves. 20 
Culture, as a characteristic of a nation or nationality, is closely related to all 
the other characterisitics listed, for there is no society or group without 
communication and forms of conduct. It has an interlinked relationship 
with politics and religion, with all three elements affecting each other's 
development through history. 
Having mentioned the influence of political authority upon the 
formation of a we-group, I must mention the all-important influence of 
religion, which has interacted with the political process and become a very 
significant factor affecting the formation of nations and nationalities. 
Religion is not always an attribute of nationality, for world religions such 
as Buddhism, Christianity and Islam have overlapped national borders 
and modern nations have been able to establish themselves on a secular 
basis. However, this does not negate the fact that religion has been a 
common factor around which some nationalities 
have congregated. 
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In ancient times, many tribal groups had their own personal gods, about 
which they created their own value systems and developed their own 
political and social customs. These mystical 'possessions' strengthened 
group sense and religion has been used by nationalists to strengthen the 
group sense of the nation or nationality. Religion is not necessarily a 
characteristic which distinguishes nationalities, but it can be used thus by 
nationalists who perceive it to be. It is possible for nations to manufacture 
or rally around national religions. The Russian Orthodox Church (the 
patriarchate of Moscow was established in 1589) played a significant role in 
influencing the development of Russian national consciousness and 
leaves its legacy today to those wishing to define Russia'a national future. 
Definition of nationalism 
Nationalism is a phenomenon which is referred to in a variety of senses. 
Upon examination of the various analyses of nationalism and its origins, I 
can detect two major ways in which the term is used: as a generic term 
which examines nationality, the origins of the nation, self-determination 
and the nation state, tribalism, patriotism, regionalism and a host of other 
issues; and in its narrower sense, as a term reflecting a political 
phenomenon with its origins in the late eighteenth/ early nineteenth 
century. 
I intend my analysis of Russian nationalism to look ^ at all the issues 
involved under a generic umbrella, but any reference to the term will be 
made in its narrower sense which I will outline below. 
There can be no simple basic definition of the term 'nationalism'. It is 
difficult to confine it to one sentence, for even the 'narrowest' definition 
requires the fusion of different elements. In my opinion, there are three 
elements which seem to be central to the definition of nationalism: a 
particular condition of mind or sentiment; the political principle which 
links nation and state; and the movement which espouses the political 
principle. 
The first element is referred to by a number of analysts, although some 
separate sentiment from nationalism. However, the condition of mind or 
sentiment is essential to forming the belief and is an integral part of the 
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meaning of nationalism. The historian, Carlton J. H. Hayes gives four 
uses of the term 'nationalism' one of which is: 
a condition of mind among members of a nationality, in which loyalty to the ideal or to 
the fact of one's national state becomes superior to all other loyalties, and of which pride 
in one's nationality and belief in its intrinsic excellence and in its 'mission' are integral 21 parts. 
Similarly, Hans Kohn describes nationalism as: 
a state of mind, permeating the large majority of a people and claiming to permeate all its 
members; it recognizes the nation-state as the ideal form of political organization and the 
nationality as the source of all creative cultural energy and of economic well-being. 22 
Kohn's description does not stress the belief in national 'excellence' or of 
the existence of a 'mission', but it reflects Hayes' contention that the 
condition of mind expresses the idealization of nation or nationality as a 
political and cultural unit. Kohn added that nationalism also contained 
the belief that one's 'supreme loyalty' was to one's nationality. However, I 
would argue whether a majority of a people with like beliefs is required to 
produce nationalism. It may be true that a majority of a people is required 
to subjectively affiliate themselves to the idea that they constitute a 
nationality, in order to establish a nationality, but it does not necessarily 
follow that the nationality wishes to form a nation-state or believes in an 
essential 'creative cultural energy'. It would be truer to suggest that 
nationalism can come from a group (or 'movement') of any size within a 
nationality. Kohn's description almost suggests that the belief in the 
existence of one's nationality is itself an expression of nationalism. 
The Royal Institute of International Affairs (in 1939) described 
nationalism as: 
a consciousness, on the part of individuals or groups, of membership in a nation, or of a 
desire to forward the strength, liberty, or prosperity of a nation. 23 
This, once again, refers to the condition of mind, but fails to pinpoint the 
political principle or mention the involvement of any particular 
movement. 
Louis L. Snyder, reluctant to give a brief definition of nationalism, gave us 
this 'least objectionable' offering: 
a condition of mind, feeling, or sentiment of a group of people 
living in a well-defined 
geographical area, speaking a common language, possessing a literature in which the 
aspirations of the nation have been expressed, attached to common traditions and common 
customs, venerating its own heroes, and, in some cases, 
having a common religion. 24 
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Snyder concedes that there are exceptions to nearly all the terms used in 
his definition, and discusses other aspects and consequences of 
nationalism, but asserts that it: 
should be considered first and foremost a state of mind, an act of consciousness, a 
psychological fact. 25 
In all the above definitions, the 'condition of mind' appears to be the 
primary factor. There is little doubt that nationalists consider their 
national group to be of unique importance and can envisage themselves 
as a distinct political unit, because the nation is believed-to have common 
values, aspirations and a common system of communication and 
comprehension. The political principle, however, receives almost 
secondary importance. Snyder talks of 'the aspirations of the nation'; the 
RIIA of a 'desire to forward the strength, liberty, or prosperity of a nation'; 
Kohn mentions the recognition of 'the nation-state as the ideal form of 
political organization'; and Hayes refers to 'loyalty... to the fact of one's 
national state'. According to Ernest Gellner, this aspect is of greater 
significance: 
Nationalism is primarily a political principle, which holds that the political and 
national unit should be congruent. 26 
This idea does not exclude the possibility of nations or nationalities, being 
included within the political unit of a dominant nation. Imperial 
nationalism may incorporate the lands and peoples of other nationalities, 
seeking to impose its power and values on others, or to carry out a policy 
of national integration or assimilation. 
Although primary importance is given to this political principle, Gellner 
also acknowledges the contribution of both sentiment and movement to 
the meaning of nationalism, suggesting that the elements might be 
separate, but are inextricably linked: 
Nationalism as a sentiment may be defined in terms of this principle. Nationalist 
sentiment is the feeling of anger aroused by the violation of the principle, or the feeling of 
satisfaction aroused by its fulfilment. A nationalist movement is one actuated by a 
27 sentiment of this kind. 
Gellner qualifies his definition as: 
a theory of political legitimacy, which requires that ethnic boundaries should not cut 
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across political ones, and , in particular, that ethnic boundaries within a given state... 
should not separate the power-holders from the rest. ' 
The fact that the political principle involves some kind of power- 
relationship implicates the fact of a movement, which (inspired by the 
sentiment or condition of mind) expresses and organizes the aspirations 
and aims of this principle. Anthony Smith divorces nationalism from the 
concept of national sentiment, although he concedes that they are 'often 
closely related'. 29 Smith pays greatest attention to the organised body 
which espouses nationalist views. For him nationalism is: 
an ideological movement, for the attainment and maintenance of self-government and 
independence on behalf of a group, some of whose members conceive it to constitute an actual 
or potential 'nation' like others. 30 
Smith is right in pointing out that nationalism cannot exist without the 
presence of a movement, but I do not think that even a narrow definition 
of nationalism can be based upon this alone. It would be fairer to say that 
such a concept requires a definition which involves all three of the 
elements mentioned above, with none taking primary importance. The 
three elements are interlinked and are all vital in explaining the 
constitution of this particular 'ism'. Like other analysts, I am reluctant to 
give a brief description of nationalism, for a great deal of significant points 
would be omitted. However, if I were pressed to give a definition, it 
would be one which equally included all three of the forementioned 
elements. I, therefore, offer three crudely-phrased definitions, which, 
together, illustrate the equal importance of the elements. Nationalism is: 
A condition of mind fostering beliefs in the uniqueness of a nation and 
expressed by a movement, which, in the pursuit of political independence, 
holds that the political and national unit should be congruent. 
An ideological movement, permeated by a condition of mind fostering 
beliefs in the uniqueness of a nation and holding that the political and 
national unit should be congruent. 
A political principle pursued by an ideological movement, permeated by a 
condition of mind fostering beliefs in the uniqueness of the nation, and 
holding that the political and national unit should be congruent. 
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A Russian/Soviet Understanding of 'Nationalism' 
Throughout the Gorbachev period, those of a nationalist persuasion, or 
those who adopted the politics of nationalism in order to achieve their 
aims rarely used the terms 'natsionalizm', 'natsionalist', or 
'natsionalisticheskii'. 31 These were (and still are) negative terms which 
resulted from the Soviet understanding of nationalism, influenced by 
Marxist-Leninist thought. Marx had claimed in The Communist 
Manifesto that 'the working men have no country"', whilst Lenin had 
written that 'bourgeois nationalism and proletarian internationalism' 
were 'two irreconcilably hostile slogans'. ' These attitudes led to a 
villification of 'nationalism' in Soviet ideology. 
The Great Soviet Encyclopaedia describes nationalism as: 
A bourgeois ideology and policy, as well as the outlook that raises the national question. 
Nationalism views the nation as a supreme non-historical and supraclass form of social 
unity and as a harmonious whole, all of whose social strata have identical fundamental 
interests... ' 
The Encyclopaedia later states that the proletarian, communist world view 
is incompatible with any nationalist ideology. However, it does support 
the Leninist 'progressive' aspects of nationalism during the struggle 
against feudalism and as a liberation ideology in the former colonial and 
semi-colonial world. 35 
According to Soviet theory, nationalism was progressive whilst it was: 
the ideological standard of the rising bourgeoisie in the struggle against feudalism and 
national oppression 
for 
under this standard the popular masses were summoned to the struggle against feudalism. 
' 
Nationalism becomes a progressive force as a liberation ideology in 
opposition to imperialism: 
In the contemporary period nationalism has a different character in countries fighting for 
political and economic independence against imperialism... Under such circumstances 
nationalism reflects, to a certain degree, democratism and protest against the imperialist 
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oppression of that part of the masses in which class consciousness has not yet been aroused. 
For considerable strata of peasantry, nationalism is a rudimentary form of anti-imperialist 
consciousness. 37 
With the development of capitalism and imperialism 'the character of 
nationalism in Western Europe and the USA changed. ' It became a: 
weapon of imperialist and colonial politics, closely allying itself with racism. m 
It continues: 
the imperialist bourgeoisie strives to impart to nationalism a strongly anti-communist and 
anti-Soviet tendency. Imperialism is banking on the revival of nationalist tendencies in 
the socialist countries. 39 
To summarize, nationalism is condemned when it is conducted by 
capitalists and imperialists, and when it is conducted by 'bourgeois' 
elements within a socialist society. On the other hand, it is considered 
progressive as a liberation policy in feudal societies and when conducted 
by 'oppressed' parties in the colonial world. Nationalism, then, was 
neither desirable nor appropriate in the Soviet Union and the negative 
associations with the term remained throughout the Gorbachev period. 
However, the negative associations do not stem from this alone - there 
were words in the Soviet Russian lexicon which could be used to describe 
nation and nationalism in a more positive light: na ro d and pa triotizm. 
Patriotism or nationalism? 
In a system where nationalism was denounced, but national groups were 
recognized and self-determination was espoused as the right of all peoples, 
the establishment of a centralized state required that all these peoples 
somehow regarded themselves as one. 'Patriotism' was the device used to 
integrate the Soviet nationalities. In essence, it differed little from the 
processes of nationalism described earlier, but in contrast to 'nationalism', 
it was viewed positively. An illustration of the typical, crude Soviet 
understanding of the difference between patriotism and nationalism can 
be summed up by the words of Dmitrii Likhachev: 
For me, patriotism is love of one's country, while nationalism 
is the hatred of other 
peoples'. 4o 
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This understanding - patriotism is good, nationalism is bad - influenced 
not only Likhachev, but many others during the Gorbachev period. 
Unfortunately, all it really explains is a subjective value judgement. 
Soviet and Russian 'patriotism' could most frequently be described as 
'nationalism' in the Western sense. 41 
Soviet patriotism 
The idea of 'patriotism' to the Bolsheviks was, at first, anathema. 
Allegiance was to a social class rather than to a state. The mood before the 
thirties was summed up thus: 
in our times patriotism plays the role of the most reactionary ideology, whose function is to 
justify imperialist bestiality and to deaden the class consciousness of the proletariat, by 
setting impassable boundaries to its struggle for liberation. 4' 
However, at this time, books already spoke of a socialist fatherland 
(o techestv o) and this concept was consolidated by the introduction of the 
policy of 'socialism in one country'. On 9 July 1934, the term ro dina was 
revived in a Pravda editorial entitled 'For the Motherland! ' It extolled the 
virtue of 'creative and self-sacrificing patriotism' and condemned any 
man who betrayed the motherland. 
A political dictionary from 1940 gives the following entry for 'patriotism': 
Love for the fatherland, 'one of the deepest sentiments, strengthened over the centuries and 
millennia' (Lenin). Love for one's motherland, the feeling of patriotism has been inherent 
in the masses from time immemorial. Patriotism draws people to the struggle against 
national and class oppression. 43 
(This is a distortion of Lenin, who recognized that the bourgeoisie were 
also 'patriotic'. )' 
The dictionary entry refers to Lenin's view that there is nothing wrong 
with 'national pride', a quality which is not only connected with one's 
language and motherland, but with being a good socialist. In fact, 
patriotism and socialism are more or less equated: 
Only toilers can be genuine patriots...... Soviet patriotism is the toilers' love for their 
socialist homeland and the deepest hate of enemies of the people. The feeling of Soviet 
patriotism is penetrated throughout the whole population, all peoples of the USSR...... To 
be a Soviet patriot is... to serve one's socialist motherland. 
45 
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The Soviet promotion of patriotism had very great nationalistic overtones 
in its integrationalist policy and rhetoric. Anthony H. Birch names two 
categories of steps taken to promote nation-building: 
On the one hand, there are direct initiatives taken to foster integration and a sense of 
national identity and pride. On the other hand, there are reactive measures taken by 
governments to minimize the political effects of ethnic and cultural cleavages within 
society. 46 
The Soviet government followed both of these categories in an attempt to 
integrate the Soviet people. The first category was taken to such an extent 
that the Soviet people was eventually referred to as a 'historical 
community of people'. In 1971, Brezhnev addressed the Central 
Committee of the CPSU with the following words: 
Over the years of socialist construction in our country, a new historical community of people 
has arisen - the Soviet people. In its joint labour efforts, in the struggle for socialism, and 
the battles for its defence, new harmonious relations have been born between classes and 
social groups, nations and nationalities - relations of friendship and cooperation. 47 
The second category mentioned by Birch - to minimalize the political 
effects of ethnic and cultural cleavages within society - was pursued by a 
nationalities policy (which not only sought to integrate the different 
nationalities economically, but gave them token political representation 
in Moscow etc. ); the identification of an enemy common to all Soviet 
peoples (first the capitalist West, later the national communism of China, 
etc. ); and, over the latter half of the Soviet era, by the introduction and 
promotion of new, standardized rituals. ` 
The Great Soviet Encyclopaedia reinforces the idea of a new historical 
community, with talk of 'all-Union' values and 'national pride': 
Under the conditions of the consolidation and development of a new historical community 
of people - the Soviet people - all-Union political and sociopsychological values are 
being 
established. There appears in the Soviet man a national pride that covers the Soviet 
Union as a whole; such pride is an important element of socialist patriotism... 
... The 
CPSU consider the education of the Soviet people in the spirit of a union of socialist 
patriotism and internationalism to be one of its most important tasks. 
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The rhetoric here mentions some of the characteristics which we earlier 
attributed to the nation, but their propagation and manifestation is 
referred to in Soviet parlance as 'patriotism'. Furthermore, Gellner's 
interpretation of nationalism as the imposition of a 'high' culture on a 
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mass society is echoed by the process of Soviet 'patriotic education' - the 
'high' culture imposed by the educated elite (the CPSU) on this 'new 
historical community' is Soviet socialism: 
CPSU activity in patriotic and internationalist education relies on the objective normality 
of developed socialism; the socio-economic, ideolgical-political, cultural and moral 
community of Soviet peoples; and the unity of all sides of life of a developed socialist 
society. 50 
The above indicates that the propagation of Soviet patriotism has a great 
deal in common with my analysis of nations and nationalism. One might 
argue that Soviet patriotic education was an attempt to create a Soviet 
nation. Of course, with all the recognized nationalities of the Soviet 
Union, it would be difficult and seem wrong semantically to call this 
community a 'nation', and, so, the surrogate na ro d is used, a word fairly 
synonymous with the German Vo 1 k. However, narod was applied not 
only to the Soviet people, but to the Russian people and all other 
nationalities of the Soviet Union. Narod thus became the acceptable 
surrogate for 'nation' - it did not create the negative associations or 
ideological difficulties conjured up by natsiia. When Russian nationalist- 
oriented groups surfaced under Gorbachev, they referred to themselves as 
'patriots' and to the Russian nation as russkii narod. The term russkaia 
natsiia scarcely, if ever, arose. 
Conclusion 
In this chapter, I have given a brief definition of the process of 
nationalism; enumerated the characteristics attributed to the nation in 
this process; and outlined the Russian understanding of the term during 
the Soviet period. I have pointed out that the Russian understanding of 
my definition of 'nationalism' would sometimes be better conveyed by the 
Russian 'patriotizm'. 
The aforementioned criteria defining nationalism will be those used to 
examine the development of Russian nationalism - the use of the term 
patriotizm in the Russian sense is, at the very least, ambiguous and 
unhelpful. However, whenever I use the term 'patriot' in the text of this 
thesis, it is a reflection of the term which nationalist-orientated people 
and groups applied to themselves. 
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The discussion about the characteristics of a nation helps to highlight 
some of the issues and views involved in the process of nationalism - 
these issues and views determine both the essence of the nation and how 
the state should be organised to suit that nation best. Russian 
nationalism was concerned with defining the nation by: establishing 
common values; developing myths by the selective interpretation of 
history; personification of the nation; establishing its territorial 
boundaries. 51 Different interpretations of these questions lead to differing 
tendencies within Russian nationalism. 
The Russian national identity and the composition of the Russian state 
were relatively hard questions to deal with. Individuals were able to say: 
'I am Russian', but were divided or uncertain as to what this meant. 
Indeed, in one survey, unskilled and lower-skilled groups often had 
difficulty giving an answer to what connected them with the Russian 
nation. 52 There were also different views as to the origins of the Russian 
nation: some opinions reflected the idea that nations are inherent, 
referring to the existence of a Russian national soul; ' others believed that 
the Russian nation was a consequence of historical circumstances. ' 
The composition of the Russian state confused this issue even further. 
Russia had never existed as a nation-state - it had been an empire under 
the Tsar and had transformed into the Soviet Union shortly afterwards - 
this meant that Russians not only had to identify themselves within a 
multiethnic environment, but also had to define their political unit. 
Russian nationalism represents those efforts which attempted to define or 
assert the fact of a Russian nation and identify it with a conception of a 
Russian state. Under Gorbachev, this phenomenon touched a large 
number of Russians, but that does not mean to say that all of them were 
'Russian nationalists' - the Russian nationalists were those who attempted 
to propagate their idea of a unique Russian nation and justify its link with 
a political-territorial unit. 
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Chapter 2: A classification of Russian nationalism 
Introduction 
In order to distinguish the tendencies which exist within Russian 
nationalism, it is first necessary to look at the categories which have been 
established both before and during perestroika. First, I will allude to one 
or two terms which arose in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries 
and are sometimes referred to by those attempting to label new tendencies. 
I will then refer to terms which arose in the Brezhnev era and influenced 
the categories which developed during perestroika. 
Russian nationalism is usually split into two categories: one which is 
more concerned with the maintenance of state; and another which 
identifies with Russian ethnicity and Russian 'cultural' values - values 
which are perceived as having been sacrificed to the state or to a non- 
Russian ideology. I believe that under perestroika it is possible to divide 
Russian nationalism into three tendencies which acknowledge not only 
the maintenance of the state and the resurrection of supposedly lost ethnic 
Russian values, but also account for other ideas which seek to establish a 
new national system in a changing political environment. For instance, 
the boundaries of the Russian state were always coterminous with those of 
first the Russian empire and then the Soviet Union, heavily centralised 
from Moscow, but under perestroika it became possible for the concept of 
the Russian state to be considered in isolation from certain Soviet 
territories which were seeking greater autonomy and possible 
independence from Moscow. This affected not only those who rejected an 
imperialist statist view and wished to institute 'traditional' ethnic Russian 
values, but also those who wished to come to practical terms with a new 
Russian entity separated from her former satellite possessions. 
The three tendencies are labelled 'imperialist', 'isolationist' and 'liberal' 
Russian nationalism. Imperialist nationalism seeks to maintain or 
preserve the status quo, viewing the whole of the Soviet Union as the 
unitary Russian state; isolationist nationalism is essentially one of 
renewal, which seeks to establish an autonomous Russian state based 
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upon what its adherents consider to be unique, peculiar Russian values; 
and liberal nationalism is spawned by opportunism or adaptation within a 
changing environment - its main source are practical solutions to a Russia 
reestablishing itself within a changing and disintegrating political 
structure. Liberal Russian nationalism pays attention to Russian cultural 
values and traditions, although it is receptive to foreign ideas. It also 
respects the national aspirations of other Union republics and does not 
'insist upon the maintenance of the Soviet/Russian empire. 
19th century - Slavophilism and Pan-Slavism 
The first most notable expression of Russian nationalism occurred in the 
1830s in the years following the Decembrist revolt of 1825. It was coined in 
1832 by Count Uvarov's formulation of the slogan 'Autocracy, Orthodoxy, 
Nationality (Na ro dnos t')', which was designed to put a nationalist slant on 
the education process in Russia, thus serving as a device to maintain the 
integrity and strength of the Russian state. ' This trinitarian doctrine was 
later adopted by the establishment in response to accusations by scholars 
such as Piotr Chaadaev that Russia had reached a state of political decay 
and that her salvation lay in the adoption of Western systems and values. 
Uvarov's trinity rejected any kind of Western political institution such as 
parliamentarianism, it cast doubt upon the possibility of a sectarian Russia 
or one which might move closer to Rome, and it proffered higher status to 
those of Russian nationality. 
The non-government (although not strictly non-establishment) response 
to 'Westernisers' such as Chaadaev was expressed by the 'Slavophiles' 
(most notably Kireevskii, the Aksakovs, Khomiakov and Samarin). These 
consisted overwhelmingly of nobility who rejected Chaadaev's criticisms 
of Russia, but also rejected the autocratic rule of the Tsar. Although they 
were monarchists, the Slavophiles believed that Peter I had introduced a 
style of government which was Western in character and alien to the 
Russian way of life. Slavophiles stressed the originality (samobytnost') of 
the Russian people, idealising Russian history and advocating Russian 
principles of social organisation - the peasant commune and the boyar 
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domain (obshchina and zemshchina). The Slavophiles valued Orthodox 
culture and managed to distinguish Russia from the West in theological 
and cultural terms. According to Kireevskii: 
Three elements in the West: The Roman Church, ancient Roman development and the 
statehood which arose out of the violence of conquest are completely foreign to Rus'2 
The Slavophiles emphasised the principlies of unity and faith, 
condemning the West for its lack of conciliarism (sobornost') and for 
having substituted rationalism for faith. 
However, according to Nikolai Berdiaev, the early Slavophiles: 
... were not enemies or haters of Western Europe, like obscurantist Russian nationalists were. 
They were enlightened Europeans. They believed in the great vocation of Russia and the 
Russian people, in the truth hidden within and they tried to characterise certain original 
features of this vocation3 
Berdiaev describes the Slavophiles as: 
our first populists (narodniki), although populists on religious soi14 
whilst Kohn referred to them as: 
... religious anarchists who 
deeply disliked the state and above all the bureaucracy, an 
element which they regarded as of Byzantine or Germanic in origin, and which interfered 
with the organic life of the people's community. 5 
Pan-Slavism was a movement which initially developed amongst the 
Slav peoples of the Austro-Hungarian and Ottoman Empires and whose 
first major event took place in 1848 at a Congress in Prague. The goal of 
the Congress was to unite all Slavs, but consisted primarily of Slavs from 
the Austro-Hungarian empire. Russian representation was conspicuously 
absent from the Prague Congress, except for the presence of the Mikhail 
Bakunin. One of the issues discussed was that of Russian universalism 
which was received in a somewhat negative light. The Russian response 
to the Prague Congress was equally as negative: 
Russians looked at the Prague Congress of 1848 with undisguised hostility. Palacky had 
confined its membership to representatives of Slavs inside the 
Austrian monarchy... But 
there were others who believed that Pan-Slavism should extend 
beyond a call for cultural 
union and should be politically unified under 
Russian leadership. From this point of view, 
the movement needed the support of a state power and the natural choice, geographically 
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and power-wise, was Tsarist Russia. It was an attitude thoroughly understood and 
favoured in Moscow. 6 
The Russian idea of Pan-Slavism is something which grew out of and 
followed Slavophilism: 
After Russia's defeat in the Crimean War (1853-56), a vague Slavophilism was 
transformed into a militant and nationalistic Pan-Slavism. What had started out as a 
cultural movement led by a Czech historian inside the Austrian Empire and subsequently 
politicized at Prague, was now appropriated by the Russians as an ideology dedicated to 
their mission. Pan-Slavism would be run from Moscow, not from Prague or the minor Slavic 
states... What had originally been a shadowy dream was thus transformed into a new 
aggressive, expansionist Pan-Slavism. 7 
Although Russia had not really participated in the Prague Congress of 
1848, the centre of the Pan-Slav movement gradually moved from Prague 
to Moscow, illustrated by the Second Pan-Slav Congress held in Moscow in 
1867. The Congress witnessed a degree of discomfort between the Russians 
and their fellow Slavs: 
To them [the visiting Slavs] Pan-Slavism meant the equality of all Slavs. Their Russian 
hosts, on the other hand, saw the movement as dedicated to supremacy of the Russian 
language, the Orthodox faith, and the Russification of all Slavs even in the Balkans! 
According to Kohn, the 'earliest concise formulation of Russian Pan- 
Slavism' was contained in a letter from Mikhail Pogodin to the future 
Alexander II in 1838.9 However, one of the most articulate proponents of 
Pan-Slavism was the scientist Danilevskii. Danilevskii's major work 
favouring Pan-Slavism was Russia and Europe, an Inquiry into the 
Cultural and Political Relations of the Slav to the Germano-Latin World, 
published in 1869, which viewed Slavic civilisation as superior to Western 
civilisation and regarded the Russians as leaders of the Slavic world. 
Danilevskii suggested that under Russian leadership, a Pan-Slav Union 
should be achieved which would include not only the territory of the 
Russian empire as it then was, but much of Eastern Europe, including 
Hungary, Albania, Romania, Greece and most significantly, 
Constantinople. " Danilevskii's Pan-Slavism seemed less concerned with 
the unification of Slavs, and more concerned with an ideology of Russian 
expansionism. Danilevskii idealised Russian history and considered 
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Russia to be separate from Europe. He believed that Russia's expanded 
influence would bring the peoples of a Pan-Slav Union benefits which 
they would be denied by a decaying imperialist Europe. 
Twentieth century - National Bolshevism 
National Bolshevism was a term originally coined in 1921, when defeated 
White Russians and emigres tried to rationalize the Bolshevik victory and 
eventually declared their support for Bolshevism and Soviet Russia. " 
These former opponents of the Bolsheviks were influenced by the 
publications Na ka nune and Smena vekh, the latter of which claimed in 
1921 that the Soviet state was now the only Russian national power in 
spite of its ostensible internationalism. According to M. Agursky, the 
converted Whites considered: 
... it [Bolshevism] was not even a lesser evil; in specific historical conditions, only the Bolsheviks would be able to restore the Russian national state, the Russian state power. 
Bolshevism was the Russian national phenomenon; the Russian revolution was a popular 
mutiny in the style of Stepan Razin... and Pugachev. 12 
Thus former right-wingers and nationalists came to regard Bolshevism 
not as Russia's destroyer, but as its saviour, uniting the country and 
restoring to it a strong army. Agursky gives his definition of the term: 
National Bolshevism is the Russian etatist ideology that legitimizes the Soviet political 
system from the Russian etatist point of view, contrary to its exclusive Marxist legitimacy. 
Etatism can be distinguished from cultural nationalism... Nevertheless, I would like to 
define etatism as a powerful form of nationalism... National Bolshevism does not reject 
Communist ideology, though it strives to minimize its importance to the level necessary for 
legitimacy. However, its objectives are different from those of Communist ideology. 
National Bolshevism in its original form strove for world domination, conceived as the 
universal Russian empire cemented by Communist ideology. It is not excluded that in some 
circumstances National Bolshevism might limit itself to the etatist concept of a Russian 
13 superpower. 
National Bolshevism was, then, an imperialist/ statist ideology whose 
adherents compromised or rationalised their beliefs with the prevailing 
situation in order to preserve what they considered to be the Russian 
empire. 
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From Brezhnev to Perestroika 
Two of the foremost scholars on the subject of Russian nationalism in 
recent years are John Dunlop and Alexander Yanov. In 1976, Dunlop 
published The New Russian Revolutionaries, which highlighted the 
activities of Russian nationalists (V S Kh S ON) who had surfaced over the 
Brezhnev period in opposition to the state. "' A subsequent classification 
of Russian nationalism appeared in his 1983 book The Faces of 
Contemporary Russian Nationalism, which divided Russian nationalists 
into 'vozrozhdentsy' and 'National Bolsheviks', its 'good' and 'bad' 
varieties. 15 Yanov, on the other hand, believed that all varieties would 
degenerate into something which is 'bad' - an extreme right-wing variety. 16 
Both men distinguished between varieties which existed within and 
outside the Soviet system. Dunlop referred to: 
... two basic types or categories of nationalists: (1) those who seek to work within the Soviet 
'system' to achieve their ends (and who may even regard the system as in some sense 
theirs), and (2) those who cannot work within the system or refuse to do so. '7 
Yanov's classification divided Russian nationalists into the 
'Establishment' and 'Dissident' Right. This method bypassed the idea of 
'good' and 'bad' varieties and facilitated the presentation of his hypothesis 
that nationalism both within and outside the system would eventually 
degenerate and blend into a nationalism of counter-reform. 18 
Vozrozhdentsy and National Bolsheviks 
John Dunlop believed Russian nationalism had the potential to command 
a sizeable support. 19 The two main manifestations of Russian 
nationalism, vozrozhdenstvo and National Bolshevism, may have had 
different agenda, but they shared areas of common concern: 
Both tendencies are preservationist, seeking to safeguard Russian historical monuments and 
the environment from defilement and destruction; both deplore present demographic and 
social trends that are seen as unfavorable to the well-being of the Russian people; both are 
'polycentric' nationalists, desiring, at least explicitly, the cultural flourishing of all 
nationalities. In addition, both tendencies exhibit a keen interest in Russian conservative 
and patriotic thought of the past, though, as a rule, vozrozhdentsy are likely to align 
themselves with the Early Slavophiles and Dostoevskii, and the Ve khi authors, while 
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National Bolsheviks are drawn to such 'realistic' thinkers as Danilevskii and Leont'ev 20 
Dunlop's vozrozhdentsy were adherents to a Russian national and 
religious renaissance. Most of them opposed the authorities from outside 
the system, but not exclusively so: 
Virtually all dissenting nationalists should be counted among the ranks of the 
vozrozhdentsy, and many 'official nationalists', who attempt to air their views in the 
Soviet media... could be considered partisans or at least 'fellow travellers' of this 
tendency. 21 
Dunlop divided this group into a liberal wing (V S Kh S ON, Solzhenitsyn, 
Agursky) - many of whom had suffered for their opposition to the regime 
- and a right wing who were more conservative and advocated greater 
caution towards the extent of change. The liberal wing stood for broad and 
sweeping changes, focusing principally on changing the state structure, 
whilst the right wing's minimum programme advocated the freedom of 
the Church and freedom of all peoples to live and realize their indigenous 
traditions and cultures. ' The different wings are by no means uniform in 
their views, but Dunlop sums up the vozrozhdentsy thus: Russian 
Orthodoxy occupies a central position in their thought and they are anti- 
communist; they are concerned with the moral and demographic 
disintegration of their country; they favour a system of checks and 
balances; economically (and, therefore, I would say, politically), they 
favour a 'third way', which avoids the excesses of communism and 
capitalism; they seek to support the legitimate ethnic strivings of ethnic 
minorities in the USSR, not ruling out secession from a future Russian 
Federation; they tend to be anti-urban, favouring peasant traditions; they 
lean towards isolationism in foreign policy matters; they tend to be anti- 
W estern, but in a 'restrained' manner and do not adhere to ideas of 'Judeo- 
masonic' conspiracies. ' 
In contrast to voz ro zhdentstyo, National Bolshevism was a tendency 
which was entrenched more within the Soviet establishment, although 
not exclusively so: 
National Bolshevism... is a more elusive tendency of thought and sentiment currently 
enjoying popularity among certain segments of the Soviet intelligentsia and ruling Party- 
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state apparatat. A number of 'official' nationalists, including many of the derevenshchiki, are 'closet' vozrozhdentsy rather than National Bolsheviks. 24 
He suggested that there was no direct continuity between the National 
Bolsheviks of the twenties and the National Bolsheviks in his analysis: 
What is happening, rather, is that present-day Soviet intellectuals are rediscovering on 
their own the ideas of a previous generation of thinkers. 25 
Dunlop also compared National Bolshevism to fascism: 
The similarities between National Bolshevism and fascism are striking; a strong impulse 
toward deification of the nation; the desire for a strong totalitarian state; a powerful 
leadership impulse (contemporary National Bolsheviks speak of a yearning for a krepkii 
chelovek, or strong man); a belief in the necessity of the existence of an elite; a cult of 
discipline, particularly discipline of the youth; heroic vitalism; an advocacy of industrial 
and military might, combined at times with ecological concerns; a celebration ofthe glories 
of the past; and a militant, expansionist dynamic. 26 
The National Bolsheviks were statist and, although espousing extreme 
right-wing ideas, adhered nominally to a radical left ideology. Dunlop's 
definition of National Bolshevism is summarized by the following 
distinguishing factors: a neo-pagan, militaristic cult of strength and 
invincibility of the Russian people; a militant and aggressive stance 
towards Russia's perceived enemies; strongly anti-Western, usually with a 
belief in a Judeo-masonic conspiracy; awareness of social and demographic 
problems, but a stubborn 'can-do' mentality; tendency to advocate racial 
purity; a 'single stream' view of Russian history; a non-religious, but not 
anti-religious posture; and a cult of heroism and discipline. 27 
Marginal Tendencies 
Besides the two major tendencies, Dunlop listed what he called 'marginal 
tendencies': 'Semi-official Russophilism', neo-Stalinism and neo- 
Naziism. 28 
'Semi-official Russophilism' is a term coined by the vozrozhdenets 
Evgenii Vagin. It referred to the Russian nationalism pursued by 
opportunists at the centre of power who had no real nationalist ideological 
conviction and who used Russian nationalism purely as a manipulative 
tool. The terms 'Russian' and 'Soviet' were used interchangeably and 
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reference to Russia and its past smacked of tokenism. 
Dunlop described neo-Stalinism as 'a surprisingly weak current' and 
distinguishes it from National Bolshevism. Neo-Stalinists were 
supporters of forced industrialisation and collectivisation, who is 
'virulently anti-kulak'. Dunlop believes that 'no National Bolshevik 
would subscribe to such sentiments' and maintains, in contradiction to 
Agursky, that Stalin was not a National Bolshevik. "' 
Neo-Naziism is anti-communist, anti-Semitic, and anti-Christian, 
pursuing the idea of racial distinction and gravitating towards the worship 
of pagan Slavic gods 'as an outlet for religious impulses- . 
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Dunlop dismisses these 'marginal tendencies' as views which were held by 
insufficient numbers of Soviet society at that time (early eighties) for them 
to have been of any significance or have any plausible future. 
Yanov 
Besides Dunlop, Alexander Yanov is the only other person to have made a 
detailed analysis of Russian nationalism during and after the Brezhnev 
era and published it in book form. 31 
In the first of two books on the subject, The Russian New Right (1978), 
Yanov concentrated on the development of Russian nationalism from its 
'renaissance' in the 1960s and 70s (V S Kh S ON, Ve che, Solzhenitsyn, etc. ), 
whereas in The Russian Challenge and the Year 2000 (1987), he paid more 
attention to the earlier historical development of Russian nationalist 
thought. This is significant, because Yanov tended to subscribe to the idea 
that, particularly in the case of Russia, history repeats itself. Yanov 
constantly drew parallels between the Russian nationalism of today and 
the right-wing ideology of Russian nationalists in the late nineteenth 
century. Yanov believed that Russian history shows a pattern alternating 
between 'soft' ('Brezhnevist') and 'rigid' ('Stalinist') phases, and that the 
Soviet Union was expecting another 'Stalinist' phase: 
... 
from a historical point of view the restoration of Stalinism in the USSR cannot in 
principle be excluded from consideration and - further - that because of the absence 
in the 
contemporary USSR (in contrast to pre-revolutionary Russia) of a mass 
'left-revolutionary' 
movement, a new cataclysm (if it occurs) has a significantly greater chance of occurring 
under the banner of 'right-wing' Russian nationalism than under that of a 
democratic 
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movement. 32 
Yanov believed that this 'right-wing' nationalism would not come from 
the Dissident Right or Establishment Right alone, but from a synthesis of 
the two. The Dissident Right were the inheritors of the 'Russian Idea': 
The Russian Idea emerged in the early 19th C., out of noble aspiration to liberate Russia 
from 'soul-destroying despotism' and a 'police-state', and Europe from 
'parliamentarianism, anarchism, unbelief and dynamite'. Russia was to be saved from too 
little freedom and Europe from too much thereof. 33 
This critical situation could only be solved in a uniquely Russian way: 
The Russian Idea pointed to the providential role of Orthodoxy, as uniquely capable of 
pulling back the world from the brink of the abyss, and to Russia as the instrument of this 
great mission. While the Russian Idea rejected the 'government's interference in the moral 
life of the people' (the police state), it also denounced the 'people's interference in state 
power' (democracy). To both of these it opposed the 'principle of AUTHORITARIAN 
power'. The people must concentrate on a moral-social life (nravstvenno- 
obshchestvennaia zhizn'), on the drive for spiritual freedom. ' 
Yanov wrote that the 'Russian Idea' originally grew out of hatred for 
Russia's native despotism and that the Slavophile movement to which it 
gave birth was 'essentially... an opposition movement. ' However, this 
'Idea' degenerated into a highly xenophobic one, which manifested itself 
in anti-Semitism, and the Slavophile movement developed dreams of a 
Russia dominating Europe and liberating it from 'complete subordination 
to the Jews'. 35 
Yanov's hypothesis was established in 1976 and, although modified in his 
book 'The Russian Challenge', it remained basically the same. There are 
four major points to be observed: 
I. Nationalistic ideologies under the conditions of autocratic government 
arise in pairs - one 'upstairs' and the other 'downstairs' 
(the Establishment 
Right and the Dissident Right). 
II. The two begin in confrontation with each other and then, eventually, 
mutually adapt. 
III. The motives and mechanisms of this adaptation differ for either side: 
For the Establishment Right there is: an intensification of political 
struggle within the leadership due to the gradual 
degradation of the 
system and the threat of an approaching crisis; gradual 
loss by USSR of its 
leading role in the world communist movement, alienation of non- 
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Soviet Marxists from Russia and of Russian public opinion from 
Marxism; the necessity of working out a general crisis of the system -a 
strategy permitting the restoration to the system of its mobilizational 
character and assuring to it the active support of the masses and part of the 
intelligentsia; the awareness that it has no other intellectual resources at 
its disposal capable of working out such a strategy except the Dissident 
Right. 
For the Dissident Right: an intensification of the ideological struggle 
within the dissident movement; an inability to deal, using its own forces, 
with its main adversary - 'Westernism' ;a lack of effective instruments of 
ideological influence on the masses; a willingness to sacrifice, for the sake 
of 'national' interests, political and intellectual freedom as a goal for the 
nation - this removes the emotional barrier, the feeling of political 
incompatibility with autocratic government. 
IV Finally if the Dissident Right develops in the direction of a merger 
with the autocratic regime, it becomes possible to describe the movement 
of ideas in more precise terms. 36 
Yanov points out that his scheme is very crude, but he highlights how the 
two sides might degenerate and then very feasibly, in a time of crisis, find 
mutual needs. He summarizes the evolution of the 'Russian Idea' in 
three main stages: 
i) From liberal nationalism confronting the regime (Nationalism A) to (ii) isolationist- 
totalitarian nationalism striving for collaboration with the regime (Nationalism B) and 
thence to (iii) military-imperialist nationalism merging with the regime (Nationalism 
37 C). 
This formula is again slightly modified in 'The Russian Challenge' : 
From a liberal nationalism that confronts the regime (L-Nationalism), to an isolationist 
nationalism that strives for co-operation with the nationalist 
faction within the 
establishment (I-Nationalism), and thence to a militaristic-imperial, 
Black Hundreds, 
fascist-style nationalism that blends with the official ideology in the process of counter- 
reform (F-Nationalism). 3" 
It is clear from this that only the phraseology and labels changed. What is 
most significant is that Yanov referred both times to three 
different types 
of nationalism: 'liberal', 'isolationist' and 'military-imperialist'. 
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Three tendencies 
Two other classifications of Russian nationalism under Brezhnev 
appeared in the journal Survey in 1979: Roman Szporluk's 'statists' and 
'culturalists' more or less reflected Dunlop's 'National Bolsheviks' and 
'v oz ro zhdents y'; whilst S. Enders Wimbush introduced three tendencies - 
'liberal nationalists', 'neo-Slavophiles' and 'neo-Stalinists'. 39 
Enders Wimbush's idea is more interesting, because it distinguishes the 
different conceptions of a Russian national unit or state: - 
The liberal nationalists were: 
in favour of accommodating minorities in a loose federation and for granting them those 
rights guaranteed in the Soviet Constitution. For these rights and for the privilege of 
participating in the federation, minorities would have to pay their fair share for 
development and defence. 40 
The neo-Slavophiles, including Solzhenitsyn: 
called for the consolidation of Russian lands into a unified Russian state, discarding forever 
the empty notion of a Russian-dominated federation. 41 
These people gravitated towards a more authoritarian solution, many 
advocating that the Orthodox Church would become a 'dominant social 
force in this state'. 
The 'neo-Stalinists', who believed: 
that Stalin's brand of strong, centralized, militarist leadership is what the Russian empire 
still requires, would prefer a greater Russian empire in which minority cultures could be 
exploited for the Russian state. 43 
In short, Enders Wimbush's analysis presents three possible tendencies in 
Russian nationalism: one which sought to establish a Russian entity built 
on a more liberal model and which was prepared to recognise the rights of 
other non-Russian republics"; another which sought to establish and 
isolate a specifically Russian state, guided, perhaps, by Russian Orthodoxy; 
and finally, one which aimed to maintain the Soviet Union as a Russian- 
dominated state/empire. 
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Classifications of Russian nationalism under Gorbachev 
John Dunlop wrote a number of pieces about Russian nationalism during 
the Gorbachev period and used a number of different terms to describe the 
different tendencies. "' His analyses generally refer to two major groups: 
one which supports the maintenance of the larger (imperial) state; and 
another which supports the idea of a renewed Russian state, inclined to 
independence from other nationalities and national territories in the 
Russian/Soviet empire. 
In a 1988 analysis, Dunlop divided Russian nationalism into three groups: 
'liberal nationalists', 'centrists' and the 'nationalist right' or 'National 
Bolsheviks'. "' Roughly speaking, liberal nationalists were concerned with 
such affairs as conservation, the environment and Russian Orthodoxy, 
whilst supporting Gorbachev's principle of reform. The 'centrist' 
nationalists represented those who held nationalist ideas, did not 
welcome the prospect of liberal reform (and were wary about the influence 
of Western models), but stood in opposition to the communist regime, 
particularly on the issue of what the 'internationalist' ideology had done 
to Russian life and culture. The National Bolsheviks consisted of people 
who shared similar views to the 'centrists', but were distinguished by the 
facts that they occupied influential positions in Soviet society and 
supported /accepted Marxism-Leninism as the buttress of a Russian 
imperial state. Dunlop also identified a group of 'neo-Stalinists' who 
'should not be classified as Russian nationalists', but who were allied with 
the National Bolsheviks. 47 
In subsequent analyses, Dunlop referred to 'liberal nationalists' and a 
'conservative coalition' which consisted of 'National Bolsheviks', 
'conservative nationalists' and 'neo-Stalinists'. The liberal nationalists 
championed: 
... political 
democracy and a market economy; they also advocate peaceful relations with 
the minority peoples of the Soviet Union and with the West. They are distinguished from 
Western-style liberals, with whom they are frequently allied, by their often fervent 
attachment to Russian Orthodoxy and Russian national traditions and by their pronounced 
abhorrence of Marxism-Leninism... 
The liberal nationalists are prepared to grant the non-Russian republics complete 
freedom...... to secede from the Soviet Union. 48 
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The common bond drawing the conservative coalition together appeared 
to be the desire to maintain the geographical and political integrity of the 
Soviet Union, with centralized and authoritarian rule from Moscow. The 
neo-Stalinists were not Russian nationalists, but 'conservative Marxist- 
Leninists and 'Soviet Patriots', who like Stalin before them, are prepared 
to manipulate Russian nationalist sentiment to help prop up the party 
state. '49 On the other hand, the conservative nationalists and National 
Bolsheviks were both Russian nationalist, but with different political 
outlooks. The values which united these 'two disparate tendendies' were: 
... an ardent Russophilia, a deep suspicion of the market and of the capitalist West, anti- 
Semitism, and resentment of nationalist and separatist sentiments in the periphery. SO 
Dunlop later used Szporluk's terms 'empire-saving' and 'nation-building' 
to describe political processes linked with the Russian national question. sl 
The empire-savers were the conservative coalition, whilst the 'nation- 
building' consisted of both democratic (Solzhenitsyn) and authoritarian 
varieties. 52 El'tsin's identification with Russia and Russian issues was not 
classed as a manifestation of Russian nationalism: although he opted 
'decisively for Russian nation-building', ' he was labelled a 'Westernizer' 
who 'played the Russian card'. ' 
Writing in 1988, Yanov remarked that: 
Any single definition - fixed for all time- of a dynamic ideological movement in Russia, be 
it Russian nationalism or Russian communism, seems to me a contradiction in terms. Any 
political change in the system alters the function of the movement within the system as 
well as the balance of liberal and reactionary elements within the movement. " 
However, he believed that the prevailing stage of perestroika had turned 
Russian nationalism into 'an ideology and rallying point of 
counterrreform'. The nationalism of the 'Russian New Right' was 
described as 'Russian imperial nationalism', where 'imperial' refers to the 
'nationalism of the dominant nation of the empire as distinct from 
minority nationalism'. Yanov's narrow definition of Russian nationalism 
seems to stem from the fact that he adopts a Russian/Soviet 
understanding of the term 'nationalism', making a distinction between 
patriotism, chauvinism and nationalism (indeed, claiming that they are 
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different in the Russian context): 
A patriot loves his country, but this does not prevent him from loving humanity. 
A chauvinist loves his country but dislikes humanity, especially if it is of Jewish origin. 
A nationalist loves his country but sees humanity as an invading force ready to conquer it - 
with the Jews in the vanguard. 
The nationalist perceives everything foreign that appears in his country - from rock music 
to linguistic appropriations, from manners to politics - as a deliberate, cunning, treacherous, 
and insidious conquest of his country. 56 
Yanov hereby limits certain aspects of nationalism by discounting actors as 
'patriots' or 'chauvinists'. These labels are very much value judgements 
which seek to moralise over the nationalistic behaviour of groups and 
individuals: the 'patriots' represent the good, the 'nationalists' the bad, 
and the 'chauvinists' the ugly. It would be truer to suggest that 
nationalism is a much broader spectrum, which manifests itself in several 
ways and does not limit itself to the 'nationalists' described above. 
There were a variety of other terms which were used to describe Russian 
nationalism under Gorbachev. Roman Szporluk believed that Russians 
were faced with two options: 'empire-saving' or 'nation-building' . He 
considered it necessary to establish what Russians meant by 'Russia' - 
whether it was a renewed empire or the establishment of a Russian 
nation-state. The empire-savers were those who regarded the Soviet 
Union: 
in its current boundaries as the proper and legitimate national 'space' of the Russian 
nation, 57 
whilst the nation-builders represented those who thought of Russia: 
as something very different from the USSR - as a geographical, historical, and cultural 
entity that does not encompass what they themselves recognize to be non-Russian lands and 
nations, even if these are part of the USSR. The geographical extent of Russia is not 
identical for all 'nation-builders. ' ...... What unifies them 
is a basically national position' 
and the political goal of establishing a Russia that is a nation-states 
Szporluk points out that it would be much easier to call the empire-savers 
'imperialists', although he refrains from that because he considered the 
term had become one of abuse. Those who constituted the empire-savers 
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(in 1989) included: 
the military and the police, the state and party bureaucracies, members of other 'all- 
Union' structures and apparatuses, such as foreign ministry or cultural officials engaged in 
foreign relations. 59 
Politically, the empire-savers included Marxist-Leninists, right-wing 
extremists, and 'Westernizers' who favoured liberal democratic and 
constitutional institutions for a state on the territory of the Soviet Union 
where all citizens would be subject to decisions made in Moscow. 
Szporluk explains that the liberal Westernizers favoured a 'Russian' state 
in place of the Soviet Union, because of residual Russian imperial 
thinking. Quoting comments by the ethnographer Iulian Bromlei, he 
highlighted the Soviet-wide dominance of Russian language and culture, 
which were attributed with 'general' and 'international' qualities. 
The nation-builders consisted of Russians who wished to define 
themselves as 'a nation that exists independently of the state, which in 
this case means the empire. ' They are further reduced into three different 
categories: 
First there are those Russians who reject communism and Sovietism and who look for an 
alternative in a nationalism rooted in culture, especially in religion. The second model of 
Russia proposes a democratic, liberal, Western-style modern nation-state. A third model is 
advanced by those who are critical of the imperial structure of the Soviet Union and expect 
a change for the better if the RSFSR were to become a full-fledged republic....... They seem 
to believe that the national needs of Russia might be addressed and met if the RSFSR 
acquired an identity that was separate from the USSR and its governmental, party, and 
other organizations-60 
It should be noted that Szporluk's model embraces the whole of the 
Russian political spectrum including 'Soviet nationalists', who wished to 
maintain the Soviet Union as a unitary socialist state or reconstruct it as a 
unitary state resembling the USA, and 'democrats' for whom the 
establishment of a liberal-democratic state was paramount and Russian 
nationalism was of little or secondary importance. 
Several other labels are used to describe the major divide expressed by 
Dunlop and Szporluk (the imperial/statist v. nation-building/cultural 
divide). 
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Dmitri Pospielovsky's discussion of Russian 'neonationalism' and the 
'Russian Idea' prefers the term 'nativists' or pochvenniki when describing 
those reviving the cultural idea. Referring to differing interpretations of 
the terms 'nationalism' and 'patriotism' by Yanov and Likhachev, 
Pospielovsky concludes: 
The terminology of the various types of national orientation remains as subjective and 
undefined as ever. Perhaps the distinction between cultural nationalism and state 
nationalism, or between nativism (pochvennichestvo) and nationalism, should be preferred 
because of its greater clarity. 61 
Interestingly, Pospielovsky develops the view that nationalism describes 
'many shades of Weltanschauung ' by adding two basic varieties - 
Christian nationalism and atheistic nationalism: 
The conflict between a Christian nationalist's convictions and his nationalism tends to 
make him less tolerant of other nations. Christian nationalism therefore constitutes a sort 
of 'halfway house' between the aggressive great-power chauvinism of an out-and-out state 
nationalist and the consistently Christian love for his people and its culture of a nativist. 
Atheistic nationalism, characteristic of the Nazis, the National Bolsheviks, and 
consistent Fascists, knows no such 'soft spots'; an adherent of this type of nationalism 
believes that whatever is good for the glory of his state, or for the dissemination of his 
state's ideology, is fine and moral. 62 
Aleksei Shmelev referred to 'liberal nationalism', such as that expressed by 
Solzhenitsyn, describing it as a 'variety of classical liberalism', 
whoseWeltanschauung consisted of a: 
striving for spiritual freedom, an orientation towards the traditional values of Russian 
culture. 6" 
Shmelev's second tendency or 'direction' of Russian nationalism described 
the activities of those who congregated about such journals as Nash 
sov re mennik and those in the bloc of 'patriotic forces', the followers of 
'national etatism' (na tsionalisticheskii etatism). 
Shmelev also observes that: 
certain public figures occupy intermediate positions between 'liberal nationalism' and 
'national etatism' or simply cross over from one to the other. In the first instance we should 
name Igor Shafarevich - the outstanding mathematician and 
former prominent defender of 
human rights. ` 
The special edition of Radio Liberty Research Bulletin on Russian 
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nationalism which featured Dunlop and Yanov, also featured Ronald 
Grigor Suny, Darrell Hammer and Andrei Sinyavsky. 
Suny declared: 
By its very nature nationalism defies precise categorization...... All the more difficult to 
pinpoint are the evident Russophilism and Slavic nationalism that permeate the dominant 
discourse among both official spokesmen and ordinary people in the Soviet Union. 65 
Suny gives credit to Dunlop's and Yanovs' analyses and refers to 
Szporluk's 1979 distinction between 'cultural or spiritual' and 'political or 
statist' nationalism, adding that: 
Statist nationalism may be subdivided into 'National Bolshevism'... and the more anti- 
Bolshevik, religious, or even neofascist varities. 66 
Suny shares Yanov's view, that 'rightist nationalism is allied ideologically 
with Stalinism' and he predicted (in 1988) that 'if Western governments 
respond to the Gorbachev initiatives... both Russian nationalist and 
Communist attentions are more likely to turn inward to the development 
of national life rather than outward in search of foreign adventures'. 
Hammer referred to the 'National Bolsheviks' and the 'Russophiles', both 
of which could 'be called traditionalist' but representing different 
traditions. " The National Bolsheviks looked back to the tradition of 
imperial Russia and the ideology of the Pan-Slavs, whilst the Russophiles 
looked back to Holy Rus' and the ideology of the Slavophiles. Basically 
Hammer was presenting a culturalist-statist model. However, his use of 
the term 'Russophile' clashes with that used by others. 
Aron J. Katsenelinboigen used 'Russophilism' almost synonymously with 
'Russian nationalism', ' whilst Vladimir Shlapentokh divided Russian 
nationalists between 'Russophile patriots' (statists) and 'Russophile 
traditionalists' (culturalists). Shlapentokh also concluded that there were 
'mild' and 'harsh' Russophiles: 
Russophiles, whether patriots or (especially) traditionalists, disagree strongly about the 
degree and character of the exclusiveness they attribute to Russia, the contraposition of 
Russians to other peoples, their degree of respect for other cultures, and their attitudes 
toward democratic institutions. 
While recognising Russia's uniqueness, culture, and religion, mild or 
liberal Russophiles 
tend to respect other peoples, particularly 'the West'... 
The division between the mild and harsh Russophiles was relatively strong in the early 
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70s, but lost its primary significance by the early 1980s. Given the strong polarization of the intellectual community in the period of glasnost, the unity of the majority of the Russophiles served to push the few liberals (such as Likhachev) towards the Westernizers' 
camp and made them the target of insidious attacks on the part of the mainstream. "' 
This last comment is significant because it suggests that Russian 
nationalism has a much broader constituency than merely the division 
between culturalists and statists. The inclusion of 'liberal' nationalists, 
suggest that there is a different political mood between and within the 
cultural nationalists. 
Yitzhak Brudny introduced four categories into his spectrum of Russian 
nationalism: 'liberal nationalists', 'conservative nationalists', 'radical 
Slavophiles', 'neo-Stalinists'. 
His study of Russian nationalism from 1985-88 observed three stages of 
development, the first of which united Russian nationalist agreement on 
the river diversion project. Later, the liberal nationalists voiced their 
support for perestroika, whilst the the radical Slavophiles and neo- 
Stalinists expressed opposition. The conservative nationalists sat on the 
fence. 
Brudny's liberal nationalists supported a modern, urban society; the neo- 
Stalinists emphasised Stalin's revival of the military and state-building 
traditions; Radical Slavophilism represented anti-urban/anti-intellectual 
rhetoric and attacked pro-Western liberalism; the conservative Russian 
-nationalists represented those who had started on the liberal wing of 
nationalism, but who soon began to express more hardline, anti- 
Western /xenophobic attitudes. '° 
Like Brudny, Helene Carrere d'Encausse distinguished four 'main 
branches of Russian nationalism: liberal nationalism, radical nationalism 
'of both the left and right' and conservative nationalism. 71 The factors 
which distinguished them were 'the choice between Western model 
development or the Russian socioeconomic system, the place of religion 
in the political system and relations with other nations'. The 'liberal 
nationalists' wished to preserve Russian culture and the national heritage 
whilst attempting to keep the various forms of nationalism from 
degenerating to extremism. Carrere d'Encausse adds that liberal 
nationalism used the philosophy of Berdiaev, Bulgakov and Franck 'as a 
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reference point'. The 'radical nationalists' of the right were National 
Bolsheviks who rejected Marxism-Leninism, but implicitly accept a 
Russian variant of it. The 'radical nationalists' on the left were reformers 
of the 'social democrat and Westernizing type', for whom 'nationalism 
counts less than their attachment to the old Soviet desire for 
modernization'. Finally, the conservative nationalists wished to restore to 
Russia its past. They rejected Marxism-Leninism as a Western ideology 
and feel that Russia has been defomed by an imported foreign system. 
Andrei Sinyavsky, perhaps, has more in common with Alexander Yanov. 
Deeply distrustful of Russian nationalism, he makes a distinction between 
Russian patriotism and Russian nationalism: 
Russian patriotism is ready to attach itself to anything as long as the Motherland is 
implied by that thing or shines through it... 
Russian patriotism is by no means always reduced to nationalism, although, equally, 
nationalism quite often gives rise to it and feeds on it.... Furthermore, in something akin to 
religion, Russian patriotism not infrequently borders on the messianic... 
Here is another, more precise definition. Although patriotism binds Russians into a kind of 
family, like family relations these are far from ideal and are accompanied by bitter feuds 
and strife not characteristic to such a degree of other peoples inspired by nationalism or 
patriotism ?2 
It appears that Sinyavsky is referring to national /nationalist sentiment. 
However, when national sentiment is expressed through political action, 
it should be analysed as a manifestation of nationalism. 
Sinyavsky does reveal three extremes of Russian nationalism: National 
Bolshevism, which had its 'core in the Soviet state system'; outright 
fascism, which was totally stripped of Marxism and believed in Russian 
racial supremacy; and Orthodox fascism, which believes in the theocratic 
authority of the church. Like Yanov, Sinyavsky views Russian 
nationalism in purely negative terms. 
In 1989, Walter Laqueur referred to the rise of Russian nationalism under 
glasnost as the 'reemergence of a 'Russian party" inspired by the 
'Slavophiles and their nineteenth-century rejection of Western ideas and 
modernism. ' Those who extolled old Russian culture and condemned 
Western values, such as writers in Nash sovremennik, Molodaia 
gvardiia and Moskva were dubbed 'new Slavophiles', some of whom 
defended the Bolshevik era, others who did not. 73 
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Although this particular analysis did not provide a precise scheme for 
classifying Russian nationalism - suggesting, perhaps, that it was still 
evolving - Laqueur later (1992) declared that: 
today the whole spectrum of Russian politics has moved to the right and become more 
nationalist. 74 
He referred to a 'national liberal camp' and to nationalists of the "extreme 
right. Among the national liberals he listed Likhachev, Averintsev, 
Tsipko, Latynina, Igor Vinogradov and Solzhenitsyn and, in addition, 
politicians like El'tsin, Sobchak, Stankevich who: 
following the downfall of the Soviet Union, insisted with increasing frequency and 
intensity on Russian concerns and interests. 75 
The extreme right's ideas included Russian exclusiveness, belief in the 
existence of 'anti-Russian intrigues' and a 'deep enmity against 
cosmopolitans and cultural nihilists. ' 
Nicolai Petro referred to three informal 'Russian nationalist associations' - 
leftist-radicals, conservatives and Christian Democrats. He outlined a 
minimal agenda common to the three groupings: land for peasants; 
restoration of pre-revolutionary city and street names; church 
independence from the state; and independent government and economic 
institutions in various regions within Russia that would strengthen their 
political and economic autonomy. The 'conservatives': 
advocate a five point agenda consisting of moral revival; skepticism of Western 
intellectual imports, especially Marxism-Leninism; fear of market competition and 
opposition to 'windfall profits'; return of peasants' land; and a sense of honoring military 
service. Unlike the left-radicals and Christian Democrats, however, the conservatives 
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rely on the Communist Party to reform itself... 
The left radicals were anti-Stalinists who favoured social democracy and 
Western democratic processes. The Christian Democrats advocated the 
rule of law, the separation of church from state, and the institution of 
private markets, but wished 'to return to the intellectual heritage of early 
twentieth-century Russian religious philosophers who rejected Marxism 
in favour of a non-materialist, religious orientation to life'. 
Finally, in 1991, Viktor Zaslavsky referred to 'imperialists' and 'national- 
separatists': 
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Recent years have witnessed a deepening polarization of the [Russian] nationalist 
ideologists into imperialist and national-separatist camps. Imperialist nationalism has 
been losing ground, and many ideologues of the imperialist persuasion have promptly 
changed their allegiance. The turn from imperialist nationalism to separatism has been 
promoted by changes in Russian mass consciousness on the one hand and by the growing 
influence of liberal nationalists and the dissemination of nationalist ideas among the 
Russian liberal-democratic intelligentsia on the other. " 
Zaslavsky observed that a 'drift towards isolationism and a separate 
Russian consciousness' that had started with perestroika had intensified 
towards the end of the Gorbachev era. Thus, following the publication of 
Solzhenitsyn's pamphlet, Kak nam obustroit' Rossiiu?: 
Isolationism and separatism were emerging as the one platform unifying all the major 
strands of Russian nationalism. " 
Although I do not agree with Zaslavsky's idea that isolationism and 
separatism 'unified all the major strands of Russian nationalism', it is true 
that the idea of isolationism was evident amongst defenders of the unitary 
empire-state and amongst those who advocated a new Russian nation- 
state. 
The abovementioned classifications provide a variety of labels which 
illustrate the divide between: statists or 'empire-builders' and nation- 
builders; statists and 'culturalists'; Westernizers and anti-Westernizers; 
acceptance of Bolshevism/Marxism-Leninism and anti-Marxism- 
Leninism. The terms 'statism' and 'nation-building' do not necessarily 
imply the presence of Russian nationalism: 'statists' might have 
been 
Soviet nationalists who believed in the 'new historical community of 
peoples' espoused by Brezhnev; and nation-builders might 
have been 
democrats who accepted the wishes of non-Russian republics to secede and 
were concerned with nothing other than establishing a civil society on 
the 
territory of the Russian Federation that remained after republican 
secession from the Union. 
The idea of Russian exclusiveness is reflected by Laqueur's 
'extreme right', 
Brudny's 'radical Slavophiles', Carrere d'Encausse's 'conservatives' and 
Sinyavsky's 'fascists', but what they do not indicate is that this anti- 
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Western exclusiveness is sometimes subsumed by the desire to maintain a 
unitary state/empire. Imperialist Russian nationalism put the unitary 
state before all else. In contrast to these nationalists, there was a small 
number of people who considered that Russian exclusiveness was 
undermined by an association with non-Russian/non-Slavic territories. 
Their priority was to break away from the republics. 
Taking these points into consideration, I aim to define three tendencies of 
Russian nationalism which are influenced by: the existence of a very 
strong imperial mentality; the idea of building a state distinct from 
empire; the idea of Russian exclusiveness. 
Three tendencies 
Pospielovsky and Suny probably sum up the difficulty of classifying 
Russian nationalism by declaring that nationalism 'defies precise 
categorization' and that the terminology of different types of nationalism 
remained 'subjective and undefined'. Ideally, I wish to avoid the use of 
terms such as 'nativist', 'culturalist', 'Russophile' or 'neo-Slavophile' and 
wish to concentrate on tendencies which linked the concept of a Russian 
state with the Russian nation and its ideal. Matters are complicated by 
different interpretations of the Russian state and confused by the the use 
of the terms russkii and rossiiskii for 'Russian'. The tendencies should 
also reflect the major alliances or incongruities of groups espousing 
Russian nationalist ideas. 
The definition of the Russian state is a major factor in determining the 
different tendencies in Russian nationalism. The overwhelming majority 
of Russian nationalist-orientated groups supported the reconstitution of 
the Soviet Union as the 'historical Russian state'. This number included 
the Association of Russian Artists (and other groups inspired by the 
RSFSR Writers' Union), Pamiat', Otechestvo, SDVO, the Liberal 
Democratic Party, RNE and others. In addition, there were groups which 
supported the maintenance of a centralised Soviet Union, but which 
displayed a heavy pro-Russian bias: the 'international' movements, OFT, 
and, to some extent, Edinstvo 'for Leninism and Communist Ideals'. 
There was a variety of political views amongst these groups - for example, 
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some advocated Marxism-Leninism, others advocated Orthodoxy and 
Zhirinovskii advocated, at first, a democratic model and then a 'Russia- 
first' authoritarian system. However, it appears that, despite political 
differences, the strongest influence guiding these groups' ideas was the 
imperative to maintain a unitary state, with the Russians as the dominant 
or core community. This is illustrated by the alliances which arose, e. g. the 
United Council of Russia, the Bloc of Public-Patriotic Movements, 
Slavianskii sobor, Co-ordinating Council of the Patriotic Forces of Russia. 
The (albeit precarious) unity of purpose shared by adherents to imperialist 
Russian nationalism was not shared by those who wished to reconstitute a 
new Russian nation-state. On the one hand, there were liberal 
nationalists who existed within, or allied to the democratic movement: 
'liberal nationalists' supported the idea of a civil society, multi-party 
democracy and a market economy, but could be distinguished from the 
majority of the 'democrats' by their attachment to Russian cultural values, 
traditions, Russian Orthodoxy. Many of their ambitions were fulfilled by 
the achievements of the democrats in establishing Russian sovereignty, 
statehood and challenging the Communist Party monopoly on power. On 
the other hand, 'isolationist nationalists' were anti-communist, rejected 
any association with the democrats and believed that the maintenance of 
empire or adoption of Western values were detrimental to the Russian 
nation's development. The liberal Russian nationalists appeared to 
gravitate towards the West, viewing Russia as unique, but essentially 
European, whilst the isolationist Russian nationalists believed more in 
the samobytnost' of the Russian people, in a similar way to the 
Slavophiles of the nineteenth century. 
The use of the terms rossiiskii and russkii can sometimes cause confusion. 
The adjectiverossiiskii means 'of Russia' or 'of the Russian state' and 
ro ssiisne are the peoples who inhabit Russia. In many instances, Russia 
[Rossiia] is taken to be the Russian Federation or RSFSR. However, in the 
view of some imperialist Russian nationalists, Rossiia corresponded with 
the whole of the 'historical Russian state' or the Soviet Union. For 
instance, the Bloc of Public-Patriotic Movements declared that 'Russia' 
always was and always would remain a 'great power' and that: 
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She will do everything to ensure that this is and shall remain the Soviet Union. 79 
However, at the same time, the Bloc spoke of 'Russian [rossisskoe] 
revival', referring to the revival of Soviet Russia or the RSFSR. In this 
case, there was a dual use of Rossiia, but rossiiskii tended to refer to the 
RSFSR. 
The 'democrats' sought 'Russian' [rossiiskii] sovereignty and 
independence, with 'Russian' relating to the Russian Federation. Hence 
the rossisskii narod were all those who lived within the territory of the 
Russian Federation - their membership was defined by citizenship rather 
than by ethnic nationality. 
The RNPR wished to create a 'Russian Union' [Rossiiskii Soiuz] or 
Russian Federal Republic [Rossiiskaia Federativnaia RespubIika]consisting 
of Russia, Ukraine, Belorussia and Kazakhstan, suggesting that Rossiiskii 
referred to the fraternity of Eastern Slavs' (Kazakhstan was included, 
because it had such a large ethnic Russian population). Once again, 
rossiiskii conveys the idea of the state. 
Russkii denoted 'ethnic Russian' and russkie were the ethnic Russians 
who constituted the majority of the Russian Federation's population. To a 
large extent, Russian nationalism was concerned with russkii nationalism 
rather than rossiiskii nationalism and related to the national values and 
issues of ethnic Russians. However, owing to the fact that ethnic Russians 
had never lived in an ethnic Russian nation-state, it was very difficult to 
separate the idea of russkii from rossiiskii. Thus, when the democratic 
movement identified itself with a rossiiskii nationalism in opposition to 
the Soviet centre, it occasionally paid attention to ethnic Russian specific 
features. Conversely, the Association of Russian Artists, a supporter of 
imperialist Russian nationalism, sought rossiiskie national aims in 
pursuing a Russian ethnic nationalism - it spoke of saving the 'ethnic 
Russian land' [russkaia zemlia] and the 'ethnic Russian soul' [russkaia 
dusha] by way of establishing institutions for the territory of Rossiia, 81 
which clearly denoted the Russian [ros siis ka ia] republic. 
The small Russian Party of National Rebirth (RPNV) put forward yet 
another interpretation of russkii. 82 It declared that any 'Great Russian' 
[v e1i ko ro s s], Ukrainian or Belorussian was a 'Russian by birth' [p ri ro dnyi 
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russkii], reflecting the view held by some Russian nationalists that the 
Eastern Slavs belonged to one 'Russian' family. ' 
The fundamental difference between these two terms is that russkii 
denotes the ethnic Russian nation, whilst rossiiskii relates to the Russian 
state. This means that the English 'Russian nationalism' could refer to 
either rossiiskii or russkii nationalism. Whilst the two terms were 
frequently used in tandem, one important point remains - rossiiskii 
conveyed the multiethnic nature of the Russian state/Russian Federation. 
Russkie accounted for 81.5% of the RSFSR population. ' 
My original definition of nationalism included three elements: a 
particular condition of mind or sentiment; the political principle which 
links nation and state; and the movement which espouses the political 
principle. I will now relate these elements to my tendencies 
Liberal nationalism. For want of a better term, this conveys the idea of a 
fairly tolerant nationalism accepting liberal democratic values. 
The particular condition of mind is that which identifies people with a 
Russian [russkii, or rossiisskii] nation. Liberal nationalism recognises a 
national identity which is characteristically Russian (no matter how vague 
or abstract that might be), but which is tolerant and reponsive to outside 
ideas. Whilst focussing on the development of a Russian national state, it 
accepts and supports the autonomy and self-determination of other 
(Soviet) nations. 
The political principle is one which concerns the establishment and 
development of a Russian national state and economy (on the territory of 
the Russian Federation), where the idea of a Russian 'people' is based 
upon citizenship rather than ethnicity. However, there is an interest in 
ethnic Russian 'specific characteristics' and concern may be extended to 
those who could be identified with a Russian state, but live beyond its 
borders, such as ethnic Russians and Russian-speakers in the Union 
republics. 
The movement represents those who worked with or within the 
democratic movement, encouraging it to adopt Russian [rossiiskii] 
national institutions and symbols, whilst propagating ideas of Russian 
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[russkaia] national culture. Liberal Russian nationalists assumed that a 
democratic, civil Russian society would allow Russian values to flourish 
freely. 
Isolationist nationalism is that which seeks to establish something 
uniquely Russian and rejects foreign influences. It does not need Russian 
dominance in the non-Russian republics - it advocates isolated 
development untainted by the burdens and infectious ideas /traditions of 
other nations. 
The sentiment is one which considers the ethnic Russians to be a people 
apart with a unique culture rooted in such things as, perhaps, Orthodoxy 
and the Russian village etc. 
The nation consists of ethnic Russians first and foremost. Non-Russians 
within the Russian state would have to share the same (Russian) fate. 
The state is the RSFSR/Russian Federation (or, sometimes, the Russian 
Federation and the territories in the non-Russian periphery where ethnic 
Russians predominate). In some instances the Russian state is considered 
to be Russia, Ukraine and Belorussia. The state would be run according to 
a specific Russian (possibly authoritarian) menu. 
The movement is represented by those expressions and manifestations of 
Russian nationalism which reject the influence of foreign culture and 
provide 'Russian' programmes/solutions for a 'Russian' society 
unshackled from the burdens of the greater empire. Some of 
Solzhenitsyn's ideas would be classified under isolationist nationalism. 
Imperialist nationalism aims, above all, to maintain an empire/ 
multinational state in which the Russians are the dominant nationality 
and Moscow is the centre of power. It does not tolerate independence 
from the centre. 
The sentiment is one which regards ethnic Russians to be the dominant 
nationality group, or first among equals in a Russian /Soviet empire or 
great power. 
Imperialist Russian nationalism advocates that the whole of the Soviet 
Union/Russian empire is the Russian's home. The empire must be run 
from Moscow and the non-Russian nationalities will receive the 'benefits' 
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of paternal or fraternal Russian influence. 
The movement is represented by efforts both within and outside the 
establishment to keep the USSR together as the historical Russian state 
and deny other republics sovereignty. It involves: the efforts of those in 
the 'international movements' to deny indigenous nationalities the 
chance to express independence; new groups from outside the 
establishment who are willing to ally themselves with others of a different 
political hue in order to achieve the greater goal of unity of the state. It is 
even represented by some of the attempts of so-called 'neo-Stalinists' to 
keep the Union intact. 
Conclusion 
The effects of glasnost and perestroika meant that Russian nationalism 
should be viewed in a way other than that which made the distinction 
between establishment and dissident circles. Of course, certain expressions 
of Russian nationalism were spawned within sections of the existing 
establishment and these had greater access to public outlets than those 
expressed by new groups formed by non-establishment figures. For 
example, the RSFSR Writers' Union had the greater wherewithal to 
disseminate ideas to a broad audience than Pamiat' did: throughout most 
of the Gorbachev period, members of the Writers' Union had access to 
organs such as newspapers, thick journals and widely-publicised 
conferences, etc., whilst the members of Pamiat' were restricted to crude 
samizdat publications, demonstrations and marches. 
The dichotomy between empire-saving and nation-building appears 
sensible, but there is a broad gulf between potential nation-builders: some 
wished to pursue an essentially rossiiskoe state built upon liberal 
democratic values with a reference to ethnic Russian specific features; 
whilst a minority wished to build a state based upon the peculiarity of the 
Russian [russkii] people, isolated from potentially harmful foreign 
influences. One may argue that the empire-savers were equally divided 
and point to the differences between, for example, OFT, which supported 
the maintenance of Marxism-Leninism and RNE, which was anti- 
communist. However, there seemed to be many expressions of imperialist 
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Russian nationalism, all of which seemed to have the overriding goal of 
preserving the greater Russian state. Under these circumstances, barriers 
were lowered and differences dissolved. The tendency was far from 
unified in certain political views and in joint political action, but it would 
be far too crude to divide the tendency into pro-Marxist-Leninist and anti- 
Marxist-Leninist tendencies. In many instances, pro-communists and 
others co-operated or worked together in the interests of preserving the 
greater Russian state. 
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Chapter 3: The Development of Russian nationalism 
Introduction 
In this chapter, I will outline the development of Russian nationalism 
from March 1985 to the end of December 1991, paying particular attention 
to the groups (associated with Russian nationalism) which appeared over 
this period. I aim to establish some of the possible influences on this 
process and to identify possible stages of development. 
Gorbachev's policy of reform was the factor which initially encouraged 
greater discussion of the Russian national question - glasnost gave greater 
exposure to existing streams of Russian nationalist sentiment. However, 
perestroika and glasnost led to consequences which transformed the path 
and character of Russian nationalism. Several new phenomena had a 
bearing on Russian national consciousness and the ways in which Russian 
nationalist ideas coalesced, including: the development of new political 
movements; the possibility of the break-up of the USSR; the possibility of 
the break-up of the RSFSR; and Russian resentment of the fact that 
Russians were identified with the centre by minority nationalities of the 
USSR. 
The first part of this chapter looks at the development of Russian 
nationalism in the Gorbachev era and can be roughly divided into four 
periods: 
Spring 1985 - late 1988, when Russian nationalism was more or less 
limited to an intellectual debate of the Russian national question in 
newspapers and journals. The one notable exception was the curious 
emergence of Pamiat', which became one of the first politicised 
movements in 1986 and then attempted to heighten its profile and attract 
greater support in 1987. 
Late 1988 - Spring 1990 witnessed the emergence of groups and parties 
for 
whom the Russian national question and the composition of the Russian 
state were of prime concern. 
Spring 1990 - August 1991 was a period of consolidation against the centre. 
Russian nationalism was adopted by members of the democratic 
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movement; democratic parties with a Russian nationalist inclination 
appeared; and the Russian Communist Party (RCP) was established. 
August 1991 - December 1991: the post-putsch period witnessed the 
strengthening of an independent Russia. This was viewed with hostility 
by pro-Union forces, including imperialist Russian nationalist forces 
whose ranks began to grow towards the end of the year. 
In the second part of this chapter, I will briefly summarize some of the 
chief developments reflecting Gorbachev's/the centre's relationship with 
Russian nationalism. This illustrates that Gorbachev was always aware of 
the Russian dimension and attempted to control or influence its power 
and direction through a series of measures. 
Part I: The evolution of Russian nationalism 
Before 1985 
In the twenty years prior to 1985 there was no organised expression of 
Russian nationalism other than by the dissident All-Russian Social 
Christian Union (VSKhSON) in the 60s and the output of the journals 
Veche, Zemlia and Moskovskii sbornik in the 70s. The only other 
expression of Russian nationalism was conducted by individuals such as 
Solzhenitsyn in samizdat publications and others through officially- 
sanctioned organs. Without doubt, there was an element within the 
establishment which supported a degree of Russian nationalism in the 
Soviet Union. Whether this resulted from deep-rooted Russian 
nationalist convictions or whether it resulted from the functional need to 
maintain the Russian as the 'elder brother' within a multinational Soviet 
society is hard to determine. The significant factor is that a certain 
amount of Russian nationalist expression was able to function through 
the journal Molodaia gvardiia and the publishing house Sovremennik. 
In 1970, Brezhnev made a personal attack on Molodaia gvardiia, which 
had published articles on the 'Russian national spirit' and identified the 
Soviet state as a Soviet 'Russian' state. Although this tendency supported 
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the idea of a Soviet empire with a Russian national face, Brezhnev 
recognised it as open opposition to Soviet ideology and rebuked the 
editorship for its behaviour. However, despite its dissenting voice 
Molodaia gvardiia was not closed down and was able to continue. Russian 
nationalist expression was allowed to exist as long as it was controlled by 
the leadership and did not pose a threat to existing structures. 
1985-1988: Searching for a Cause 
When Gorbachev came to power in March 1985 Russian nationalism had 
no particular focus, no officially -recognised group furthering its interests. 
John Dunlop described the 'Russian nationalists' of 1985 as 'a loose cluster 
of individuals sharing certain fervent concerns'. ' Certainly, Russian 
nationalism represented a loose collection of ideas and those who were 
orientated towards it were united by a common concern - the fate and 
position of Russians and Russia. This Russian national sentiment was 
expressed in the pages of Molodaia gvardiia, Nash sovremennik and in a 
number of novels, many of which lamented the demise of rural Russia 
and its values. It was also centred around VOOPIik and other small 
groups concerned with Russian culture and the preservation of Russian 
historical monuments. The chief concerns expressed by writers and 
commentators involved: the environment; the destruction of rural 
Russia; the discussion of Russian culture, heritage and identity. 
Although Gorbachev promoted the idea of glasnost in party and state 
organs in his very first speech as leader in March 1985, a more significant 
breakthrough for glasnost in society came with the abolition of the 
censorship functions of G la vl i t, in June 1986.2 This did not guarantee 
complete freedom of speech, but it provided a foundation for 
development. ' Russian nationalist expression did not reflect any 
immediate change, but the Russian national question gradually became a 
topic of greater discussion, mainly in the form of an intellectual debate by 
members of Russia's literary elite. Well-known authors, such as Rasputin 
and Belov, voiced Russian national issues in literary form in some of the 
thick journals in 1985 and 1986, but a broader discussion of Russian 
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national issues emerged in 1987-8 when glasnost began to wield a greater 
influence. Some of the articles which emerged focussed upon an 
evaluation of history, reassessing the relationship between the Russian 
past/Russian culture and the post-1917 period. As glasnost presented the 
opportunity to examine such issues as Stalinism, it also gave scope to the 
those who championed the Russian dimension in history to express 
themselves. 
There is little doubt that Russian writers and literary commentators were 
at the forefront of this discussion. At the end of 1985/beginning of 1986, 
the RSFSR Writers' Union was prominent in voicing opposition to the 
'river-diversion project' - one of the first environmental concerns of 
Russian nationalist-orientated figures. By 1987, the work of writers 
covering Russian national themes was very popular. A survey by I. A. 
Snezhkova of the demand for books in five Moscow libraries at the 
beginning of 1987 showed that the most popular book was Viktor 
Astaf'ev's Pechal'nyi detektiv, with an average waiting list of 111 people. 
Other popular books from authors with a Russian national agenda 
included V. Pikul"s Favorit (average waiting list of 106.77 people), Iurii 
Bondarev's Igra (50 people) and V. Rasputin's Pozhar (31). 5 
Another study of the Russian press in 1986-7 by Snezhkova indicated that, 
in 1986, on average every fourth copy of Pravda contained an article 
dedicated to Russian culture. Around half of the authors were members 
of the 'creative and artistic' intelligentsia. In 1987, the number of articles 
on Russian cultural matters increased slightly to one in every three. b 
Although these articles were presented as part of the life of Soviet peoples 
and was not subject to any specific focus, there is some significance in the 
small increase of Russian material between 1986 and 1987 and the fact that 
many of the authors were from the creative arts. 
Russian writers were vocal at the USSR Writers' Union congress in April 
1987, when some used the opportunity to criticise 'mass culture' and 'rock 
music' - these could be seen as alternative terms 
for 'Western' cultural 
influences, which had appeared as a result of glasnost and perestroika. In 
addition to condemning Western influences, Stanislav Kuniaev, the 
editor of Nash sovremennik, stood up for colleagues who dealt with the 
Russian national question. 7 Much of what some of the writers had to say 
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could be regarded as conservative opposition to perestroika, but part of 
this comment also revealed support for Russian national values. 
The anti-Western offensive continued at the beginning of 1988 through 
articles in Russian nationalist-orientated publications from A. Prokhanov, 
M. Dunaev and A. Trofimov. Prokhanov's January article criticised 
perestroika's 'Westernizers', who had turned to the West for ideas of 
development which were alien to the 'mass of the people'. He also 
criticised those who wished to return to a pre-socialist 'Russian idea', 
recognising the de-stablising effect it might have on the unitary state. " 
Prokhanov's ideal recognised socialism and the continuation of the 
historical Russian state. It was as if he considered socialism to be an innate 
Russian national value. Dunaev suggested that the Russian people could 
be destroyed neither by weapons nor war, but could be broken if it were to 
be 'deprived of its culture'. 9 'Rock-culture' and consumerism were 
Western influences which posed a threat to such qualities as 'historical 
memory' and the 'ideals of the nation'. Trofimov lamented the fact that 
national culture was being uprooted and replaced by the 'dregs of Western 
mass culture'. " These comments were all part of the debate to define 
Russian national values. The clearest message which can be drawn from 
these commentators is that Russian national values were at odds with 
Western values -a message which might have supported socialism as a 
Russian national value, but was vague enough to provoke the thoughts 
and sympathies of opponents to socialism. 
In the same year (1988), the activity of Memorial, the informal group 
formed to commemorate the victims of Stalinism, was a reflection that 
glasnost was beginning to examine the Soviet past in more detail. Writers 
and critics joined in the debate. For example, Vadim Kozhinov suggested 
that the Russian people or, more precisely, the Russian peasantry was the 
greatest victim of the formation of the Soviet state and Stalinism; whilst 
the historian, Apollon Kuz'min, appeared critical of 'European' or anti- 
Russian paths of development which might have been imposed on Russia 
following the October Revolution - he suggested that figures such as 
Trotsky were 'Europeanists' and had neither time for, nor understanding 
of (Russian) 'patriotism'. " 
Another significant event for the development of Russian nationalism 
in 
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1988 was the decision by the Politburo on 12 May 'to authorize the 
publication of works of pre-revolutionary and emigre Russian 
philosophers'. 12 Although, it did not have any immediate noticeable 
effect, it meant that the ideas of Solov'ev, Berdiaev and others could be 
introduced into the debate on the Russian national question. 
During this period, there was a gradual effort to define Russian culture 
and values. This was conducted by members of the cultural elite and 
there was relatively little imput from other sections of society. It is 
impossible to draw a uniform picture of these 'Russian national values' 
from the intellectual debate - nationalism was being promoted by a vague 
movement attempting to define its ideology. 
Pamiat' 
Besides the intellectual debate, Russian nationalism was represented by 
the emergence of one of the first 'informal' groups, Pamiat'. This group 
started as a cultural society or club before Gorbachev came to power, but, in 
the latter half of 1985, became the first politicised group with a Russian 
nationalist viewpoint. In 1987, Pamiat' raised its profile through active 
campaigning over preservation issues, conducting demonstrations in 
Moscow and, later, in Leningrad. Its major areas of concern appeared to be 
environmental, preservationist and other cultural issues, but Pamiat' was 
also characterised by anti-Semitism and anti-Westernism. Owing to the 
latter characteristics, the group drew criticism from some quarters, but, 
nevertheless, drew support from prominent figures in the literary world 
such as Kozhinov, Rasputin and Belov. In autumn 1987, Kozhinov 
defended Pamiat' by declaring that the group had positive features which 
should not be ignored, whilst Rasputin also defended certain aspects of the 
group's activity; Belov spoke up for forces in Pamiat', which were for 'the 
rebirth of national culture'. " Even the liberal Gavriil Popov, stating that 
'the main weight of the administrative system had fallen on the Russians 
and that the Russian past had suffered the most', declared that there were 
reasons for the development of a group like Pamiat', whose ranks 
contained many 'sincere patriots. "' Despite some of its less attractive 
features, Pamiat' probably did attract the interest or support of some 
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nationalist-orientated Russians, precisely because it was the only 
movement putting forward such a strong Russian message (the Spasenie 
group in Leningrad also sought to protect historical and cultural 
monuments, but did not have the same Russian orientation as Pamiat'). 15 
Like members of the the literary elite, Pamiat' displayed a passion and 
interest for something 'Russian', but did not share a uniform view on the 
Russian national question. A combination of disagreement and personal 
rivalries led to splits in the organisation in 1987 and 1988.16 The splits 
showed that Pamiat', reflecting Russian nationalism as a whole, 
represented an unorganised mass of various views, advocating, for 
example, paganism, Orthodoxy, Marxism-Leninism, monarchy, pro- 
market economics, anti-Westernism, anti-Semitism. 
The effects of glasnost 
Perestroika could not be carried out without questioning the existing 
structures - glasnost allowed questions to be asked. This played a 
significant role in the development of Russian nationalism. 
First, glasnost stimulated intellectual thought, allowing freer discussions 
of the 'historical past' and introducing the ideas of previously banned 
thinkers. For Russian nationalism, this meant the introduction of pre- 
revolutionary and emigre thought such as Solov'ev and Solzhenitsyn. 
Glasnost intensified the activity of those who were already involved in 
the intellectual discussion on Russian national values and broadened 
their opportunities to express their ideas. It also gave thinkers outside the 
literary community to join in the intellectual debate. 
At the same time, glasnost relaxed certain ideological taboos, including the 
discussion of Russian national issues. The principle of internationalism 
was no longer as sacred as it had been and Russians, long promoted as the 
core of Soviet internationalism, were able to focus on and define their 
own issues. This became more apparent in 1988 when democratisation in 
political life led to national movements in the republics and some 
Russians sought to review, rationalise or justify their position in the 
internationalist community of the Soviet Union. 
The discussion of Russian national values in the open arena of the media 
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was presented as a literary discussion, but it was an attempt to present 
more serious political views to the public. The earliest standard bearers of 
these views on behalf of the intelligentsia included the RSFSR Writers' 
Union, Nash Sovremennik, Molodaia gvardiia, Moskva, Literaturnaia 
Rossiia and Sovetskaia Rossiia, whilst the non-intellectual, more active 
expression of Russian nationalism was offered by Pamiat'. 
1988-1990: Organised movements 
In 1988, certain tendencies of intellectual thought encouraged by glasnost 
began to merge and materialise into political programmes. The 
movements which voiced these programmes were at first unofficial, or 
'informal' (neformal'nye), but some soon developed into something more 
significant. The emergence of organisations with a Russian nationalist 
orientation resulted, to some extent, from a coalescence of intellectual 
trends, but also as a reaction to the development of independence-minded 
movements in the republics. One of the most significant factors drawing 
intellectual trends together was change in the electoral system and the 
subsequent electoral campaigns of 1989 and 1990. The March 1989 
elections to the USSR Congress of People's Deputies allowed two thirds of 
the seats to be chosen by secret ballot - members of public organisations 
could be nominated as long as they did not 'contradict the constitution or 
the laws of the Soviet Union'. 17 The 1990 elections to the RSFSR Congress 
of People's Deputies, which were free of quotas, such as those appointed to 
1989 USSR Congress, witnessed a greater participation of new informal 
movements, representing a broader range of views than in 1989. It became 
more apparent towards the end of 1989 and the beginning of 1990 that 
Russian nationalism was focussing less on ecological and conservationist 
issues and shifting towards ideas of, for example, Russian sovereignty and 
economic independence. 
This period can be seen as as a time during which Russian nationalism in 
its various manifestations tried to mobilize popular support, which was 
reflected by: the growth in the number of organisations with a Russian 
nationalist focus; the broadening of the political issues they addressed; 
and, to some extent, the broadening of activity 
beyond the centres of 
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Moscow and Leningrad. 
'Cultural' groups 
One of the first notable Russian nationalist-orientated movements to 
appear at the end of 1988 was the Association of Russian Artists 
(Tovarishchestvo russkikh khudozhnikov). The founders of this group 
included several members of the creative intelligentsia who had been 
involved in the intellectual debate on the Russian national question in 
the media. It was one of the first intiatives of the Russian literary elite to 
form a political movement centred around 'Russian' values, although the 
Association claimed that it had 'cultural' and 'educational' priorities. 18 Its 
political concerns were reflected by its support for the maintenance of the 
Soviet /historical Russian state, but it sought to influence rather than to 
transform itself into a political group. 
Other 'informal' groups attempted to propagate their views under a 
'cultural' banner. Rossiia molodaia was a small group which formed in 
March 1987 to teach people (mainly children) about Russian military 
history. It contributed to the Russian nationalist debate by attempting to 
personify the Russian nation through historical figures. 19 The Leningrad 
group Russkoe znamia (March 1989) also presented itself as a cultural 
group interested in Russian history, calling for the return of Russian 
historical symbols and for the 'truth' to be told about the 'Fatherland's 
heroes'. 20 
Around and following the March 1989 elections, members of the 'creative' 
intelligentsia were instrumental in forming the Foundation of Slavonic 
Literature and Slavic Cultures (March 1989), the Moscow group 
Otechestvo (May 1989), 21 the Movement of Lovers of Russian Letters and 
CultureEdinstvo (latter half 1989), the Union for the Spiritual Rebirth of 
Russia [SDVO] (March 1989). The first three groups here emphasised their 
'cultural' orientation in their official titles' whilst SVDO placed its accent 
on a broader 'spiritual rebirth' - in addition to promoting and discussing 
Russian culture, it sought to 'unite the country's patriotic organisations'. 
'Cultural' groups were not limited to Moscow and Leningrad. In June 1988 
a Union of Patriotic Associations of the Urals and Siberia announced that, 
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among other things, it would act to 'resurrect the interest in Russia's 
spiritual heritage, protect historical and cultural monuments and 
conserve nature'. ' The group (which included Otechestvo from 
Sverdlovsk, Rodina from Cheliabinsk, Pamiat' from Novosibirsk and 
others) indicated that it was concerned with ecological and cultural 
matters, but also declared that it supported perestroika and was interested 
in seeing a 'real participation of the people in solving society's most 
important problems'. ' 
In addition to cultural groups, there were also single-issue conservation 
groups such as the Public Committee for Saving the Volga 
(Obshchestvenyi komitet spaseniia Volgi - OKSV) and the Foundation for 
the Restoration of the Church of Christ the Saviour (Fond 
vosstanovleniia Khrama Xhrista Spasitelia). These organisations 
contained familiar faces from the literary world - writer Vasilii Belov was 
one of the leading members of OKSV (formed January 1989) and writer 
Vladimir Soloukhin was chairman of the board of the Foundation 
(formed September 89). 26 The issues championed by such groups were not 
just conservation issues, but national symbols. This is illustrated by a 
'message' sent by the Foundation for the Restoration of the Church of 
Christ the Saviour to the people of Russia: 
The whole nation created this church in honour of the victory in the Patriotic War of 1812 
and in memory of the fighters who were killed for the freedom and independence of 
Russia... 
We are calling every citizen of Russia to stand together with us in order to restore this 
national place of worship... 27 
The reason for the emergence of 'cultural' groups is that it was a safe 
option - they did not send out the message of a direct challenge to the 
centre by claiming that they were pursuing cultural interests. At the same 
time there seemed to be no general consensus on the Russian national 
question and it was as if the creative intelligentsia and others had formed 
organisations to promote Russian national consciousness and reach a 
more uniform view on the Russian national question. However, a 
significant proportion of these groups subsequently took part in the 
political process, joining political and electoral alliances etc. 
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The 'international' movements 
It is no coincidence that the first movements (besides Pa mia t') arose at the 
end of 1988. Besides the new electoral law which applied to the March 
1989 elections, ' Russian nationalism was sparked by events in the 
republics, most notably in the Baltic republics. The earliest republican 
movement, the Estonian Popular Front for the Support of Perestroika, 
appeared in Spring 1988 - this had the broad support of the democratic 
movement, the local Party and the authorities. ' By August, there were 
demands in the Baltic for economic and political sovereignty and, by 
October, Popular Fronts were established in all three republics. 
In its programme document, the Association of Russian Artists had called 
for unity from Soviet citizens to maintain the 'historically state-formed 
brotherhood'. ' This reflected the concern which some Russians had about 
the possible break-up of the historical Russian state. However, the 
problem was more pressing for some of the Russian citizens who lived in 
the Baltic republics. Within a short time after the formation of the 
Popular Fronts, the 'internationalist' movements appeared: Edinstvo in 
Lithuania, Interfront in Latvia and Interdvizhenie in Estonia. Although 
these organisations held their founding conferences at the beginning of 
1989 (January and March), they were formed around November/ December 
- little more than a month after the Popular Fronts were established. The 
'intermovements' claimed to be internationalist in their outlook and 
spoke in Marxist-Leninist terms, but there was a strong Russian- 
nationalist current running through the movements. For example, they 
spoke up, more or less, for the Russian/Russian speaking community; 
resisted the idea of having to learn the titular language of the republic they 
lived in; opposed the renaming of streets which had had Russian names 
imposed upon them; opposed the break-up of the unitary state. 
Other 'internationalist' movements appeared with a somewhat Russian- 
orientated agenda. Nina Andreeva's 'Edinstvo for Leninism and 
Communist Ideals' appeared in May 1989, two months after her letter 
appeared in Sovetskaia Rossiia, berating the forces of change in the Soviet 
Union. " It is no coincidence that this letter appeared around the time of 
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the March elections. Although Andreeva's letter had criticized certain 
aspects of Russian nationalism (for example, 'neo-Slavophiles' who 
sought to return to the social forms of 'pre-socialist Russia'), this ought to 
be seen as a condemnation of anti-communist trends in political life, 
rather than a blanket condemnation of all forms of Russian nationalism. 
Andreeva also supported some of the activities of Russian nationalist- 
orientated groups. 
The United Workers' Front (OFT) was formed in June 198932 and became 
an active supporter of Russian interests and preserving the Union. OFT 
eventually became one of the prime movers behind the formation of the 
Russian Communist Party. 
Although these 'internationalist' groups used a great deal of 
internationalist rhetoric, they should be considered supporters of 
imperialist Russian nationalism: their association with Marxism- 
Leninism does not rule out nationalist tendencies. There were, no doubt, 
genuine internationalists within the ranks of these organisations, 
particularly in Andreeva's Edinstvo, but this group was very ready to use 
Russian sentiments to its own ends - which does not conjour up the 
picture of principled Marxism-Leninism which it claimed to represent. 
The timing of the formation of these groups is very revealing: republican 
politics were changing; Russian minorities were worried about their status 
within the republics; Russian pride risked being wounded. To some 
extent, they were an expression of conservatism, but they were also an 
expression of Russian conservatism. It was fairly safe and acceptable to 
establish groups which operated within a Marxist-Leninist framework: 
they could pose opposition to the politics of change without formally 
opposing the CPSU and its ideology. It should also be assumed that these 
organisations believed in a 'Marxist-Leninist' Soviet system where 
Russians constituted the 'elder brother'. However, Gorbachev and some 
of his reform-minded Communists would represent a truer picture of 
internationalism. 
Other early 'informals' 
In addition to a proliferation of small Pamiat' groups, there were a 
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handful of other organisations of a Russian nationalist orientation which 
formed before 1990. These organisations were committed to a more active 
participation in political life than the 'cultural' groups and include: the 
Rossy Civic Association, the Russian [Rossiiskii] Popular Front (RNF), the 
Christian Patriotic Union (KhPS), Otechestvo in Leningrad, the National 
Democratic Party, the Orthodox Constitutional-Monarchist Party of Russia 
and the Russian Communal Union. 
Rossy, or the 'Civil Association for a Sovereign Republic of Rus", formed 
in Leningrad at the end of 1988 from a club of philosophy and religion. 
Rossy was also dedicated to the development of Russian culture and the 
renaissance of Russian national consciousness. However, throughout 
1989 it developed a more political posture and became one of the first 
groups to suggest the establishment of a sovereign Russia on the territory 
of the RSFSR. ' It even suggested that in the future, a 'National Popular 
Front' might be set up to achieve this35 -a suggestion inspired, no doubt, by 
the Popular Fronts in the Baltic republics. 
The Russian [Rossiiskii} Popular Front (December 1988) pictured itself as 
the Russian equivalent of the Baltic Popular Fronts. ' Curiously, the 
Front's formation was announced in the Russian nationalist-orientated 
newspaperSovetskaia Rossiia , which stated that the RNF supported 
perestroika and sought to 'strengthen the integrity of the country'. 37 
Some of its founder members were linked to Pamiat' and to other 
'patriots' - it is even claimed that one of them, Iurii Demin, tried to attract 
the Russian nationalist writer Iurii Bondarev to stand as an R NF 
candidate to the USSR Congress of Deputies. ' Its main programme was 
described as 'the material, spiritual, national and democratic resurrection 
of Russia-. '9 However, unlike the cultural groups or international groups, 
the RNF presented ideas which clearly challenged the CPSU -a 
programme document in May 1989 declared that the RNF supported 
political plurality (including a multi-party system), rejected communism 
and stood for maximum independence for the Union republics, 'including 
Russia'. 40 
The Christian Patriotic Union (KhPS) was founded in December 1988 
under the leadership of former Russian nationalist dissident Vladimir 
Osipov. One of the Union's main tasks was to 'bring about the spiritual 
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and moral renewal of society and to resurrect the national-patriotic 
consciousness of the peoples of Russia". "' Russia's 'spiritual and biological 
salvation' would be achieved through the adoption of Russian Orthodoxy, 
the introduction of Russian republican insitutions (Academy of Sciences, 
own capital city etc. ), the resurrection of old Russian names, symbols 
traditions, the purity of the language, etc. By the end of 1989, in 
preparation for the 1990 elections, the KhPS declared that it supported 
neither capitalism, nor communism, but 'Russia', and its motto was 
'Orthodoxy, Patriotism, Conciliarism [sobornost']'. ' The Union attempted 
to suggest that it had no political ideology, but it clearly had a list of 
national political demands - the complexion of the political system was 
secondary, as long as the Russian national priorities were fulfilled. 
Therefore, the KhPS was willing to back any party or tendency which 
would most likely introduce its conception of a greater Russian national 
state guided by the Orthodox religion. 
The Leningrad group Otechestvo (Leningradskoe russkoe patrioticheskoe 
dvizhenie 'Otechestvo') formed in late March 1989 with the aim of uniting 
the city's 'patriotic' forces to 'resurrect Leningrad and Russia'. Otechestvo 
supported the CPSU's path of perestroika and democratisation. Its 
interests included the ecology, Russian culture and language, but there 
were other political aims: to return the land to the peasantry; to introduce 
regional self-government and khozrashchet; to return to the Russian 
people their 'well-being'; and to reverse the low Russian birth-rate 
through social policy (thus preventing the threat of Russians 'dying-out'). 
All this was to be achieved by observing the importance of the unitary 
Russian/Soviet state, Russian Orthodoxy, the importance of the Army and 
security organs, and a better Russian national education programme. 
The National Democratic Party (NDP) formed in Leningrad in September 
1989. By this time the first democratic opposition movement, Democratic 
Union, had been established for over a year and Leningrad had its own 
democratic movement, the Leningrad Popular Front (June 89). The 
National Democratic Party opposed not only the CPSU and its past record, 
but also the nascent democratic opposition - both were considered to be 
manifestations of 'Zionism'. Some of the NDP's proposals included: 
removing Article 6 (the leading role of the CPSU) from the Constitution; 
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the institution of a presidency leading to the possible restoration of a 
monarchy; and the transformation of a unitary state into a confederation 
in which republican legislation had priority over all-Union legislation. 
One of its main tasks was 'the creation of a political party which stands up 
for the interests of the indigenous population of the Russian Federation'. 
This appeared to be 'first and foremost, the Russian [russkii] people'. ' 
In addition to some of the Pamiat' groups, Osipov's KhPS and possibly the 
NDP, the Orthodox Constitutional-Monarchist Party of Russia (PKMPR) 
was one of the first openly monarchist organisations. Formed in autumn 
1989, it supported the restoration of a monarchy under Grand Prince 
Vladimir Kirillovich, the would-be first-in-line to the Romanov throne. 45 
PKMPR declared that it would support any party or public organisation 
which shared its views, linking Russian imperial statehood with the 
monarchy and reviving Russian Orthodoxy. The Party's manifesto stated 
that it would fight for the restoration of 'trampled' national traditions - 
first and foremost, the national traditions of the Russians [russkie]. Its 
political aims included land reform, the 'strengthening' of the armed 
forces and the restoration of property rights to dispossessed members of 
the nobility and their descendants. 46 
The Russian Communal Union [Russkii obshchinyi soiuz - ROS], which 
formed in August 1989, advocated an imperialist Russian nationalism by 
which ethnic Russians [russki e] were considered to be the inheritors and 
rulers of the greater Russian state (the Soviet Union). Its programme 
opposed the introduction of capitalism and the gave only partial support 
to the Communist Party, although it rejected a multi-party system. ROS 
sought to maintain a "One and Indivisible' Russia through 'communal 
order', Orthodoxy and the Russian Army. 'Communal order' would serve 
to 'maintain Russian interests, language, way of life and traditions' and 
would 'develop communal forms of politics and economics'. Basically, 
ROS aimed to establish a unified Russian empire on the perceived 
'Russian' value of communality, which would be employed through the 
Russian institutions of the Ve che, the Duma and the Sobor. This was an 
attempt to devise a 'Russian' solution, almost a Russian 'third way', for 
the Soviet Union. 47 
There is one factor which seems to unite these different groups: a revival 
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of Russian culture, traditions and values. However, opinions differed on 
the constitution of the Russian state, the political system and Russian 
national values. Rossy seemed to be the only group which advocated the 
idea of a Russian state independent of other republics - the others 
ultimately viewed the Russian state as the Soviet Union. Some opposed 
the CPSU and the communist system, whilst Otechestvo , KhPS and, 
perhaps, ROS, showed tolerance towards the idea of a reformed CPSU. 
NDP and Otechestvo expressed a distrust of the democratic movement 
and appeared to support some sort of authoritarian rule. Three of the 
above-mentioned organisations supported the restoration of the 
monarchy, whilst five supported the restoration of Russian Orthodoxy as 
one of the cornerstones of Russian national values. The variety of 
opinion was a distinguishing factor not only between these organisations, 
but within them. Like Pa m is t', they were subsequently liable to splits and 
none of them managed to develop mass support. The RNF gained a 
sizeable support in Moscow for a short time, but splits within the party 
and the leadership style of Skurlatov led to a decline in appeal. Of these 
earlier groups, Otechestvo gained a notoriety which was second only to 
Pamiat'. However, despite the fact that Otechestvo appeared as a signatory 
or participant in many of the intiatives produced by 'patriotic forces', its 
activity and support should not be overestimated. 
Alliances and the 1990 elections 
The 1989 elections to the USSR Congress of People's Deputies were not 
contested by any particular organised Russian nationalist platform. 
However, there was evidence of the Russian national dimension in 
campaigning, as illustrated by reports of the use of the slogan: 'Vote for 
him, he is Russian'. 4" Attempts to organise a united campaign of Russian 
nationalist views appeared in the run up to the 1990 elections. 
The first significant alliance of nationalist forces took place in September 
1989 with the formation of the United Council of Russia (Ob"edinennyi 
sovet Rossii or OSR). This association was formed on the initiative of the 
Association of Russian Artists and brought together imperialist Russian 
nationalist forces of various descriptions: Russian 
'cultural' societies, 
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'international' movements and self-styled 'patriotic' groups such as 
Otechestvo. 49 Their main concerns included the integrity of the Soviet 
state, the development of RSFSR sovereignty and the affairs of ethnic 
Russians throughout the Union. All the organisations had something 
else in common - they recognised the role of socialism and the CPSU in 
maintaining the 'fatherland'. To a large extent, they represented pro- 
Russian conservative forces within the establishment who were opposed 
to some of the changes brought about by perestroika. They were 
particularly agitated by the appearance of independence movements in the 
republics - it is probably no coincidence that OSR formed shortly after the 
formal founding congress of the Ukrainian independence movement 
Rukh, which took place on 8-11 September 1989. 
OSR left no doubt that it was forming with the aim of attracting broader 
support and achieving representation on the political stage. Its 
'immediate task' was to 'prepare and conduct an election campaign for the 
elections of Deputies to the RSFSR Congress and local soviets'. ' 
The call for RSFSR sovereignty is a significant development. Whilst the 
OSR spoke of the importance of maintaining the 'unitary state of the 
peoples of the USSR within its historically formed borders', it also spoke of 
'equality of the RSFSR and the Russian people with other Union republics 
and peoples'. In the past, this demand had_ expressed itself as a call for 
institutions such as an Russian Academy of Sciences51 or Russian national 
mass media, " but the idea of Russian sovereignty was altogether new 
from such conservative imperialist Russian nationalists. It was, in part, a 
reaction to declarations of sovereignty in Estonia (Nov 88), Lithuania (May 
89), Latvia (July 89) and Azerbaijan (September 89), not to mention the 
demonstrations and calls for independence in Georgia from autumn 1988 
to summer 1989 - the achievement of Russian sovereignty would, thereby, 
give the Russians the 'equality' or parity they sought. Another factor 
affecting a call for sovereignty was that OSR wished to identify itself more 
clearly with the RSFSR in the run up to the RSFSR elections. 
OSR identified itself with Russian national renaissance in other ways. For 
example, in November, it participated in a 'round table' session with two 
of its constituent members, the Association of Russian Arists and the 
Foundation for the Restoration of the Church of Christ the Saviour, to 
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discuss a forthcoming celebration of St. Sergii of Radonezh. The 
participants issued a statement which extolled the national virtues of the 
saint and, referring to his legacy of religious buildings and institutions, 
called for 'all that was illegally taken from the people and the Russian 
Orthodox Church to be returned to its original owner and inheritor'. ' 
Despite the fact that OSR had declared its formation with the intention of 
contesting the March 1990 elections, it was aware that it should fight its 
campaign on a broader, more prominent platform. It was competing in 
opposition not only to reform-minded communists, but also to the 
Interregional Group of Deputies (officially formed July 1989), which was in 
December discussing the formation of its own electoral platform' 
Consequently, on 15 December an announcement appeared of an initiative 
to create an 'electoral platform of Russia'. ' The initiative group was held 
in the RSFSR Writers' Union building and included members of OSR, the 
Edinstvo Movement for Lovers of Russian Literature and Culture, the 
Ross i is Club of Electors' and representatives of 'other Moscow patriotic 
movements'. Those who gave speeches included OSR's V. Skripko, 
RSFSR Writers' Union Secretary Iu. Prokushev, A. Prokhanov, M. 
Lemashev and E. Volodin. It was decided that the 'bloc's' concerns would 
include, among other things, the sovereignty of the RSFSR and the 
strengthening of Russian statehood [gosudarstvennost' Rossii]. This 
meeting was followed by the announcement at the end of the month of 
the Bloc of Public Patriotic Movements of Russia. " 
The Bloc was a coalition of imperialist Russian nationalists and resembled 
a roll-call of the OSR and other organisations inspired by Russian 
nationalist writers. In its address, the Bloc stated that the RSFSR and local 
elections would 'predetermine much in the fate of Russia and its peoples' 
adding that the political crisis in progress put into doubt the existence of 
the 'thousand-year' (Russian) great power. Whilst supporting the 
continuation of an integrated Union, the Bloc sought to establish a greater 
identity for Russia through the establishment of Russian sovereignty, the 
resurrection of a Russian Communist Party and a Russian Academy of 
Sciences. It also demanded greater republican control over Russia's 
economic resources. The call for a Russian Communist Party was very 
significant. In principle, Russia would achieve 'equality' [ ra vnop ra vi e] 
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with other Union republics which had their own republican Communist 
Party structures - however, it would also provide an opportunity to push 
forward a more pro-Russian agenda and provide a platform of challenge 
to reform-minded elements within the CPSU. The Bloc's priority was, 
supposedly, to achieve structural parity with the other Union republics 
and to minimise Russia's perceived close association with the centre, but 
one cannot rule out the other motives. 
The Bloc's concern for the integrity of the Soviet state might well have 
been a reaction to the independence movements /Popular Fronts in non- 
Russian republics. However, there were also concerns about the possibility 
of the RSFSR being carved up into separate states: in April, Democratic 
Union member, Vladimir Balakhanov, had suggested that Russia's future 
might be secured by shedding the empire and dividing Russia into three 
or four sovereign states - Russia, East Siberia, West Siberia and the 
(Russian) Far East. ' In addition, members and sympathisers of the Bloc 
were reacting to the perceived anti-Russian feeling being generated 
outside Russia: in August 1989, Galina Litvinova labelled Russia's 
'unequal' position in the Union as a source of 'Russophobia'; Arsenii 
Gulyga blamed 'Russophobes' for the disappearance of the 'proud name of 
the nation - Great Russians'. " This feeling of injured Russian national, 
pride amongst the Bloc's sympathisers was intensified before the elections 
by events such as the protest against the (Russian) centre at the USSR 
Congress of People's Deputies in December 1989 (Gorbachev was forced to 
call to order a group of deputies from several republics after they had 
blamed Russia/the centre for their misfortunes)' and the outbursts of 
anti-Russian feeling in Baku which had developed after the central 
authorities sent troops into the city in January 1990. There was also a 
degree of focus on events in Moldavia: in January, the Moldavian 
Russian nationalist-orientated 'international movement', Edinstvo, 
announced the secession of Tiraspol from the Moldavian 
SSR and its 
unification with Russia. 61 
In the same month (January), there were significant 
developments 
amongst potential opponents of Russian nationalist-orientated groups. 
Firstly, the electoral bloc, Democratic Russia, was 
formed to contest the 
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March elections and, secondly, the Democratic Platform was established 
within the CPSU. Aware of these developments, the 'patriots' campaigned 
actively. The Bloc's major campaign slogans called for 'popular accord' 
and 'for the rebirth of Russia' - one of the Bloc's candidates, OSR member 
Vladimir Bondarenko, called for the 'national-religious Rebirth of 
Russia'. "' A meeting of 'patriots' organised by the Bloc, which was held 
outside Ostankino television tower in Moscow, was also dubbed 'For the 
Rebirth of Russia'. It was the biggest pre-election meeting of Russian 
nationalists and was widely reported in the press. ' The press also 
mentioned that members of Pamiat' were present, namely Sychev's 
Pamiat' group, which, like the Bloc, supported the idea of socialism as a 
basis for Russian national rebirth (according to Valerii Solovei, the Bloc 
was supported by certain sections of the CPSU and was actually given 
backing by the Moscow City Committee of the CPSU in Moscow)' 
Other nationalist-orientated groups held joint meetings around this time. 
Between 24-26 January, the All-Union Central Council of Trade Unions 
and the Moscow Komsomol hosted a conference of 'patriotic and socialist 
movements'. Participants included the 'Intermovements' from Lithunia, 
Latvia and Moldavia, Nina Andreeva's Edinstvo, Filimonov's National 
Patriotic Front Pamiat' and the Moscow Otechestvo Association. ' Nina 
Andreeva declared in her speech that: 
we must put all our arguments to one side: they are insignificant in face of the danger 
threatening socialism. 66 
This illustrates Andreeva's desire to unite conservative socialist forces and 
nationalist forces to defeat the forces of reform. This picture very much 
describes Andreeva's own organisation Edinstvo - an alliance, or even 
synthesis, of conservative communism (with elements of 'Soviet' 
nationalism) and imperialist Russian nationalism. There was a great deal 
in common between the groups at the conference and the Bloc of Public 
Patriotic Movements. 
Despite representation at the abovementioned meetings, Pamiat"s 
campaign was lifeless. In Moscow, it could not even attract a 
hundred 
participants to its election meetings and demonstrations. 
67 For a 
movement which had received such attention in its earlier 
days, it was 
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clear that Pa m is t' had lost its momentum. 
It is difficult to say how many of the candidates for the RSFSR elections 
were of a Russian-nationalist orientation. In February, the Bloc of Public 
Patriotic Movements produced a list of 61 candidates to contest the 
Moscow seats to the RSFSR Congress of People's Deputies, but this is just a 
small representative sample of Russian nationalist activity. ' One 
particular pre-election study of two Moscow regions divided candidates 
into six categories: 'Westerners', right-populists, statists, left-populists, 
ecologists and national-patriots. 69 The survey concluded that only 2% were 
'national-patriots', while 17% were 'statists'. Further analysis showed that 
40-45% of the statists were nationalist-orientated, suggesting that 
approximately 10% of all candidates were Russian nationalist-orientated. 
Of course, judging by the narrow Russian interpretation of 'nationalism', 
this figure is probably an underestimation and should be regarded as a 
minimum percentage. '° The answers to other questions posed indicate 
that the figure may, indeed, have been higher: 8% of respondents said that 
'Russia was only for Russians [russkie] and should be ruled by Russians', 
whilst 20% of the candidates said that the 'fact of a multinational Moscow 
was bad and the situation should be changed'. "' 
In February 1990, the liberal newspaper Argumenty i fakty warned that, in 
Moscow and Leningrad, the main challenge to democratic candidates 
would come not from CPSU candidates, but from Russian nationalists. ' 
However, this idea proved to be unfounded. In the two main Russian 
cities, the Bloc suffered a resounding defeat: for example, in Moscow it put 
up (an official list of) 61 candidates for seats in the RSFSR Congress of 
People's Deputies - three candidates were successful, whereas the 
Democratic Russia bloc won 57 of the 65 Moscow seats. 73 Pa m is t' fared 
even worse: in Leningrad, election candidates advocating Pam ist "s ideas 
received only 2-3% of the vote. 74 Similarly, the other abovementioned 
Russian nationalist-orientated 'informal' groups failed to make an impact. 
The 'Patriotic' Bloc reacted with enmity towards the democrats. On 6 
March, two days after the first round of voting, one of the Bloc's 
supporting newspapers, Sovetskaia Rossiia, criticised the 
fact that rival 
candidates had formed a Democratic Russia electoral 
bloc, claiming that it 
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was a 'sly propaganda trick' - possibly, in an attempt to discourage people 
from voting for the democrats in the second round of voting. On 23 
March, members of the 'patriotic' Bloc protested against the election 
results. ' Thirty-six defeated candidates from Moscow who had run for the 
RSFSR Congress of People's Deputies or Moscow City Soviet launched an 
appeal to the authorities calling for the elections to be declared null and 
void. They attacked signatories to the election platform of the Democratic 
Russia bloc, accusing them of slander and of using 'illegal' pressure on the 
electorate. However, despite their complaints and accusations, the election 
results stood. 
It seems unlikely that the 'patriotic' Bloc was a victim of unfair practices 
(by the Democratic Russia bloc). It should be noted that the 'patriotic' Bloc 
received more media coverage than Democratic Russia - the former 
published its election manifesto in the press in December 1989, whilst the 
latter was allowed to publish extracts of its manifesto only after the 
elections. "" In addition, the Bloc received on average 8-10% of the vote 
nationwide and many of their high-profile candidates failed to secure 
seats. " The reason for the Bloc's poor performance seemed to be its 
association with the Communist Party. Whilst many of the Bloc's 
candidates supported the leading role of the Party, many rival candidates 
wished to change this - one opinion poll of candidates to the RSFSR 
Congress (conducted in two areas of Moscow) showed that 88% of them 
wished to abolish Article 6 of the Soviet Constitution guaranteeing the 
Party's leading role. 78 'Patriotic' candidates pushing a more Russian- 
nationalist message, in some cases, fared much better than some of their 
colleagues, suggesting that the electorate had some sympathy towards 
Russian nationalist ideas, but less enthusiasm for the Communist Party. 79 
It is possible that the Bloc's message displayed inconsistencies which 
caused confusion: whilst supporting the transfer of land to the peasantry, it 
opposed many aspects of market reform; whilst insisting on strengthening 
the Soviet state, it promoted Russia's independence. Perhaps, the 
electorate were suspicious of its links with the establishment, including 
the military. One thing is certain - whilst the Bloc was suffering its 
crushing defeat, several 'democratic' candidates of a Russian nationalist- 
orientation, who opposed the CPSU, were successfully elected to the 
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RSFSR Congress of People's Deputies, including, for example, Viktor 
Aksiuchits, who represented one of the short-lived Russian 'popular 
fronts'. ' This might suggest that there was interest in the Russian 
national question, but not necessarily in alliance with conservative Soviet 
socialist values. 
Spring 1990 - August 1991: Russian nationalism moves to centre stage 
Following the March 1990 elections, a larger number of political 
movements began to identify themselves. This was encouraged by the 
rescinding of Article 6 of the Soviet Constitution in February and its 
confirmation at the III Congress of USSR People's Deputies on 13 March. 
Some of these movements carried a Russian national message, but this 
message was allied to a broader spectrum of political views: not all of the 
new movements supported an 'indivisible' great Russian state (the Soviet 
Union); a number of them rejected communism; and some embraced the 
principle of democracy. For example, spring 1990 witnessed the formation 
of the Russian Christian Democratic Movement (RKhDD), the Republican 
Popular Party of Russia (RNPR), the Party of Russia's Rebirth and Soiuz 
Ve nedov, each representing a different interpretation of Russian 
nationalism: the RKhDD pursued liberal democracy with Russian 
institutions; the RNPR rejected both communism and liberal democracy, 
proposing a Russian 'democratic' solution for Russia alone (having shed 
the non-Russian republics); the Party of Russia's Rebirth supported the 
maintenance of the Russian empire and opposed the democrats; whilst 
the Soiuz Venedov represented an imperialist Russian nationalism which 
wished to build an empire based upon the reconstruction of the ancient 
Aryan Vedic religion whose 'highest stage of development was Russian 
Orthodoxy'. " 
A handful of other movements appeared over the period until August 
1991, but the most significant developments were the creation of the 
Russian Communist Party in June 1990, the Democratic Russia Movement 
in October 1990 and their subsequent political activities. 
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Democracy and Russian Nationalism 
Following the success of the Democratic Russia electoral bloc in the 
elections, Russian democracy realised that it could not afford to ignore the 
Russian national question. 82 Indeed, just before the elections, one of 
Leningrad's prominent democrats, Marina Sal'e, had published an article 
questioning why the democratic movement was ashamed of the Russian 
national idea. ' 
Aksiuchits' RKhDD was the first prominent movement to make a link 
between liberal democracy and Russian national values. Part of 
Aksiuchits' identification with the democratic movement stemmed from 
the fact that he (and others in the movement) loathed communism so 
much. ' The democratic movement seemed the most suitable 
counterpoise to the establishment and the CPSU. The RKhDD was 
committed to the creation of a civil society, in much the same way as 
Democratic Union, the Leningrad Popular Front or (later) the Social 
Democratic Party of Russia were, but it also wished to promote 
'patriotism', to create a Christian Russian national identity (with the 
prominence of Russian Orthodoxy) and Russian governmental 
institutions (e. g. Zemskii Sobor). 
Other parties appeared with democratic programmes displaying no 
particular inclination to the Russian national question. They would later 
reveal a significant interest in following Russian affairs. The Liberal 
Democratic Party (LDP) of Vladimir Zhirinovskii, which claimed to have 
been in existence since May 1988, held a congress in March 1990 which 
supported the principles of the rule of law, a multi-party system, a mixed 
economy, a presidency and 'de-ideologisation' of all public institutions. 85 
The LDP's inclination towards an imperialist Russian nationalism only 
became apparent in the latter half of 1990 with amendments to its 
programme in October and its participation in the 'centrist' bloc -a 
coalition of imperialist Russian nationalists, which produced a joint 
manifesto in November. " 
Parties such as the Democratic Party of Russia (DPR), formed May 1990, 
and the Republican Party of the Russian Federation 
(RPRF), formed 
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November 1990, linked the principles of democracy with the idea of 
Russian [rossiiski] statehood. The DPR stood for for the 'democratic 
renewal of Russia' and spoke neither of the Christianity or 'patriotism' 
advocated by the RKhDD , 
but of 'spiritual renewal of the republic's 
peoples'. "' Its message demanded the renewal of the republic and its 
statehood, but it also stressed the need for a civil society and rights of the 
individual. Similarly, the RPRF supported political plurality and a civil 
society, but stood for the 'restoration of genuine Russian [rossiiskii] 
sovereignty'. ' No doubt the combination of democratic values and the 
Russian [rossiiskii] national idea attracted support. There were also 
indications that both of these parties contained elements for whom the 
Russian national idea was of considerable importance: a 'Russian fraction' 
formed within the DPR which, in March 1991, attended a congress of the 
Russian-nationalist orientated RNPR; S9 whilst a survey at the RPRF's 
founding congress found that 24% of the delegates considered that Russia 
should have its 'own peculiar path, differing from the rest of progressive 
mankind'. ' This suggests that the parties and their support were, to some 
extent, alliances of liberal democratic values and Russian nationalism. 
The formation of the Democratic Russia Movement was a breakthrough 
for the democratic movement and for liberal Russian nationalism. The 
formation of its predecessor, the Democratic Russia electoral bloc, had laid 
the path for democrats to pursue specifically Russian politics, something 
which had previously been the concern of so-called 'patriots', such as some 
of those representing the Bloc of Public Patriotic Movements and Pamiat'. 
The aims of the Democratic Russia electoral bloc had included the pursuit 
of sovereignty for the Russian Republic and a new RSFSR Constitution - 
both of which could be described as features of Russian national renewal. 
The founding congress of the Democratic Russia Movement continued 
this line: speaking of 'Russia's fate' and 'national salvation', it referred to 
an 'independent, free, democratic and flourishing Russia'. 91 A. Murashev, 
Chairman of the Movement's Organisational Committee (Orgkomitet), 
declared that the Movement's most important tasks were: to hold a 
national referendum to accept a new Russian Constitution, which would 
provide the legal basis for the 'rebirth of Russian statehood'; and the 
direct 
election of a Russian president who could give Russia 
its own power and 
84 
'neutralise the destructive activities of the communist imperial centre'. 92 
The Movement was an alliance of a number of Russia's democratic 
organisations including the DPR, the Social Democratic Party of Russia, 
Democratic Platform (later RPRF), RKhDD, Memorial 
, Shchit, Aprel' and 
others. The question of uniting to form a single party was never on the 
agenda. This might stem from a number of factors: the movement wished 
to observe the principle of political plurality; there was rivalry between 
the ambitions of leading personalities in the constituent parties; and, 
although there was agreement on the principle of an independent, 
democratic, sovereign Russia, there were differing views on the 
importance of the Russian 'national question'. ' 
As a result of its broad alliance, Democratic Russia became the rallying 
point not only for Russia's democrats, but also for liberal Russian 
nationalism which existed within democratic ranks. It also provided a 
unified opposition to the centre and to conservative imperialist Russian 
nationalist forces. 
The 'Patriotic' Opposition 
In the aftermath of their March 1990 defeat, conservative forces had to take 
action to secure an audible voice and a power-base in Russian politics. 
They represented a 'curious mix of views, but they were united by two 
things: the unitary --state, whether it was the Soviet Union or the Russian 
empire; and an ackowledgement of the Russian factor, whether it meant 
the renaissance of perceived Russian values or the preservation of the 
Russians as the 'elder brother' in the unitary state. This recipe had been 
displayed by the alliances between so-called 'patriots' and 
'internationalists' in the run up to the March elections. 
Conservative resistance to change was represented in the USSR Congress 
of People's Deputies by Soiuz, which was founded before the RSFSR 
elections in February 1990. However, its activity was not really prominent 
until the end of the year. In June 1990, the Rossiia group of deputies 
formed in the RSFSR Congress which paralleled (and was allied to) So iuz 
in the USSR Congress. These groups supported the integrity of the Soviet 
Union and opposed the democratic forces. However, in mid 1990 they did 
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not project a voice loud enough to oppose the reformist centre, the 
democratic movement and represent Russian interests. This was 
approached through the creation of the Russian Communist Party (RCP) 
in June. 
Certain Russian nationalist-orientated groups had been demanding a 
Russian Communist Party for some time - as previously noted, it had been 
one of the demands of the Bloc of Public Patriotic Movements. The 
elections had shown a decline in the popularity of the CPSU and a 
preference of the democrats over the 'patriots'. There were indications 
that a majority of Russians welcomed the idea of greater Russian 
independence and less central control' Therefore, the idea of a Russian 
Communist Party might have appealed to the imagination of some 
sections of the Russian population as well as sections of the CPSU. 
It should be noted that steps had already been taken before the elections to 
create a Russian Communist Party. There had been calls within the CPSU 
for a special party organisation for the RSFSR as early as July 1989. This 
idea was discussed and accepted at a Central Committee plenum in 
September 1989 and a 'Russian Bureau' of the Central Committee was 
formally established in December of the same year. 95 There had been 
support for a Russian party rather than a Russian Bureau around this 
time, particularly from the Leningrad gorkom (city committee) and 
obkom (provincial commiittee). Then, in February 1990, an 'Initiative 
Committee' for the formation of an RCP was created. 96 
The impetus for the creation of the RCP came from the RSFSR United 
Workers' Front (OFT), in conjunction with the Leningrad gorkom and 
ob ko m. OFT had called for the establishment of an RCP as early as 
December 1989, following a defeat of its motion in the Leningrad City 
Soviet to base electoral constituencies on the work-place rather than the 
district. 97 This was followed by a resolution passed at the II Congress of 
OFT RSFSR in January 1990 calling for an Initiative Congress to re- 
establish an RCP within the framework of the CPSU. 98 As a movement 
independent of Communist Party structures, OFT probably realised that 
considerable support could be mobilised from within the Communist 
Party and was aware that there had already been moves to create a 
republican party - an alliance with Leningrad 
CP structures could achieve 
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this. ' 
A draft programme for the creation of the RCP appeared in March 1990, 
followed by the first Initiative Congress for Reviving the RCP on 21-22 
April. " Izvestiia reported that the delegates included representatives of 
OFT and of LRPD Otechestvo lo' - two of the most prominent 'patriotic' 
groups in Leningrad. The Initiative Congress recognised that an RCP 
within the CPSU more or less existed and declared on 22 April that all 
members of the CPSU living on the territory of the RSFSR would 
automatically become members of the republican party. 102 A second 
Initiative Congress was held in Leningrad in June, shortly before the 
Russian party conference (organised by the Russian Bureau of the CC 
CPSU) in Moscow: 
It claimed to represent some 1,764,000 communists, called for more work to be done on the 
programmatic documents and nominated candidates for a CC [Central Committee] for the 
proposed Russian party. And in a scarcely veiled threat, it declared that if the Russian CP 
was not created at the forthcoming Russian conference, the organising committee and the CC 
nominees would take on the responsibility of the CC RCP. 1°3 
The Russian party conference started on 19 June and, the following day, 
transformed itself into the Founding Congress of the Communist Party of 
the RSFSR. 104 
The new RCP was a victory for Russian nationalist-orientated 
communists - they had achieved 'equal rights' in CP terms, could focus 
upon Russian affairs more easily and pursue the idea of Russian 
sovereignty. Although they had the backing of conservative elements 
within the CPSU (who required a power-base from which they could 
oppose the Party reformers), the 'patriots' had played their part in the 
process - OFT had a considerable influence on the formation of the RCP 
and was not even a constituent part of the CPSU. Many of the resolutions 
passed by the Initiative Congress had coincided with OFT's views - and the 
Organisational Bureau (Orgbiuro) of the new RCP included OFT 
theoreticians M. Popov and A. Sergeev. 105 The Orgbiuro also included 
other members well-known for their 'patriotic' views: Deputy Editor of 
Molodaia gvardiia, Viacheslav Gorbachev, and CC CPSU member, Dmitrii 
Barabashov. 
The RCP did not immediately become the efficient and highly-organised 
87 
force that had been envisaged by its sponsors - it only developed its 
organisational structures towards the end of the year following internal 
disputes between various groups within the Party, who had been unable to 
agree upon a party programme of action-" Up until this time, the RCP was 
identified with the conservative views of its First Secretary, Ivan 
Polozkov. However, from the end of 1990, the RCP took a more Russian 
nationalist course, forging a new bloc of forces, united 'not under a red, 
Bolshevik banner, but under moderately nationalist, mainly statist 
slogans'. 107 The mastermind behind this move appeared to be Gennadii 
Ziuganov. 108 
The first significant manifestation of this bloc emerged on 27 February 
with the staging of a Conference of Public-Political and National-Patriotic 
Movements 'For a Great and Unified Russia! "09 The Conference came into 
being following significant developments. 
Firstly, Soiuz group of Deputies had come to prominence in 
November /December as an influential parliamentary opposition to both 
El'tsin and the centre. It held its founding congress on 1-2 December and 
made it clear that its most important aim was to stop secession of (and 
further devolution of power to) the republics and to maintain the unity of 
the Soviet Union, proposing the imposition of direct presidential rule on 
those republics whose leaders refused to sign a new Union Agreement-110 
Soiuz was not just a body of conservative communism - it also 
represented imperialist Russian nationalism and Soviet nationalism. "' 
Although Soiuz included thirty-three different nationalities, there were 
indications that it was highly pro-Russian (it included many Russians 
from the periphery, members of the 'international movements' and 
representatives of the military-industrial complex). "' The group of 
Deputies co-operated closely with the 'international movements' in the 
Baltic and Moldavia and backed the idea of so-called 'committees of 
national salvation' to restore order in the periphery. "' 
Secondly, a letter to Gorbachev in Sovetskaia Rossiia in December 
signalled the strength of feeling from conservative elements opposing the 
potential break-up of the Union. 114 It called upon Gorbachev to take 
immediate measures against separatism and, if necessary, exercise direct 
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presidential rule. The letter was signed by literary figures such as 
Bondarev and Prokhanov, but also by prominent military figures such as 
Generals Moiseev and Varennikov. 
Thirdly, the aftermath of events in Lithuania and Latvia in January 
provoked concern from adherents to imperialist Russian nationalism. On 
13 January, the Lithuanian radio and television' centre in Vilnius was 
attacked by OMON and Spetsnaz forces and announcements were made 
that power had been assumed by a Lithuanian 'National Salvation 
Committee'. A similar event occurred on 20 January in Riga, when an 
attack on the Latvian Interior Ministry building was followed by 
announcements that a Latvian 'National Salvation Committee' had taken 
control. It was unclear as to who was behind these 'salvation committees', 
but they were supported by members of the local Communist Parties, 
members of the military and KGB, hardliners from the Soiuz bloc and 
members of the small 'centrist' bloc of political parties and movements. "' 
The shadowy nature of the national salvation committees suggests that 
they never existed as such, but were smokescreens for the involvement of 
the central authorities. The failure of these actions in the Baltic to 
overthrow the local parliaments signalled to 'statists' that alternative 
political action had to be taken to secure the integrity of the Union. 
The aim of the organisers of the Conference 'For a Great and Unified 
Russia! ' was to bring together the broadest alliance of pro-Union forces. 
The device of Russian nationalism seemed to have broad appeal, because 
it could mobilise not only self-styled Russian 'patriots', but members of 
Soiuz and other 'internationalist' movements which had pro-Russian 
sympathies within their ranks. An article in Sovetskaia Rossiia following 
the Conference claimed that 26 parties, groups and movements of 'the 
most diverse orientations' took part: 
from Communists of Russia to the descendants of the Russian nobility and monarchists, 
Orthodox and Muslim clergy. "' 
Nezavisimaia gazeta reported that around 60 public organisations and 
parties took part, including the Communist Party of the RSFSR, the Soiuz 
group of Deputies, OFT, Edinstvo, Otechestvo, the 'Centrist' 
bloc and a 
delegation from the RSFSR Writers' Union. "" There was, clearly, a very 
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broad range of statist groups uniting under an imperialist Russian 
nationalist banner. One journalist commented that : 
in spite of a big difference in ideological outlooks, they found a common language... they all have one ideal today - Russia, because today they all have one faith- in her [Russia's] 
great fate. 1" 
This comment is backed up by the words of one of the Conference 
participants, N. V. Vasil'ev: 
The disintegration of Russia is terrible. It is not important that we are of different 
orientations, the main things are the renaissance of Russia and our unification. 119 
The strength of unity behind this Russian nationalist approach to the 
maintenance of the Union is illustrated by the words of National 
Democratic Party member, Evgenii Krylov, who declared that the delegates 
should 'use the structures' of the CP and 'join the RCP'12° - the NDP had 
originally been formed as an anti-communist party. 
The RCP stressed before 27 January that the Party itself was not conducting 
the Conference - CC spokesmen claimed that it was being run by an 
organisational committee headed by Aleksandr Prokhanov. 121 However, 
one of the chief speakers was First Secretary of the RCP, Ivan Polozkov, 
and Sovetskaia Rossiia printed his speech alone the day after the 
Conference. He spoke of the 'great Russian [russkii] people', 'the 
renaissance and renewal of Russia', Russians becoming 'unnecessary 
people in their own country' and the tragedy of 'millions of Russians... 
living in other Union republics'. " Polozkov's speech underlined the 
Russian orientation of the RCP. There is little doubt that the RCP had 
more than a convening role in the Conference. " 
As a result of the Conference, a Co-ordinating Council of the Patriotic 
Forces of Russia was formed. This was intended to be the co-ordinating 
body and mouthpiece for the 'patriotic bloc' which had supposedly been 
formed. In its sessions, the Council, chaired by Eduard Volodin, made 
pronouncements criticising both El'tsin and the centre and promoting the 
idea of a 'third force' (in opposition to El'tsin-Gorbachev or the democrats- 
communists) - the national-patriotic movement. "' However, despite 
drawing representatives of 'over 40 public-political movements, parties 
and organisations of Russia' to a session at the end of March, the Co- 
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ordinating Council's activity was surprisingly quiet. It appeared that the 
RCP had decided to build its power-base in a parliamentary fashion by 
seeking to remove El'tsin from the post of Chairman of the RSFSR 
Supreme Soviet. Thus, its attentions were temporarily re-routed away 
from the Co-ordinating Council and the extra-parliamentary 'patriotic' 
bloc. " The efforts to remove El'tsin were foiled and the RCP failed to 
keep the question of a presidency off the agenda at the III RSFSR Congress 
of People's Deputies between 28 March -5 April. 
Members of the Co-ordinating Council of the Patriotic Forces of Russia 
were involved in a further attempt before August to rally like-minded 
forces behind the Russian flag in order to maintain the integrity of the 
Union, with the formation of the Otchizna All-Russian Patriotic 
Movement in June 1991.126 This Movement was formed five days after 
Boris El'tsin was directly elected President of the RSFSR. It resulted from 
an initiative by 140 People's Deputies of the RSFSR127 in conjunction with 
representatives of 45 organisations and societies. " Support came from 
Soiuz and Otechestvo, amongst others. The significant difference about 
this Movement was that it had very close links with both the Army and 
the Navy. The Founding Congress of the Russian branch of Otchizna took 
place in an army club and the main speaker was RSFSR People's Deputy, 
Lieutenant General B. Tarasov, who subsequently became the Movement's 
leader. In his address to the Congress, the 'military patriot' underlined 
that the 'way out of the crisis' could only be achieved through 'patriotism' 
and 'spiritual and ethical [n ra vstvenno e] rebirth'. Tarasov added that: 
We must restore the sovereignty and national honour of the Russian people, and repulse 
Russophobia. 129 
One of the aims of the movement was to attract 'patriots of Russia, 
irrespective of their party affiliation and ideological convictions'. 130 The 
development of Otchizna was clearly an effort to unite and stimulate the 
pro-Russian and pro-Union forces targetted by the previous efforts of 
those who had participated in the Conference 'For a Great and Unified 
Russia! The close relationship with the Coordinating Council of Patriotic 
Movements of Russia was underlined when the Council passed a 
resolution at the end of July 1991 to hold a unifying congress with 
the 
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Otchizna Movement. 131 
Otchizna's open military-orientation was an indication that Russian 
'patriotic' forces were attempting to identify and ally themselves with the 
armed forces. This might have been because the armed forces were seen as 
a potentially willing constituency of support or because RCP-backed 
Russian nationalists were preparing for a future seizure of power. 
Certainly, oblique warnings appeared in the press in July when Otchizna 
appealed to the Georgian public to reject the draft citizenship law, hinting 
that it 'discriminated' against the 'Russian population'. 132 However, when 
the attempted coup occurred in August 1991, Otchizna was one of the 
organisations which condemned the actions of the Emergency Committee 
(GKChP). This suggests that the RCP-sponsored bloc did not support the 
coup attempt, which probably damaged the bloc's efforts to develop 
broader support both within the military and amongst the public. It does 
not rule out the possibility that Otchizna and other Russian nationalist 
forces were preparing their own future coup or were planning to flex their 
muscles to dissuade others from leaving the 'historically-formed, 
thousand-year statehood' of Russia. 
Other New Developments 
This period witnessed the formation of several other Russian nationalist- 
orientated organisations, which failed to capture the public's imagination. 
These organisations were, on the whole, limited in support and could 
sometimes be identified with specific agenda (e. g. monarchism). Most had 
links with other Russian nationalist organisations and a number of the 
leaders had been members of earlier organisations such as Pamiat'. 
Soiuz Venedov was an example of a movement which had its origins in 
previous organisations. Founded in spring 1991, Soiuz Ve nedo v's leader 
was former Leningrad Pamiat' member, Konstantin Sidaruk. 
' It resulted 
from the split of a fairly anonymous organisation (the Russian Popular 
Party) which had originally split from the National Democratic Party 
shortly after its formation in 1989. The group's activity appeared to 
be 
limited to the distribution of its Pan-Slavist, anti-Marxist-Leninist 
propaganda in the newspaper Rodnye prostory, which 
bore a swastika-like 
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symbol on the front page. This symbol reflected Soiuz Ve nedo v's Nazi- 
like views which supported the expansion of a Russian Orthodox 
(representing the highest stage of development of an ancient pagan 
religion) empire stretching beyond the confines of Russia. The group did 
not really develop its programme after its inception, but it maintained 
links with a number of other groups including Pamiat', Otechestvo, the 
Christian Patriotic Union and, more significantly, with two later groups, 
Russian National Unity and Slavianskii Sobor. 
The Party of Russia's Rebirth (Partiia vozrozhdeniia Rossii, later the 
Union of the Rebirth of the Fatherland - Soiuz vozrozhdeniia Otechestva) 
formed in April 1990 and represented one of the 'patriotic' organisations 
wooed by the Co-ordinating Council of the Patriotic Forces of Russia, 
O tc hiz na and Soiuz. '34 It was essentially a pro-socialist, anti-capitalist 
organisation (many members were also Communist Party members) 
whose organisational committee came into being following the 
publication of a letter of 74 Russian writers in February and another letter 
penned by writers, cultural figures and academics in Nash sov re mennik 
in April135 - this suggested that it had close links and sympathies with 
conservative Russian nationalist forces from within the establishment. 
However, the Party can be distinguished from groups such as the 
Association of Russian Artists by its open anti-Semitism (or, as it claimed, 
'anti-Zionism') - it appeared that the Party's membership included former 
members of small 'patriotic' groups such as Otechestvo (Sverdlovsk, 
Tiumen'), Rodina, Patriot and pro-socialist members of Pa m is t'. 1' 
Perhaps one of the most interesting developments concerned the RNPR, 
which also formed in April 1990. Unlike the Party of Russia's Rebirth, the 
RNPR grew out of a branch of Pamiat' which was opposed to 
communism. 13' Originating as the 'white' (anti-communist) wing of 
Pamiat' in Leningrad and progressing through a further stage as the 
Russian National-Patriotic Centre (RNPTs), RNPR called for 'democracy' 
[n a ro dovlastii e], whilst criticising the activities of 'left-radicals' (democrats 
such asVybory - 90, LNF, etc. ) and 'Western' 
forms of democracy. Its 
platform document supported Russian 'rebirth', 
RSFSR 
sovereignty /statehood and the introduction of Russian 
institutions - all 
features shared with the Bloc of Public Patriotic Movements. 
However, 
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RNPR did not lay any emphasis upon the integrity of the Soviet Union. 
In September, Aleksandr Solzhenitsyn published his pamphlet in the 
Soviet press on his vision of a renewed Russia. This struck a chord with 
RNPR which produced a programme in October calling for a renewed 
Russia, separate from the non-Russian republics, but forming a 
federal /confederate Russian [Rossiiskii] Union with the Slavic republics 
and Kazakhstan. RNPR aimed to achieve this through a 'sensible 
combination of patriotism and democracy' where democracy was of a 'new 
national Russian' variety. " This was one of the first organisations to 
reject the idea of the empire and to advocate a 'third way' to achieve this. 
The Party even referred to itself as a 'third political force'. "' However, this 
'third way' was somewhat vague - it appeared to consist of the idea of 
Russian statehood, the guidance of Russian Orthodoxy and a principle of 
'nation first'. The Party advocated a mixed economy with state ownership 
of, amongst other things, the military industrial complex, most of the 
available land and strategic raw materials, whilst protectionist measures 
would be introduced to prevent the purchase by foreigners of Russian- 
owned businesses, securities and inventions. " By November, the Party 
had dubbed itself, the 'Party of Solzhenitsyn's ideas'. 14' However, although 
Solzhenitsyn's ideas were greeted with respect by Russians, they did not 
mobilise a mass political following. Similarly, the RNPR enjoyed only 
marginal support throughout this period. 
From spring 1990, there was also a small burst of activity from monarchist 
groups. PRAMOS, RISO, the Petersburg Monarchist Centre (PMTs) and 
the Orthodox-Monarchist Accord (Pravoslavno-Monarkhicheskoe 
soglasie) all supported the restoration of Grand Prince Vladimir 
Kirillovich to a Russian throne - these groups were referred to as 
'legitimists' - whilst others, the 'popular monarchists' were concerned 
with the restoration of a tsar, but wished to select somebody other than 
Vladimir Kirillovich. " All the groups supported rule by monarchy and 
the restoration of Russian Orthodoxy as a guiding influence in Russian 
life. However, they differed on one other fundamental point - the 
'legitimists' supported the restoration of a Russian nobility, whilst popular 
monarchists rejected this as a Western idea. 
PRAMOS was founded in May 1990, having refashioned itself 
from the 
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previously mentioned PKMPR. It joined in alliances which supported a 
greater Russian state, but opposed communism and socialism. In 1990, it 
promoted a monarchist message which received some attention, due to 
public interest in the death of the Imperial family. However, by 1991, it was 
virtually inactive-" RISO was legalised in Russia in spring 1990, after 
having been an emigre movement. Throughout 1990-91 it propagated an 
anti-communist, monarchist idea through a substantial amount of 
literature and a newspaper called the Dvuglavyi orel (Double-Headed 
Eagle). PMTs (spring 1990) and Pravoslavno-Monarkhicheskoe soglasie 
(July 1990) were small organisations with a limited activity. Both included 
former members of Pamiat'. 1' PMTs campaigned for the restoration of 
former Russian symbols, including the Russian tricolour, the double- 
headed eagle, the tsarist national anthem, and spent much of its activity 
campaigning for the return of pre-revolutionary place-names, in 
particular, that of St. Petersburg. 145 
The 'popular monarchists' also increased their activity following the 1990 
elections. The Popular Orthodox Movement (Na ro dn o- p ra vo slavnoe 
dvizheni e), which had formed in February and included E. Pashnin's 
Kh P S146 and a handful of other (mostly Pa m is t') groups, "" started printing 
newspapers. However, its activity was short-lived and the movement died 
out by autumn of the same year. Another notable adherent to the popular 
monarchist idea was the "Christian Rebirth" Union of V. Osipov. 
Formerly part of the KhPS, this Union had competed in the March 
elections148 and continued its political activity throughout 1990, producing a 
manifesto in May claiming that Russia's strength was in Orthodoxy, 
Patriotism and Sobornost' [conciliarism]. In September, the group 
organised a meeting which included a majority of the groups supporting a 
'popular monarchy', who then formed an organ (predsobornoe 
soveshchanie) to prepare for a convocation of the Zemskii 
Sobor - the body 
which would elect a Tsar from the Romanov 
dynasty. 149 
Most of the monarchist groups envisaged Russia's rebirth through features 
of pre-revolutionary Russia. Although there was public sympathy 
for the 
Royal family following revelations about their execution, the idea of an 
Orthodox monarchy in Russia did not spread. The strength of the 
monarchist message even waned 
in 1991, following the initial 
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mushrooming of groups in 1990. 
In October 1990, a small, but significant group was established under the 
leadership of yet another formerPamiat' member, Aleksandr Barkashov. 
Under the slogan "With Faith in Russia, we shall win! ", 150 Russian 
National Unity (Russkoe natsional'noe edinstvo - RNE) took over from 
Pa m is t' for its notoriety as one of the most extreme right-wing exponents 
of Russian nationalism. "' A month before it was founded, Barkashov had 
broken with Viktor Iakushev, who went on to found the fascist National- 
Social Union (NSS), whilst in December RNE formed an alliance with 
Soiuz Ve n ed ov- another group with an extreme right-wing ideology-"' 
The group was anti-communist, anti-Semitic, anti-Western, opposed 
Gorbachev and opposed the 'democrats'. It spoke of 'order' and 'discipline', 
supported a 'strong, indivisible, powerful Russia' in which the 'Russian 
[russkii] nation/people should retain their 'historical place and role'. " In 
February 1991, it published an address to 'compatriots' in which it criticised 
'separatist tendencies', which had grown into 'anti-Russian extremism'. " 
RNE declared that it could not forgive the spilling of 'fraternal Russian 
blood' and called upon the armed forces to maintain the territorial 
integrity (of the Union) and protect Russians [russkie]. It called for the 
mobilisation of reservists of Russian nationality in the Union republics to 
'keep public order'. Finally, the address proposed the creation of a 
Temporary State Organ with emergency powers, consisting of 
representatives from the armed forces, the KGB, the MVD, Afghan 
veterans, 'patriotic' toilers and 'patriotic' specialists. Clearly, RNE aimed to 
hold the Russian empire together and uphold the primacy of ethnic 
Russians by authoritarian means. 
In the same month (October), the Slavic Party" was founded by Fedor 
Moskalenko, who had previously been a member of Skurlatov's RNF and 
a member of the short-lived Popular Front of the RSFSR. " The Party had 
a pan-Slavist message, aiming to 'maintain and strengthen the Great 
Russian state [and] protect the interests of the indigenous population of the 
Slavic republics'. ' The Party programme called for the stimulation of the 
birth-rate in the Slavic republics and the settlement of unpopulated areas 
of Russia with 'Slavs, refugees professing Orthodox 
Christianity and 
respecting Russian culture and folk traditions, patriotic-minded 
Russian 
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and Slavic emigres and their descendants'. " Like some of the Pamiat' 
groups, Moskalenko's Party advocated the idea of national-proportional 
representation in the republics 'in all spheres and at all levels', including 
the organs of power. The Slavic Party was indicative of imperialist 
Russian nationalist efforts to maintain the greater Russian state through 
the nucleus of Slavic unity. This method had been employed by members 
of the Bloc for Public Patriotic Movements. 
In October - November, there was an attempt by some of the smaller 
parties and movements to raise their profile and participation in political 
life. Having formed in June 1990, the 'Centrist Bloc"59 was consulted in 
autumn by the Soviet leadership on the questions of the Union 
Agreement and the Consititution. It was reported that the Bloc's leader, V. 
Voronin had met with Council of Ministers Chairman, Nikolai Ryzhkov, 
on the question of forming a 'coalition government of national unity'. 160 In 
addition, representatives of the Bloc met with Deputy Chairman of the 
Supreme Soviet, Anatolii Luk'ianov. 161 The Bloc consisited of V. 
Voronin's Union of Democratic Forces, V. Zhirinovskii's LDP, Skurlatov's 
RNF, lu. Bokan"s 'Blue Movement' and others. Showing an increasing 
imperialist Russian nationalist tendency, the Bloc produced a 'manifesto' 
in December, "" declaring that the country could be saved with the help of 
the army. l It also called for the creation of 'national salvation committees 
- which inspired the idea of the so-called 'committees' announced in the 
Baltic in January of the following year. On 15 December, a group within 
the Bloc, calling itself the 'League of Independent Academics' worked out 
an alternative draft Union Agreement, in which the USSR would be 
renamed the Russian Republic and the country would be divided into 
provinces (gubernii). 1" By February, the Bloc was calling for presidential 
rule in the USSR, the dissolution of the Russian and Baltic parliaments 
and a ban on all political parties. The Centrist Bloc certainly managed to 
raise its profile, which was beneficial to Vladimir Zhirinovskii, who later 
contested the Russian presidential elections. 
At the end of December, a new organisation appeared which supported the 
idea of a greater Russian state, but one which did not coincide with the 
boundaries of the Soviet Union. The Russian National Union (R usskii 
obshchenatsional'nyi soiuz - RONS) wished to reconstitute a 
Russian 
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[Rossiiskii] Union consisting of Russia, Ukraine, Belorussia and areas of 
Kazakhstan and Kirgizia with a dense Slavic population, whilst allowing 
the peoples of Central Asia, the Caucasus, the Baltic and Moldavia to 
choose independence, if they so wished. One of RONS's aims was to 
restore to the Russian people" its 'national dignity and way of life' - the 
rebirth of the Russian people would be based upon the values of: God, the 
Fatherland, the Family and the Individual. " Oppposing both the 
communists and the democrats, RONS proposed that the Russian 
economy should include heavy involvement of the state, taking into 
account moral and national interests. The guiding principle was: 
"Anything that is for the benefit of Russians and Russia is good". RONS 
was advocating a 'third way' characterised by 'Christian moral principles' 
and a 'Russia first' policy. In the approach to the March referendum on 
the maintenance of the USSR, RONS opposed the Union which 'subjected 
Russians to robbery by the southern republics'. "" Furthermore, it called for 
an alternative referendum on the unification of lands it considered to be 
the basis for a new independent state - the Russian Union. 
At the beginning of 1991, there was another attempt to unite some of the 
newer and more established Russian nationalist-orientated organisations. 
Slavianskii sobor (Slavic Assembly) drew together some of the groups 
which had surfaced from within the establishment and some of the 
extreme right-wing groups spawned by Pa m is t'. Thus, the United Council 
of Russia, Edinenie (formerly the Movement of Lovers of Russian Letters 
and CultureE dinst vo ), LRPD Otechestvo, OFT and the Initiative Congress 
of the Russian Communist Party (which had continued to function as an 
independent body) were linked with the likes of RNE, Soiuz Ve nedov, 
and the Slavic Party-'68 Members of the literary world such as Bondarev, 
Proskurin and Prokushev were united under the leadership of the 
extreme right-wing ex-Pamiat' member, Barkashov, i. e. those who had 
supported the maintenance of communism were prepared to share a 
forum with right-wing anti-communists, all in the name of 'protecting the 
honour, dignity rights and interests of the Slavic population'. 169 The aims 
of the Assembly included the strengthening of 
Slavic unity and 
'maintaining the value system of Slavic civilisation . 
loo However, in 
reality, the greatest emphasis was 
focused upon the fate of 
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Russians /Russian-speakers and Russia. In all, 52 'patriotic' organisations 
took part in the Founding Congress in January - this number increased to 
96 at the II Congress in May of the same year, when a 'Slavic Duma' was 
established to co-ordinate the organisation's activities. "" At this Second 
Congress, the 'Slavia -inform' Association was formed to co-ordinate the 
activities of certain Russian nationalist publications in the interests of 
'informing the population about the most important events'. " 
Slavianskii Sobor's activity continued throughout 1991, establishing links 
with a handful of parties from other Slavic countries and creating regional 
branches in the Soviet Slavic republics, but focusing mainly upon the 
integrity of the Union and opposing 'Zionism', separatism and 'anti- 
Russian extremism'. 
There were very few new Russian nationalist-orientated organisations of 
any note founded during 1991 prior to the events of August. The Russian 
Party (Russkaia partiia) of Viktor Korchagin was founded in May 1991173 
and continued the idea of building a greater Russian state, based not upon 
the Soviet Union, but, in this case, upon the territory of the RSFSR and 
areas of the Soviet Union densely populated by Russians - Northern 
Kazakhstan, Northern Kirgizia, the left bank of the Dnieper and Crimea. 
The Russian Party was hostile to communism and the democrats, both of 
which were linked with 'Zionism'. 174 Korchagin's Russian solution 
involved a multi-party system (with the aim of removing the CPSU from 
power) preceded by an 'emergency' transitional period during which 
executive power would be handed to a Russian national government and 
officers of the armed forces. The Party opposed central planning and 
privatisation of state assets, but supported a mixed economy in which 
workers owned their own enterprises. The Party's Russian 'third way' 
rejected Christianity and seemed to think that self-rule by ethnic Russians 
('a unique, great nation') was sufficient for the revival of the Russian state. 
Many of the fringe groups which appeared during this period were linked 
to former members of Pamiat' (and other early 'patriotic' organisations), 
who, having developed their views, wished to establish their own, 
personal political soap-boxes. The development of these smaller parties 
illustrates a number of things: firstly, that the idea of a monarchy 
became 
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briefly fashionable in 1990, although not a serious prospect; secondly, that a 
Russian nationalism surfaced which advocated a Russian 
fundamentalism (i. e. a system distinct from communism and Western 
democracy, but with supposed Russian national characteristics), which was 
not linked to the idea of maintaining the whole of the Soviet Union as the 
Russian empire/state; and, thirdly, the alliances which were created 
(notably, Slavianskii sobor, in which supposed extremes of the political 
spectrum came together) proved that adherence to imperialist Russian 
nationalism was more important than paying attention to political 
differences. 
The Presidential Election 
A resolution to hold a referendum on the maintenance of the Soviet 
Union was passed by the USSR Supreme Soviet on the 18 January 1991. 
When this was held on the 17 March, a supplementary question was asked 
in Russia: "Do you consider the post of an RSFSR President elected by 
universal suffrage to be necessary? " Almost 70% voted in favour of a 
directly-elected Russian presidency. " This made the creation of such a post 
almost inevitable. 
Russian nationalist opposition to the idea of -a Russian presidency 
materialised only in the form of parliamentary hindrance. This reflected 
opposition to El'tsin and E'ltsin's candidacy rather than opposition to the 
principle of a Russian president. During the Third Russian Congress of 
People's Deputies, the Communists of Russia bloc and the Rossia group of 
deputies had tried to keep the issue of a presidency off the agenda. When 
the question of approving the election came before the Fourth Russian 
Congress in May 1991, the Co-ordinating Council of the Patriotic Forces of 
Russia issued an appeal to the Congress to delay the election, in order to 
give 'work-collectives and citizens' ample opportunity to put forward 
candidates-" However, these efforts failed and the election date was set for 
12 June 1991. 
The CC of the Russian Communist Party supported the candidacy of 
Nikolai Ryzhkov, a high-profile candidate who had already received the 
backing of many work collectives and regional Party organisations. " 
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Ryzhkov represented Communist Party conservatism rather than Russian 
nationalism, but had the most promising chance of all the candidates 
standing against El'tsin - having been a former prime minister, he was 
known and could receive the backing of the establishment and its media - 
thus, the RCP supported him in the absence of more attractive candidates. 
Ryzhkov reciprocated their support by playing the Russian card: he vowed 
to help prevent the break-up of Russia; condemned the forcible 
resettlement of displaced Russians; pledged to look after Russians 
[rossiiane] outside the borders of the RSFSR, adding that all refugess 
should be given 'moral and material' support; he also promised to revive 
the Russian countryside and help purge society of mass culture - two areas 
of Russian nationalist concern from the early days of glasnost. l'$ Despite 
Ryzhkov's statements, Russian nationalism was better represented by the 
candidacies of Vladimir Zhirinovskii and by the hardline General Al'bert 
Makashov. Zhirinovskii's campaign was characterised by a populist, 
Russian nationalist message - he promised to defend Russians and the 
Russian language, to rename the USSR 'Russia' and to eliminate the 
national territories of the USSR by introducing provinces or gu be rn ii as 
administrative units. " Makashov was closer to the establishment, with a 
similar outlook to some of the aforementioned 'international' 
movements-"' He had been active in the foundation of the Russian 
Communist Party and was backed, along with his running mate, Alexei 
Sergeev, by the Initiative movement of the RCP. In a televised presidential 
debate, Makashov gave a very inarticulate performance, but managed to 
stress that if El'tsin was voted into power, it would cause the disintegration 
of Russia. 181 Like Zhirinovskii, Makashov was a pro-Union candidate, but 
drew respect as a Russian 'patriot' even from the RNE newspaper Pul's 
Tushina. 182 
The election result gave El'tsin a convincing victory, with 57.3% of the 
vote. " However, it should be noted that El'tsin paid significant attention 
to the Russian national angle. Having already established himself as a 
champion of Russian sovereignty and Russian institutions, 
El'tsin 
appointed the former Moscow Otechestvo member, 
Aleksandr Rutskoi, as 
his presidential running-partner. At the beginning of 
1991, he had 
suggested that a Russian [ros si is ka ia] army might 
be necessary to protect 
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Russia's sovereignty"' and also began to voice his support for Russians 
living in the periphery - something which Russian nationalist 
organisations (particularly the 'international' movements) had been doing 
fervently for some time. " 
It was no surprise that Nikolai Ryzhkov came second in the ballot 
(16.85%), but many were surprised by the third place success of Vladimir 
Zhirinovskii, who received 7.81% of the vote. The size of his support 
might reflect a number of things, for example: he was a non-Communist 
candidate, who, at the same time, opposed the democrats; he was new (i. e. 
did not represent one of the old high-ranking nomenklatura) and had 
managed to develop a sufficiently high profile in a short space of time; he 
had developed a populist programme which promised to make people 
rich and pledged to cut the price of vodka. However, one cannot ignore 
the strength of Zhirinovskii's (imperialist) Russian nationalist message, 
which struck a chord with a section of the electorate. General Makashov 
finished fifth out of six candidates with 3.74% of the vote - tainted, no 
doubt, by the fact that he was a little-known communist candidate 
representing conservative opinion. 
'A Word to the People' 
One of the most significant events connected with Russian nationalism 
before the attempted coup of August was the publication of a letter in 
Sovetskaia Rossiia. ` 'A Word to the People' was a passionate appeal to 
the nation to hold together the historical Russian state, i. e. the Soviet 
Union. Addressing 'Russians' and 'citizens of the USSR', the letter started 
with a warning: 
There is great, unprecedented trouble. The Motherland, our country and great state, which 
were handed to us for protection by history, nature, and our glorious ancestors, are 
dying, 
breaking apart and sinking into shade and non-existence. 
187 
The thrust of this warning was that secessionists and democrats were 
leading the country to ruin. The letter spoke of 'the 
backbone of Russia 
breaking' and pointed to the skills of renewal which 
Russians could offer: 
Amongst the Russians there are state-minded men prepared to 
lead the country to a 
sovereign future which is not degrading. 
There are experts in economics capable of reviving 
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production. There are thinkers, creators of spirit, who can clearly see the national [obshschenarodnyi] ideal. 'm 
The appeal called for the maintenance of the unitary Soviet state, whilst 
lauding the qualities of Russians and pursuing the idea of Russian 
national renewal. It closed with the following words: 
The Soviet Union is our home and stronghold, built by the great efforts of all peoples and 
nations, it has saved us from shame and slavery over the years of dark invasions! Russia is 
wonderfully beautiful and unequalled! She is calling for help. 189 
The signatories to the letter clearly considered the Soviet Union to be a 
Russian state, or, at least, a Russian-dominated state. They included the 
prominent Russian nationalists Prokhanov, Rasputin, Volodin, Bondarev 
and V. Klykov, instigator of the RCP-led 'Bloc of Patriotic Forces' Gennadii 
Ziuganov, Soiuz leader Iurii Blokhin, General Gromov of the MVD 
(Interior Ministry), General Valentin Varennikov, V. Starodubtsev and A. 
Tiziakov. The latter three were all participants in the failed coup attempt 
the following month. 
The 'Word' was yet another attempt to rally Russian nationalist 
sympathies together to form a 'popular patriotic movement'. In August, 
Sovetskaia Rossiia published an article from the 'initiative group' of this 
'movement' calling to action those who sympathised with the 'Word'. 190 
The newspaper added that the Liberal Democratic Party and the USSR 
'Intermovement' had both passed resolutions supporting the principles of 
the 'Word' and pledging to participate or work with a 'popular patriotic 
movement'. 191 Three days after the intiative group's call to action, the 
attempted coup took place. 
Following the coup attempt, there was speculation that the 'Word' had 
been a rallying cry for, or warning of, the forthcoming coup. However, 
despite the fact that three of the of the signatories to the 'Word' were 
involved in the coup attempt, 192 there is evidence to suggest that the joint 
forces which formulated the 'Word' might well have been planning a 
seizure of power, but not the attempt that took place on 19-21 August. In 
an interview in Moskovskie vedomosti in 1992, one of the signatories to 
the 'Word', Eduard Volodin, declared that: 
If it had not been for the August farce, it [the Word] would 
have helped to form a powerful 
patriotic movement all over the country. 
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Volodin claimed that the August events had seriously hindered the 
development of the 'patriotic movement' and the activity of the Co- 
ordinating Committee - he even suggested that the events were triggered 
by the democrats, in order to break up 'national forces'. The idea that the 
'democrats' were responsible for the coup attempt is not very credible - the 
comment is more a reflection of Volodin's bitterness or regret about what 
happened to the 'patriotic movement' following August. However, it is 
feasible that the 'patriotic movement' was not planning an August coup, 
because although the action of the GKChP was backed by the Russian 
Communist Party, it was immediately condemned by the Moscow branch 
of Otchizna . 1' It is likely that only three of the 'Word"s signatories knew 
about the coup attempt beforehand. 
The August event may not have been inspired by Russian nationalism, 
but it did attract the sympathies of some imperialist Russian nationalists. 
The RCP and the LDP were amongst those who lent their support to the 
Emergency Committee, whilst others maintained a neutral silence. 
The plotters were essentially conservative elements in the establishment 
who thought that reform had gone too far. Their message called for the 
maintenance of the Union, but used the motifs of Soviet nationalism, 
speaking of establishing the 'pride and honour of the Soviet person'. 195 The 
plotters did not refer to the special qualities of the Russian people or to the 
maintenance the historical Russian state. Their 'Address to the Soviet 
People' was formulated on a pro-Soviet and populist basis - it did not 
advocate a return to pre-perestroika communism, but preferred to 
highlight some of the more unpopular forms of business activity (and 
criminal activity) which had arisen. Perhaps, the plotters thought that 
they would attract the support of most statist-minded Soviet citizens. 
However, they could not count on the backing of pro-Union democrats 
and, significantly, it appears that imperialist Russian nationalism was 
divided in its attitude towards the coup. 
August 1991 - December 1991: Reacting to the 
break-up of the Union 
During this period, Russia managed to strengthen its independent identity. 
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Imperialist Russian nationalists who opposed the democratic idea of 
Russian statehood were hindered, at first, by a pre-emptive strike from 
El'tsin and then by the subsequent political developments in Russia and 
the republics. The number of pro-Union statists began to grow during this 
period as people from the democratic camp and supporters of a liberal 
Russian nationalism reacted to the possible break-up of the Union. This 
increased the ranks of imperialist Russian nationalism, although its 
adherents were disorganised and lacked unity. A number of new Russian 
nationalist groups appeared, some of which supported the maintenance of 
the unitary Soviet/Russian state, but none of which carried the weight to 
oppose the break-up of the USSR. More significantly, there was an 
indication that a few of the groups which had advocated the maintenance 
of the greater Russian state within the borders of the Soviet Union, were 
beginning to accept the idea of the break-up of the USSR and to focus upon 
a different, more isolationist concept of Russia. 
Russian nationalism's post-putsch potential 
Over the course of the 1990-91, liberal Russian nationalism had achieved 
many of its aims. The 'democrats' gained the upper hand and Russia 
began to develop its own state identity and institutions. Russia also started 
to operate as an independent actor and focus on its own affairs. The 
country had not been taken over by a Russian fundamentalism which 
excluded anything associated with the West, but by a democratic 
movement which offered to establish a civil society in which Russian 
national values could flourish. For liberal Russian nationalists, this 
meant, among other things, the propagation of Russian history and 
culture, the freedom of Russian Orthodoxy, Russian national media of 
communication, Russian national institutions and Russian state symbols. 
Following August 1991, Russia consolidated upon its newly-found state 
identity, starting with the re-introduction of the traditional Russian 
tricolour. The flag not only represented the victory of the democrats over 
communism, but was also a symbol of the Russian national 
ideal - Russian 
statehood. It also signalled a possible confrontation with those who 
had a 
different conception of the Russian state. 
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Directly after the failed coup, E1'tsin confronted imperialist Russian 
nationalism by suspending its mouthpieces Sovetskaia Rossiia and Den'. 
It was assumed that, due to their close links with some of the plotters, 
those involved with the newspapers had participated in the coup attempt. 
A second blow was directed against imperialist Russian nationalism when 
there was an attempt to confiscate the building belonging to the RSFSR 
Writers' Union, which had been a bastion of Russian nationalist thinking 
since the beginning of glasnost. 196 However, the Writers' Union retained its 
building and, after a few weeks, the two newspapers resumed publishing - 
for the remainder of the year Den' and Sovetskaia Rossiia were at the 
forefront of airing imperialist Russian nationalist opinion. The reversal of 
these actions by El'tsin against the organisations may stem from several 
factors: firstly, there was no proof that the Writers Union or these 
publications had conspired in the attempted coup; secondly, the democrats 
did not want to develop an authoritarian image; thirdly, antagonising such 
groups might lead to a greater unity of opposition; and, fourthly, the 
democrats did not want the imperialist Russian nationalists to be the only 
ones associated with the Russian national idea. Russian nationalism was 
still a potentially strong mobilising force: it could serve as a replacement 
ideology for communism; with the collapse of communism and the 
centre, Russian politics could easily polarise between the 'patriotic' and the 
'democratic' camps; the vast majority of the RSFSR population were ethnic 
Russians or Russian-speakers, who posed a potentially vast constituency of 
emotional support, particularly in the event of an ethnic Russian crisis 
outside the RSFSR's borders. Self-styled 'patriots' had for some time 
focused their opposition to the democrats and the centre around the 
Russian national idea - it was in their interests to maintain and 
develop 
this image. 
Post-August Developments 
Shortly after the August events, the Rossiia group of 
deputies joined with 
others to rally opposition to the democrats 
by forming the Russian Popular 
Union (Rossiiskii obshchenarodnyi soiuz - ROS) under the 
leadership of 
RSFSR People's Deputy, Sergei Baburin. ROS held its Founding 
Congress 
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in October 1991 and included several members of the Soiuz group of 
deputies who joined ROS when the USSR Congress of People's Deputies 
effectively ceased to exist. Its sympathies lay in the maintenance of the 
Union, 197 but with the effective break-up of the Soviet Union, it 
concentrated on the ideas of the rebirth of Russia and the unity of Russia, 
Ukraine and Belorussia. The group claimed that it aimed to 'unite 
Russians and Bashkirs, Iakuts and Ukrainians, Germans and Poles, the 
peoples of the Volga and the Northern Caucasus', whilst it also appealed to 
'family' of the Eastern Slavs of Russia, Ukraine and Belorussia to unite-"' 
This emphasis is significant, because the group wished to act as an 
umbrella representing not only those 'patriotic' groups which aimed to 
maintain the Union, but also those which supported the idea of a 
fundamentally Russian state divorced from the non-Russian/non-Slavic 
republics. 
ROS believed in the 'rebirth of Russia' based upon the principles of 
democracy [narodovlastie], patriotism and justice. "' This involved the 
Russian people joining together to form a force of 'patriotic unity' to 
determine its 'historical fate', reflecting ROS's intention to form a unified 
Russian 'patriotic' alliance against the Western-influenced 'democrats'. 
In December, one of ROS's rallying slogans was: "All who love Russia, 
unite! i200 People joined ROS on an individual basis from a number of 
different 'patriotic' organisations, including members of the isolationist 
Russian nationalist group RNPR (which by 31 October 1991 had been 
renamed the National Republican Party of Russia - NRPR), RNF, 
Otechestvo (Moscow) and the Rebirth Party. There was clearly a broad 
platform of opinion in the Union, but it failed to become an all-embracing 
'patriotic' movement. 
Towards the end of the year, another group emerged (it was founded 1-2 
December) which became a member of ROS. The Russian Union (R uss 
ki i 
soiu z) ' was based in Ekaterinburg and represented several of the 
Russian 
nationalist-orientated movements which had surfaced 
in the Urals and 
other parts of the Soviet Union. It 
included Otechestvo of 
Sverdlovsk/Ekaterinburg - the first 'patriotic' movement to adopt 
the 
name Otechestvo. Previously, this group 
had supported the unitary Soviet 
state, but the Russian Union now advocated a more 
isolationist view, 
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calling for the establishment of a 'one and indivisible' Russian [r uss ko e] 
state, i. e. a state for the ethnic Russian people. This ethnic Russian state 
would comprise not only the '55 territories [krai] and provinces [oblasti] of 
the RSFSR 'inhabited mainly by Russians', but also the left bank of the 
Dnieper, Crimea, the 'Cossack districts [okrugi] of Kazakhstan and other 
regions' - i. e. areas where ethnic Russians constituted a majority. 20' Several 
figures had already called for the revision or review of internal Soviet 
borders, but onlyRossy and, possibly, the Russian Party had previously 
called for an ethnic Russian state within the borders of the RSFSR. The 
Russian Union believed that 'national interests' were higher than 'class, 
party, group or individual interests' and based Russian 'rebirth' on 
'national spirituality' - it did not advocate a theocratic state, but one in 
which Russian Orthodoxy bore a significant influence on Russian life. It 
added that spirituality could be restored 'only when politics and the 
economy are Russian' - this was a somewhat vague concept, but it 
involved Russian ownership of all land, power and large-scale property. 
The Russian Union displayed an isolationism which was anti-communist, 
anti-'democratic', anti-Western and anti-Semitic - it called for a vague third 
way for the Russian nation. Although this party was small, it was a 
further indication that, at the end of 1991, a number of people were 
beginning to accept the idea of a Russian state separate from from the non- 
Russian (or, at least, non-Slavic) republics and run according to a supposed 
unique 'Russian' system. 
At the end of October, another new party emerged uniting members of the 
Soiuz group of deputies, the declining RNF of Skurlatov and the leaders 
of the 'Christian Rebirth' Union, including Vladimir Osipov. The Party of 
Rebirth (Partiia vozrozhdeniia) wished to 'recreate and strengthen the 
centuries-old statehood of the fatherland'. 202 Its slogan was 'property, 
statehood, justice' - it wished to establish a market economy through the 
creation of a 'middle class'. Opposing the 'tyranny of the party 
apparatchiks' and the 'hegemony of the pseudo-democrats', the Party used 
a 'patriotic' platform. Vladimir Osipov even expressed the need 
for a 
'patriotic' party at the Party's Founding Congress: 
There are quite a few parties and movements of a patriotic orientation 
today. But, alas, 
nearly all of them pass themselves off as educational societies... 
We do not have a real 
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party, i. e. a political mechanism by which we could secure our participation in government or win power (by constitutional means). We need to create such a party. 203 
The Party wished to maintain the Soviet Union /historical Russian state 
on a federal basis and focused on the Russian people as the basis of this 
federal 'Eurasian' state: 
We... hope to awaken the national consciousness of the Russians who should become the 
spiritual basis for the possible rebirth and strengthening of Russian Eurasian statehood 
within its NATURAL GEOPOLITICAL BORDERS. 204 
The Party of Rebirth appeared to be a movement for the rebirth of the 
declining political careers of Skurlatov, Osipov and members of the Soiuz 
group of deputies. It dubbed itself an 'inter-republican political 
organisation', but it was of little interest to the non-Russian republics 
(most of which had declared independence by this time). Despite its pledge 
to represent all people, irrespective of their nationality and faith, the 
inclusion alone of Osipov in its leadership cast considerable doubt on this - 
he was the same Osipov who supported the restoration of Orthodoxy and a 
Russian monarchy as the bases for national revival. 
The Russian Party of National Rebirth (Russkaia partiia natsional'nogo 
vozrozhdeniia - RPNV) was intitated in September/October, although its 
Founding Congress was held at the end of the year (21 December), just 
before the break-up of the Soviet Union. 205 Like the Party of Rebirth, 
RPNV aimed to stop the break-up of the USSR and the RSFSR and to 
'revive a one and indivisible Russia'. It also focused heavily upon the 
'Russian' people as the centre of this unitary state. The 'Russian' people 
constituted not only of Great Russians (v eli ko ro ss y), but also of Ukrainians 
and Belorussians. The Party's plan for the re-integration of the state 
involved three stages: firstly, it would establish a Great Russian state 
(Ve li ko ro ssii a) within the structure of the RSFSR; secondly, it would unite 
the three Slavic states in a 'state-like formation'; and, thirdly, it would 
attempt to unite the other republics which might return to the Soviet fold. 
The Russian revival would involve, amongst other things: the influence 
of Russian Orthodoxy; the insitution of 'Russian' communes (o bshchin y) 
in every community (village, town, province, republic, etc. ) in order to 
protect the 'dignity and rights of Russian people'; the establishment of 
Russian cultural institutions; Russia's income to be spent within Russia 
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(no subsidies to states outside Russia). Although the Party concentrated on 
the immediate revival of the 'Great Russian' state and 'Russian' state, the 
imperialist Russian nationalist idea was clear from the Party's call for 
national-proportional representation in all major organs of the Russian 
state, thus guaranteeing 'Russian' control over government, the army, law 
enforcement, science, culture, business and education. 206 The RPNV 
advocated a 'Russia first' policy, aiming to develop first the revival of the 
Great Russians, then of the 'Russians' (Slavs) and to maintain them as the 
dominant force in the USSR (or its successor). 
At the end of the year, Nashi formed with the aim of saving the 'historical 
Russian state'. Its appearance or activity was fuelled, no doubt, by the 
Ukrainian vote for independence on 1 December (which was a devastating 
blow to imperialist Russian nationalism) and the Belovezhskaia pushcha 
meeting on 7 December which resulted in the formation of a 
Commonwealth of Independent States (between Russia, Ukraine and 
Belarus) and a condemnation of the 1922 Union Treaty. 
Nashi ('Ours') derived its name from a television programme produced by 
Aleksandr Nevzorov. 207 Formed on 13 December, Nash i was an outspoken 
group of prominent figures who supported the maintenance of the Soviet 
Union under Russian domination. In addition to supporting a strong, 
centralised Russian state, Nashi viewed themselves as defenders of 
'minority rights, particularly those of ethnic Russians in the independent 
Baltic states'. 208 Nevzorov was a well-known television reporter who had 
supported the suppression of separatism in the Baltic republics, portraying 
a distorted version of the January 1991 attack on the radio and television 
station in Vilnius and subsequent events in Riga. His pro-Russian, statist 
views can be summed up by his own words: 
I believe in the Russian idea. It is alive, in spite of years of defamation. Russia will not 
die! I was on the side of 'ours' and I will continue to defend them wherever they live. I was 
a supporter of a unified Russian great power and I still am. 2°9 
Besides Nevzorov, Nashi included Soiuz colonels Viktor Alksnis and 
Nikolai Petrushenko, Vladimir Zhirinovskii, A1'bert Makashev, and 
editor of Nash sovremennik, Stanislav Kuniaev. 21° Nashi represented a 
coalition of high-profile imperialist nationalists attempting a last-ditch 
effort to maintain the Union, whilst bringing the public's attention to the 
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possible plight of Russians in the (non-Russian) periphery. 
Democrats adopt imperialist Russian nationalism 
Autumn 1991 witnessed splits within Democratic Russia, mainly over the 
question of the integrity of the Union. This resulted in Russian 
nationalist-orientated elements rejecting the break-up of the single state 
and changing from a liberal Russian nationalist viewpoint to an 
imperialist nationalist viewpoint. 
The Popular Accord [Narodnoe soglasie] alliance had formed within 
Democratic Russia in April 1991 and had made it clear that it supported the 
idea of a Union state based upon 'the territories which support the 
maintenance of state unity'. These territories would all be voluntary 
signatories to a union treaty agreed upon by all parties. 21' Popular Accord, 
which consituted a minority of Democratic Russia's members, included 
Travkin's DPR, Aksiuchits' RKhDD and the Constitutional Democratic 
Party (Konstitutsionno-demokraticheskaia partiia - KDP) of Mikhail 
Astaf'ev (KDP existed within the framework of Democratic Russia in 
April, but was not officially founded until mid-June 1991). By November 
1991, this group was voicing a much stronger message against the break-up 
of the Union and also against the possible break-up of Russia. 212 Travkin 
believed in a single democratic state and was less worried than his alliance 
partners about specific Russian issues, although voiced concern about the 
fate of Russians and Russian-speakers outside the Russian Federation. 
Aksiuchits and Astaf'ev, who had been two of Democratic Russia's greatest 
exponents of liberal Russian nationalism, opposed the break-up of the 
Russian great power (d e rz hav a) and seemed concerned about the threat to 
Russian traditions and values which might occur as a result of that break- 
up. Consequently, Narodnoe soglasie left Democratic Russia and took up a 
position of opposition to El'tsin and the Democratic Russia. The following 
month (December), Narodnoe soglasie split through a lack of accord 
between its own leaders. 
There were probably several issues which influenced these democrats to 
slide from a liberal Russian nationalist to an imperial Russian nationalist 
viewpoint. The first was concern about the consequences for Russia of the 
111 
break-up of the Soviet Union and the 'unconstitutional' Belovezhskaia 
Agreement. Secondly, they were worried about the rights of Russians and 
Russian-speakers in the Baltic states, particularly in view of what they 
considered to be discriminatory citizenship laws. 21' Thirdly, they were 
frustrated by the democrats' reluctance to act decisively on behalf of 
Russians in areas of dispute and conflict, such as the left bank of the 
Dniester in Moldavia. There were a host of other issues which led these 
Russian nationalist-orientated democrats to believe that their former 
colleagues in Democratic Russia were paying little attention to the needs of 
ordinary Russians and, thus, displaying themselves to be against the 
people (antinarodnyi) or anti-Russian. The attitude they displayed was 
similar to that of a number of the 'patriotic' groups which opposed the 
democrats. Aksiuchits and Il'ia Konstantinov of RKhDD and Mikhail 
Astaf'ev distanced themselves so far from the democratic movement that, 
shortly after the break-up of the Soviet Union, they joined in alliance with 
other 'patriotic' movements under the umbrella of the Russian Popular 
Assembly (Rossiiskoe narodnoe sobranie), a political bloc which included 
Baburin's ROS and NRPR (formerly RNPR). 214 
This latter period from August to the end of December marked a difficult 
time for Russian nationalism as a whole. The victory of the 'democrats' 
was accompanied not only by a fall in the popularity of the Communist 
Party, but also by the disunity of 'patriotic' groups. The efforts of some 
imperialist Russian nationalists to unite around the RCP were dashed 
when decrees suspended the Communist Party's activity on 23 August and 
disbanded (both the CPSU and) the RCP on 6 November. 215 
The 'patriotic' organisations which appeared during this time were a vague 
attempt to rally forces and unite them behind a Russian national idea. The 
organisers of these groups were already outspoken advocates of Russian 
nationalism who were attempting to draw other 'patriots' together to 
revive the flagging fortunes of their own parties/organisations. There was 
still a strong tendency towards the maintenance of the single Soviet 
Union/Russian state, which was reinforced by the addition of 
disillusioned Russian nationalist 'democrats' such as Viktor Aksiuchits. 
However, with the establishment of Baburin's ROS, there were indications 
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that 'patriots' of an isolationist persuasion and imperialist persuasion were 
beginning to come together under a general umbrella. The result of this 
was that imperialist Russian nationalists began to show a greater sympathy 
towards the idea of developing a greater 'Russian' (albeit Slavic - Russia, 
Ukraine and Belarus) state, separate from the non-Russian former 
republics. 
Part II: Gorbachev/the Centre and Russian Nationalism 
Prior to 1985, the relationship between the Soviet establishment and 
Russian nationalism had never been easy. Gorbachev must have known 
that embarking on reform might have far-reaching consequences and that 
nationalism was a force to be reckoned with all over the Soviet Union. 
His first taste of national unrest occurred in 1986 with clashes between 
young ethnic Russians and Iakut students during March/April in 
Iakutsk. 116 This was followed in December by demonstrations in Alma-Ata 
against the appointment of an ethnic Russian, Gennadii Kolbin, as 
republican Party leader in Kazakhstan. It was not only the nationalism of 
the non-Russians which the central leadership would have to balance - 
Russian nationalism was a potential force with which the centre needed to 
take great care. 
Wooing Russian nationalism 
Gorbachev, himself, was a convinced socialist and committed to the idea 
of the Soviet Union - in fact, he could even 
be described as a 'Soviet 
nationalist'. He made one or two references to 
Russia which might have 
suggested pro-Russian sympathies or preferences, 
but these were fairly 
insignificant. For example in May 1985, shortly after he came to power, 
he 
praised the 'leading' role the Russian people 
had played in the victory of 
World War II; "' and, in 1986, he made an impromptu speech in 
Krasnodar 
in which he referred to Russia as 
'the last haven, the last reservoir of 
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spirituality". "' Regardless of such comments, Gorbachev was a staunch 
supporter of the Soviet state, although he realised that he would have to 
reach a modus vivendi with Russian nationalism and keep it in check 
whenever it threatened the identity of the Soviet Union. 
One of Gorbachev's first political acts was to introduce an anti-alcohol 
campaign in spring 1985, which was welcomed by a number of prominent 
figures with Russian nationalist sympathies, particularly those in the 
creative arts such as Valentin Rasputin, who had been critical of the effects 
of alcoholism on Russian life in his story Pozhar. 219 Another political 
gesture which pleased Russian nationalist-orientated figures in the world 
of the creative arts was the decision in August 1986 to shelve the river 
diversion project - an ecological issue which had become a focal point of 
Russian nationalist concern. " 
There were a number of other gestures which indicated a more responsive 
attitude of the centre towards the Russian national question. In 1985, 
there were broad celebrations of the 800th anniversary of the Russian 
classic book Slovo o polku Igoreve (The Word on the Host of Igor) and a 
discussion of this treasure of Russian national heritage was published in 
the magazine Ko mmunist. " In 1986, Il'ia Glazunov, an artist whose 
canvasses focussed around Russian historical, religious and national 
themes, was granted an exhibition in the Manege exhibition hall next to 
the Kremlin - this was significant, for the Manege was the most 
prestigious exhibition hall in the country. Glazunov, who expressed 
outspoken Russian nationalist views had earlier (1985) been appointed 
director of the State Museum of Decorative and Applied Art. ' 
Gorbachev made other appointments in the arts world as a gesture of 
goodwill towards those who promoted the Russian national question. In 
1986, the village-prose writer, Sergei Zalygin, was appointed chief editor of 
Novyi mir; Academician Dmitrii Likhachev was made head of the Soviet 
Cultural Foundation; and film director, Elem Klimov, became first 
secretary of the Cinematographers' Union. ' 
The pro-Russian lobby in the Soviet cultural establishment appeared 
happy at first with developments and, no doubt, hoped that the centre 
would ally itself further with Russian nationalism. However, there were 
also signs of opposition from the central authorities, suggesting that there 
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would always be a limit to the extent of influence that Russian 
nationalism would bring to bear upon the political system. For example, 
in 1985 and 1986, A. Kuz'min and V. Kozhinov published articles 
questioning the official conception of Lenin's theory of 'two cultures', 
suggesting that Lenin had supported the development of (aspects of) 
Russian culture after the revolution. Following a debate between 
orthodox Marxist-Leninists and the Kozhinov/Kuz'min side, Aleksandr 
Iakovlev, one of Gorbachev's closest allies at the centre, intervened in the 
debate by criticising certain historians and scholars for failing to use a class 
approach in their studies, for idealising pre-Revolutionary Russia and 
portraying Christianity as the basis of Russian culture. ' 
Pam is t' -a curiosity 
The central authorities' attitude to the appearance of Pamiat' was very 
curious. Having made its mark in 1987, Pamiat' was a peculiar 
phenomenon in the Soviet Union - an independent organisation 
espousing Russian nationalist views and anti-Semitism. The organisation 
was not subject to any ban, but received plenty of criticism in the pro- 
Gorbachev press. ' In May 1988, Argumenty i fakty published an article 
claiming that the KGB had issued a warning to Pam ist "s Dmitrii Vasil'ev 
that he risked prosecution under Article 74 of the Soviet Criminal Code 
for infringing national rights of equality. 12' It was only later in the year that 
Gorbachev implied any threat of a legal crackdown. "' However, Pa m is t' 
was not hindered by legal action or repression, but by more subtle means - 
KGB infiltration and 'neutralisation'. There were suspicions that Pam ist' 
had been initiated by the KGB in order to discredit the idea of independent 
organisations and to discredit Russian nationalism by associating it with 
anti-Semitism. It is not clear whether there is any truth in the idea that 
the KGB initiated Pamiat', but it is clear that the KGB manipulated the 
Pamiat' movement to descredit Russian nationalism. Documentation 
shows that Russian nationalist organisations (and, particularly, Pa m is t') 
were saturated with KGB members who, thereby, influenced and 
directed 
the movements' activities. ' Thus, having infiltrated Pamiat', the 
KGB 
fanned the movement's anti-Semitic inclinations and attempted to 
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discredit Russian nationalism as a whole. Action against Pam ist' reached 
a significant point in July 1990, when the authorities successfully 
prosecuted Smirnov-Ostashvili of one of the Pamiat' splinter groups 
under Article 74 of the RSFSR Criminal Code. 
The centre also contributed to the fractured nature of Pamiat'. Having 
interviewed several former KGB operatives, Valerii Solovei has 
ascertained that the KGB played a part in provoking the disintegration of 
the movement into many small splinters, which were, thus, ineffective 
and incapable of attracting a mass, unified support. '9 
A balancing game 
Despite the two-pronged attack against Pamiat', Gorbachev continued to 
play a balancing game with Russian nationalism. In June 1988, Russia 
celebrated the millennium of baptism of Kiev Rus'(or the millennium of 
Christianity in Russia), which was widely reported in both the 
government paper, Izvestiia and the Party paper, Pravda. ° Gorbachev, 
himself, met Patriarch Pimen and the Holy Synod at a Kremlin reception 
on 19 April 1988 - the first meeting between a Soviet leader and the head 
of the Russian Orthodox Church for over forty years - and on June 11, 
President Gromyko gave a reception for guests of the official millennium 
celebrations and participated in a question and answer sessional These 
developments were not only indicative of greater religious freedoms 
introduced by perestroika, but they served as an olive branch to Russian 
nationalism -a significant number of people appeared to be linking the 
Russian national idea with Russian Orthodoxy. A rapprochement 
between the Russian Orthodox Church and the Soviet centre could only 
serve the centre well. 
However, Gorbachev might have had further reasons for his efforts to 
placate and satisfy Russian nationalism. There were schisms within the 
Soviet centre itself, resulting in two wings: the reformers, headed by 
Gorbachev; and the conservative faction, headed by Egor Ligachev. By 
1988, this schism had reached a new high with the publication of Nina 
Andreeva's infamous letter in Sovetskaia Rossiia which launched a major 
attack against the liberal reform wing of the Party. 2 This letter was 
116 
thought to have been backed, if not penned, by Ligachev. Although the 
letter criticised certain manifestations of Russian nationalism, including 
religious and (essentially) anti-Marxist-Leninist interpretations, it praised 
some of the achievements and aims of these Russian nationalists 
('traditionalists') and implied that the conservative opposition and the so- 
called 'traditionalists' had much in common about which they could 
unite. Gorbachev's courtship of the Russian Orthodox Church might 
have been an attempt to draw religious Russian nationalist-orientated 
elements away from the conservative opposition within the Party - he was 
aware of the possibility of Ligachev attracting Russian nationalist support 
to his cause. 
Ligachev's own relationship with Russian nationalism is a reflection of 
the relationship between conservative elements and 'patriots' within the 
establishment. One of the best-informed Russian scholars of Russian 
nationalism, Valerii Solovei, described Ligachev to me as a 'convinced 
Marxist', suggesting that he had little sympathy for the principle of 
Russian nationalism. ' However, at the same time, Ligachev had 
announced that Russian nationalist writers, Iurii Bondarev and Feliks 
Kuznetsov, were among the authors he read in his leisure time. ' He 
made no secret of the fact that he agreed with the opposition of certain 
Russian nationalist writers to the influence of 'mass culture' -a 
euphemism for 'Western culture' - and, in July 1989, he made a 
demonstrative visit to an Il'ia Glazunov art exhibition, highly praising the 
artist's work. 5 Perhaps, Ligachev manipulated Russian nationalism in 
order to bolster his concept of the Soviet state and should be considered an 
advocate of Soviet nationalism. However, this Soviet nationalism was 
one which relied on the idea of Russia as the 'elder brother' and depended 
on Russians as the core nationality of the Soviet state. Whilst nationalist- 
separatist movements were developing in the non-Russian areas, it was, 
first and foremost, the Russian and Russian-speaking population who 
were exhorted to maintain the (historical) unitary state. 
Realising that he could neither antagonise nor boost Russian nationalism, 
Gorbachev continued to display a cautious ambivalence towards the 
phenomenon. In the 1989 elections to the USSR Congress of People's 
Deputies, the Communist Party was reserved 100 seats to which it 
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appointed deputies. One of the appointees was the writer, Vasilii Belov, 
who was not renowned for his service to the Party, but was better known 
as a supporter of Russian issues. Similarly, a year later, when Gorbachev 
formed a Presidential Council, two of its seventeen members were 
outspoken supporters of Russian issues - the writer (and non-Party 
member), Valentin Rasputin, and OFT leader Veniamin Iarin. The 
inclusion of such figures helped broaden the complexion of political views 
within Gorbachev's 'cabinet' and demonstrated to the pro-Russian lobby 
that Gorbachev was sensitive to their views. 
However, there were limits to the extent that pro-Russian demands could 
be accepted. At a Politburo meeting on 14 July 1989, Gorbachev declared 
that Russian sovereignty could not be granted at the expense of weakening 
the Union: 
Certainly, we need to restore Russia's authority, but not by giving Russia sovereignty. That 
would mean removing the Union's core. 
... We need to work at/study more strongly the idea of a powerful Centre. 
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This powerful centre would be achieved by maintaining the Russians and 
the RSFSR as the core of the Union: 
They [Great Russians] have within them an integrational peculiarity, which has formed 
through history... We need to say something about the contribution of the Russian nation, 
about its integrational role... Nevertheless, it is difficult without this to answer the 
question of how to organise the RSFSR, how to take its specific features into consideration. 
It is the core of the whole federation of the USSR. And, yet, a question still remains. 23' 
The 'remaining' question concerned the institutions by which the Russian 
Federation would be represented. Gorbachev was aware in July of calls 
within the CPSU for the creation of a Russian Communist Party, although 
he was not keen on this idea. He reacted more favourably towards the 
suggestion of creating a Russian Bureau of the CC CPSU, which was 
subsequently established in December 1989 and headed by Gorbachev, 
himself. ' 
Russian nationalists and conservative elements within the Party were 
dissatisfied with the Russian Bureau and continued to campaign for an 
RCP. However, the eventual establishment of the RCP in June must have 
been precipitated, 
sovereignty. 
to some extent, by the declaration of Russian 
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El'tsin had pushed the case for Russian sovereignty from the beginning of 
1990, when he had also drawn attention to Russia's plight: 
Great attention must be paid to the Russian population. This is not chauvinism, but a 
necessary condition for Russia's revival. 
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By linking the idea of democracy with Russian statehood, El'tsin was able 
to attract the support of democrats and certain Russian nationalists. The 
result of this was that on 17 May 1990 the People's Deputies of RSFSR 
included the question of 'Russian Sovereignty, the Union Agreement and 
democracy [na ro dovlastii e]' on their agenda. Gorbachev reponded to this 
by supporting the RSFSR Deputies in their efforts to strengthen Russia's 
sovereignty, but only within the framework of the Union. 24° 
Russia declared its sovereignty on 12 June - just one week before the 
Russian Party Conference opened. In a speech delivered to the 
Conference, Gorbachev declared that: 
There is an active process in forming the structures of a new political system in the [Russian] 
republic. A certain step in this direction has been made with the creation of the Russian 
Bureau of the CC CPSU, Russian independent trade unions, a komsomol and the formation of 
a State Committee of the RSFSR on nationality questions. Other Russian public-political 
organisations and associations are being created. 
The creation of a Russian Communist Party is a logical outcome of this process... 2 ' 
Gorbachev's words indicate that he had no choice but to accept the 
inevitable formation of an RCP - on its second day, the Conference 
transformed itself into the Founding Congress of the RCP. Thus, by June 
1990, Gorbachev's opposition to both Russian sovereignty and the 
formation of an RCP had capitulated. 
The Centrist Bloc and the KGB 
The appearance of the 'Centrist Bloc' in summer 1990 was a curious 
occurrence. John Dunlop noted that the Bloc had an uncannily close 
relationship with the KGB, ' suggesting that if the security organs had not 
just infiltrated, then they had orchestrated the Bloc's formation. The 
Centrist Bloc claimed to represent democracy and, yet, was very much at 
odds with the Democratic Russia movement. It was less critical of the 
centre and the CPSU. Towards the end of 1990, the group proposed to co- 
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operate with the CPSU and spoke out against the persecution of 
communists, separatism, and the disintegration of existing state structures 
- in particular, the army, the KGB, the MVD and the Public Prosecution 
Office. " As noted earlier, the Bloc had been granted audiences with both 
Ryzhkov and Luk'ianov, but in January 1991, they had also been granted a 
meeting with KGB boss Kriuchkov. 2 
Co-operation between the Bloc and the centre went beyond consultation. 
It was the Centrist Bloc which had suggested the formation of 'national 
salvation committees' to prevent separatism in the non-Russian republics. 
Following the attempted crackdown on separatism in the Baltic in January 
1991, there was an announcement that 'national salvation committees' 
were taking control, but no one was able to determine who was on these 
committees. On 22 Jan 1991, Gorbachev announced that the events in 
Vilnius and Riga were 'in no way an expression of the line taken by the 
presidential authorities in whose name they had been perpetrated. '245 
However, it was almost certainly the authorities which sanctioned the 
actions of the security forces. The Centrist Bloc's proposal to establish such 
committees created the illusion that a 'third force' might be involved. 
The sense of co-operation between the Centrist Bloc and the Soviet centre 
might point to one of three possibilities: the authorities were trying to 
establish a quasi-multiparty system with the 'democratic' Centrist Bloc 
under their guidance; the central authorities were attempting to discredit 
the 'democratic' movement as a whole by associating it with the Centrist 
Bloc; the authorities were trying to weaken the democratic movement 
through a principle of 'divide and rule'. 
Russian nationalism forgotten? 
From late 1990, Gorbachev's dealings with the Russian national question 
focussed on a personal struggle with El'tsin and the democrats. Gorbachev 
was determined to prevent any weakening of the centre and the 
strengthening of Russian republican institutions. This battle had been in 
progress since Russia declared its sovereignty in summer 1990. By 24 
October 1990 the USSR Supreme Soviet passed a law confirming that 
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USSR laws took precedence over republican laws. In response to this, the 
RSFSR Supreme Soviet passed a law on the same day confirming the 
precedence of Russian republican law over Union law. " The battle 
gathered pace with the turn of the year. On 15 January 1991, El'tsin 
suggested that it would be impossible to protect sovereignty without a 
Russian [rossiiskaia]army. 247 This was a clear and worrying challenge to the 
centre. 
In February, pro-democratic mass demonstrations in Moscow were 
countered by an anti-El'tsin rally in which pro-Russian, anti-El'tsin and 
anti-Semitic slogans were present. One sign read: The People and the 
Army are One! " The participants were obviously trying to portray El'tsin 
as an anti-Russian figure. Although the rally was organised by 
conservative and Russian nationalist organisations, Gorbachev's security 
bosses, Pugo, Iazov and Kriuchkov were in attendance. "" This suggests 
that the rally was organised with Gorbachev's backing or knowledge. 
However, over the course of the year, Gorbachev's relationship with 
Russian nationalism became somewhat insignificant. Following the 
failure to remove El'tsin from the post of Chairman of the RSFSR 
Supreme Soviet in March, Gorbachev appeared to begin to work with 
El'tsin and other republican leaders in order to forge a new Union treaty. 
Co-operation with Russian nationalist elements was continued by 
conservative members of the establishment, although this was not an 
organised, co-ordinated effort. When the 'putschists' of the GKChP 
declared a state of emergency in August, they did not have the unified 
support of all self-proclaimed 'patriots'. This suggested that even the 
figures at the centre who were distancing themselves from Gorbachev had 
failed to maintain a favourable balancing act with Russian nationalism. 
Conclusion 
Russian nationalism over the Gorbachev period represented a variety of 
opinions which were never unified under the Russian banner. There 
were differences in attitudes to Western democracy, communism or 
alternative political systems and there were differences as to 
how the state 
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should be constituted. 
The Russian nationalist debate began with figures within the 
establishment, who, on the whole, supported the maintenance of the 
Soviet socialist system, but wished to highlight the Russian dimension 
and revive the fortunes of the Russian nation. There was a feeling that 
glasnost would allow this to happen and the discussion of Russian culture 
and values gradually increased. 
The appearance of Pam ist' marked the beginning of a number of Russian 
nationalist fringe groups, which began to express the latent Russian 
nationalist extremism that existed within pockets of the population. It also 
marked the inclusion of non-establishment figures in the Russian 
nationalist debate. The initial impact of Pamiat' was probably due to the 
fact that it was such an unexpected development, whilst, at the same time, 
it appealed to some who needed an outlet to focus on the Russian national 
question. 
Subsequent efforts to form Russian nationalist-orientated organisations 
reflected the development of 'informal' groups as a whole, but also 
reflected a response to national movements in the republics. Some of the 
prime movers behind such organisations were the RSFSR Writers' Union 
and Russian elements in the non-Russian periphery - these groups were 
closely associated with conservatives in the establishment. 
Encouraged by the KGB, which had infiltrated all new political 
organisations, the fringe groups fractured into many small splinters 
insignificant in terms of membership and support. Meanwhile, Russian 
nationalism connected with conservative elements of the establishment 
attempted to broaden its powerbase through a series of alliances. From 
September 1989, with the appearance of OSR, to December 1991, with the 
establishment of Nash i, there were various vain attempts to unite support 
under a Russian 'patriotic' banner, punctuated by periods of 
disorganisation and inertia. 
Russian nationalism was subjected not only to a policy of divide and rule 
from the centre, but was divided by different conceptions of the Russian 
nation and Russian state. The democratic movement attracted not only 
those who were interested in developing Western-style civil society and 
political democracy, but also those who thought that these values could be 
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linked with the development of specific Russian values. In 1990, 
Democratic Russia adopted the aim of strengthening the Russian republic's 
state identity, thus stealing the ground of imperialist Russian nationalists 
within the conservative establishment and others who had been calling 
for the Russian Federation's structural and institutional parity with other 
republics as a starting point for Russian 'revival'. 
Gorbachev was powerless to stop the formation of a Russian Communist 
Party which formed with the backing of conservative elements in the 
establishment and considerable efforts from Russian nationalist-orientated 
groups. Although an RCP hoped to take over the organisational structures 
of the CPSU and, perhaps, present itself as a modified version of the CPSU, 
the RCP was still tainted by the negative associations linked with 
communism. It began to steer a moderately Russian nationalist course in 
its efforts to unite support, which was illustrated by its participation in the 
formation of the Co-ordinating Council of the Patriotic Forces of Russia. 
The formation of new groups with a Russian nationalist hue continued 
throughout 1989-91 and reflected the development of new political 
movements as a whole - many failed to achieve mass support and served 
as vehicles for the egos of their leaders. The most vocal 'patriots' were 
those linked to, or allied with, the conservative establishment, although 
the most successful were those who envisaged Russia's independent 
development with the structure of liberal democracy. Those who rode on 
the back of the democratic movement's success witnessed the 
strengthening of a Russian national identity through the institution of 
Russian political structures, Russian national symbols and the restoration 
of historical names, etc. However, not all of the 'liberal Russian 
nationalists' were satisfied with the democratic movement and, towards 
the end of the year, some left, fearing that the movement was too 
orientated towards the West. 
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hapter 4: Russian Nationalist Issu 
Introduction 
There are many categories under which nationalism is justified. These 
include divine sanction, nature, freedom, security, sovereignty, majority, 
birthright, culture, duration, status quo, need and revenge. ' The broad 
range of justifications reflect the broad range of issues related to 
nationalism. 
Russian nationalism under Gorbachev did not constitute a unified 
movement, but a collage of different views attempting to define or 
redefine the Russian nation and state. There is no doubt that all the above 
justifications for nationalism were evident amongst this collage. For 
example, some felt the need for the revival of a Russian nation and 
Russian institutions in order to achieve 'parity' with other republics; there 
was a belief that to maintain the status quo would maintain core Russian 
national values and the 'historical Russian state'; the protection of 
Russian nature was not only a metaphor for the protection of Russian 
values, but a refection of the belief that Russians are spiritually connected 
to the land. 
The main issues covered here are: the environment; concern over the 
destruction of the Russian village and urbanisation; the debate over 
Russian identity; demography; territory; racism and xenophobia; the 
question of Russian sovereignty and institutional identity. 
Environment 
The issues of environmental pollution, ecological engineering and the 
decay and destruction of historical monuments were not restricted to the 
RSFSR, but were the concern of all the Soviet nationalities. ' Indeed, as 
Geoffrey Hosking points out, issues concerning the environment and the 
protection of historical monuments became the main focus of early 
independent political activity under glasnost. ' In the words of Graham 
Smith, this was due: 
133 
.. to the fact that at this early stage the environment was allowed on to the local public 
agenda, because it was judged not to pose a direct challenge to regime legitimacy. 4 
Many environmentalists in the non-Russian republics regarded that their 
interests conflicted with official policy from Moscow and, therefore, 
interpreted their needs in separatist and nationalist terms. In the same 
way, or perhaps in reaction to the separatism in non-Russian republics, the 
Russians also linked environmental concerns with nationalism. Besides 
the fact that the environment was an accessible subject, Russian 
nationalism was able to associate the environment with the past and the 
question of national identity: 
Like the national consciousness of smaller nations, that of the Russian was centred on a 
perception of national danger, of the erosion and irreplacable loss of culture, of a sense of the 
past. Like Armenian, Estonian, and other national movements, the Russian was deeply 
concerned with environmental destruction with threats to Russian nature, and with the 
brutal treatment of cultural and religious monuments. ' 
Those who had protested over environmental issues (albeit often 
unsuccessfully) even before perestroika, increased their currency as figures 
of trust: 
... protests over such concerns as the pollution of the 
Volga River, the location of nuclear 
energy plants in the Ukraine, Lithuania and Armenia, and the apparently unrestrained 
pollution of the air in most of the Soviet Union's industrial regions did accomplish one 
important thing - they established the credibility of those who were protesting. The 
protesters... were identified as critics who could be trusted to speak out. They openly 
complained about conditions affecting everyone's well-being... What mattered was that 
6 they were willing to challenge the calloused authorities... 
This credibility provided environmentally-conscious nationalists with a 
stronger platform to express their views under glasnost. 
River diversion 
One of the earliest causes of the environmentalists was the controversial 
river diversion project. This concerned diverting the flow of rivers from 
the north to the south in order to transform and cultivate the arid 
southern regions of the Soviet Union. Although this idea had been 
around for decades, it became topical again in the early 80s and provoked 
considerable opposition following the advent of Gorbachev in 1985, such 
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that a decision was made to shelve it as early as March 1986. ' 
The eighties projects planned to divert rivers from northern Russia via 
the Volga to provide water to the Ukraine and southern regions of Russia; 
and divert the Siberian Enisei and Ob rivers to fill the Aral Sea which 
would then provide water via canals to others areas of southern Russia, 
but more significantly to Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan. 
Some of the most vocal opponents were the literary figures Valentin 
Rasputin, Iurii Bondarev, Vasilii Belov, Sergei Zalygin and the journal 
Nash sovremennik. Although some opponents of the schemes had 
expressed their disagreement in emigre publications before glasnost, they 
seized their opportunity to express greater concern and opposition openly 
in the Soviet press in and after 1985. 
The nationalist journal Nash sovremennik fuelled the debate in the 
summer of 1985 with the publication of the opinions of twelve specialists 
on land renewal rejecting the diversion projects and their possible effects. ' 
Valentin Rasputin had addressed the river diversion issue as early as 1976 
in his book Farewell to Matera. This story was republished in 19859 - the 
year which witnessed a recovery of Rasputin's fortunes. 1° Rasputin not 
only continued his opposition throughout the year to the river diversion 
project, but also channelled his efforts towards the protection of Lake 
Baikal. The nationalist angle of this campaigning was illustrated by the 
constant linking of the environment to culture and history. 
At the RSFSR Writers' Conference in December 1985, a number of writers 
played the nationalist card in their short speeches and spoke with passion 
about protecting the environment. Rasputin said: 
Russia expects us to take Baikal, the Altai pine and the sacred lands of Russian Siberia 
under our patronage. And this, of course, should not be patronage in the cold and 
formal 
sense of the word, but sons [of Russia], active protection, without which we cannot manage. 
" 
V. Belov's speech expressed concern for the protection of Russian villages, 
but was more of a call for the protection of [Russian] culture and a 
condemnation of Western influence. ' Sergei Zalygin was concerned with 
examining the possible ecological consequences of such projects prior to 
their implementation. He suggested that the projects cease for a few years 
in order to reach a more objective decision as to whether to continue or 
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not. However, his speech did contain emotive words on man and his 
environment, reflecting his concern for preservation rather than 
avoidance of ecological disaster: 
When we change nature, we extract man from it and strip him of his natural and historical 
surroundings, in which he grew up, lives and works. 
Engineers do not understand this. They decide purely technical problems. Who should 
answer the question of what will happen to man if he is stripped of his ancient habitat, his 
own house and home? 13 
The following month Zalygin, Bondarev, Belov and Rasputin were among 
the signatories of a letter supporting an article in Sovetskaia Rossiia 
condemning the diversion projects. 14 The article, by M. Lemeshev ( who 
became a member of the Council of Moscow Otechestvo ), suggested that 
there was no concrete scientific evidence that river diversion would 
provide the south with the necessary water, for the level of the Caspian Sea 
had been rising since 1978, and the problem was more a matter of water 
conservation than water diversion. Lemeshev also suggested that 
continuation of the schemes was in the interests of ministerial bureaucracy 
and that the Ministry of Water was irresponsibly carrying out 
'unscientifically based projects'. However, despite Lemeshev's accusations 
of bureaucratic abuse and an unscientific approach, he also mentioned the 
cultural and historical cost: 
We should also bear in mind that the transfer of northern waters will inflict irreparable 
damage on the historical and cultural property of our people. In the event that even the 
first stage of the project is carried out, 368 out of 492 historical and cultural monuments 
might be destroyed or damaged by flooding or warming. 15 
This was a theme pursued by the authors of the joint letter. After pointing 
to the cost and possible failure of such projects, they highlighted the 
historical and cultural cost: 
... the project does not make provision 
for the preservation of cultural and historical 
monuments in a fundamental part of Russia, where the inspired national genius created a 
whole century, where some of the world's spiritual treasures were established. 
16 
The letter continues with the theme of national damage: 
And what about the demolition of villages, settlements, the warming of ancient towns? The 
irreplacable losses will, of course, have a negative effect on all life in our society. 
It is impossible to save one part of a unitary living organism at the expense of destroying 
another. Our country is one, there will not be another, and we have to look after it, look 
after its wealth. Interfering with natural conditions which have formed over millions of 
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years,... threatens to have serious consequences not only for future generations, but for those 
living today. " 
The river diversion projects were not the only subjects of interest to 
nationalists and environmentalists. After all, it was the Chernobyl 
catastrophe which tested glasnost and alerted people to the serious 
condition of their environment. This encouraged nuclear power stations 
and industrial complexes to come under environmentalist scrutiny. There 
were ample grounds for environmental concern when one considered that 
Chernobyl was not the first nuclear accident - there had been one years 
earlier in the Cheliabinsk area when the truth about the event had been 
silenced by the authorities. Large amounts of effluent and other pollutants 
were discharged not only into Rasputin's beloved Lake Baikal, but all over 
the Soviet Union. Soviet Weekly reported that between 1986-91 nearly 100 
million tonnes of pollutants were expelled annually into the Soviet 
environment. " 
Lake Baikal had been a subject of ecological concern since the 1960s. 
Figures such as Rasputin highlighted the polluting effect of the Baikal 
Pulp-Paper Combine and the Selenga Pulp-Cardboard Combine. However, 
the ecological threat to the lake was threefold: 
First and most directly, it is affected by direct dumping of wastes from industrial plants and 
urban sewage systems. Second, Baikal suffers from precipitation of large quantities of 
airborne pollutants passing over the lake. Finally, the lake is affected by erosion and 
contamination by runoff from lands surrounding the lake that have been disturbed by 
improper agricultural practices and logging operations. 19 
The nationalist reaction to ecological concerns was to link the ecology to 
the essence of the nation. Juni Bondarev wrote an article entitled 'The 
Legacy of Culture' before the 27th Party Congress in 1986. He claimed that: 
... tradition and the past are the 
legacy of the main qualities of the people's spiritual 
energy. 20 
Bondarev went on to list features of the Russian national legacy, including 
architecture, literature, painting, political activism. However, along with 
the man-made legacy of `memory and culture', Bondarev lists natural 
features of the country which were subject to environmental concern: 
Never does a year pass, nor the bitter taste of anxiety, when you think about the sacred 
place and pearl of Siberia - Baikal, whose crystal-clear waters continue steadily and 
annually to be blocked up wth industrial waste, in spite of serious protective resolutions. 
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When you also remember Lake Onega, which like Baikal is unique in the purity of its fresh 
water: now you can only drink there safely 40 km from the shore. If you think about the 
Visimsk Nature Reserve in the Urals, where a reservoir will be constructed 400 hectares of 
space to provide drinking water for the town of Kirovograd and they have already cut down 
21 in advance unique varieties of trees... 
Bondarev goes on to curse the river diversion project, its possible 
unknown ecological damage and the destruction of historical monuments 
that would result. It is clear that Bondarev has a strong ecological message, 
but within the context of his article, the environment is treated as a 
national(ist) subject - the environmental concern is sandwiched between a 
discussion of Russia's past, its culture and a rallying cry for the 
Motherland. 
Valentin Rasputin spoke of ecology along with such terms as 'morality' 
and 'spirituality. He claimed that the land had lost its ecological balance 
whilst the nation was devoid of spiritual balance. Rasputin also indicated 
that his story Pozhar ('Fire'), published in Nash sovremennik in 1985 
illustrated that, whilst Siberia's ecology had been ruined, the people were 
losing their humanity and soul. ' 
These ideas were echoed by the author Dmitrii Balashov in Literaturnaia 
Rossiia in 1989. Balashov claimed that among the solutions for 
overcoming the breakdown of Russia were the restoration of ecological 
balance and the restoration of Russian national culture. This included the 
closure of many heavy-industrial concerns and the reforestation of 
deforested areas. 23 Balashov was continuing a trend that was evident at the 
very beginning of the Gorbachev era in 1985 when authors such as 
Rasputin and Belov had urged writers at the RSFSR Writers' Conference to 
examine the issues of the Russian environment and Russian culture. 
The efforts of such figures were acknowledged and supported by the critic 
Larisa Baranova-Gonchenko when she responded to a criticism by A. 
Eremenko, who had proposed that writers should adhere to writing and 
not meddle with such subjects as river diversion: 
... it is, not only through the 
'prayers' of authors, but through the continuous and, for the 
most part, thankless specific activity of V. Rasputin that what remains of Baikal's clean 
waters is still alive. We should salute Rasputin for this! ... in the meantime 
Rasputin, 
Zalygin, Bondarev, Belov, Astaf'ev, Aitmatov and Krupin, having put their favourite 
occupation to one side, are concerned with business that is 'not theirs' - the problem of river 
diversion and preservation of Lake Baikal; they shout, as if in a 
desert, that the the sin of 
submerging war graves near Rzhev under water will not part them 
from those still living; 
24 
they give up their own publications in favour of Karamzin... 
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Her words of support reflected the view of nationalist elements in the 
Writers' Union that artists were right to pursue and promote the ideas of 
Russian national culture and that the issue of the environment was 
closely linked to these ideas. The comment concerning the pre- 
revolutionary historian, Karamzin, indicates the importance given by such 
figures to his long-forgotten work on the history of Russia and their 
willingness to give up space in their journals in favour of the re- 
publication of his work. 
The river diversion projects and the preservation of Lake Baikal were the 
cause celebre of nationalist environmentalists. However, these issues were 
more than a convenient platform for Russian nationalist expression; they 
were fundamental to a more mystical interpretation of Russia's existence. 
As Simon Dixon puts it: 
Throughout 1986-88, the Soviet press reported spontaneous meetings of workers in various 
parts of the Russian republic to protest against pollution by chemical plants and the 
construction of power stations... The injection of a specifically nationalist element into these 
protests may be detected not only when particular cultural or historical monuments are 
threatened, but also when a religious view of nature as God's handiwork is offended by 
man's trespassing beyond boundaries of his place in God's scheme. 25 
Whilst figures such as Zalygin continued to press the issue of water 
conservation and Rasputin voiced concern over gas and chemical 
complexes, " the population became more aware of environmental 
dangers. However, they did not necessarily associate the decline of the 
environment with their own moral and spiritual decline as Balashov and 
Rasputin, etc. might suggest. A poll carried out by Goskomstat RSFSR in 
1989 revealed that there was a significant concern for the environment, 
whilst there was less worry about the state of Russian morality: 52% of 
urban dwellers and 33% of rural dwellers considered environmental 
pollution to be a worrying problem, whilst 18% of the urban population 
and 10% in rural areas considered morality to be a problem. ' 
Vasilii Belov illustrated another nationalist angle on concern for the 
environment. This was one which viewed natural resources and their use 
as something which should be guarded by Russia and should neither be 
abused nor sold for use by foreigners: 
The President is mistaken when he speaks of inexhaustible natural resources. The country's 
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wood has been chopped down... Half of the oil has already been extracted. And we are 
pumping gas past our villages to some far off place. 28 
Preservation 
Besides conservation of the ecology, many voices spoke in favour of 
preserving historical buildings or even rebuilding those that had been 
demolished. An officially approved organisation, VOOPIiK [the All- 
Russian Society for the Preservation of Historical and Cultural 
Monuments], had existed before Gorbachev's incumbency and had had 
limited success in mobilizing youngsters and enthusiasts in participating 
in restoration programmes. Glasnost allowed for a greater discussion of 
the subject and greater mobilisation of support. 
As previously mentioned, Bondarev, Belov, Rasputin et al. had 
underlined and condemned the possible destruction of 'historical and 
cultural monuments' in the event of river diversion taking place. 
Bondarev's article in Sovetskaia Rossiia in January 1986 asked the 
question: 
So, just what is our culture? It is the Kremlin, the old Arbat, the wisdom of Pushkin, the 
Sukharev Tower, the phenomenon of Lomonosov, the architecture of northern villages, great 
painting, the Decemberists. freedom, the world of Tolstoi, the genius of Lenin, the October 
Revolution, socialism. 29 
Bondarev mentions the Kremlin - one of Russia's main architectural 
symbols; the Sukharev Tower, which had long since been pulled down; 
and the architecture of the north, which was considered by supporters of 
the Russian village to be a representation of the 'real Russia'. He 
proceeded to condemn the needless destruction of 'national monuments', 
criticising the replacement of the old Arbat by an 'American-style avenue' 
and lamented the disappearance of old streets and buildings: 
They continue to destroy the Moscow river bank, Shkol'naia Street, the whole right side of 
Tula Street has been destroyed, as well as Andronikov Street, Railway (Voksal'naia) 
Street, part of Volkhonka, Nizhegorod Railway Station, the Osterman-Tolstoi House, 
Rakhmaninov's and Belinskii's houses, the 18th century houses on Bakunin Street ... 
30 
The list continues before Bondarev quotes Lenin: 
Reconstruct the capital, but in a way that not a single monument of ancient craftsmanship or 
anything of value created by the artistic genius of the Russian people should suffer. 
31 
Bondarev's words illustrate the nationalist concern for preservation of 
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historical monuments, which reflect not only the craftsmanship of the past 
but symbolise the national ideal. For figures such as Bondarev, the 
cultural inheritance represents the characterisation of the Russian nation. 
In an editorial on the front page of Sovetskaia Rossiia in November 1985, 
Russians were urged to pay attention to the restoration and preservation of 
their cultural inheritance. The article centred on the restoration of 
buildings, villages and towns. The moral and spiritual link with this 
legacy is not left to any doubt: 
... an active relationship with cultural monuments also assumes spiritual benefits - we 
should become better, purer, kinder, more conscious... 
... Cultural monuments contain not only beauty, but behests to future generations: behests of ideals, morals, technology and economics... 
... In the present conditions, when the area of spiritual education is becoming an integral 
part of our life, it is necessary to very quickly step up all work concerning the preservation 
and publicity of monuments, and their use in the patriotic education of memory. 32 
In 1985 / 86 Muscovite talk centred on the restoration of buildings which 
had been destroyed for the sake of 'progress'. Two buildings which were 
considered to be of significant Russian historical loss in Moscow were the 
Church of Christ the Saviour, which had been demolished in the 30s to 
make way for a new Palace of Congresses, but eventually replaced by an 
open-air swimming pool; and the Sukharev Tower, which was removed in 
order to make way for a road. There was also evidence of restoration of 
Russian cultural 'monuments' in progress -I was shown around the 
Danilevskii Monastery by a member of the Institute of Restoration. The 
buildings and frescos were scattered with workshops, scaffolding and 
building materials, for the complex was being restored as part of the 
celebrations of the millenium of Christianity in Russia. 
Although conversation centred around those buildings which had been 
lost, there was independent political action which sought to protect any 
further destruction of historical monuments. Geoffrey Hosking cites the 
example of the Shcherbakov mansion which, like the Sukharev Tower 
previously, had been earmarked for demolition to make way for a large 
road: ' 
An action group of students and schoolchildren, led by Kirill Parfenov, occupied the building 
for two months, whils Parfenov himself appeared on a popular television prgramme to 
explain the need to protect the capital city's historical heritage. 
3 
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The debate about the Sukharev Tower, whose fate was portrayed as a 
callous deed of indifference towards Russian cultural heritage, continued 
throughout the eighties. The desire to rebuild it was symbolic of the 
movement to rehabilitate and redefine Russian national culture. By the 
nineties, a strong lobby still advocated that it should be rebuilt and three 
options appeared to exist: some thought that it was not necessary to 
rebuild it whilst there were no materials or qualified workers and also 
rejected the fact that it would be completely new; another option stressed 
the necessity to build it later; and a third option suggested that it should be 
built away from its original site. ' 
Two other notable incidents concerning the protection and restoration of 
monuments were the unsuccessful attempts to save the Angleterre hotel 
in Leningrad35 and the construction of a church on the site of the destroyed 
Ipat'ev House demanded by nationalists and monarchists. ' The former 
incident produced a significant amount of indignation, particularly of ter 
the local authorities moved in the demolition workmen whilst the 
lobbyists were temporarily absent. The calls for a monument to replace the 
Ipat'ev House in Sverdlovsk had a somewhat greater nationalistic flavour 
in that the Ipat'ev House was the site on which the last Tsar and his family 
were executed (or, at least, held before execution). The lobbyists were 
mostly monarchists who lamented the destruction of the original building 
(razed following the orders of the then Sverdlovsk Party boss, Boris El'tsin) 
and wanted the site declared a holy shrine, honoured by the construction 
of a church. 
A number of political groups adopted the theme of preservation or 
conservation within their programmes. Reference to the subject is hardly 
surprising when one considers the opposition that arose against all forms 
of mismanagement under the Communist Party regime. However, from a 
nationalist interpretation, it became 'un-Russian' to violate the 
environment and Russia's historical and cultural legacy. The Russian 
Christian Democratic Movement condemned the 'feckless and criminal 
economic policies' of the communist system for bringing Russia 'to the 
brink of an ecological catastrophe". " The Association of Russian 
Artists 
(Tovarishchestvo russkikh khudozhnikov) listed several issues about 
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which it was concerned, including 'folk culture', 'historical memory', 
'nature and economics' .' These are all concerns which could be related to 
preservation and environmental issues. 
Pamiat' was originally formed around 1980 as a literary and historical 
society attached to the Ministry of Aviation Industry of the USSR. Many of 
its members were involved in the restoration of historical and cultural 
monuments - an activity which no doubt drew the organisation 
considerable support. 39 The concern for national monuments merged with 
a growing membership who believed in anti-Russian conspiracy theories 
to synthesise the idea that Jews were to blame for the destruction of 
national architecture. 40 This grew out of the belief that a large proportion of 
Soviet architects and town planners were Jewish. In April 1987, Pam ia t' 
members assumed control of the Moscow section of VOOPIiK and were 
later successful in expelling members who did not agree with Pamiat"s 
views. 41 
Pam ist' emphasised the loss of architecture over the Soviet period as a 
substantial loss to Russian culture: 
Our centuries-old culture was ruthlessly trampled on and defiled - for example, 40% of all 
architectural monuments in Russia perished,... 42 
In August 1988, the organisation listed a number of tasks, the first of which 
was to: 
... Awaken and restore the 
Russian national consciousness and pride in its great people. 43 
Other 'tasks' referred to preservation and environmental concern within 
the context of this 'national awakening': 
... to restore and 
fittingly make use of those monuments of the past which have escaped 
destruction... 
... to change ecological policy, so 
that the state would fight the plunder and destruction of 
nature, as well as ruinous, destructive projects, by virtue of deed and not by words... 
... the publication of surnames and 
the bringing to trial of those guilty of:... destroying the 
country's nature;... killing Russian villages 
It should be noted that the latter 'task' called for the publication of 
surnames, reflecting Pa mia t"s belief that many or most of them would be 
non-Russian. 
The manifesto of 12 January 1989 listed a set of sixty-one 
demands, 
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amongst which were: 
We demand the publication of the names of ALL destroyed churches. 
... We demand the publication of names of their destroyers and prosecution of them... 
... We demand the restoration of all destroyed churches... 
... We demand legislation to stop malicious deeds, designed towards destroying our lands, 
reservoirs and forests... 
... We demand cessation of the destructive pillage of our mineral wealth, forests and 
reservoirs by international usurious Zionist capital. 
... We demand an end to the secret and overt pillage of the country, the export of raw 
materials, works of art, antiquity and other valuables. 45 
It is clear that Pa m is t "s preservationist and environmentalist stance is 
driven by nationalism and nationalist protectionism. Everything is 
couched in terms of protecting the national cultural and ecological wealth, 
particularly from the supposed threat of foreign or Zionist (read 'Jewish') 
capital. One incident in which Pamiat' displayed its preservationist 
credentials received attention and has been referred to subsequently, 
because the protest was expressed at a private meeting with Boris El'tsin 
whilst he was Moscow Party boss. Pamiat' were campaigning against the 
redevelopment of Poklonnaia Hill, which involved the construction of a 
monument. At one Pamiat' meeting, M. Lemeshev (the author of the 
letter opposing the river diversion project in Sovetskaia Rossiia 20/12/85) 
gave an unscheduled speech claiming that the proposed monument 
incorporated masonic symbols. ` The approach for saving Poklonnaia Hill 
involved forming accusations that the new monument would contain 
anti-Russian masonic (this implies 'Judeo-masonic') symbols. The subject 
of preserving the hill was discussed with El'tsin at a meeting in May 1987 
when Pa m is t "s profile had become inflated, not so much for its activities 
involving the preservation of historical monuments, but for the 
outspoken anti-Semitic views expressed. In reporting the meeting, 
Moscow News referred to the group's contrasting aims: 
On the one hand, it [ Pa mia t) calls for protection of historical relics, for rooting out drinking 
and alcoholism and for environmental protection. And, on the other, it disseminates absurd 
fiction that some sort of a 'mysterious organization' is, allegedly, operating in the whole 
world and in our country, and that it puts itself the task of annihilating ages-old culture, 
'Americanizing' Soviet society and aggravating the socio-economic problems of the USSR by 
using 'bureaucracy - that monster of world masonry, zionism and. imperialism. 47 
The meeting with El'tsin not only covered the Poklonnaia Hill issue, but 
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also focussed on the protection of 'architectural relics'. El'tsin informed 
those present that 9,500 of these 'relics' had already been placed under state 
protection, including a large number requiring immediate restoration. " 
There were a host of groups which were set up ostensibly for ecological 
purposes and which allied themselves with nationalist ideas, for example, 
the All-Russian Society for the Preservation of Historical and Cultural 
Monuments, the Social Committee for Saving the Volga, and the 
Foundation for the Restoration of the Church of Christ the Saviour. 49 
Other organisations, such as the Salvation Group (Gruppa spaseniia), 
Monument(Pamiatnik); Nevskaia bitva; Era; - all members of Leningrad's 
Council for the Ecology of Culture (SEK - took little part in the 
development of Russian nationalism, but their concern for the ecology 
and particularly for protecting historical monuments is indicative of the 
renewed interest in Russian heritage and the prevailing tendency towards 
examining the Russian national character which developed under 
perestroika. 
The Russian Village 
There was a school of thought which considered the Russian village and 
Russian rural life to be the embodiment of all that was Russian. The 
urbanisation which took place under the Soviet regime was viewed as a 
systematic destruction of a Russian national way of life by an interfering 
foreign influence. The prime exponents of such ideas were the 
derevenshchiki and pochvenniki, variously called in English 'village 
prose writers', 'ruralists', 'nativists' or 'organicists'. Depictions of rural 
Russia in literature stretch back throughout the Soviet period, but from 
the early 70s rural prose tended to present the degeneration of the Russian 
rural community as the degeneration of morals and the; traditional 
Russian way of life. 
This is a view that once again links Russian culture to its environment, 
with the Russian village symbolising the 'spirituality' of Russian culture. 
As Vladimir Soloukhin wrote whilst appraising the work of Valentin 
Rasputin: 
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The Russian village is not just a social or economic category, it is a spiritual category. 51 
[The concept of 'spirituality' is very vague and means different things to 
different people. In the minds of village prose writers it signified old, 
conservative values and served as an antidote to the materialism of 
Marxism-Leninism and Western culture. ] 
The spirituality of country life was contrasted with the upheavals of a 
soulless urban life. Kathleen Parthe pointed out one Soviet observation of 
this trend which predated the Gorbachev era: 
The Soviet critic Shaitanov observed [in 1981] that village prose had developed its own 
cliches and that the most frequently used was that of the situation of pereiezd (moving) 
from one's family home to a larger settlement or city... .. The emphasis in village prose 
according to this critic, is on the dukhovnost (spirituality) of traditional rural culture. 52 
There can be little doubt that the relationship between urban and rural 
Russia had changed over the Soviet period - the Russian rural population 
had been steadily diminishing as the table below indicates , but this is not 
unusual in an industrialised society. 
1959 1975 1987 
RSFSR population (in millions) 1 117.5 133.8 145.3 
RSFSR rural population (millions) 55.9 44.5 38.4 
Rural population as percentage 
of overall population 45.57% 33.26% 26.43% 
The pattern for the decline of the rural population as a proportion of the 
overall republican population is repeated in all the Western Soviet 
republics (the Slavic republics, Baltic republics and Moldavia) whilst the 
decline is markedly less in the Caucasian and Central Asian republics [in 
fact, the rural populations in Tadzhikistan and Turkmenia even grew 
between 1975 and 1987]. Therefore, the decline in the rural population in 
the RSFSR only reflected the rural populations of the more industrialised 
Soviet republics. 
Moshe Lewin addressed the question of accelerated urbanisation in the 
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Soviet Union and the social effects upon those who moved from a rural 
setting to the city. He put forward the idea that moving to the cities 
challenged and altered the migrant peasant community's sense of values, 
which were molded by their 'compact social, cultural and economic' life. 
The peasant communities, in turn, brought their influence to the cities 
and established a presence of adapted peasant relations within the urban 
environment. ' Lewin's analysis represents two undeniable facts: the 
Soviet Union underwent a rapid industrialisation and urbanisation; and 
that this had an effect upon the overall social relations of most people. 
However, Lewin points out that this phenomenon is not unique to the 
Soviet Union: 
The making of a stable and more self-controlling urban culture and moral world is certainly 
a difficult task. Once the aftershocks of the previous shattering events begin to subside, the 
cities begin to reconsider their own identities, and urban problems come to the fore, becoming 
the subject of public awareness and of political and scholarly treatment. But some of the 
older tasks remain on the agenda; the diminishing but still important battle between rural 
and urban worlds, or cultures, continues. This is certainly a universal phenomenon in our 
time in urban societies in recently urbanized countries. 55 
A nationalist interpretation of these events is to portray the Russian 
village as the true harbour of Russian culture and, irrespective of the fact 
that changing urban-rural ratios and their social consequences have 
occurred in other Soviet republics (as well as in other countries), lament 
the shrinking of rural culture as the atrophying of Russian national 
culture. Urban culture represents Westernised /cosmopolitan culture, 
imposed upon Russia, perhaps, by an alien ideology. 
The image of the village was one which was idealised and was frequently 
conjured up from images of the past. As Geoffrey Hosking remarked, 
village prose writers in the 60s portrayed the village: 
"Not as it was at the time of writing, but as it used to be somewhat earlier. "56 
The tendency under glasnost (and earlier) was to portray the loss of this 
rural Russian national culture and the idealisation of the village served to 
accentuate this: 
The writers do this [reviving the 'iconic version of the traditional 
Russian village'] not to 
paint a naively idyllic picture, but to show that the village, along with 
its oldest 
inhabitants, is dying. And since the traditional small villages are being abandoned, 
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modernized, or absorbed into larger units, everything within them, from people to bast 
shoes is an image of 1oss. 57 
Some of the village prose writers who were most vocal or prominent 
following 1985 include Abramov, Astaf'ev, Belov, Krupin, Lichutin, 
Likhonosov, Mozhaev, Proskurin, Rasputin, Soloukhin. 
The theme of the uprooted peasant and the condemnation of new 
settlements and cities occurs in a numbers of works such as the previously 
mentioned Pozhar by Rasputin, Belov's Vse vperedi and Astaf'ev's 
Pechal'nyi detektiv .' Rasputin's work tells of a new settlement which has 
replaced an old village sacrificed in the cause of progress. The new 
settlement has replaced the old settlement and with it has gone the old 
community and its sense of values. The former village of Iegorovka is a 
metaphor for the old, 'real' Russia. In Pechaln'yi detektiv, Astaf'ev seems 
to mourn the loss of traditional Russian life and bemoan the fact that the 
link with the Russian historical past has been severed. ' All three stories 
portray Russia as morally corrupt and bereft of traditional (rural) values. 
These authors and others leave us in little doubt that those who are to 
blame are the urban intelligentsia and those who wreaked havoc upon the 
Russian countryside through the tool of the Communist Party. 
The theme of destruction is continued in the various condemnations of 
collectivisation. Glasnost brought more positive appraisals of the NEP 
period which were expressed in stories such as Sergei Zalygin's Posle buri 
('After the Storm)', which indicated a compatibility between Russian 
national traditions and communism. " The guilt was placed at the feet of 
Stalinism by such authors as Belov (Na ka nun e) and Mozhaev (Muzhiki i 
baby). These works were continuations of works started in the 70s and 
condemned the process of collectivisation as a crime against the Russian 
peasantry. "' 
In August 1988, Kseniia Mialo wrote an article in Novy mir entitled "The 
Torn Thread: Peasant Culture and the Cultural Revolution". The thrust 
of the article was to lament the destruction of the Russian peasantry as the 
destruction of Russian culture. She blames this unnecessary break with 
the past on the policy of collectivisation and the influence of a replacement 
culture introduced by the communists. She believes that, although it is 
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impossible to restore the destroyed peasant culture, the link with the past 
can be recreated through the birth or rebirth of a Russian cultural idea, 
which is a prerequisite for rebuilding Russia. In Mialo's eyes, the Russian 
rural peasant culture was the embodiment of Russian national culture, 
and, although it has been destroyed, should serve as guidance for 
recreating this new national culture. 62 
Echoing the idea that the peasantry embodies something specifically 
Russian, Fatei Shipunov, writing in the nationalist journal Nash 
sovremennik, described the peasantry as: 
the body and soul of the people (narod), the very nucleus of its soul and spirit. 63 
Speaking at a plenum of the governing committee of the RSFSR Writers' 
Union, S. Danilov suggested that this 'soul and spirit' was still alive and 
urged those in power to divert greater resources to the rural community in 
order to save this nest of Russian values: 
It is often said that the exodus from the countryside is a natural process, that it happens all 
over the world. I do not want the best people to leave the village. If they leave, then 
Russia will be impoverished, the Russian language will grow poor and there will be an 
impoverishment of the national morality and national conscience.... 
... I want our plenum to urge the Government and the Central Committee of the Party to 
support the ideas expressed at the Congress of ko1 kh o z-workers: there is no retreat, greater 
funds must be given to the rural community immediately. `M 
Focussing on the peasantry gives an idealised image of the Russian at 
variance with Soviet communism. The peasant is distant from the tainted 
hand of Soviet communism and the guardian of national values. Vasilii 
Belov used his public appearances at Writers' Union conferences and the 
Congress of People's Deputies to voice his concern for the Russian 
peasantry and rural Russia. During a resignation speech to the Supreme 
Soviet he linked the saving of the peasantry to the salvation of national 
culture: 
The peasantry is the salvation of the people and state altogether. It is the salvation of 
language, national traditions, the national culture of every people. I stress - every people. 
Saving the peasantry means ceasing interethnic struggles, it means a healthy ecology and 
demography and, finally, the army. 6' 
This statement does not so much reflect Belov's concern for the peasantry, 
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but his concern for Russia and the maintenance of a unitary state. Belov is 
opposed to the Soviet regime that introduced urbanisation, but he does not 
advocate the break-up of the Soviet state. Support for the Russian 
peasantry and condemnation of urbanisation provides a suitable 
expression of the Russian national ideal without addressing the question 
of the maintenance of a Russian state whose borders are coterminous with 
those of the Soviet Union; the idea of Russian national revival and the 
maintenance of a unitary state are alluded to, but the question of Russian 
ethnic dominance in a multiethnic state can be conveniently fudged and 
ignored. Belov's stance is pro-Russian, anti-Soviet, but pro-state - his focus 
on the peasantry allows him to express his position without raising some 
of the more complicated consequences of pursuing his ideas. 
It is interesting to note that when the RSFSR Supreme Soviet addressed 
the citizens of Russia in October 1990 on its approval of the Shatalin 500- 
day plan, it referred to the Russian village. Bearing in mind that Russia 
had already declared sovereignty by this stage, the Supreme Soviet referred 
to the programme as one of 'national salvation' and stated that: 
The village is to be revived and the strong master returned to the 1and. 66 
This official comment from the Russian parliament reflects the broad 
support for the national importance of the Russian village. 
The search for national identity and the definition of the Russian character 
Nationalism's selective use of its diverse inherited cultural wealth and its 
tendency to personify the nation leads to a huge discussion about what 
constitutes or reflects the national identity. To some extent the nation is 
idealized and subjected to an examination of that which makes it unique. 
The examination of Russian identity which took place over the perestroika 
years' dredged up ideas from the past by thinkers such as Solov'ev and 
Berdiaev, as well as producing a plethora of new reflections and opinions: 
many looked to the pre-Soviet past to provide images of the Russian man; 
some intimated that the Russian nation was not unduly affected by the 
Soviet period; whilst others advocated the idea of total national renewal. 
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One of the most confusing and, perhaps, contentious issues affecting 
interpetations and portrayals of the Russian character was that of empire 
and the Russian's relationship with his/her imperial legacy. Whilst some 
nationalists portrayed the Russian as a superior character whose imperial 
role was a reflection of his strength, other nationalists asserted that the 
Russian was benevolent, paternalistic and altruistic, an educator and 
provider. Nationalism is frequently accompanied by personification of the 
nation and an idealization of the national character. This involves 
crediting the national character with many virtues. The revelation of 
failings or faults is kept to a minimum, but certain faults and pecadillos 
may be highlighted as a feature of the national character if they are 
somehow appealing. 
Russian nationalism frequently asserted its identity with reference to 
Russia's unique position as a border between the supposedly diverse 
cultural worlds of Europe and Asia, thus claiming to be neither wholly 
European nor Asian. Nationalist discussion and the propounding of a 
Russian 'idea' provided Russia with a philosophy or mission which set it 
apart from other cultures. Russian nationalists sought to convince their 
fellow nationals that the Russian was the inheritor of something essential 
- an exclusivity which expressed itself through behaviour, language, 
religion and moral values. 
Likhachev's evaluation of the Russian character 
One of the leading figures who sought to evaluate and establish a notion of 
the Russian character was Academician Dmitrii Likhachev. Likhachev 
was widely respected for his scholarship and for his advanced years which 
both connected him with the prerevolutionary Russian past and endowed 
him with an aura of wisdom. It was also to his credit that he had survived 
six years of confinement in the infamous Solovki prison as a victim of 
Stalin's repression. His credentials enabled him to draw upon a large 
constituency of interest and, thus, he commanded a great deal of influence 
as an authority on the subject of Russian culture. Eschewing some of the 
more extreme and imperialist views expressed by nationalism, Likhachev 
gravitated towards liberal nationalism and labelled himself a 'patriot' 
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rather than a 'nationalist'. Others labelled him the 'conscience of Russia'. 67 
A philologist and literary historian, Likhachev drew upon sources of 
literature in order to construct an image of the Russian. In 1984 the 
Sovetskaia Rossiia publishing house published a bound copy of 
Likhachev's Zametki o russkom, a set of essays reflecting on the nature of 
the Russian and his culture. ' Likhachev referred to the Russian's virtue, 
his cultural contribution and the effect of his physical environment upon 
his development. The essays outlined a fairly common account of how 
the Russian envisaged himself and provided an attractive model 
description for nationalist-oriented Russians to follow and adopt through 
the Gorbachev years. Likhachev's opinions and observations led to a 
number of interviews during the late 80s in journals and newspapers 
consulting his opinion on Russian culture and morality. 
In Zametki o russkom, Likhachev discussed the Russian's kindness; his 
tendency towards close family relationships; his close, essential 
relationship with his vast territory and environment; the value of his 
unique national cultural inheritance. 
The more negative aspects of Russian history are blamed upon the rulers 
and the Russian people are absolved: 
One should not make the nation responsible for the deeds of its rulers...... Of course, there 
are (more) examples of Tsarism's cruel attitude towards other nations (which could be 
brought up}, but was it not really the Russian people themselves who suffered, and first and 
foremost the Russian people who suffered from the cruelty of its own government? 69 
Likhachev also discusses the virtues of what he considers to be patriotism 
as opposed to nationalism: 
True patriotism enriches others, enriching them spiritually. However, nationalism, by 
walling itself off from other cultures, turns its own culture to waste and ruin... 
Patriotism is the noblest of feelings. It is not even a feeling - it is the most important aspect 
of both a personal and social culture of the spirit, when a person and a whole nation (narod) 
somehow rise above themselves and set themselves goals which are beyond their personal 
aims. 
However, nationalism is the severest of human misfortunes. Like all evil, it hides itself, 
lives in the shadows and only pretends to be generated by love for one's country. 
70 
Although Likhachev was propagating a nationalist message, he sought to 
dissociate himself from the negative and unattractive associations with 
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nationalism. For instance, he distanced himself from the xenophobia that 
sometimes results from nationalism and expressed support for cultural 
freedom and democracy. This made his liberal nationalist message more 
acceptable to a larger proportion of Russian society as well as to observers 
outside Russia. As an influential figure in this field, Likhachev's views 
are significant. His emphasis on national renewal focussed on recognition 
of mistakes in Russia's recent past71 and on the re-examination and study 
of Russian history and culture: 
Before us stands the task of restoring the fullness of Russian culture... Russia is not an 
abstract concept. In developing her culture we must know what it produced in the past and 
what it is now. However complicated it might be, we must study Russian 
The features of nationalism in Likhachev's ideas are confirmed by his 
attempt to personify the nation: 
... Russian culture and along with it the whole of Russia is a personality, an individual. 
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In a fashion which is typical of nationalism, Likhachev seeks to establish 
an idealised vision of the Russian national character, which reflects virtue 
rather than fault. He even goes so far as to suggest that national character 
should only really be judged by its 'positive' traits: 
National character is paradoxical. Each positive quality is encountered by its opposite 
negative characterisitic: openness by reserve, generosity by greed, love of freedom by 
slavish obedience, etc. However, we judge any national type first and foremost by its 
positive charactersitics. 74 
That which is 'positive' is determined by subjective analysis. Glasnost 
gave Likhachev a greater opportunity to publicise his own interpretation 
of the national ideal and present his idealised image of Russian man. This 
idealisation took place amidst a time of guilt and of repentance as 
unsavoury aspects of Russia's Soviet past where dredged up by glasnost. 
Likhachev's representation of the Russian might well have been an 
attempt to encourage and convince the Russian of his worth and potential 
whilst revelations of the past pointed to shame and ignominy. The 
idealised Russian man was an attempt by Likhachev to encourage ethical 
values in what appeared to be a moral void. He even suggested that the 
Russian character was distinguished by the Russian's moral authority: 
The Russian people must never lose their moral authority among other peoples - an 
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authority desevedly won by Russian art, Russian literature, the struggle of the Russian 
intelligentsia for a better future for all mankind and the profound internationalism of the 
Russian people. A great people should be at the height of responsibility in its patriotic 
feelings and should not slip into crude nationalism. Only by being aware of our global 
responsibility can we Russians preserve our leading position in our country. We should help 
all peoples of our country to become morally purer and, of course, not sink to base chauvinism. 
We Russians do not need chauvinism. It is primarily found in weak peoples - peoples with a 
weak culture and weak cultural heritage. 75 
Whilst discouraging bigotry, Likhachev tries to inspire pride in the 
Russian nation. Russia is clearly described as a 'great' and 'strong' nation, 
where 'great' and 'strong' do not refer to size of the populous: 
... a great nation, a nation with its own great culture and own national traditions, is obliged 
to be good, especially if the fate of a lesser nation is tied to it... 
A strong nation is not necessarily large in number, a weak one not necessarily small. It is not 
a matter of the number of people belonging to a given nation, so much as the certainty and 
stability of its national traditions. 76 
Likhachev links certain virtues with the Russian character which some 
might not associate with the usual image of the Russian, certainly not with 
the Russian of the Soviet period. He writes of the Russian's association 
with industriousness which, he believes, is one aspect of Russian religious 
consciousness that does not exist in other branches of Christianity: 
The Christian ideal acquired a vital virtue in Russia - that of industriousness. 
'' 
He also stresses the Russian's association with the love of freedom: 
Freedom of choice also increased thanks to the openness of Russian culture... 
Russian culture, thanks to its mixture of different legacies is full of internal freedom. 
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Likhachev does not isolate Russian culture from its foreign neighbours. In 
fact, he declares that Russian culture is basically European and Byzantine: 
We are a country of European culture... Along with this we took in Byzantine culture, to a 
very large degree through Bulgaria. 79 
This 'European' Russian culture is one which is receptive to and can be 
enriched by foreign influences. However, whilst relating Russian culture 
to foreign culture, Likhachev presents the nationalist angle by arguing that 
Russian culture developed its own distinctive, even, 'higher forms' of the 
foreign styles of culture: 
This capacity of Russian culture to enrichen itself 
from foreign cultures and by 
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transformation of its own earlier culture was [even] more evident in the change of styles. The Russian land created its own artistic styles in the ancient period of its development up 
until the time of Petrine reforms, and after Peter it was incorporated into the general development of Western artistic life, constantly transforming artistic styles which 
originated in the West and were then responded to in Russia. But what a response! In Russia each style acquired not only its own forms, but higher forms. Baroque, classicism, 
sentimentalism, romanticism and realism! 80 
Whilst declaring the Russian people to be 'great' and 'strong' Likhachev is 
careful to stress that the Russian character is international and is not 
predisposed to racial prejudice. He justifies this with reference to the 
multicultural character of the Petersburg of his childhood and to the 
perceived harmonious relationship between different 'nations' in ancient 
Russia. 
Russian culture has from the very start been a culture of different peoples... Ancient Rus' was 
distinguished by the complete absence of racial prejudice against those over whom its 
influence spread... In not one single document is there a trace of racial or chauvinistic motive 
and a large number of documents have been preserved... Russian culture was open to other 
peoples and actively incorporated their experience. It is precisely due to this that Russian 
culture became great. "' 
The Russians are attributed with a quality which stresses their tolerance 
and regard for others: 
The multinational [Russian] state cultivated respect between nations. Even when the 
Russians hated the Tartar warriors as enemies, they did not hate them for their national 
features - they did not notice them... Not once has the word 'slant-eyed' or anything 
similar crept up in Russian texts. The 'all-embracing responsiveness' [vseotzyvchivost'], 
about which Dostoevskii wrote, was a feature of the Russian national character... 'all- 
embracing responsiveness' and national tolerance always existed in Rus'... This very feature 
constitutes the strength and national peculiarity of the Russian people. 82 
Likhachev is suggesting that the Russian character possesses a quality 
which responds to and caters for the needs of others. Thus, in spite of 
Russia's imperial history, he rejects any Russian national arrogance and, at 
the same time, provides a justification for the Russians' position as first 
among equals in a multinational empire: their 'all-embracing 
responsiveness' credits them with a moral and social authority befitting 
their position. 
Despite his efforts to define and encourage interest in the Russian national 
identity, Likhachev dissociates himself from the idea that the Russian 
national character is genetically inherited: 
It would be ridiculous to suggest that features of the 
Russian character were innate in 
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Russians. In fact, they were cultivated by history and the historical situations in which Russia most often found itself... 83 
He also distances himself from the idea that there is one definitive 
Russian type, thus accommodating others within the Russian state: 
The character of the people is not uniform. We notice how differences in the Russian 
character were formed and are forming amongst coastal inhabitants, others in Siberia and 
yet others along the Volga... It is impossible to separate Russia from the peoples who 
populate her, who together with the Russians make up her national body. Russia is almost the only country of its kind- due to the wealth of her cultural types and the complexity of the intertwining of different traits within them; by the energy of her various revelations; 
and, finally, by the intensity of her relationships with other nationalities. 84 
The above words demonstrate a dilemma which all analysts of the Russian 
national question encounter - Likhachev was trying to establish the 
Russian [ ru ss ki i] national character, whilst always having to address the 
phenomenon of a multinational Great Russia [Ross ii a] . On the one hand, 
he treats Russia and all of her nationalities as a unitary 'national body', 
whilst, on the other, he attempts to define something which is specifically 
Russian [russkii], relating to those who are ethnically Russian. This 
theme, brought about by Russia's imperial legacy, is one which frequently 
crops up in evaluations of, or observations on the Russian national 
character and identity. Likhachev's observations tend to obscure the 
difference between russkii and rossiiskii, suggesting that the two are 
different, but inseparable. There is no doubt that he identifies a specific 
Russian ethnic nation, but this nation cannot be defined outside the 
context of the multinational state of which it is the senior member. By 
selective analysis, Likhachev and others attempted to define something 
which would be both plausible and acceptable to those who considered 
themselves to be 'Russians'. 
Other observations on the Russian national character 
Others besides Likhachev attempted to define the Russian character and 
unite the Russian people about an idealised image of themselves. Many 
illustrated their evaluations by selecting examples from Russian history. 
Dmitri Balashov used the example of an early historical hero, St. Sergii of 
Radonezh: 
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The best sides of the Russian national character traced throughout our history and today 
are contained namely by Sergii Radonezhskii. These are an absolute, unalterable 
adherence to chosen principles, a preparedness to work and as much kindness as 
circumstances allow, quiet efficiency, a deliberate, principled modesty, an outward meaning in all one's actions, identical treatment of the high and the low and absolute, sacrificial 
patriotism. "5 
Whilst others resorted to later figures as the embodiment of Russian 
values such as the Soviet Russian hero Iurii Gagarin: 
The first person in space was a Russian, a Soviet chap, clever and modest, with an amazing, 
unforgettable smile which won over a planet of people. Even today we love him as if he 
were alive, our Iurii Gagarin, and we will always love him, for he absorbed the best 
qualities of the Russian, Soviet character - cheerful, courageous, sincere and infinitely 
devoted to the Motherland. There is an example of a true patriot, there is a genuine son of 
the Fatherland! "6 
Aleksandr Saltykov, a priest, also related the development of the Russian 
character to the past, its religious past: 
The influence of liturgical life on the Russian people, on the formation of its mental 
properties, is as evident in its culture as it is in the great moral qualities of the Russian in 
the past. That which is best in the Russian people, those traits of the Russian person which 
are rightly lauded in fiction are not something innate. Kindness, gentleness, tolerance, 
benevolence, sacrifice, fearlessness, disinterestedness, cordiality - these and other 
characteristics, which are often recognised as the best in the Russian person, particularly in 
the past, were fostered within him by constant, centuries-long spiritual and moral 
preaching which he would hear from the church pulpit and through the repentance which 
would be inculcated into him from childhood. 8' 
Aleksandr Kazintsev argued that the Russian national character was 
unchanging and examined early Russian literature to draw-parallels with 
the present. ' This idea of the unchanging nature of nations was also 
expressed in the journal Ve che when it printed an extract from a book by 
the emigre Russian A. V. Kartashev: 
... from the 
historical start to their historical death nations [narody] are steady types 
which cannot be broken down, evidently subject to the law of biological individualisation 
and self-preservation, analogous to the law of stability of organic forms. 
... Thus, Russia is not 
just like an external, historically changeable fact, but like a stable 
organic whole, a spiritual type, the living soul of the Russian people with a united, 
assembly-like consciousness. 89 
A certain interest was shown in the work of Lev Gumilev who claimed 
that a nationality or 'ethnos' developed according to 'its ecological 
environment. This development would proceed over time until an 
identifiable group emerged: 
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Human collectives have a rigid link with the landscape that feeds them. This is the Motherland. 
But in order to use the landscape's resources one must adapt, and this requires some considerable time. Adaptation comes about over generations; it is not the grandsons, but the great-grandsons of the first newcomers to the country who, with natural conditions unfamiliar to their grandfathers, master the set of traditions necessary for a successful existence. It is then that the Motherland becomes the Fatherland. That is how it was even in paleolithic times. 90 
It is this idea that the national group is somehow organically bound to its 
physical environment rather than just a product of its social history that 
attracted people like Balashov and coincided with the views of authors 
such as Astaf'ev, Rasputin and Belov who considered the image of the 
hard-working, courageous and honest rural peasant to be the embodiment 
of the true Russian character. 
It was common for those of a Russian nationalist inclination to square the 
Russian national character with Russia's imperial past. The usual claim 
was that the Russian character was peace-loving and altruistic and that 
Russian expansion brought occupied peoples peace and equality rather 
than subjugation and exploitation. In 1988, V. A. Tvardovskaia pointed to 
this tendency when referring to the work of writers in the nationalist- 
orientated journal Molodaia gvardiia: 
From the point of view of commentators of the youth journal (V. Chalmaev, M. Lobanov), 
Russia's past witnessed no oppression, no violence, no wars of conquest - only just wars. It is 
true that historians often promote the same idea of the foreign policy of Russian autocracy - 
the very word 'conquest' was never used in those days - when they spoke of Central Asia or 
the Caucasus they only spoke about 'voluntary annexation'. 9' 
In 1991, Viktor Aksiuchits also rejected the idea that the 'Russian people' 
were 'imperialists, occupiers, oppressors of all the rest of the peoples in the 
country' and attempted to refute it by giving the example of the Russians 
withdrawing from Paris after having defeated Napoleon. ' 
The image put forward by nationalist-orientated commentators of the 
Russians in relation to the empire was that they were pioneers who 
brought protection to those who they subsumed and that the Russian was 
inclined to treat national minorities benevolently: 
The leading force of their [peoples of the USSR] international unity was the working class 
of Russia, headed by the Communist Party. The Russian working class honourably fulfilled 
the great international duty bequeathed to it by Lenin, having shown decisive help to 
earlier oppressed peoples to overcome backwardness... 
93 
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The preceding words appeared in Pravda in January 1986 reflecting the 
existing pre-Gorbachev image of the Russian as the benevolent elder 
brother in the family of Soviet peoples. This idea continued throughout 
the Gorbachev period particularly amongst those of an imperialist Russian 
nationalist inclination. It was prevalent amongst some of the Pamiat' 
groups: 
All over the course of its history, the Russian people has come to the help of its brothers and 
neighbours. Even in those centuries when world politics were not based on morality but on 
force, the 'Russian people never suppressed smaller peoples, never destroyed them, never 
Russified them. Kindness, patience and an ability to organize life in a non-aggressive and 
unparasitic way are primordial Russian qualities. 4 
Igor' Sychev, a Pamiat' group leader, referred to the Russian people's 'just' 
role as guardian of others: 
The Russian people was very rightly considered by other peoples to be the elder brother in 
the great family of nations. 95 
One of the major proponents of imperialist Russian nationalism, 
Aleksandr Prokhanov, also highlighted the benevolent, sacrificial nature 
of the Russian character: 
The orientation of the Russian individual and collective conscience towards the state, the 
psychological character of the Russian person, open to international links, the sacrifice of 
the Russian economy, culture, ethnos, which facilitated the creation of the state. 
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Russian exclusiveness 
The propagation of an idealised Russian national character was 
occasionally reinforced by reference to the exclusiveness of the 
Russian. 
An article by G. Petrov in Sovetskaia kul'tura on 24 
November 1987 
reported an 'academic conference' in which one participant, 
Mikhail 
Antonov, had claimed that: 
There is and never has been a more talented people on the earth 
than ours, the Russian 
people ! 97 
The article was critical of some of the opinions expressed at 
the conference, 
including those of Antonov and particularly those presented 
by Dmitrii 
Vasil'ev of Pamiat'. A subsequent letter to the paper, whilst giving no 
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support to Vasil'ev, questioned whether Petrov was proud of his national 
origins and pointed out that Antonov was not the first person to have 
expressed these words, but that they had been used by figures including 
Pushkin, Tolstoi, Dostoevskii, Chekhov and Maiakovskii. 98 
Another later example of the idea of Russian exclusiveness appeared on 
the pages of a pro-monarchist independent newspaper: 
NO OTHER PEOPLE IN THE WORLD HAS BEEN THROUGH THE SAME TIMES AND 
TASKS AS THE RUSSIAN PEOPLE AND NO OTHER PEOPLE HAS DERIVED SUCH 
STRENGTH, ORIGINALITY AND SPIRITUAL DEPTH FROM SUCH EXPERIENCES AND 
TORMENTS. 99 
Whilst monarchists and like-minded people rejected socialism and 
communism, others united the ideas of Russian exclusiveness and 
socialist exclusiveness. A declaration by the Association of Socialist- 
Populists claimed: 
Russia is a historical phenomenon which has no analogues in world history... 
Historical events that occurred in our country, her territorial, climatic and later spiritual, 
political and economic peculiarities led to Russia receiving its own course in the general 
development of world civilization, a course which differed from all other countries in the 
world. 
Factors established by the foundation of a particular Russian path continued to have an 
effect, making Russia more and more unlike the rest of the world... 
and this was qualified by the consequential development of Russian social 
thinking which produced thinkers such as Herzen who espoused 'populist 
or Russian socialism': 
The basis of Russian socialism is the principle of communality brought out of the depths of 
history by the people themselves. 100 
It was not only the likes of a small Russian socialist group which expressed 
such ideas. Even the 'internationalist' Edinstvo group of Nina Andreeva 
suggested that socialism had its roots in the Russian national past. An 
address to 'compatriots' listing the historical Russian figures evoked by 
Stalin (Aleksandr Nevskii, Dmitrii Donskoi, Kuz'ma Minin, Dmitrii 
Pozharskii, Aleksandr Suvorov, Mikhail Kutuzov) to inspire a Soviet 
Victory in the Second World War continued the link between the efforts of 
these nation-buliders and the national character of socialism: 
We will defend Lenin from vandalism and lack of historical memory - so that he and those 
builders of the Russian land whose courageous image shielded and saved the nation in 
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November 1941 might once again - perhaps for the last time - teach, inspire and save us... 
... Socialism is the flesh of the flesh of our historical past, it is the child of our national 
genius, of our national spirit. 101 
One of the figures who was most outspoken in this respect was Aleksandr 
Prokhanov, an undoubted imperialist Russian nationalist who suggested 
in 1988 that the state had no future in turning to alien Western concepts or 
by adopting a mystical, intangible 'Russian Idea'. Prokhanov implied that 
socialism was firmly rooted in Russian history and that it was the only 
force capable of integrating all tendencies in Russian/Soviet society. In 
Prokhanov's view, socialism was an integral part of Russia's state 
identity. "' 
Russian language 
Several other issues besides the definition of national character gravitated 
around the discussion of national identity. One of the central issues was 
that of the Russian language, which acted as a unifying factor in the 
Russian/ Soviet state and served as a badge of identity to many people in 
non-Russian republics who did not have a command of the titular 
language (the 'international' movements in the Baltic republics sometimes 
referred to the rights of 'Russian-speakers' rather than 'Russians'). One 
should note that there was a significant number of 'Russian-speakers' 
(russkoiazychnye) both within and outside the Russian Federation whose 
ancestral lineage was not Russian, but who identified themselves 
culturally with Russia. "' 
The unifying role of the Russian language was expressed by L. Skvortsov 
in Pravda in January 1986: 
There cannot be genuine love for the country, for the Motherland, without a love of one's 
mother tongue, without a knowledge of its invaluable riches and possibilities. 
A great example and unsurpassed model for us to imitate is Lenin's careful and, at the same 
time, creative relationship with the Russian language... 
The cementing role of the Russian language is great in strengthening our multinational state 
and in developing a common Soviet culture which is socialist in content, varied in its 
national forms and international in spirit. 
Unbiassed census data shows a steady growth in the number of non-Russians naming the 
Russian language as their mother tongue or as a second language which they freely 
command... 
The outstanding role of the Russian language in uniting the great brotherhood of peoples of 
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the USSR should, in my opinion, receive deserved attention in the new wording of the CPSU 
Programme. 104 
The above words represent the attitude towards the Russian language over 
the Brezhnev-era - that it served as a suitable lingua franca in the 
multinational Soviet state. However, stressing the importance of the idea 
of the 'love of one's mother tongue' suggests that those of non-Russian 
nationality were being required to absorb a Soviet language which was 
essentially Russian, thus introducing them not only to Soviet culture, but 
also to a Russian register and understanding. This attitude continued 
throughout the Gorbachev period and in March 1989 another article 
appeared in Pravda singling out the qualities of the Russian language 
above others of the USSR. 105 Although the russifying role of the Russian 
language was supported by people of an imperialist Russian nationalist 
persuasion, some rejected the idea of using Russian as the 'Soviet' 
language, claiming that the language was being ruined or 'de-nationalised'. 
Some objected to the infiltration of foreign words, others objected to the 
introduction of terms ushered in by communism. An extreme example of 
this appeared in Igor' Siniavin's (one of several Pamiat' group leaders) 
political programme, which called for the establishment of a commission 
to protect the Russian language: 
We must create a special state commission, possessing the right of direct sanctions, based 
upon a publishing and research centre consisting of Russian (not only by passport) academics 
and writers, pursuing the purity of the Russian language. We must cleanse the Russian 
language of false Party-speak, of the cramming of abbreviations, of lickspittle pro- 
Westemisms and of the cripplings of Yiddish. 1°6 
Similarly, another Pamiat' group called for the establishment of a body to 
protect the language: 
We demand that the purity and wealth of the mother tongue be protected from the 
pernicious influence on it of newspaper jargon by creating of an Academy of the Russian 
language... 107 
Russian nation as a victim 
In addition to claiming that the Russian language had suffered, some 
observers attempted to portray the Russian person as a victim of the 
Soviet 
period, seeking to absolve the nation of any misdeeds 
during the 
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unsavoury events of recent history. Undoubtedly, Russian individuals 
suffered in much the same way as other individuals of other nationalities 
did, but some commentators expressed the idea that Russians were the 
greater victims, perhaps in response to the sentiment held by non- 
Russians that the Russians occupied an imperial role within the Soviet 
set-up. There was a clear need, particularly by those of an imperialist 
nationalist persuasion who wished to maintain the unitary Soviet state 
structure, to establish an image of the Russian nation as a benevolent 
'elder brother' who had sacrificed much for its siblings, but also suffered 
just as much in the process. It was necessary to unite Russians behind the 
idea that they shared a common national virtue and were in no way 
responsible as a nation for the misfortunes and atrocities which befell the 
Soviet Union. Several figures claimed, variously, that Russia was the 
victim of the revolution and socialism; Russia had suffered a severe 
moral degradation as a result of Soviet rule; the Russian nation of all the 
Soviet nationalities had sustained the greatest harm to its national identity 
and culture. 
In a debate with Benedikt Sarnov, Vadim Kozhinov recognised that the 
revolution was both 'Russian and popular'. However, he also suggested 
that it was brought about by emigres who had been outside Russia so long 
that they could no longer understand the country. Naming such figures as 
Bukharin, Zinoviev, Kamenev and Sokol'nikov as well as 'immigrants 
from Europe' Radek and Rakovskii, Kozhinov subjected Trotskii to the 
greatest criticism. He indicated his belief of Trotskii's complicity in turning 
the revolution into an anti-Russian act: 
... Trotskii wrote that the Russian life reconstructed 
by L. Tolstoi 'took its course outside 
history... similar to the existence of a beehive or an anthill'. How excessively 
considerately he treats an anthill... The revolution, directed against capitalists and 
landowners was turned into the most extreme violence against the nation [narod]. 108 
Vladimir Zhirinovskii claimed that whilst other nationalities complained 
they had lost their natural resources under socialism, it was the Russians 
who were the real victims: 
Today they are beginning to shout and howl: "Where are our riches? They have 
appropriated everything from us! " It seems that the Tatars had their oil taken away, 
theYakuts their diamonds, the Uzbeks their cotton. Everything was taken away from 
everyone. Now it seems that the Russians are to blame for everything. Yet another blow is 
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inflicted on the Russians. Now it seems that the Russians brought the revolution on their bayonets and that Russians bought up raw materials and provisions for next to nothing: Moldavian grapes, Georgian mandarines, Uzbek cotton... And yet, we must ask, to whom did we give it away? What, the Russians live better than all the others? Russians are 
poorer than all the others. They are right in one thing: the resources trickled away and 
part of the national wealth went abroad to help communist regimes there.... 
If we take a grand total, then Russia is the one that grew impoverished, it was purely Russian regions and genuinely Russian lands, and in all aspects a blow was inflicted on the 
main nation... And today the victim once again appears to be the Russian people, but they 
are already tired and do not want the role of donor foisted upon them. 109 
Igor' Shafarevich's formulation of the idea of 'Russophobia' originally 
published in Samizdat in 1982 and republished in various official 
publications in 1989 (particularly in Nash sov re menni k) put forward the 
idea of Russia as a victim, which had been unfairly portrayed as the 
vanguard of Soviet rule, when it was itself the victim-"' In 1991, 
Shafarevich updated his idea and summarized the basic points of his first 
work: 
In our writing on current affairs and literature there is a very influential tendency instilling 
the idea of the inferiority and detrimental nature of Russian history, culture and the 
national psyche: "Russia is the breeding-ground of totalitarianism, the Russians had no 
history, the Russians always grovel before strong power. " In order to designate this 
tendency, we use the term 'Russophobia'. It is fatally dangerous to the Russian people, 
stripping it of its faith in its strengths. "' 
Shafarevich's updated article on Russophobia was written in view of the 
revelations which had surfaced under glasnost and following the sizeable 
number of articles which had appeared in response to the broader 
publication of his original work. Once again Shafarevich was at pains to 
absolve the Russian people and Russian character of any responsibility for 
the revolution and its aftermath, blaming the events on a section of society 
which he named the Malyi narod [little nation]. 
Evgenii Anisimov, writing in Moscow News, suggested that it was because 
of the Russians' very nature that they became such an easy victim to both 
the Russian empire and the Stalinist empire: 
The exploitation of the Russian people's kindness, their readiness to sacrifice themselves, 
their patience and unpretentiousness, the use of their national wealth in the name of 
distant imperial aims effected the notorious 'law of colonial ingratitude'. People felt 
offended by the parent-state which emphasized their role officially, but actually 
belittled 
it: people were sacrificed in vain to the Motherland and hopes were dashed. 
l'2 
The moral degradation of Russia was a theme which had been salient in 
the work of the aforementioned village-prose writers, such as in 
Vasilii 
164 
Belov's Vse vperedi, which suggested that moral decadence was due to the 
creeping influence of urban (and, therefore, `non-Russian') culture. The 
idea was that the rural community had been able to provide a moral 
guidance and that the destruction of the community had removed the 
basis for this guidance. Frequent reference to morality (nravstvennost) 
appeared in texts putting forward Russian nationalist sentiments, but what 
this abstract term referred to was not always clear. For some it was simply 
the influence of the Russian Orthodox Church (to which I will return 
later) : 
We must revive our people spiritually and morally with the help of primarily the 
Orthodox Church. 113 
For others, such as Viacheslav Gorbachev, morality entailed the rejection 
of material values and the acceptance of the idea of the social collective. 
Moral degradation was signified by the materialistic, consumerist values 
ushered in by the Brezhnev-era. The criticism of these 'urban' values was 
clearly an attack on Western values and Gorbachev indicated that these 
values had appeared at the expense of 'spirituality' and collective social 
responsibility. 114 
Mikhail Antonov recognised a moral decline in the Russian nation and 
indicated that this needed to be remedied before other change could take 
place: 
The truth is that it is not just the economy that is sick,... it is the country and the nation 
that are sick, the nation's soul is destroyed, its moral foundations have been undermined. 
Without a renewal of this basis all measures of a purely economic nature are useless. 
We now need a real break-through in this area of theory, not abstract constructions, but the 
enrichment of the theory of spiritual and moral values of all peoples of this planet and first 
and foremost our great Russian nation. 115 
These words, which addressed a plenum of the RSFSR Writers' Union, 
followed an earlier article in Sovetskaia Rossiia in which Antonov had 
expressed the same sentiment and stressed the need for moral 
rearmament. 7i16 In 1990 Antonov suggested that Russia needed the 
reintroduction of a Russian Orthodox Christian morality to revive the 
country and its economy. "' 
Russian National Unity, the party headed by former Pamiat' member, 
Aleksandr Barkashov, referred to the ideas of Russian national and moral 
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loss incurred as a result of the revolution: 
It historically arose that the Russian People, by the strength of its great Spirituality, Morality, developed economic activity, Culture, numerousness, military strength and fairness, became a powerful nucleus of attraction, about which a mighty multinational state 
was formed. It was the Russian nation and not any celebrated internationalism or general human values, which was the pivot and cement in this state. As a result of the 1917 
revolution, of subsequent events and, in particular, of genocide in all its forms, the Russian 
people were stripped of their role by violent and artificial means... "' 
This idea of Russian national loss was put forward by all the other Pamiat' 
groups. Vasil'ev's National Patriotic Front Pamiat' blamed 'Zionists' for 
harming the Russian people: 
They [Zionists] took away from the Russian people traditions, the national economy and 
the private property that belonged to them by right ... 
119 
Propagating the idea of suffering and loss not only suggested the 
endurance and nobility of the Russian character, but it served to unite 
people behind a common sense of loss and mutual sympathy. The idea of 
Russia as a victim produced a sense of something approaching martyrdom: 
The world is hoping that Russia will point out a new way, for a great light is born of great 
suffering. 
No one in the world has suffered more than Russia, Belorussia and Ukraine, no one has 
sipped more bitterly from the cup, that is why the word is behind them. "° 
Some commentators pointed to the spiritual and ascetic qualities of the 
Russian people, whilst others emphasised the material injustices which 
the nation had needlessly suffered. In almost every case, the Russian 
nation was not responsible for its own suffering and loss. 
Re-evaluations of history and Russian historical figures 
The examination of character and national loss also required a re- 
examination, and in some cases, a re-evaluation of history. The focus on 
Russian history tended to paint more idealised pictures of the pre- 
revolutionary Russian past and rehabilitated views of history which had 
existed prior to Soviet power. Although certain figures in history such as 
Dmitrii Donskoi and Aleksandr Nevskii were portrayed positively over 
the Soviet period, other figures such as Stolypin, who had been vilified 
throughout the same period, became a figure of much attention and 
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respect. In addition, Russian history was examined in relation to Soviet 
history which was itself subject to great scrutiny and review. The 
discussion and positive propagation of Russian history, the resurrection of 
symbols and 'values' from the past became an important factor in the 
course of uniting Russians around a national ideal that appeared to have 
some precedent and, therefore, 'legitimacy'. 
The re-examination of history focussed to a large extent on the Soviet 
period, particularly on the Stalinist terror and Brezhnev's stagnation. 
Russian. nationalist interpretation of Soviet history varied. In some 
instances (as mentioned above), the Russian nation was cast as the victim, 
whilst other opinions viewed the socialism and events of the period as a 
necessary and fundamentally characteristic step in the Russian state's 
history. 
Several figures who expressed Russian nationalism, such as Aleksandr 
Tsipko, Viktor Aksiuchits and I1'ia Glazunov, believed that Russian history 
and Soviet history bore little direct relation to each other i. e. that Russian 
history came to a standstill in 1917 and that Soviet history should be 
viewed separately. "' Others, who supported socialism and the maintenance 
of the unitary Soviet state followed a 'single stream' theory of Russian 
history, which recognised the Soviet state as a continuation of the Russian 
state. Both tendencies observed fairly positive images of the pre- 
revolutionary Russian past. 
Aleksandr Ageev pointed to the idealisation of history used by nationalist- 
orientated figures to rally others around a national idea. In a vein similar 
to Gellner, he suggested that this was part of the myth-building process of 
nationalism: 
The person...... in searching for an image of another better life inevitably turns to the past. 
This is the way that Slavophile myths about pre-petrine Holy Russia once arose... This is 
the way that the modern myth arose about a pre-revolutionary Great Russia, where 
everything was different and better than in the communist Russia. 
tm 
The interest in pre-revolutionary Russian history was one of the most 
significant developments in shaping the nucleus of a recognisable Russian 
identity about which Russians (both russkie and rossiiskie) could 
congregate and unify. Mikhail Lobanov stressed the importance of 
knowing one's own history in Nash sovremennik in 1988, downplaying 
167 
the idea of internationalism by asserting that events and issues in other 
parts of the world cannot be as important as the products of one's own 
history. " 
Certain adherents to Russian nationalism complained that the education 
system did not provide an adequate propagation of Russian history. For 
instance, the Leningrad branch of Pamiat' declared that: 
In schools in the other republics of the USSR, children learn both the history of the USSR 
and the history of their republic, which cultivates a love and pride for their native land 
(k ra i). In RSFSR schools, all they learn is the history of the USSR. 124 
These words were all but reproduced by a member of the Moscow Writers' 
Union Anatolii Zhukov, who compared Russia with the other republics: 
We are an exception. For example, in Russian schools Russian history is not taught, there is 
only USSR history. 125 
This concern for the teaching of a Russian national history overlooks the 
fact that the history of the USSR as it was taught in Soviet schools was, 
more or less, a history of the development of the Russian state charting 
Russia's history from Kiev Rus' through the Tsars and the October 
Revolution up to the present. The textbooks may have presented certain 
(but, by no means, all) events in a negative light from an ideological 
perspective, but this was no less true of the republican history textbooks. 
The RNPR was one of several groups which called for a revised (or 
'objective', as they preferred to put it) version of Russian history : 
The RNPR will strive for the objective teaching of Russian history and the removal of 
distortions, tendentious evaluations and falsifications brought into it. 126 
The desire for a more positive appraisal of Russian history was highlighted 
by the aforementioned support for the republication of Karamzin's 
History of the Russian State. This account of history was welcomed 
because it was free from the ideological constraints of communism and 
because it glorified the feats of Russian history. Many of the heroic figures 
in distant Russian history (particularly those instrumental in the founding 
and maintenance of the Russian state) were accepted as such by Soviet 
history books. However, the closer history approached 1917, the more 
likely historical establishment figures were to be portrayed in a negative 
light. The reappraisal of history under glasnost rehabilitated several 
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figures who were held up as icons in a link with the pre-revolutionary 
past. Petr Stolypin and Tsar Nicholas II represent just two of these figures. 
Stolypin became a figure of respect for a broad spectrum of people, ranging 
from from pro-El'tsin democrats to members of Pamiat'. It was not so 
much that Stolypin was admired for his economic policies, but that he 
became a national figure who represented pre-revolutionary Russian 
national interest and an alternative programme of reform to that of the 
communists. Although condemned by pro-communist imperialist 
nationalists such as Nina Andreeva's Edins tv o for anti-communism and 
for liberal economic policies, ' Stolypin was celebrated as a Russian patriot 
by a number of other groups and his speech on agrarian reform appeared 
in a number of publications, particularly in some of the new independent 
newspapers. These articles repeated Stolypin's desire for a better future for 
Russia and often cited his words: 'We need a great Russia! "' One group 
who used this phrase, the Republican Popular Party of Russia, RNPR, held 
the 'First All-Russian Stolypin readings' on 14-15 December 1991,129 after 
previously announcing its intentions to do so in copies of its paper, Nash e 
v re mia. The Party's leader Nikolai Lysenko had previously described 
Stolypin as 'our great hero' . 
130 
Valentin Rasputin, writing before the Russian presidential election in 
1991, declared his support for Nikolai Ryzhkov, but added that his ideal 
candidate would be a figure like Petr Stolypin who was capable of 
understanding 'Russia's historical fate' and the 'Russian people's 
character'. Rasputin suggested that Stolypin was an embodiment of the 
true Russian character, implying that as a leader he iinderstood Russia's 
role in the world -a 'spiritual' role. 131 
Another article entitled 'Reading Stolypin', which appeared in the 
nationalist-orientated Moskovskii literator, urged liberals and members of 
the left to judge 'patriots' not by such figures as leader of one of the 
Pamiat' groups, Smirnov-Ostashvili, but by the values of Stolypin. 
132 This 
suggests that Stolypin's pro-Russian rhetoric, his defence of maintaining a 
strong unitary Russian state, his authoritarian methods and 
his solutions 
for the development of agriculture, the peasant community and Russian 
society in general were supported by the author as an example of acceptable 
Russian national values. For such people, Stolypin not only understood 
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the Russian national character, but reflected the Russian national character. 
A renewed interest in the monarchy was another feature in the search for 
national identity. The rehabilitation of Tsar Nicholas II and his family was 
an issue which received some attention. In 1989, Moscow News printed an 
interview with G. Riabov who claimed that he had found the bodies of the 
Royal Family outside Sverdlovsk and that he wanted to rebury them. " 
There was also an outcry over the demolition of the Ipat'ev House in 
Sverdlovsk where the Tsar and his family were believed to have been 
murdered. Certain nationalist-orientated people erected a cross on the site, 
which was declared sacred and demands surfaced for a church to be 
constructed on the site to commemorate the death of the last Tsar. " 
Sympathy for the Tsar surfaced in a variety of other ways. Culprits were 
found for the downfall of the monarchy. The extreme Russian nationalist 
Vladimir Fomichev blamed Kerenskii and 'almost all of his government' 
for changing centuries of Tsarist power, claiming that they were masons. 135 
Several groups adopted the Tsar as a national symbol and some supported 
the restoration of the monarchy. Pamiat' groups openly expressed their 
support for the monarchy. For example, Dmitrii Vasil'ev declared: 
THE TSAR IS THE FATHER OF THE NATION. 
MONARCHY IS THE HIGHEST DEMOCRATIC INSTITUTION OF RULE ON EARTH. 136 
Information about the Tsar and his family appeared in Vasil'ev's 
newspaper Pamiat' and one printed the words and music to the former 
Russian national anthem 'God Save the Tsar '. 137 
In 1989, the Orthodox Consitutional-Monarchist Party appeared which 
transformed into PRAMOS, the name used by the monarchist party led by 
General Denikin in the 20s. PRAMOS was formed with the direct aim of 
erecting a church on the site of the former Ipat'ev house, but it also 
supported the idea of the restoration of the Romanov dynasty. " Similarly, 
another monarchist group, RISO, advocated the idea of restoring the 
Romanovs to power in the person of Grand Prince Vladimir Kirillovich: 
The ultimate aim of RISO's activity is to restore a Russian Orthodox Kingdom... 
RISO takes upon itself the defence and propagation of the RUSSIAN 
MONARCHIST IDEA 
in its everday activity... 
The most senior in the Romanov family, His Imperial 
Highness the Grand Prince Vladimir 
Kirillovich is considered by the impertsy [RISO members] to 
be the Head of the Russian 
Imperial House. 139 
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RISO stressed that the restoration of the monarchy was the only way to 
revive the Russian people - in other words, the only way to truly re- 
establish the Russian national identity: 
The spiritual and ecclesiastical reconstitution of the Fatherland WITHOUT THE 
RECONSTITUTION OF THE MONARCHY is an empty dream and an illusion instilled by 
godless people. You cannot put the cart before the horses. 
The revival, both spiritually and in every other way, of our people and our god-given 
Fatherland, can only be achieved with the restoration of the monarchy and in the course of 
organising it... 140 
It was not only the more extreme groups that supported the idea of a 
restored Russian monarchy. Monarchist elements existed in other parties 
such as Vladimir Karpets in the Russian Christian Democratic Movement 
(RKhDD). Karpets' monarchist and nationalistic views led to some 
objection in the Movement's executive body, the Duma, but it did not 
prevent Karpets from himself occupying a place in the Movement's 
influential Duma. 141 
Pro-monarchist newspapers appeared such as RISO's Dvuglavyi orel, 
Monarkhist of the St. Petersburg Monarchist Centre, Russkoe Znamia and 
Moskovskie vedomosti. All included the double-headed eagle on their 
masthead and Mo na rkh ist sometimes had little but a picture of Tsar 
Nicholas II and his family on the front cover. " However, it was not only 
the publications of recognisable pro-monarchist groups which paid 
attention to the last tsar and to Grand Prince Vladimir Kirillovich. For 
example, the DPR newspaper Demokraticheskaia gazeta carried an 
interview with an advisor to Grand Prince Vladimir Kirillovich in late 
1991 which portrayed the Grand Prince in a favourable light, suggesting 
that, although discretion was used by interviewing a third party, there 
might be sympathy for the idea of the monarchy within elements of the 
democratic movement (albeit, fairly conservative pro-Union elements 
in 
this case), 143 
Russian national symbols 
The adoption of Russian and, in particular, pre-revolutionary symbols was 
another feature of the search for Russian national 
identity. The Russian 
flag, the white, blue and red tricolour was adopted 
by Demokraticheskii 
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soiuz and also by members of the Russian parliament and its supporters 
following the Russian declaration of sovereignty in June 1990. This 
eventually led to the tricolour being raised over the Russian parliament 
building following the failed putsch of August 1991. Other, perhaps more 
menacing appearances of the tricolour were also in evidence. For example, 
one independent newspaper reported in 1989 that the tricolour had 
appeared along with banners of the imperial eagles, standards from the 
past and tunics from the Petrine era at a rally of soldiers in Gorky Park. 
The Russian flag was used on an advertising pamphlet attempting to 
persuade soldiers to subscribe to the army newspaper Krasnaia zvezda. 
The reporter commented that 'not one red flag was to be seen in the park' 
and one participant in civilian clothing boasted that there were no 
hammers and sickles. One major, also a People's Deputy, declared that the 
display of banners were: 
"our valour, our history". '44 
The Russian press began to explain the meaning of all the old Russian 
symbols. The small independent newspaper, Liumpen, had a front page 
article on the history of the Russian flag, explaining its origins and those of 
its predecessors. The symbolism of its colours reflected the qualities that 
the Russian character should live up to: 
... white is for nobleness and candour, blue is 
for loyalty, honesty, irreproachability, 
chasteness and red is for courage, bravery, generosity and love. 145 
Some of the small nationalist-orientated parties even demanded the 
restoration of pre-revolutionary Russian national symbols. For example, 
Vladimir Osipov's Christian Patriotic Union listed as two of its pre- 
electoral propoals: 
The revival of national historical symbols. 
The return of original names to cities, towns, villages, streets, squares and territories. 
146 
Moskovskie vedomosti carried an article explaining the Romanov coat-of- 
arms, whilst the monarchist papers Dvuglavyi orel and Monarkhist 
explained the significance of the Russian double-headed eagle crest which 
contained within it eight other coats-of-arms representing the eight parts 
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of the Russian empire. 147 Besides the revival of old symbols, new national 
symbols were also brought into existence. For instance in December 1991, 
the newspaper Rossiisskie vesti announced that new Russian awards were 
being planned. The article showed a proposed design for a medal to 
honour the 'Defender of Free Russia' which had an image of St. George as 
its centrepiece. The Secretary for the RSFSR Supreme Soviet Presidium 
Commission for State Awards announced that Order of St. George was 
being revived and that the highest award would be the Order of the 
'Revival of Russia' which would include the Russian crest of the two- 
headed eagle. ' 
A large and broad selection of the press continued to portray images which 
were regarded as Russian national symbols. Den' and Sovetskaia Rossiia 
frequently printed photographs of Russian churches, birch trees, icons and 
people in national costume over the course of 1991. Den "s pictures were 
published under the the rubric 'Den "s Album' and tended to focus on one 
particular theme. For instance, in one edition the camera focussed on 
Russian churches and the eight pages of the newspaper featured seven 
photographs of Russian Orthodox churches, whilst on another occasion it 
focussed on Russian graves and memorials, portraying images of the 
Russian cross and the imperial eagles. 149 
The message conveyed by these images was put less subtly, but similarly, by 
one of the Russian nationalist independent newspapers Istoki, which 
showed three photographs: a girl in national dress, singers in national 
dress and a woman icon-painter. Under the rubric 'Corner of Russia' the 
pictures were accompanied by the words: 
Rus' is strong in its history. Do not forget or pervert it. It is in the churches, the books and 
the people. It is transmitted from the old to the young... 
'5° 
Russian nationalist-orientated figures were attempting to unite people 
around common themes and a common history, which to some extent had 
been forgotten and were now being reformulated to encapsulate a national 
ideal. 
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Summary 
Reflecting the views of Gellner and Shafer mentioned in Chapter 1, 
Russian nationalism used the 'pre-existing, historically inherited 
proliferation of cultural wealth' very selectively and 'myth and actuality' 
were mixed to identify the Russian nation. 
The Russian public's view of its own identity extended as far as identifying 
certain characteristics and virtues. For example, a survey conducted in 
1987-88 in three cities (Moscow, Tashkent and Tallinn) concluded that 
Russians considered themselves to be, first and foremost, kind (dobryi), 
hospitable and steadfast. In addition, they frequently chose to describe 
themselves as industrious and unselfish - however, they rarely recognised 
themselves to be talented or business-like. 151 As far as broader questions of 
Russian national identity and national values were concerned, Russian 
nationalism (in its various manifestations) attempted to win the hearts 
and minds of the people. By drawing upon Russia's historical legacy and 
reworking myths of the past, Russians were portrayed as kind, benevolent 
and peace-loving, whilst the ideas of collectivism or conciliarism 
(sobornost'), spirituality (dukhovnost'), morality (nravstvennost') and 
patriotism or nationality (n a ro dnos t') seemed to be the values which were 
most frequently used to portray Russia's exclusive identity. 
Demographic problems 
In addition to opposition to the urbanisation of the Russian people, 
demographic issues of concern included the falling birth-rate of Russians 
in comparison with some of the non-Russian populations and, more 
notably, the position of Russians in non-Russian areas of the union. 
One of a number of people to express concern about the Russian birth and 
mortality rates was Solzhenitsyn in his pamphlet Kak nam obustroit' 
Ross iiu? Solzhenitsyn's concern that the Russian ethnic nation would die 
out was echoed by the Christian Patriotic Union's slogan calling for the 
'biological salvation of the nation'. This group even called for measures to 
be introduced to remedy the de-population of certain areas: 
We must establish state help for young families 
in areas of de-population (extinction). We 
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should pay the young family a monthly benefit for each child, from the second child 
onwards, a sum to the amount of the minimum living wage. '52 
Whereas Solzhenitsyn blamed the empire for the decline of the Russian 
nation, the Christian Patriotic Union (KhPS) wished to maintain the 
empire and were more concerned about maintaining Russian numerical 
domination within that empire. KhPS leader Vladimir Osipov rejected 
the accusation that his concern for the falling birthrate and de-population 
was a sign of fascism, " but his views were reflected by other imperialist 
nationalist-orientated groups such as Pa m is t': 
There is a critical demographic situation. "Without any exaggeration it is possible to say 
that today the Russian nation as a whole is faced with the fact of de-population 
(extinction)... " The birthrate of Russians is decreasing catastrophically fast and nothing is 
being done to increase it. In 1940,59.9% of all children born in the USSR were born in 
Russia, but in 1985 it was only 44.2%. As on Western sociologist remarked, the Russian 
people could soon become a 'national minority in their own country'. 15' 
At the end of 1991, the Russian Party of National Rebirth (RPNV) 
considered one of the Party's aims to be the creation of conditions which 
would 'restore the genetic stock of the [Russian] nation' following the 
'genocide' it had suffered over seven decades of Soviet rule. 155 
The other demographic problem which worried imperialist nationalist- 
orientated Russians, in particular, was the fate of Russians and Russian- 
speakers in the non-Russian republics. 
The RKhDD, who up until late 1991 manifested mainly a liberal variety of 
nationalism, addressed the question of displaced Russian citizens 
[rossiiane] in its programme, showing that it was fully aware of the 
problem: 
Foreseeing the inevitable exit of certain territories from the composition of the USSR, the 
R Kh DD considers it necessary to create favourable living conditions for each people in their 
historical motherland. The Russian state's immigration policy should be based upon this 
principle. At the same time, the Russian state should work out an effective programme to 
look after the interests of that part of the Russian [rossiiskoe] population left in the 
partitioned territories. ' 
The RNPR, which was more isolationist in its Russian nationalist 
orientation, was more direct in its intention to guarantee displaced 
Russians the opportunity to resettle in Russia: 
The RNPR will develop a State immigration programme and set up a special Immigration 
Fund of the Russian Federal Republic. This state-wide and 
local (zemstvo) immigration 
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intiatives should completely provide the demands of Russian re-settlers, returning to their historical Motherland from both former territories of the USSR and other countries. 15' 
However, the imperialist Russian nationalist viewpoint was hostile to the 
idea of resettling Russian populations, for they considered the USSR to be 
the Russian home. Shortly before the Russian presidential election in 
June 1991, Nikolai Ryzhkov condemned the idea of forcibly transferring 
numbers of the population, declaring that the president should look after 
Russians living outside the borders of the RSFSR and that refugees should 
receive both 'moral' and 'material' support. " At the same time, Vladimir 
Zhirinovskii criticised El'tsin's idea to resettle Russians living outside 
Russia on RSFSR territory. He referred to the Russians as the most 
humiliated and oppressed nation and vowed to 'protect' them. 159 This was 
a view typical of imperialist Russian nationalists, who were concerned 
about the Russian and Russian-speaking populations in all of the non- 
Russian republics. However, despite the large Russian populations in 
Kazakhstan and Ukraine, it was the events in the Baltic republics and 
Moldova which received the most prominent Russian nationalist 
attention. 
Imperialist Russian nationalism in the Baltic and Moldova was 
represented by the 'international' movements which preached 
internationalism at first, but soon revealed their larger concern for the 
Russian and Russian-speaking populations. The Latvian Interfront 
newspaper, Edinstvo, printed the claim that: 
The Russians have been deprived of their Fatherland and become outcasts-16D 
This was a common sentiment from the supporters of the 'international' 
movements who resorted to the use of the term 'Russophobia' to describe 
the separatist behaviour of the titular populations of the union republics. 
It was not surprising that movements developed in the Baltic states 
protecting the rights of non-titular peoples. Although Russians 
represented only 9.4% of the population in Lithuania in 1989, the figures 
were 34% and 30.3% in Latvia and Estonia respectively. 161 The advent of 
the 'international' movements was fuelled by republican proposals for 
new language and citizenship laws which might put the Russians at a 
disadvantage. However, despite the fact that the 'international' 
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movements genuinely defended the interests of the Russian and Russian- 
speaking populations, they only ever conceived these interests being 
maintained within a Union framework, whereas other Russians outside 
the international movements were comfortable with the idea that they 
might become citizens within a new independent state. Judging by the 
election results and referenda of 1990-91, there seemed to be a convergence 
of attitudes between a significant number of Russians and the titular 
nationalitires in the non-Russian republics. 162 
Besides the international movements, Russians were represented by other 
movements within the Baltic. For instance, in 1990, one newspaper 
reported that six Baltic cities with Russian majorities had united to solve 
their social and political problems. The union they formed pledged to 
defend the rights of Russians-" In addition to groups set up in the Baltic, 
Russian nationalists in Moscow gave continued backing to the Baltic 
Russian population. For example, in January 1991, at a very sensitive time 
- after 'Bloody Sunday' in Vilnius and shortly before the storming of the 
Interior Ministry in Riga - several figures, including V. Belov and A. 
Prokhanov, published an open letter to Boris El'tsin, voicing their support 
for the Russian population. " 
One of the problems accentuating imperialist Russian nationalist feeling 
was the fact that the Russian populations of the union republics did not 
really integrate. Large numbers of Russians were industrial workers and 
concentrated in industrial centres. For example, in Estonia and Moldova 
(left bank of the Dniester) certain industrial areas were dominated by 
Russians. The managers of these concerns were directly responsible to 
Moscow and were reluctant to see that relationship change. The 
concentrations of Russian workers also meant that they circulated in a 
Russian environment and there was no need to learn the local language or 
become informed about local (non-Russian) affairs. For example, Iurii 
Arutiunian highlighted the isolation of Russians in non-Russian republics 
with -research on Russians in Tallinn and 
Tashkent. First, there is the 
matter of close social integration: 
... in Tashkent only 
4% of recent Russian immigrants, 11% of long-standing residents and 14% 
of those bom in Tashkent have close firends among Uzbeks. 
'65 
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Secondly, there is the question of familiarizing oneself with the local 
language and culture: 
Our material shows that most Russians are not acquainted with the culture of the republic they live in. For example, in answer to a question which asked respondents to name prominent people who are respected by the local population, the Russians were only rarely able to name representatives of indigenous nationalities (not more than 1-2% in Tallinn and Tashkent). Russians have a poor command of the languages of the indigenous nationalities: just 14% of Russians in Tallinn and 5-6% in Tashkent speak Estonian or Uzbek fluently. In Tallinn and Tashkent respectively, 38% and 69% of Russians do not know the languages of the indigenous population. " 
Arutiunian pointed out that very little in a Russian's career or personal 
life depended on contact with the local population or knowledge of their 
language and that: 
Everywhere the Russians lived they felt as if they were in their 'own' Union rather than in 
a given republic, at least until perestroika. 167 
When there was a knowledge of the local language, there was a greater 
chance of identification with the local population. In Tallinn, 83% of 
Russians who spoke Estonian had friends amongst Estonians, whilst 
around half that figure (42%) of non-Estonian-speaking Russians had 
Estonian friends. And this phenomenon had an effect on the number of 
people who supported the Estonian 'international' movement, 
Interdvizhenie: 
In Estonia, according to the data for 1990, more Russians who know the Estonian language 
considered that the Popular Front to a large extent expressed their interests (48%) than 
thought Interdvizhenie did. Those who do not know the Estonian language rarely (18%) 
sympathize with the Popular Front, and most of them (58%) support Interdvizhenie. l6" 
There were at least two suggested imperialist Russian nationalist solutions 
aimed at keeping the separatism of the Baltics in check and giving the 
Russians a greater say in political affairs. One was the suggestion by 
Latvia'slnterfront that proportional representation should be introduced 
into the electoral system. 16' This was designed to significantly reduce any 
Latvian majority within the republic - the number of Latvians accounted 
for barely more than fifty per cent of the republic's population in 1989 - 
and, if extended to the Soviet Union would ensure Russian dominance 
throughout the Union. Another suggestion was Zhirinovskii's idea that 
the Russian empire be divided into provinces [gu bern i i] and that the Baltic 
states' attempts at separatism would be foiled by the creation of a 'Baltic 
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province' including all three republics, plus the Kaliningrad territory and 
parts of the Smolensk and Pskov territories. The effect of this would be to 
create a "normal balance of the population with the dominance of 
Russians'. 170 
The solution to a demographic problem in Moldova was to create an 
autonomous Russian-dominated republic. The Transdniester area in 
Moldova consisted of about fifty per cent Slavs, half of whom were 
Russian. The Moldovan language law passed in September 1989 was 
accompanied by the establishment of an 'international' movement 
representing mainly Russians and Ukrainians. The Moldovan Edinstvo 
movement was vocal in opposing language and citizenship laws which 
might affect the Slavs, but it was Transdniester which attracted the 
attention of Russian nationalism. 
Although Russians accounted for only one quarter of the population in 
the Transdniester area (a small territory along the left bank of the Dniester 
river), they were dominant in the provincial capital, Tiraspol. In response 
to the manifestations of national autonomy emanating from 
Chisinau/Kishinev, the Tiraspol authorities declared the formation of the 
Transdniestran Moldavian Soviet Socialist Republic on 2 September 1990. 
This was later followed by resistance to reincorporation into the Moldovan 
republic in late 1991 and a declaration of independence as the 
Transdniester Republic in December 1991. Despite the fact that only a 
quarter of this area's population was Russian, the Transdniester became an 
area of interest and concern to Russian nationalist-orientated figures 
within the Russian Federation. For instance, Skurlatov's RNF called for 
this area (amongst others) to be incorporated into the Russian Federation 
and, despite the Russian government's refusal to recognise the area's 
independence, Rutskoi looked upon the separatists favourably. "' 
Solzhenitsyn had advocated that some of the peripheral areas of Russia 
with predominantly Russian populations be incorporated into Russia, 
subject to local referenda on the matter. It is interesting that whilst such an 
idea was put forward for areas of the Ukraine, Crimea, Kazakhstan, 
Estonia, etc., where there were sizeable Russian majorities, that the 
Transdniester area, with twenty-four per cent Russians and no common 
border with the RSFSR, should be the only area to 
declare its 
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independence. It should also be noted that whilst the idea of incorporating 
Russian-populated areas into a Russian republic was favoured by an 
isolationist Russian-nationalist thinking, the Transdniestran separatism 
-was very much supported by people of an imperialist Russian nationalist 
persuasion. For those with Russian nationalist sentiments, the 
Transdniester problem became an example of the problems of Russians 
living outside Russia's existing borders and, to some extent, it became a 
tool to highlight the indifference of the authorities towards the plight of 
'fellow Russians'. 
Territorial issues 
Very closely linked to the demographic problems were the territorial 
concerns of Russian nationalism. These differ very slightly from the 
abovementioned demographic issues in that they focus on the Russian 
need or right to maintain or acquire territory. Territorial concern is as 
much a quest for power and prestige as it is for the protection of a resident 
population's interests. 
Liberal nationalism made very little issue of territorial claims and 
disputes. Most of those who had fought for a Russian national liberal- 
democratic state in opposition to the centre fully accepted the republican 
borders as they stood and had no designs on other territories. 
Other manifestations of nationalism were uncomfortable with the bilateral 
agreements drawn up between the RSFSR Government and other 
republics and some objected to the foreign policy of Andrei Kozyrev who 
condemned the idea of border disputes resulting from the ethnic overlap 
of populations. " 
Expressions of isolationist Russian nationalism were accompanied by a 
desire to draw Russian-populated lands on the Russian periphery into the 
Russian state and Slavic populated areas such as Belorussia, Ukraine and 
(Northern) Kazakhstan into the Russian compass. It was also hostile to 
ideas to give up or cede any territories already absorbed into the RSFSR or 
under dispute. 
Imperialist Russian nationalism was hostile to the idea of giving up any 
of the territory constituting the Soviet Union and, in the case of 
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Zhirinovskii, advocated the idea of irredentism and expansion. The 
imperialist Russian nationalist attitude held that Russians rightly occupied 
the territory of the USSR and that peoples wishing to secede had neither 
the right nor the werewithal to do so. A letter from Russian writers to 
Boris El'tsin in January 1991 protesting over his role in allowing the 
Union/Russian state to fall apart, spoke of: 
the historical rootedness of Russians in the Baltic lands. 173 
These words implied that Russia had a historical right to their presence in 
the Baltic. The writers considered the Russian state to be a 'body', which, 
presumably, could not function properly with the removal of limbs or 
vital organs. 
The justifications used for claiming territory as Russian were moral, 
economic and historical. Dmitrii Balashov, writing in Prokhanov's 
newspaper, Den', put forward his argument against secession: 
Those such as Belorussia and Ukraine who must not under any conditions secede from Russia 
are doing so... 
I do not want to hold anyone by force. To be part of Russia is a great honour which must be 
earned and it is a huge advantage which one must work for. The path is open to those who 
do not want to be Russians. '74 
Balashov says that the path is open for other peoples to leave, but, in 
reference to Moldova, totally rejects this. He says that the division of the 
country will lead not to the freedom of peoples, but their submission to 
another master - he says that Moldova, by Western estimates, is not 
eonomically strong enough to function independently and, therefore: 
... it is not a matter of 
Moldavian independence, nor can it be. It might be (and already is) a 
matter of returning this piece of Russian land to Rumania. 
175 
Balashov justifies the reference to Moldavia, or Bessarabia, as 'Russian' 
land by recalling historical victories which secured it for Russia as far back 
as Rurik. It is referred to as 'land spilt with Russian blood, land recalling 
the glory of the Russian weapon's victory'. 
In another nationalist-orientated newspaper, Iu. Piatnitskii expressed 
surprise that the Russian people had voted for a president of the 
RSFSR 
when Russia was historically far larger than that: 
A disgusting farce is being played out before us which could turn into a great disaster. 
Our 
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time and money has been wasted. What did we receive in return? Yet another President, as they now say, of a sovereign Russia. Excuse me, a sovereign Russia stretches from the Baltic 
to the Pacific Ocean and from the Arctic Ocean to the sands of Kushka. It is within these borders that Great Russia, a unitary state with a centuries-old history and traditions, was historically formed. 176 
Similar historical, moral and economic arguments were applied to the 
maintenance of other republics within a Russian state. For instance, 
Vladimir Zhirinovskii suggested that Georgia had no 'historical 
perspective' to become an independent state in respect of its geographical 
location and that the Baltics could not sustain economic independence. " 
The subject of the Kurile islands was, perhaps, one which differed from 
others in that it involved neither a complex demographic problem nor a 
dispute between members of the Soviet Union. 
In 1991, rumours surfaced that there were plans to sell the Kurile Islands 
back to Japan. Dmitirii Balashov was amongst those who voiced 
opposition to the idea, suggesting that it would eventually lead to a drastic 
reduction of Russia's size. 18 This followed an article the previous year in 
which G. Piatov reviewed Alexander Yanov's proposal for Russia to sell 
the islands to Japan in exchange for economic aid. Piatov rejected the idea, 
forecasting that the Russian public would not support such a move and 
adding that it might even ignite German demands for the return of their 
former territories. 179 
Balashov, in response to a letter in Ogonek which dubbed the Soviets 
'invaders' for annexing the territory at the end of the war in 1945, asserted 
that Russia was only regaining land taken from her during the Russo- 
Japanese war and suggested that the editorial board of the magazine were 
reinforcing the results of what was a shameful war for Russia by 
supporting former territorial losses. " 
An address to El'tsin from professors and Academicians in October 1991 
urged El'tsin not to give up sovereignty of the Kurile Islands. They 
implied that ceding the territory to Japan would have environmental costs 
by claiming the area was an 'ideal resort and tourist zone' and that it 
should not be 'exploited for minerals on an industrial scale'. 
Their 
solution was for Russia to develop the islands as a resort 
in conjunction 
with other countries, including Japan. More significantly, they concluded 
that the sale Kurile Islands at that moment would 
be a 'huge material and 
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moral loss for Russia'. Consequently, they pledged their support to a 
Russian national solution for the area: 
Russian Academicians are prepared to take active part in solving the problem of taking 
over the region of the Kurile Islands and using its resources for the good of the Fatherland. l81 
Those who overtly expressed Russian nationalist views would not tolerate 
giving away an inch of the RSFSR's territory (and, in some instances, 
USSR territory). The maintenance of territory involved the maintenance 
of national pride and this is what the Academicians referred to when they 
spoke of 'moral loss'. 
New Times reported in 1991 that the support for maintaining the Kuriles 
had come from a broad constiuency in the Russian parliament, ranging 
from Rossiia bloc leader Sergei Baburin to democrat Oleg Rumiantsev. 
The outspoken Russian nationalist, Baburin, had visited the islands to 
declare his solidarity with the Russian settlers there. He declared that any 
politician attempting to sell the islands: 
would break his neck, because the people of Russia would never forgive this. 182 
Many of those who had advocated or employed liberal nationalism in 
their political actions were content to accept the republican borders 
established under Soviet rule. Isolationist nationalism employed 
demographic reasons to justify the expansion of these frontiers, whilst 
imperialist nationalism added historical, moral and economic 
justifications to lay claim to as many lands of the former Russian empire 
as possible. 
Russian Orthodoxy 
The ideological vacuum left by the demise of communism and the 
frequent reflection on Russian 'spirituality' and 'morality' meant that 
Russian Orthodoxy could not fail to find a place in the Russian nationalist 
debate. Dmitriy Pospielovsky commented that when Orthodoxy was 
adopted by the Slavophiles of the nineteenth century, their 'Russian 
orientation' was not coloured by an adherence to Russian Orthodoxy or 
any other kind of christianity as a personal religion, but that: 
It was in the course of their intensive study of Russia's cultural 
heritage and values, that is, 
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an Orthodox Christian culture and Orthodox Christian values, that the Slavophiles 
became converted to a personal Christianity. " 
In Pospielovsky's view, a similar phenomenon occured in the latter half of 
the twentieth century when the so-called 'd e re venshchik i' gravitated 
towards Russian Orthodoxy as an essential component of the national 
identity. Their works revealed an interest in the Russian nation before 
Orthodoxy surfaced as an expression of nationalism : 
the national element appeared long before a conscious discovery of the Christian 'soul' of 
the nation as the kernel of its spiritual health. '' 
Nevertheless, by the time glasnost allowed people to admit their religious 
beliefs, certain Russian nationalist-orientated figures had already 
developed an association between Russian Orthodoxy and the essence of 
the Russian nation. The changes that were about to follow as a result of 
glasnost prompted a greater discussion of the role of Russian Orthodoxy in 
Russian life. 
Mikhail Gorbachev had commented in 1986 that Russia was the: 
last haven, last reservoir of spirituality. '85 
Gorbachev's comment was not directed at the significance of religion in 
Russia, but signalled a general attitude held by Russians that their national 
development was guided by spiritual rather than material demands. With 
the collapse of communism and the absence of an ideological value 
system, the spiritual dimension of the Russian nation was occupied by an 
interest in Russian Orthodoxy. This interest was expressed not only by 
those who had already adopted Orthodoxy as a value system, but by many 
who were reacting to the discredited communist system. For these people, 
the adoption of religion became a mark of nationality and a mark of 
rebellion. 
One of the most significant events marking a change 
in church-state 
relations was the meeting between Gorbachev and 
Patriarch Pimen in 
April 1988, two months before the celebration of the millennium of 
Christianity in Russia. Gorbachev's speech announced that there would 
be 
a revision of the laws on religion and the 
Orthodox Church's response was 
to support Gorbachev's perestroika campaign. 
" Although it was, at first, 
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not clear what a revision of the legislation on religion would entail, the 
announcement heralded the opportunity for a greater expression of 
religious freedoms. The occasion of the millennial celebrations was itself a 
huge opportunity to reflect on the role of Russian Orthodoxy in Russian 
culture, history and life. 
Russian Orthodoxy was, by no means, central to all expressions of Russian 
nationalism, but it can be identified as an issue of interest within all three 
tendencies: liberal Russian nationalism supported Orthodoxy as a symbol 
of renewal, a counterweight to communism; isolationist Russian 
nationalism viewed it as a central feature of the exclusivity of the 
Russians; whilst imperialist Russian nationalism not only viewed it as an 
expression of the national spirit, but used it as a tool in attempting to keep 
parts of the Union together. 
There were manifestations of Russian nationalism which were totally 
opposed to the role of Orthodoxy or any other religion in re-establishing a 
Russian state. The so-called 'internationalists', represented by Nina 
Andreeva's Edinstvo, were an example of those with imperialist 
nationalist ambitions who could not countenance the idea of religious 
influence within a Marxist-Leninist Russian state. There was also a small, 
but insignificant number of pagans such as the Pamiat' group of 
Emelianov, which believed that Christianity was another branch of an 
anti-Russian Judaism. In addition, there were elements amongst 
advocates of liberal Russian nationalism whose quest for an independent 
Russia paid no attention to Russian Orthodoxy as a central theme in the 
development of a Russian nation or state. 
The general discussion on Orthodoxy focussed on its spiritual, moral, 
social and cultural roles in Russian life. The rehabilitation of Russian 
Orthodoxy was accompanied by the portrayal of Orthodox Christian images 
and Church developments by the media; an increase in the number of 
active church buildings and religious associations; the adoption of 
Orthodoxy and its symbols by new political groups. 
In the earlier years of glasnost, a number of figures alluded to the 
importance of the Russian national question and the importance of 
Christianity in Russia. This number grew as religious freedoms increased. 
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Likhachev, Rasputin, Soloukhin, Latynina, Mikhail Antonov, Aksiuchits 
and Solzhenitsyn are just a few of the names who represented the view 
that Russia needed to be 're-Christianised'. This idea was also echoed by a 
number of political groups which appeared in the form of a number of 
Christian groups, including the RKhDD (the Russian Christian Democratic 
Movement); many of the Pamiat' groups who specifically called for the 
ruling influence of Russian Orthodoxy; monarchist groups; SDVO, the 
Christian Patriotic Union; RNPR; and others. 
Likhachev, who reflects, for the most part, the liberal tendency of Russian 
nationalism, spoke of the Russian person and his long-standing 
relationship with Christianity and Christian values. Although he pointed 
to peculiarities of Russian Orthodoxy, describing Orthodox Christianity as 
the 'happiest' Christianity (albeit referring to the aesthetic beauty of its 
material manifestations), Likhachev supported the separation of church 
and state and also condemned the idea of a national religion focussing on 
one people. Likhachev maintained that Christianity's strength lay in its 
'universal' and 'international' nature. 187 However, one of the ideas central 
to his thought is the close relationship between religion, morality and 
culture, suggesting that Russian culture was inextricably linked with 
Christianity and, therefore, with Russian Orthodoxy. Likhachev's focus on 
Orthodox Christian morality presented a model upon which the Russian 
nation should fashion itself, a model of national re-evaluation and 
renewal based upon something other than the recent events of Soviet 
history. Likhachev's message placed a greater emphasis on the moral, 
rather than the cultural values of Orthodoxy, which smacked of 
exclusivity. 
There were elements within all tendencies of Russian nationalism which 
regarded Russian Orthodoxy as a symbol of national renewal. This was 
either because they were convinced Russian Orthodox believers or 
because 
they accepted it as an embodiment of the Russian national spirit. 
In 1989, 
Mikhail Lobanov referred to the revitalisation of Russian 'spiritual 
culture' and its vital link with the Russian Orthodox 
Church: 
... if the people 
have culture, they are alive. Today we see 
Russian spiritual culture being 
crystallized and it hardly needs a new revolution.... 
... For 70 years our spiritual 
fibre has been destroyed, beginning with the cultural supports of 
the economic set-up all the way to national traditions, 
to the realization of our national 
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identity. The main thing is to prevent the Church being trampled down again. "" 
Over a year later, Lobanov was still expressing the central idea of Russian 
Orthodoxy in both Russian spiritual life and in literary art. He stressed 
that this was even more significant in the prevailing climate of pluralism 
that had grasped Russia. 189 
There is some doubt as to the strength of religious faith as a factor in the 
activity around Orthodoxy. Vladimir Poresh wrote that the Russian 
Orthodox Church had been spiritually drained over the years of Soviet 
rule and was suffering from the rot of offical Soviet appointments made 
within its hierarchy. In Poresh's view, church attendance might have been 
up and baptisms may have numbered 'over 1000 per day', but the 'spiritual 
essence' was lacking. If this were the case, it might have indicated that 
interest in Orthodoxy had grown, because many people associated it more 
with a national rather than religious revival. 19° 
Indeed, the Russian Orthodox Church did see a significant increase in 
active interest over the glasnost period. In 1985, there were 6806 registered 
Russian Orthodox associations, whilst by 1990 the number had increased to 
11 118. In addition, 4100 Russian Orthodox buildings were opened over the 
same period-191 
The Russian Orthodox Church enjoyed a much higher public profile 
following the millennium celebrations of summer 1988. Although 
unofficial celebrations met with some obstruction from the authorities, 192 
there appeared to be a genuine rapprochement between the Party and the 
Church. In spring 1989, Metropolitan Pitirim of Volokolamsk and Iurevsk 
visited the Moscow Higher Party School in which he announced: 
Today both the Party and the Church are concerned about peace, culture and human 
morality. Thus the scope for our co-operation is really vast. 
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The fact that a prominent religious figure would be able to address a Party 
body in such a public manner suggested that some sections of the Party 
sanctioned the idea of the Russian Orthodox 
Church playing a role in the 
development of culture and morality. Later that year on 15 
October, 
Moscow News reported that Metropolitan Pitirim read a sermon on 
Central Television following the prime time news programme Vremia. 194 
This was a significant event in a state which 
had previously banned any 
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form of religious propaganda. 
In 1990, the Church Act removed the remaining restrictions on the practice 
of organised religion. The Russian nationalist press played its part in 
reviving Russian Orthodoxy and its traditions. For instance in January 
1991 Literaturnaia Rossiia printed an Orthodox calendar for the month, 195 
whilst the independent Leningrad paper Vozrozhdenie Rossii printed an 
article about the Russian Orthodox celebration of Christmas, concluding 
with the words: 
God let us return to our great Orthodox holidays and revive the spiritual wealth that we have lost in recent times. It is only in the Lord, only in the Orthodox faith that we will be 
able to be reborn as a Church, as a nation and simply as people. 196 
In the same year Nash Sovremennik carried an Easter address to its 
readership from Patriarch Aleksii. 197 (The Patriarch's association with 
Russian nationalism did not end there, for in 1990 he joined the All- 
Russian Association of Patriotic Letters and Culture Edinenie, along with 
many prominent Russian nationalist-orientated writers. ) The 
independent Russian nationalist newspaper Russkii vestnik printed an 
article on the Great Fast, the Russian Lent, explaining that it was a time of 
repentance and meditation. However, the piece went further than to just 
describe the religious significance - it encouraged parents to involve their 
children in the Orthodox traditions and at the same time prevent their 
children from succumbing to the influence of television. It stressed the 
importance of the family and suggested that the family should indulge in 
joint readings and listen to 'spiritual' or classical music together. It seemed 
that observance of Orthodox traditions were being put forward as an 
alternative Russian solution to the influence of (Western) mass culture-"' 
The rehabilitation of Orthodox holidays and their national significance 
were emphasised when the Russian Orthodox Christmas Day, 7 January, 
was declared an RSFSR national holiday in 1991.1w 
There were several instances when Russian Orthodoxy was used as a 
justification for conservative views held by Russian nationalists and when 
Church figures participated in espousing such views. For instance, the 
views of a Russian Orthodox archbishop appeared in Pravda as early as 
1987 criticising pop music and mass culture, and suggesting that such 
phenomena diverted young people's attention 
from, in particular, the 
188 
Russian classics. 200 The imperialist Russian nationalist thick journal Nash 
sovremennik published a number of articles which linked Orthodoxy with 
a variety Russian nationalist views. Mikhail Antonov advocated the re- 
introduction of an Orthodox Christian work ethic in order to revive the 
economy, thus avoiding what he considered to be the undesirable methods 
of Western production and technology, whilst another author attempted to 
show that capitalism was un-Russian in that it was incompatible with 
Russian Orthodoxy. 20' One of the ideas behind the latter view was that 
Orthodoxy enshrined the principle of community or conciliarism 
[sobornost], a Russian social trait incompatible with the individualism of 
capitalism. 
Orthodoxy as a national force to political movements 
The appearance of political organisations inevitably produced a number of 
religiously-inclined groups. Some of these were formed with an obvious 
commitment to christianity, of which Orthodoxy represented only one 
branch, whilst other groups expressed a specific allegiance to Russian 
Orthodoxy, which was more symbolic of their adherence to Russian 
national values. Of the Christian parties which arose, the RKhDD, 
Kh DSR and R Kh DP were the most prominent. These organisations were, 
in principle, in favour of the revival of Christianity in Russia, although 
some elements within them concentrated on the re-establishment of 
Orthodoxy as a national force. 
The KhDSR (Christian Democratic Union of Russia) under Aleksandr 
Ogorodnikov identified itself with an independent Russia202 and with the 
ideas of Russian christian thinkers such as Berdiaev, Bulgakov, 
Novgorodtsev, Fedotov and Frank. 203 However, its whole emphasis was 
upon reviving Christianity rather than focussing upon Orthodoxy: 
we, christians, should do everything possible to save the Fatherland. Recognising our share 
of responsibility for what has happened and relying on more than a thousand years of 
christian tradition and culture, we wish to put forward our programme for getting Russia out 
of its crisis. 204 
The RKhDP under Aleksandr Chuev, which broke away from the Kh DSR 
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in spring 1990, apparently over disagreement about the use of funds, also 
supported the revival of Christianity and the separation of church from 
state. Although the party opposed the idea that Orthodoxy should become 
a 'new state ideology', it was suggested that a major difference between the 
KhDSR and the RKhDP was that the latter was more willing to co-operate 
with Patriarch Aleksii. 205 The RKhDP programme of 1991 also spoke of 
'the Church' rather than 'religion' or 'Christianity': 
It is impossible to talk about a spiritual and cultural revival of Russia, whatever it might be, without mentioning the foundation, the basis of its whole spiritual essence - the Church. 206 
This suggested that the party was prepared to focus upon the institution of 
the (Orthodox) Church when dealing 
revival of Russia' rather than merely 
with the 'spiritual and cultural 
propagating christian ideas in 
Russian society. 
The RKhDD also supported the general idea of the adoption of Christian 
values by Russian society, but there was a slight bias towards a national 
identification with Russian Orthodoxy. This is summed up by one of the 
movement's declarations: 
It was the Russian Church which taught us the Christian Testaments. Therefore our return 
to the Lord's house should be a return, first and foremost, to Russian Orthodoxy. We are 
called upon to return to the nation the stolen treasures of a thousand years of Orthodox 
wisdom - patristic studies, Russian holiness and piety, the genius of Russian theology and 
207 philosophy, socio-political and economic thought... 
Other groups identified themselves firmly with the rehabilitation of 
Orthodoxy as a national solution to Russia's problems. Khristiansko- 
patrioticheskii soiuz (the Christian Patriotic Union) was unequivocal in its 
support for the influence of Russian Orthodoxy: 
The Christian Patriotic Union believes that the path to saving the Russian people and 
other fraternal peoples of our Motherland lies in the revival of Orthodoxy... and the 
national consciousness of the people. Our prime task is the restoration of the Russian 
Orthodox's authority and role in society. Only the Church should be the spiritual 
shepherd of the country. '208 
One of the Patriotic Union's successors, Osipov's 'Christian Rebirth' Union 
continued this idea: 
We support neither 'capitalism' nor 'socialism', i. e. we 
do not support a totalitarian or 
democratic system. We are not treading a foreign path, but our own path - we are 
for an 
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Orthodox Russia. We have had enough of alien ideas and slogans. Russia does not need ideology, but faith, not politics, but spirituality, not democracy, but conciliarism (sobornost'), not a union of republics, but a great power. 209 
The 'Christian Rebirth' Union suggested, among other things, that there 
should be an Orthodox broadcasting channel and that all of the main 
Orthodox holidays should be recognised as national holidays and non- 
working days. There is absolutely no doubt about the link between 
Orthodoxy and national revival: 
Our strength is in Orthodoxy, Patriotism and Conciliarism [Sobornost']. 210 
Some of the Pamiat' groups identified themselves closely with Russian 
Orthodoxy. Vasil'ev's NPF Pamiat' adopted the Russian Orthodox cross 
and a Russian church bell as two of its symbols, whilst the Leningrad 
group declared: 
We must revive our people spiritually and morally with the help of, primarily, the 211 Orthodox Church... 
One group, under the leadership of Aleksandr Kulakov, even named itself 
the Orthodox National Patriotic Front "Pamiat"'. Within its basic 
principles it declared: 
The Orthodox National Patriotic Front "Pa miat", guided only by the authority of the 
Orthodox Church regards as its tasks: 
The fight for the Revival of Russia based on the traditional foundations of her millennial 
history, culture, national peculiarity and statehood, expressed in the triune concept of 
'Orthodoxy, Self-rule and Nationality'. 212 
The prominence of Orthodoxy amongst new political parties and groups 
should not be overstated. There were relatively few groups which 
advocated the idea of Orthodoxy as a core ideology or even as a significant 
guiding influence. The RKhDD was probably the group with the largest 
following to stress the significance of Christianity and, in the Russian 
context, Russian Orthodoxy. The Movement advocated that the Church be 
separate from the state and supported the idea of freedom for all religions. 
Most of the democratic groups and parties merely advocated the right to 
practise one's faith and express one's religious beliefs and did not stress the 
importance of Russian Orthodoxy. However, in some instances, 
individual members of these groups and parties might have associated 
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themselves with the Russian Orthodox Church in order to stress their 
'Russianness' or their opposition to communism. Boris El'tsin was just 
one of many figures who used photo-opportunities to exploit the 
photogenic 'Russianness' of the Russian Orthodox Church. 
At this point, one should also note that certain members of the Orthodox 
clergy openly supported or associated themselves with Russian nationalist 
groups. Patriarch Aleksii was a member of Edinenie, whilst Metropolitan 
Pitirim was a member of Mikhail Antonov'sSoiuz dukhovnogo 
vozrozhdeniia Otechestva and there was clerical support for other 
'cultural' organizations such as Otechestvo. 
The Russian Orthodox Church itself was weakened as a national unifying 
force by schisms which existed in Russian Orthodoxy. As glasnost gave the 
Church an opportunity to publicise itself, it also gave an opportunity to 
others to discredit certain figures within the Moscow Patriarchate for their 
collaboration with the centre and links to such bodies as the KGB. 
Glasnost also revealed to the Russian people the work and existence of the 
underground organisation, the True Orthodox Church of Russia, and the 
Russian Church Abroad. The latter established a branch in Russia under 
the name of the Free Russian Orthodox Church. 
Some people, who were disgruntled with the Moscow Patriarchate's 
association with the Soviet authorities through the Soviet Fund for Peace 
and with the number of appointments within the Church's hierarchy 
influenced by the Soviet authorities, opted to join the Free Russian 
Orthodox Church. Moscow News reported in 1990 how one parish had 
transferred its allegiance to the the Russian Orthodox Church Abroad after 
the Moscow Patriarchate had attempted to transfer the parish priest to 
another parish. According to the article, the Moscow authorities had taken 
this decision because they were annoyed by the priest's refusal to provide 
information on foreign visitors to his church. 213 Not surprisingly, attempts 
to establish parishes in Russia subordinate to the Free Russian Orthodox 
Church were met by resistance from the Moscow Patriarchate and local 
authorities. 214 The hesitation by some to accept the Moscow Patriarchate's 
authority was not only due to the distrust of its past associations, 
but also 
because of its political role: the Church was becoming increasingly 
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identified with the state, with the Patriarch speaking like a state-church 
leader; the Moscow Patriarchate also appointed itself as arbiter of which 
members of the clergy would be allowed to compete in elections; and the 
Church was instrumental in opposing the development of national 
churches in Belorussia and Ukraine. 
The True Orthodox Church had existed for about seventy years as an 
underground organisation in opposition to the Moscow Patriarchate, 
which it condemned for its links and co-operation with the Soviet 
authorities. The True Orthodox Church was not interested in joining with 
the Moscow Patriarchate to form a national church, but in maintaining its 
spiritual duties. The Moscow Patriarchate did not take kindly to a rival 
Russian Orthodox Church and did its utmost to stop the True Orthodox 
Church from acquiring church buildings. "' The True Orthodox Church 
responded to the Patriarchate's persecution and obstruction tactics with an 
open letter to Patriarch Aleksii requesting that the Patriarchate leave them 
alone. 216 
Certain figures within Russia and from the Russian Church Abroad 
sought to establish unity in Russian Orthodoxy. The Russian nationalist- 
orientated Vladimir Soloukhin suggested that a rapprochement between 
the Moscow Patriarchate and the Russian Church Abroad might begin if 
the latter were offered an old, possibly ruined monastery on Soviet 
territory. 21' Gleb Rar, writing from the exiled Church's point of view, agreed 
that there should not be two Russian churches, but put forward a cautious 
approach for unification so that the Church Abroad's achievements would 
not be wasted. 218 
Despite competition from the Moscow Patriarchate (some even might 
think that due to competition from a Moscow Patriarchate which still 
generated distrust) and the fact that it was based in the USA, the Russian 
Church Abroad was given some attention by Russian nationalists. 
Metropolitan Vitalii expressed his views in the independent Russian 
nationalist press where the Russian Church Abroad was given 
broad 
respect. 219 
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The Russian Orthodox Church's imperial role 
In addition to the political differences (as opposed to theological 
differences) between the Moscow Patriarchate and the other branches of 
Russian Orthodox Church, the Church faced a crisis within the Soviet 
Union, for its unity was linked to the unity of the Soviet state. The 
Church had, to some extent, fulfilled an imperialist role uniting the Slav 
peoples of Russia, Ukraine and Belorussia. In 1989, the then Metropolitan 
Aleksii of Leningrad and Novgorod commented on the physical and 
moral destruction suffered by the church under Stalin: 
When the church was dynamited it made not only a gap in the street, but also in people's 
hearts. There are too many of these gaps and blanks. One such blank is the lost heritage of 
the Slavic written language and culture which for centuries united the Russians, Ukrainians 
and Byelorussians. '2° 
This comment represented a view held by many imperialist Russian 
nationalists - that the 'fraternal' Slavic peoples were united by common 
interests and heritage, in this case by Russian Orthodoxy. There were 
many Russian nationalists who did not wish to see the separation of these 
so-called 'fraternal' republics and for some time the Russian Orthodox 
Church had carried out the role of the Soviet state in discouraging 
religious separatism. " 
In 1946, the Ukrainian Uniate Church, which had been a bastion of 
nationalism, was incorporated into the Russian Orthodox Church. The 
state supported this move in order to suppress incidence of Ukrainian 
nationalism and separatism and the Russian Orthodox Church was happy 
to spread its influence to areas it regarded as historically its own. 
The rise of republican nationalism in the perestroika years led to 
heightened activity to restore the Uniate Church. Many Russian 
nationalists opposed this, fearing the loss of the Russian Orthodox 
Church's influence and the loss of territory which they considered to be 
theirs. 
In 1989 the Ukrainian Uniates received recognition and were allowed to 
register, despite the efforts of Metropolitan Filaret of 
Kiev, a Russified 
ethnic Ukrainian to resist. The following year an extraordinary 
bishops' 
council was convoked by the Moscow Patriarchate to 
deal with the 
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disintegration of the Church's influence in Ukraine and Belarus. As a 
result, they brought into being a Ukrainian Orthodox Church and a 
Belorussian Orthodox Church. By this action, the Moscow Patriarchate 
sought to convince Ukrainians and Belorussians that there was no need to 
join the Uniate churches or form autocephalous churches. According to 
John Dunlop, these two new churches were not independent, but 'heavily 
dependent on Moscow'. ' 
It is interesting to note that well into perestroika, over half of all working 
Russian Orthodox churches in the Soviet Union were in the Ukraine. 
This was not a reflection of the Ukrainians' religous zeal, but of state and 
church policy. The prominence of Russian Orthodoxy in the Ukraine was 
a deliberate policy of Russification and the Russian Orthodox Church was 
still employed as a tool of Russian imperialist nationalism in Ukraine and 
Belorussia throughout the perestroika years. 
Xenophobia 
Nationalism is frequently accompanied by the identification of a common 
enemy or opponent. Russian and Soviet society was permeated by an 'us 
and them' mentality in which the West and capitalism had been portrayed 
as an evil opponent. The enemies singled out by Russian nationalism 
were frequently the West, sometimes the Orient, Islam and 'russophobic' 
members of the non-Russian nationalities, but the group which were 
treated with the most venom were the Jews. 
Opposition to the West and 'Zionism' was presented as an ideological issue 
with the West representing 'un-Russian' values embodied by materialism. 
Criticisms were variously made of capitalism, Marxism-Leninism as a 
product of Western thought, Western-style democracy and its implications, 
mass culture, pop music, consumerism and 'Western' immorality. 
Reference was made to the imperialistic ambitions of not only the West 
but also of China and Japan to take over Russian territory and resources. 
Some expressed the idea that anti-Russian conspiracies existed - these were 
frequently attributed to the West, but often attributed to the Jews, who 
were accused, along with the freemasonry (who could be of Western or 
195 
Jewish origin), of being involved in a strategic plot to destroy Russia. 
Attacks on Western values were as much an attempt to define Russian 
national values as they were an innate hatred of the West. The 
isolationism of Soviet socialism had led to relatively little contact with the 
West and Soviet propaganda was very xenophobic towards countries 
outside its sphere of influence, despite its claims to be internationalist. 
This must have had a lasting effect on some sections of Soviet society and 
these attitudes synthesised with visions of Russian nationalism to create 
an idea of Russia isolated from the outside. The idea of an enemy or 
opponent was designed to encourage people to unite behind a common 
national ideal, for people tend to focus on similarities rather than 
differences in face of an enemy. 
Early attacks on the West and Western lifestyle appeared in the journals 
Nash sovremennik and Molodaia gvardiia. In 1986, Viktor Astaf'ev made 
an oblique attack upon Western values by criticising the 'soulless' habits of 
the Muscovite intelligentsia. ' He criticised their bourgeois values which 
included the worship of Western consumer goods and fashions, a theme 
which was continued later by Viacheslav Gorbachev in Molodaia gvardiia 
who did not condemn Muscovites, but the whole phenomenon of 
materialism and consumerism ushered in by the Brezhnev era. 224 There 
was a suggestion that this consumerist attitude was responsible for the 
'stagnation' which blighted Brezhnev's rule. Gorbachev's attack was not 
merely an attack on materialism, but on the driving forces behind it - 
Western rationalism and individualism. Iurii Bondarev also made 
scathing attacks on Western consumerism from the mid-eighties, referring 
to consumerism as if it were a poor substitute for Russian culture which 
was rooted in the values of the past. He described 'civilisation' as: 
a small part of culture... a unidirectional projection of its energy which often ensnares a 
person, promising him comfort and convenience. It thrusts upon us the need for things, the 
thirst for consumerism... 
Bondarev went on to say that: 
The civilisation of consumerism brings about cosmopolitan fashion, feminisation and 
masculinisation, money, leisure, stage idols, a levelling of talents, a loss of truth, Russian 
Pepsi-Cola. We cannot avoid a great deal of this, but we ought to be choosy. 
726 
Bondarev was suggesting that one should be wary of the consumerism 
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offered by (Western) civilisation, for the pleasures of civilisation should 
serve rather than control man. 
Western culture was subject to various attacks, particularly the 
phenomena of mass culture and rock/pop music. The condemnation of 
such phenomena was really a conservative reaction by people who 
believed that everybody should be educated on a staple diet of the classics 
and that new styles and influence were superficial and meaningless. This 
is a feature of the generation gap in many societies. In the Russian 
context, those of a nationalist persuasion identified the newer influences 
with the West and deemed them incompatible not only with their 
personal taste, but with the Russian nation. 
In 1987, Iurii Segeev addressed the Plenum of the USSR Writers' Union 
warning against 'foreign' influences in culture and suggesting that 
Western mass culture had little to offer but sex and violence. ' This 
evaluation was very much the attitude to to pop/rock music which was 
closely identified with the West and received criticism from several 
quarters. Vasilii Belov described it as: 
first and foremost, a narcotic medium728 
whilst Valentin Rasputin warned against the dangers of mass culture, in 
particular rock music, which could affect people with an illness: 
These people, as a rule, become in their later years spiritually empty, with undeveloped 
tastes and views. 229 
Mikhail Dunaev went so far as to write a whole article about the evils of 
rock music in Nash sov re mennik. He described rock music's origins and 
effects: 
Rock music, as we know, grew out of negro religious singing... 
... the 'beat' characterising rock music summons up 
in the organism all kinds of physiological 
pulsations, sexual and nervous ecxitement, along with a paralysis of the thought process. 
"' 
He leaves no doubt that this foreign influence has no place 
in Russia: 
One of the most important characteristics of Russian culture 
is its openness... Yes, our culture 
is open to Mozart... But it is incompatible with rock culture whose code 
is the 'music' of 
rock. 231 
Vadim Kozhinov suggested that Western-style democracy would 
inevitably bring such evils with it. He expressed the idea that the 
freedoms 
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of democracy released more evil than good, promoting the growth of vice 
and crime. 2 
The greater fear was not of the failure of a Western system applied to 
Russia, but that the West was plotting to take over Russia and that Russia 
would fall to the power of Western capital. Aleksandr Prokhanov claimed 
that the West had planned to destroy not only the Soviet empire, but had 
planned the destruction of the Tsarist empire. ' Eduard Limonov feared 
that this was still the case with Russia in 1991. He claimed that the 500-day 
plan for economic recovery put forward by Stanislav Shatalin and others 
was 'immoral' and an act of capitulation, because it meant that the West 
could interfere in Soviet internal affairs. Limonov seemed to believe that 
the West was conspiring to take over the East. He believed that the West 
would buy Soviet raw materials cheaply and in return sell the USSR 
consumer goods. Eventually the West would start manufacturing goods 
on Soviet soil, whereupon they would make demands on Soviet domestic 
policy, forcing them to give up the Baltic, then perhaps Georgia, Armenia 
and, eventually, force the USSR to make territorial concessions to the 
Japanese. Limonov's beliefs were summed up by the statement: 
The West is committed to a strategic hate of the USSR. ' 
These beliefs and fears were reflected in an article by Anatolii Kuz'mich 
Tsikunov (who went under the pen name of A. Kuz'mich) in the 
nationalist-orientated independent newspaper, Domostroi. He criticised 
the USSR law on foreign investments passed in 1991 which 'strengthened 
the right of foreigners to acquire shares, to reap the profits of enterprises 
and the harvest of the lands'. A. Kuz'mich objected to the rights of 
foreigners to use Russia's natural resources and feared that there was 
nothing safeguarding these resources for the Russian people: 
We cannot find one law guaranteeing the right of Russians to their own natural resources. 35 
He warned against an imperialist invasion of Western capital: 
We need to think with our heads where we should go and how we should make our living: 
for the Russian people, Russia or the foreign Uncle Sam. To be frank, Russian man [mu zhi k] 
only lives for today. Who will stand his ground against Western mass consumption? It is 
like giving glass beads to a native. At least it will be if our dear 'managers' and 
'businessmen' sell our mother land. ' 
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Another woman, worried about the presence of foreign businessmen in 
her local area of Tiumen' wrote in Den' that Russia's connections with 
foreign business was leading to a free-for-all in which foreigners from all 
parts of the world would be given the opportunity to carve up Russia for 
themselves: 
0 
In order to destroy the country, it is necessary to loosen the provinces and then Moscow. No 
fire is required - she will fall on her own. That is why the Chinese are throwing their 
weight about in Siberia, the Japanese in the Far East and the English in Crimea. In the 
Northern Tiumen' area we have a big Babylon: they are all here, along with Germans, 
Italians, Americans and Canadians. Soon the South Koreans will turn up and, possibly, even 
Turks. 23' 
The Bloc of Social Patriotic Movements produced an electoral platform 
before the March 1990 elections condemning 'separatists' and 'left-radicals' 
of: 
selling [of] our national wealth to 'foreign partners'. 2m 
The Bloc wished to stir up opposition to the West and Westernisers as it 
pursued its 'fight for the genuine revival of Russia'. 
Mikhail Antonov claimed that elements within the Soviet communist 
hierarchy were responsible for colluding with and selling Russia to the 
West. Both Soviet communism and the democrats were portrayed as allies 
of the West. He advocated a Russian system of socialism based on 
sobornost' and Orthodoxy which would protect Russia from the evils of 
Western capital. 9 
Whilst figures such as Prokhanov defended socialism as a system suited to 
the Russians, others criticised communism and Marxism-Leninism as 
Western or Jewish concepts alien to Russian society. V. Kozhinov, S. 
Kuniaev and A. Kuz'min were amongst those who condemned Marxism- 
Leninism for its anti-Russian nature within the pages of Nash 
sovremennik . 
240 Those representing a more extreme expression of 
Russian nationalism such as Dmitrii Vasil'ev were unequivocal in their 
condemnation of Marxism-Leninism and where the blame for it lay: 
... the bacillus of all our 
ills is Marxist-Leninist ideology, whether you like it or not. It is 
completely obvious from its fundamental positions that communist doctrine is nothing other 
than Zionist sectarianism. 241 
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Anti-Semitism 
Anti-Semitism is not an inherent feature of Russian nationalism, i. e. it is 
not characteristic of every manifestation of Russian nationalism. 
However, Jews have been singled out as the common enemy by certain 
exponents of Russian nationalism throughout its history and this 
continued during the Gorbachev period. Indeed, from the moment 
Pamiat' surfaced as a politicised organisation, Russian nationalism 
appeared to be very closely associated with anti-Semitism, as if the latter 
were a logical conclusion of the former. According to Valerii Solovei, this 
resulted from an attempt by the central authorities to discredit Russian 
nationalism: if the public were to associate Russian nationalism with such 
ugly images, this would harm the potential popularity of both Russian 
nationalism and the idea of a pluralist political system which could allow 
such organisations to develop. ' Therefore, not only was Pamiat' allowed 
to exist without being suppressed by the authorities, but the extremist 
views of Pamiat' and their like initially received a disproportionate 
amount of coverage in both Soviet and Western media. 
Although anti-Semitism was evident in material written by commentators 
in journals, such as Nash sovremennik, and within the ranks of so-called 
'internationalist' organisations, such as Edinstvo and OFT, the harshest 
condemnations of Jews were made by small, more extreme Russian 
nationalist-orientated groups, which had very little public appeal. These 
marginal groups paid an inordinate amount of attention to the presence 
and alleged roles of Jews in Russian history and society. They frequently 
used the terms 'Zionism' and 'Zionists' in place of 'Jewry' or 'Jews'. Some 
sought to make a distinction between Zionists and Jews, whilst others 
denied accusations of anti-Semitism when making criticisms of Jewish 
figures, stating, for example, that the Arabs were also a Semitic people. It 
is difficult to see any reasonable, logical link between a Zionist -a person 
who supports the idea of a Jewish state - and the 'Russian-nationalist' 
concept of a Zionist: a person of Jewish origin, hell-bent on destroying 
Russia and the Soviet Union. The only logical conclusion one can come to 
is that 'Zionist' was a surrogate term for 'Jew', but a term which allowed 
the user to (falsely) claim that he/she was not anti-Jewish. When I use the 
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term 'anti-Semitism' here, it should be read as 'anti-Jewish'. 
Jews were blamed for a number of Russia's problems and misfortunes 
including: the instigation of the Bolshevik revolution; the death of the 
Tsar; the demise of Russian culture; the destruction of Russian 
architectural monuments; the spread of alcoholism; and even genocide of 
Russians. In addition, there were claims that Jewish plotters were 
conspiring with the West to break up the Soviet Union and its armed 
forces; attempting to introduce a democracy which would rob the Russian 
people of its wealth; attempting to control the press and the media. 
Accusations and hostility aimed at the Jews were used in an attempt to 
rally Russians against an identifiable common enemy. This was 
recognised by some Russian commentators as a familiar device: 
the search for the enemies, the plotters and the radicals, especially concrete enemies, and 
best of all - with non-Russian names - is an attempt to remove the blame from one's own 
name. This is as old as the hillS. 243 
Another commentator, D. Gai, claimed that a hatred of the Jews was no 
substitute for a 'proper diagnosis of Russia's real problems'. "' But why 
should any Russian nationalist pick on the Jews as their enemy? There is 
no evidence to suggest that their accusations and allegations are true and 
most, if not all of them, can be disproved. However, the reasons stem 
from a number of perceived factors. First, there was an inherent vein of 
anti-Semitism which had existed during Tsarist times, re-surfaced under 
Stalin and materialised in the form of anti-Zionist publications during the 
Brezhnev era. Secondly, it was easy to highlight certain figures of Jewish 
origin who were prominent political actors during the revolutionary 
period and leading figures in the Bolshevik Party. Thirdly, many Jews 
occupied responsible or professional positions in Soviet society, a fact 
manipulated by the Nazis and in Poland in the 30s to provoke resentment 
towards the Jews. Fourth, there was a lingering resentment amongst some 
Russians that Jews had been amongst the few people to have the 
opportunity to leave the USSR - this could be viewed as a privilege that 
Russians envied, or as treachery in forsaking Mother Russia. These 
factors, whether or not they had any foundation, were sufficient to stir up 
prejudice and reinforce anti-Semitic conviction. 
Anti-Semitic views appeared in the nationalist press, particularly in the 
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thick journals Nash sovremennik and Molodaia gvardiia throughout the 
Gorbachev era. At first, the references to Jews were oblique with the 
substitution of the terms 'Zionist' or 'mason'. Writers such as Karpets and 
Pikul' referred to 'masons' whose aims were invariably to challenge 
Russian statehood or conquer the world. 245 Igor' Shafarevich referred to 
them as part of the Malyi Na rod, a social layer responsible for the ills of 
Russia and, although he did not directly equate the Jewish people with the 
Malyi Narod, he made specific reference to the influence of Jews in the 
revolutionary movement at the beginning of the twentieth century. 246 
Small extremist Russian nationalist groups such as some of the Pamiat' 
groups reflected the view that the Jews had been responsible for the 
Bolshevik revolution. Aleksandr Shtil'mark of Vasil'ev's Pamiat' 
enumerated a familiar list of names associated with the revolution which 
he held responsible for the destruction of Russian culture. In the same 
manner as Shafarevich, he highlighted the Jewish names of pseudonyms 
with the use of brackets, as if to stress their Jewish nationality: 
You cannot call the actions of Leon Trotsky (Bronstein), Lazar' Kaganovich, Emel'ian 
Iaroslavskii (Gubelman), lakov Sverdlov, Lev Kamenev (Rosenfeld) and Grigorii Zinoviev 
(Apfelbaum) anything other than criminal. 247 
A. Kulakov, of another Pamiat' group, wanted to stop Jews from 
emigrating to Israel so that they could be prosecuted for bringing the 
'communist evil' into the world. " According to Argumenty i fakty, he 
believed that: 
The world is already subject to global Jewish capital. It is this same capital which 
financed the 1917 revolution and which provoked and organised a genocide of the Russian 
people. Internationalism and communism are philosphies belonging to the Jews. 249 
The Russian Party of the RSFSR went as far as to include the 
acknowledgement of 'Zionist' guilt for its participation in the revolution 
and subsequent events as one of its programmatic aims: 
1. We must recognise Marxism-Leninism as a veiled Zionist ideology and Bolshevism as a 
variety of Zionism. We must remove the teaching of Marxism-Leninism in secondary and 
higher education. 
2. We must strive for a public verdict on Zionism: 
That it is GUILTY of a criminal seizure of power during the October Revolution of 1917 and 
of a Zionist occupation of Russia. 
That it is GUILTY of unleashing the red terror, civil war and a genocide of the Russian 
people. 
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That it is GUILTY of plundering and destruction Russia and of reducing Russians to the lowest poverty by means of a Zionist yoke. 
That it is GUILTY of creating a communist Zionist economy, which, in the interests of the Zionocracy, artificially maintained shortages of basic goods, whilst Russians were forced to 
stand in disgraceful queues for bare necessities. 230 
The newspaper of N. Lysenko's RNPR suggested that Lenin was serving 
Jewish interests when he led the revolution. Not only did the text 
attribute Lenin with the name 'Blank' - the name of his supposedly Jewish 
maternal grandfather - but it was accompanied by an illustration in which 
Lenin was receiving thousands of dollars backhandedly from two Jews. " 
Some Russian nationalist elements' also put forward the idea that Jews had 
been responsible for the demise of the monarchy and the death of the Tsar. 
Whilst Apollon Kuz'min advocated the idea that Jews had organised the 
February Revolution which had destroyed the Russian monarchy, "' an 
edition of Fomichev's newspaper Pu l's Tu shina claimed that the whole of 
the Royal Family had been 'ritually murdered by Zionists'. ' However, not 
all views linked Jews to the destruction of the monarchy. In another 
instance, an anti-monarchist view was put forward by S. Nosov who 
claimed that he had uncovered a Zionist-Masonic plot to re-establish the 
monarchy. ' 
As the extract from the Russian Party programme showed, some Russian 
nationalists held the Jews responsible for the destruction of Russian 
culture. One view in Nash sovremennik suggested that the Jews were the 
architects of a vanguard in the artistic world, formed with the specific aim 
of usurping and destroying Russian culture. " One Pamiat' document 
declared: 
We must encourage the development of national principles in our culture and science, 
exposing and fighting anti-Russian and Zionist forces which have formed an influential 
elite and powerful mafia within these spheres. We want our culture to be Russian not only 
by name! 256 
In addition to the destruction of Russian culture, Jews were accused of 
destroying both the Russian ecology and the Russian architectural and 
historical monuments. One Pamiat' group demanded that the names of 
those who destroyed Russian churches be published' -a demand 
frequently made if they thought that Jewish names might be on the list, 
whilst one observer blamed the Jews for destroying old Moscow. 
' 
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Konstantin Smirnov-Ostashvili accused the Jews of being a 'nation of 
destroyers'. 259 
The Jews were also blamed, in one or two instances, of causing the 
downfall of the Russian nation by inflicting alcoholism upon them. A 
Moscow News reporter attended a Pamiat' meeting and encountered a 
man with the following words printed on his sweatshirt: 
If you smoke, drink wine and beer, you're an accomplice of Tel Aviv. 260 
Pamiat' made several references to the 'alcoholisation of the people', 
which they blamed upon the Jews, but this attitude was not confined to 
Pamiat' meetings. An article by F. Uglov which appeared in Nash 
sovremennik suggested that the high level of alcoholism in Russia was a 
result of the conspiratorial activity of Jews and the West. 261 
The idea of Jewish conspiracy theories was especially popular with 
Pamiat' which made frequent reference to the document The Protocols of 
the Elders of Zion. The belief in the authenticity of this document was 
perhaps one of the few ideas which united all the splinters of Pa m is t'. The 
Protocols which had been used by the Nazis to discredit Judaism, have 
been dismissed many times by Jewish and Western scholars as a forged 
document representing a fictitious meeting during the First Zionist 
Congress at the end of last century. Pamiat' believed that the Protocols 
even predated the Congress. 262 Extreme Russian nationalists who 
supported the autheniticity of such a document probably did so, because 
there was no other source claiming any kind of theory of Jewish world 
domination. 
The idea of Jewish conspiracy was held by a number of Russian nationalist- 
orientated figures who feared the break up of Russia and the USSR. One 
view claimed that Jews were instrumental in encouraging the aggressive 
policies of the United States, " whilst another view in the independent 
socialist paper Bor'ba (which was sympathetic towards Nina Andreeva's 
Edinstvo) claimed that the world was being controlled by a 'Euro- 
American capitalist conglomerate under the direction of a global Zionist- 
Masonic centre' whose plans included the break up of the USSR and its 
'unified defence system'. "' A. Barkashov, leader of Russkoe natsional'noe 
edinstvo held a similar view: 
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Today as never before it is vitally important to the international financial oligarchy to keep Russia as a kind of appendage for raw materials for the USA... Therefore, in order to raise the degree of control and exploitation in the interests of the USA and, therefore, the Jewish financial oligarchy, they wish to pull down, separate and dismember Russia. 165 
The conspiracy theories were backed by claims that Jews were attempting to 
control the press and the media. This was characterised by opposition to 
journals such as Ogonek and to central television. In addition, there were 
claims that E1'tsin and the democrats were in the pockets of Jewish capital. 
For example, an edition of the independent nationalist newspaper 
Russkoe voskresenie showed a caricature of El'tsin under the Star of David 
wearing a masonic apron and holding masonic symbols. " Another 
Russian nationalist independent newspaper posed the question: "What 
will the first president of Russia kiss? " The page showed a three pictures 
of Lech Walesa kissing an object, a Jewish worshipper kissing the wailing 
wall in Jerusalem and the caricature of a fat man wearing a ring bearing 
the Star of David. The pictures implied that El'tsin would be kissing the 
ring on the hand of the rich, fat Jewish man. 267 
The independent Russian nationalist newspapers were full of ugly 
caricatures of Jews with hook noses and yarmulkas. Russkoe voskresenie 
even portrayed Jews as animals with animal-like feet and tails. These 
alarming images were matched by some alarming stories. The first edition 
of Narodnoe delo printed an article entitled: "AIDS is not dangerous to 
white people". It claimed that South African research had shown that 
white people could not catch AIDS, but could develop a personal viral 
immune deficiency. On the other hand, it claimed, 'blacks and half-blacks 
(mulattoes, Jews and Gypsies)' could catch the disease. The article went on 
to say that Soviet research in 1925 had shown that Russian blood and 
Jewish blood were 'biochemically different'. 21 
It is difficult to estimate the full extent of anti-Semitism in Russian society. 
There were no, or few, expressions of anti-Semitism amongst democrats or 
amongst those who expressed or made use of a liberal variety of Russian 
nationalism. Many of the incidents mentioned above were confined to the 
extremist fringes, but, from the early days of Gorbachev's reign, anti- 
Semitic expression was characteristic of both isolationist and imperialist 
nationalism. In 1990, Moscow News reported an opinion poll carried out 
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in the Moscow area which found that 7.6 per cent of respondents blamed 
the Jews for the results of Russia's post-revolutionary development and 8.8 
per cent agreed that Jews should be punished for 'crucifying Christ'. 
Whilst the extremists represented a little under 10 per cent, the article 
concluded from the research that about 25 per cent of Russians (in the 
Moscow area) were 'rabid anti-Semites" . 
26' This is a relatively large 
constituency and it is not surprising that it was sometimes harnessed in 
the pursuit of Russian nationalism. 
Russian national sovereignty and new Russian institutions 
Russian nationalism managed to stamp the Russian identity upon the 
state by establishing new Russian institutions and Russian sovereignty. 
This process was necessary to liberal and isolationist nationalism, because 
it served the interests of establishing an identity independent from the 
Soviet centre. On the other hand, adherents to imperialist Russian 
nationalism could afford to maintain Soviet state institutions for the 
practical purpose of securing the existing state structure. However, it was 
probably adherents to imperialist Russian nationalism who first promoted 
the idea of new Russian institutions. 
The focus on Russian institutions began with calls by Russian nationalists 
for structural parity with the union republics. The RSFSR did not have its 
own republican communist party or Academy of Sciences and these facts 
were used to propagate the idea that Russia was somehow at a 
disadvantage or discriminated against within the Soviet system. It was a 
tactic which attempted to illustrate that Russia did not occupy a position of 
privilege within the Soviet Union, but it also drew attention to Russian 
national affairs. Although it did not have the same republican structures 
as the other Union republics, Russia was served by all-Union bodies which 
(many believe) led to greater Russian central control and influence over 
the other republican bodies. 
Addressing the Congress of People's Deputies in 1989, Vasilii Belov was 
one of the prominent Russian nationalist -figures to argue in favour of 
Russian institutions. He claimed that the Russian republic was at a 
disadvantage, because it did not have its own Republican institutions 
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(referring to the lack of a communist party and Academy of Sciences). He 
pointed out that as the RSFSR was served by the central USSR bodies, 
these bodies were perceived as being Russian by the other republics and, 
consequently, Russians were unjustly blamed for the faults of these 
bodies. 27° 
Whilst some of the communist-inclined imperialist Russian nationalist 
groups veiled a great deal of their activity in terms of 'internationalism', 
others sought to inject a recognisably Russian content. Pamiat' groups 
represent the trend within Russian imperialist nationalism which openly 
declared their support for Russian institutions: 
We demand equal rights for Russians with the other peoples of our country. We insist on the 
creation in Russia of its own Academy of Sciences, Conservatory, Institute of Russian 
History, Centre for Russian Culture, Russian Theatre, Russian Cinematography and an the 
publication of a Russian Encylopaedia. 271 
The Tovarishchestvo russkikh khudozhnikov (Association of Russian 
Artists), which supported the maintenance of the USSR, but claimed to be 
a Russian cultural group, concentrated its programme (in 1988) on the 
institution of Russia-wide means of communication: 
... this programme examines the preparation and activity.. of the association in creating a brand new, modern information system in Russia. The movement will strive for the creation 
of a national information bureau called 'Golos Rossii' ['Voice of Russia'], a national radio 
and television broadcasting channel, the development and distribution of newspapers, 
magazines and a Russian publishing business... 272 
At the end of 1989, the Bloc of Social and Patriotic Movements called for 
the creation of a Russian Academy of Sciences, a Russian Communist 
Party and a Russian broadcasting channel. 273 The Bloc even went as far as to 
suggest that the RSFSR should have its own capital in Moscow separate 
from that of the USSR. 
An item in Moscow News on the subject of Russian empire did not 
support the re-establishment of Russian empire, but stated: 
... Russian people's 
demands - to restore the traditional Russian flag, the coat-of-arms 
reflecting Russia's history and the Russian anthem - are reasonable, natural and unrelated 
to the imperial mentality. Appeals to restore citizenship of the Russian Federation, to 
establish a Russian Academy of Sciences, to launch a republican TV channel, to make 
Leningrad, this great city with the fate of a region, Russia's capital - all these are 
justified. 274 
The author was, perhaps, wrong when he declared that such things were 
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unrelated to the imperial mentality. They are certainly not indicative of a 
imperial mentality, but imperialist nationalists sought to establish and 
rehabilitate Russian institutions for the following reasons: firstly, because 
there was a real need to establish or reinforce a Russian identity and 
Russian institutions to some extent fulfilled this need; secondly, they 
aimed to harness the sentiments of people such as the author of the 
abovementioned piece in Moscow News ; and, thirdly, the establishment 
of a Russian communist party (amongst other organisations) could serve 
as a platform of opposition to the so-called 'left-radicals' within 
Gorbachev's government. 
The RNPR were one of the only groups gravitating towards isolationist 
Russian nationalism before Solzhenitsyn published Kak nam obustroit' 
Ross iiu? in 1990, but, it goes without saying, that adherents to the 
isolationist tendency supported the wholesale introduction of Russian 
national institutions. The RNPR not only supported Russian sovereignty 
and statehood, advocating the introduction of Russian political 
institutions such as the zemstvo and the Sobornaia duma, but it 
demanded a list of other national bodies, including: a Russian Academy of 
Sciences, a Russian National Conservatory, Opera and Theatre, an Institute 
of the Russian People, and a Centre for Russian Culutre. In addition, the 
Party called for the restoration of such things as Russian national state 
symbols etc. 275 
The most outstanding reflection of liberal Russian nationalism was the 
move by democrats to identify themselves with Russia and create Russian 
national institutions which could serve as a powerbase to challenge 
existing Soviet structures. Whilst Mikhail Gorbachev resisted the tide of 
support from within all tendencies of Russian nationalism to create 
RSFSR republican structures parallel with those in other republics -a 
Russian communist party, a ko msomo1, Russian trade unions, an 
Academy of Sciences etc. - 'democrats' within the Russian parliament set 
about establishing a politically and economically sovereign Russian 
republic. 
It was Boris El'tsin who played the liberal nationalist card and was 
instrumental in establishing not only Russian sovereignty, but a Russian 
presidency. The fact of Russian sovereignty can also be attributed with 
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precipitating the establishment of other Russian republican institutions. 
El'tsin's speech to the RSFSR Congress of People's Deputies on the 22 May 
1990 signalled his move towards using Russian nationalism to enhance 
his power. In a bid to become Chairman of the RSFSR Supreme Soviet, 
E'ltsin declared that Russia needed both political sovereignty and 
economic sovereignty, including the establishment of a republican state 
bank separate from the Union State Bank and of a Russian Foreign Trade 
Bank. 27' Earlier that year, El'tsin had already produced an electoral 
programme for the March elections attracting Russian nationalist support 
by calling for the institution of a Russian Academy of Sciences, Russian 
radio and television broadcasting and a Russian press agency. 2' 
E1'tsin's election to the chair of the RSFSR Supreme Soviet on 29 May 1990 
was followed by the Declaration of State Sovereignty of the RSFSR by the 
Congress of People's Deputies on 12 June 1990. The Declaration stated that: 
The sovereignty of the RSFSR constitutes the natural and necessary condition for the 
existence of statehood of Russia with its centuries-old history, culture and traditions. 278 
and that: 
Republican citizenship of the RSFSR is established throughout RSFSR territory. 279 
This laid the basis for the establishment of a Russian [rossiiskii) state in 
which Russian nationality was based on citizenship rather than ethnic 
origin. 
E1'tsin strengthened the Russian republican political institutions by his 
success in winning approval for the introduction of post of President of the 
RSFSR at the Third Congress of People's Deputies in March-April 1991. 
Imperialist Russian nationalists within the Rossiia faction in the Congress 
were amongst those who resisted the introduction of such a post with such 
powers, but they were unable to defeat the likes of Democratic Russia who 
supported the idea of a presidency and backed El'tsin's candidacy. ' 
El'tsin's subsequent victory as the first directly elected president of Russia 
on 12" June 1991 was a personal vindication of his tactic to ally himself with 
aspects of liberal Russian nationalism in order to give himself an effective 
powerbase. 
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Conclusion 
The focus on Russian nationalist issues was, at first, limited to 
environmental, conservationist and cultural issues which could be 
perceived as areas of social interest rather than a challenge to the Soviet 
regime. However, underlying these issues was a great concern for the 
future of the Russian nation and the development of Russian national 
values. 
Glasnost led to a bolder discussion of the Russian national identity and 
various attempts were made to re-define the Russian nation. As 
intellectuals tried to stimulate Russian national consciousness, they 
looked increasingly to the pre-revolutionary past to reconstruct the image 
of the Russian. For some, Russian Orthodoxy became the embodiment of 
Russian spiritual values and represented something which was unique to 
the Russian people. Others seemed to believe that there were innate 
qualities within the Russian people (and/or its communities) which had 
existed since time immemorial or had developed over Russia's thousand- 
year history. 
As Russian nationalist-orientated movements began to appear, other 
issues became more prominent. There was a greater focus on demographic 
and territorial issues, which reflected Russian nationalism's attempt to 
define its political-territorial unit. Attention was paid to the establishment 
of Russian national institutions and the issue of Russian sovereignty. 
With the exception of the universal desire to establish Russia-wide 
institutions, the other issues became areas of contention which divided 
those interested in the Russian national revival. The issue of 'displaced' 
Russians outside the RSFSR became an issue of passionate concern, 
particularly in view of, what Russian nationalist-orientated organisations 
perceived to be, the indifference of Western-orientated 'democrats' to their 
fate. Russia's territorial integrity was another important topic of focus, 
whether the 'Russian motherland' was perceived to be the RSFSR; the 
RSFSR and areas outside the republic inhabited predominantly by 
Russians; a Russia which included a 'triune' Russian people of Russians, 
Ukrainians and Belorussians; or the whole of the Soviet Union/former 
Russian empire. 
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The attempts to define Russia as a unique entity were frequently 
accompanied by xenophobia. This was least (or not at all) apparent in 
liberal Russian nationalism, which propagated the ideas of a unique 
Russian culture, but displayed a maximum of tolerance and repect towards 
other nationalities and their cultures. However, imperialist and 
isolationist Russian nationalism displayed unity in their opposition to the 
West and sometimes manifested resentment towards the minority 
nationalities of the Soviet Union and, at times, virulent anti-Semitism. 
The issues listed here did not unite all strands of Russian nationalism in 
agreement, but they represent areas of concern which focussed attention 
on the development and fate of the Russian people. 
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Connected with the Tendency 
Introduction 
0 0 
One of the most emotive factors provoking the growth of Russian 
nationalist sentiment and introspection was that of the loss of empire. 
Although many Russians would have denied that the Soviet Union was a 
Russian empire (and during glasnost many Russians vehemently denied 
that they ever enjoyed imperial status, insisting that they were the major 
victims of the Soviet ideological empire), ' there was a great feeling of 
anger and resentment amongst certain numbers of the Russian population 
when the populations in non-Russian republics discussed and sought 
independence from the Soviet Union. Some interpreted this as a betrayal 
of the Soviet Union and socialism, whilst others openly opposed any 
break-up of the historical Russian state/empire. 
The majority of Russian nationalist groups and parties gravitated towards 
the imperialist tendency and displayed a broad range of political opinions. 
To some extent, it is possible to sub-divide this tendency according to the 
variety of political beliefs expressed, but the idea of the unified Russian 
imperial /Soviet state was the overwhelming factor which drew these 
groups together to form joint platforms and alliances. The other common 
factors between these groups were mistrust of and opposition to the West 
(and to the Western-influenced 'democrats') and a general concern for 
ethnic Russians and Russian-speakers throughout the Soviet Union. The 
majority of the membership of each group consisted of ethnic Russians or 
Russified Slavs, who were affected by a residual imperial thinking, 
particularly when the independence movements appeared in the non- 
Russian republics - even the 'internationalist' groups were very quick to 
lend their 'internationalist' support to Russian/Russian speaking 
communities. 
All the views which can be classed under the umbrella of imperialist 
Russian nationalism conceived the Soviet Union/Russia to be a unique 
entity which had to be preserved at all costs. There seemed to be various 
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conceptions or justifications of this 'exclusiveness'. 
Soviet Nationalism? 
Gorbachev and others at the centre could justifiably be labelled 'Soviet 
nationalists' or Soviet 'patriots' in Soviet parlance. There was, no doubt, a 
number of people who believed in the unity of the Soviet state and who 
had no Russian axe to grind. Whilst Gorbachev repeated the idea that 
Russia was the core of the Union, he defended the Union not historical 
grounds, nor just on ideological grounds, but also on practical grounds. 
For instance, he considered it prudent and practical to maintain, rather 
than destroy, the interdependent economies of the republics': 
No republic can now live without another republic. After all, the whole of Uzbekistan's 
land is working for the whole of the Union. 75% of the land is employed in cotton 
production, not only for Uzbekistan, but also for other republics... ' 
However, in other instances, 'internationalism' and 'Marxism-Leninism' 
were used to promote Russian nationalist interests, or, conversely, Russian 
nationalism was used to support Marxism-Leninism. 
The 'internationalist' movements promoted a Soviet nationalism, injected 
with a very heavy Russian nationalist content. This was most noticeable 
in the Baltic and Moldavian international movements and OFT, whose 
attempts to present themselves as defenders of Marxism-Leninism were 
undermined by their pro-Russian agenda. Despite their rhetoric, these 
groups consistently defended the rights of Russian and Russian-speaking 
populations and condemned manifestations of nationalism or 
independence within the non-Russian communities. 
Nina Andreeva's Edinstvo, which Dunlop and others have described as 
'neo-Stalinist', was perhaps the most Soviet nationalist of all the groups 
related to imperialist Russian nationalism. During the war and the 
Brezhnev era, a carefully-controlled Russian nationalism was 
manipulated in order to bolster the Soviet regime and ethnic Russians 
were made to feel pride in the fact that they were first among equals in the 
Soviet Union. Edinstvo reflected this trend, promoting Marxism- 
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Leninism, internationalism and condemning nationalism, but appealing 
to the imperial pride of the Russians. Therefore, Edinstvo became a 
coalition between an Orthodox Marxism-Leninism and a Russian 
nationalism, whereby the Russian people were identified with those 
Marxist-Leninist values and the USSR as a whole. 
Russian Idea 
Whilst some used Marxism-Leninism or Soviet nationalism as 
justification for the integration of the greater Russian state, others pointed 
openly towards the Russian nation and a Russian idea as the glue or 
integrational factor. Of course, this approach was less satisfactory to the 
non-Russians, whose role in a unitary state would be automatically 
reduced to a second-class status. 
The Politburo decision in 1988 to sanction the publication of previously 
forbidden works by Russian thinkers and philosophers led to discussions 
of the ideas of the Aksakovs, Berdiaev, Bulgakov, Frank, Struve, Fedotov, 
Leontev, Chaadaev, Solov'ev, Gershenzon, Merezhovsky, etc. This process 
reintroduced the idea of Russian messianism -a religious idea holding 
that the Russians were the chosen people and Russia had a mission from 
God to save the world. It envisaged Moscow as the new spiritual centre of 
Christianity, or the 'Third Rome'. Although, these ideas did not provoke 
sudden cries for the establishment of a Third Rome, many of the old ideas 
coincided with ideas and attitudes already expressed in the Russian 
nationalist press. For instance, the importance of morality, spirituality and 
Orthodox Christian values espoused by Solov'ev, Struve and Berdiaev 
were reflected by some of the ideas of Rasputin, Belov, Bondarev and 
Viacheslav Gorbachev. 
Over the course of 1989-91 people of various political persuasions moved 
towards the idea of a Russian path. Valentin Rasputin, a sympathiser with 
imperialist Russian nationalism had joked cynically in 1989 that Russia 
should leave the Union. 4 This was not a call for Russian withdrawal, but a 
jibe against national independence movements in the republics. Later, he 
prescribed a Russian solution for the greater Russian state (Soviet Union), 
insisting that Russia should not follow the ways of other countries, but 
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establish her own path. ' 
Igor' Shafarevich, another convinced imperialist Russian nationalist who 
advocated a Russian 'third way' for the whole of the Soviet Union, rejected 
liberal democracy and Marxism-Leninism, claiming that they were both 
stimulated by the same technological and scientific 'utopia' and would 
both lead to the same disastrous conclusion. " 
A 'Russian path' did not only describe the political nature of the Russian 
state and the spiritual /religious complexion of Russian society, it also 
presumed peculiar social values - many of which reflected conservative 
family values or religious/moral values. 
The majority of ideas about a specific Russian path were relatively vague 
in detail - some nationalists suggested that the Russian path was guided by 
a mystical Russian 'national soul': 
Russia exists... as a steady, organic whole, a spiritual type, as the living soul of the Russian 
people with a joint [sobornyi] consciousness. Her statehood, her nationality and her culture 
were born of this soul, as its embodiment. It is impossible to redesign, reinvent and rebuild 
Russia according to a plan which is foreign to her. 7 
Whether such imperialist Russian nationalists regarded socialism, 
Orthodoxy and/or monarchy as the guiding principles of the Russian state, 
the moral authority of the Russian people seemed central to their 'Russian 
idea'. The extreme Russian nationalist group RNE put forward the 
following view: 
Our main aim is the spiritual, moral and physical revival of the Russian People, to return 
to the Russian People its historical place and role in the state and the world. 
As a result of history, the Russian People, by force of its high Spirituality, Morality, 
developed economic activity, Culture, numerousness, military strength and sense of justice, 
became a powerful nucleus of attraction, about which a more powerful multinational state 
formed. It was not internationalism or human values, but the Russian People who were the 
core and cement in this state. ' 
Not everyone stated the case as boldly as RNE, because the espousal of a 
Russian idea for the Soviet Union could antagonise the non-Russian 
nationalities. Most referred to a Russian 'revival' or the revival of 
traditional Russian values whilst upholding the integrity of the unitary 
Soviet/Russian state. 
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Eurasianism 
Eurasianism was a concept which was rarely referred to during the 
Gorbachev era, although it became more fashionable in 1992 - after the 
break-up of the Soviet Union! 
There are two understandings of the term 'Eurasia'. In the West, it is 
understood to be the name of the continental landmass of Europe and 
Asia, whereas, in the Russian tradition, it is understood to be synonymous 
with 'Greater Russia': 
'Eurasia' in the Russian usage happens to be those internal expanses of the continent where 
there has historically been a symbiosis between Russians and others, mainly - in the eyes of Eurasianists - Altaic, Mongol-Turkic peoples. ' ° 
The philosophy of Eurasianism was originally developed amongst Russian 
emigres in the 20s and 30s. One of the leading theorists, N. S. Trubetskoi 
rejected internationalism and developed the view that nationalism was a 
'positive principle of a nation's [narod] behaviour'. However, he did not 
advocate a narrow Russian nationalism, but the nationalism of a new 
multi-national Eurasian nation (i. e. the peoples of the USSR): 
the national substratum of the state, which in the past was called the Russian Empire and 
is now called the USSR, could only be an aggregate of the peoples populating this state, to 
be considered as a special multi-national nation, and, in this respect, having its own 
nationalism. We call this nation the Eurasian nation, its territory is Eurasia and its 
nationalism is Eurasianism. " 
To some extent, this idea was reflected by the Soviet nationalities policy 
and, particularly, by Brezhnev's 1971 declaration that 'a new historical 
community of people has arisen - the Soviet people'. 12 
However, Eurasianism never really existed as an elaborated single doctrine 
and it was largely through the efforts of Lev Gumilev that the concept of 
Eurasia was 'naturalised on Soviet soil' and came to mean a 'Greater 
Russia' in the minds of some imperialist Russian nationalists. Gumilev's 
theory of 'ethnogenesis' had been expounded before glasnost, but received 
further attention with the publication of his work in 1988-89.13 Gumilev's 
theory held that a nation, or 'ethnos', was not just a product of social 
history (as Marxism taught), but also a product of biological, geographical 
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and psychological factors, further determined by the level of 
passionarnost' - an innate energy or drive. Gumilev suggested that 
'ethnoses' are essentially different and that they should not be merged into 
a single nation, but exist symbiotically. " His ideas linked Eurasianism 
with the ancient mutual relationship between Rus' and the Steppe, 
suggesting that a distinct Eurasian civilisation had developed over Russia's 
thousand year history. 
This idea of a Eurasia in which a Russian nation (or, even, Slavic- 
Orthodox 'superethnos') necessarily existed symbiotically with other 
(Turkic, Altaic) nations was attractive to the imperialist Russian 
nationalist mentality. The concept guaranteed the unity of the Soviet 
state/Russian empire, whilst upholding the identity of the Russian people. 
Furthermore, the Eurasian concept encapsulated the idea of the 
exclusiveness of the 'historical Russian state' - Russia/Eurasia constituted a 
separate entity which could be allied neither to the East nor the West, but 
lay somewhere in between. 
Vadim Kozhinov, one of the Gorbachev era's supporters of a Eurasian idea, 
asserted that Russia's role in the world was to provide a balance between 
East and West and that Russians who embraced the West for whatever 
reasons would be making a grave mistake. 15 This view was reflected by A. 
Lanshchikov who suggested that the Russian Eurasian role had been the 
saviour of both Europe and Asia: 
For half a millennium Christian Rus' held back a dynamic and aggressive Asia from 
invading Europe and for the other half of the millennium she held back a dynamic and 
aggressive Europe from invading Asia. At first we defended Europe from Asia and then 
Asia from Europe, and who is defending us now when we are ruining ourselves economically 
and morally? 16 
Eurasianism was a relatively obscure idea that failed to capture the Soviet 
imagination during the Gorbachev period. Many Russian nationalists 
would have felt uncomfortable with the idea of a Eurasian nation and 
Eurasian idea subsuming the Russian nation and the Russian idea. In 
addition, the Russian population was declining in relation to the other 
nationalities of the USSR - this meant that the dominant Russian presence 
in Eurasian civilisation would disappear in the future and the balance of 
influence would shift to the non-Russian peoples. Some of the small, new 
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Russian nationalist groups tried to remedy the question of a declining 
Russian population by reviving the idea of pre-revolutionary academics 
that the Russian nation included Great Russians, Little Russians and 
White Russians, i. e. Russians, Ukrainians and Belorussians. '? 
One party, the Party of Revival, which formed towards the end of 1991, 
referred to Russia as a 'Eurasian state' and Gumilev's ideas were given 
ample airing in 1991 in publications such as Literaturnaia Rossiia and 
Nash sovremennik. 18 However, it was only with the fall of the Soviet 
Union that the Eurasian idea began to gain any currency and attract 
interest. The collapse of the Soviet Union and the demise of Soviet 
ideology evidently encouraged people to seek different justifications for 
holding the Russian empire/Soviet Union together. 
Sub-dividing groups associated with imperialist Russian nationalism 
The groups listed below represent some of the most notable adherents to 
imperialist Russian nationalism. They also represent the variety of views 
which existed within the tendency. It should be assumed that all of the 
groups mentioned here displayed anti-Western tendencies and opposed 
the 'democrats'. However, they displayed different attitudes towards the 
significance of Marxism-Leninism or co-operation with the CPSU, the 
importance of Orthodoxy or other values. 
In his analysis of the break-up of the Soviet Union, John Dunlop referred 
to Russian nationalists within the conservative coalition opposing 
Gorbachev's reformers and E1'tsin's 'democrats' as 'National Bolsheviks' 
and 'conservative nationalists': those who believed that the Russian state 
was best maintained through Marxism-Leninism and the structures of the 
Party; and those who opposed Marxism-Leninism, but were attracted to 
Russian Orthodoxy and the idea of a monarchy. In addition, there were 
'neo-Stalinists', who were not 'Russian nationalists', but were prepared to 
manipulate Russian nationalism in order to 'firm up the Marxist-Leninist 
legitimacy of the Soviet state". "' These labels were very useful in describing 
whether a supporter of Russian nationalism was pro- or anti-Marxist- 
Leninist, but they do not describe adequately the imperialist Russian 
nationalist-orientated groups which appeared under Gorbachev. The 
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scheme below takes into account the coalitions which the groups 
represented and their relationship towards the establishment. I have sub- 
divided this broad tendency into: internationalists, socialists, conservative 
revivalists, populists, unifiers, Pamiat' and anti-communists. 
Internationalists 
The 'internationalists' represent those groups which upheld the idea of 
Marxist-Leninist internationalism in order to maintain the unitary state, 
but had an underlying Russian agenda. They represent a coalition of 
Dunlop's 'neo-Stalinists' and 'National Bolsheviks'. Whereas Nina 
Andreeva's Edinstvo represented a limited association between Marxism- 
Leninism and Russian nationalism, the 'international movements' in the 
non-Russian republics and OFT represented a much stronger expression of 
Russian interests: 'international' interests reflected the interests of the 
Russian and Russian-speaking communities and the condemnation of 
national independence movements. 
Edinstvo - for Leninist and Communist Ideals 
Edinstvo formed on 29 May 1989 in Moscow, following the publication of 
a letter by a Leningrad Institute teacher, Nina Andreeva, in Sovetskaia 
Ross i ia, entitled "I Cannot Give Up My Principles". ` The article was 
referred to as a 'manifesto of the forces against perestroika"" and was an 
expression of communist conservatism, not only resisting the forces of 
change, but calling for a return to the socialism of Stalin. Edinstvo has 
been. described as 'neo-Stalinist' or 'neo-Bolshevik' and analysts such as 
Dunlop denied that it was Russian nationalist. ' However, discussions of 
Russian nationalism always seemed to include reference to Nina 
Andreeva and the Edinst vo group, and I believe that there is some 
justification to include this association in an analysis of imperialist 
Russian nationalism. 
Edinstvo's rhetoric called for a return to socialist principles and resisted 
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any break-up of the USSR. Its statute opposed nationalism and preached 
the ideal of internationalism whilst maintaining the 'cultural property of 
the peoples of the Soviet Union. ' However, if we examine the 
vocabulary which Nina Andreeva used and the alliances which Edinstvo 
subsequently made, we can detect certain similarities with imperialist 
nationalism which might suggest that this form of conservatism was 
underpinned by a commitment to the Soviet state and its historical 
predecessor, the Russian empire. This is not a new phenomenon: during 
the war years, Stalinism employed a very controlled and limited form of 
Russian nationalism as a means of inspiring the Russian people to victory. 
Edinstvo's Stalinist or neo-Stalinist politics employed this form of 
Russian nationalism. 
The Andreeva letter is an interesting document. Whilst criticising the 
national pride of the Great Russians and attacking the deviation of 
Russian nationalist-orientated 'traditionalists' or 'neo-Slavophiles', 
Andreeva manages to find common ground with this tendency: 
Traditionalists have undoubtedly performed a service in: unmasking corrruption; the just 
solution of ecological problems; the fight against alcoholism; the protection of historical 
monuments; and in countering the domination of mass culture, which is rightly viewed as a 
psychosis of consumerism. 24 
Although there is support for some of the views of the 'neo-Slavophiles', 
there is little, if no support for the 'left-liberal socialists', who, we assume, 
are the architects of perestroika - Gorbachev and his supporters. Besides 
this, the letter uses some of the vocabulary frequently used by nationalists 
in referring negatively to 'cosmopolitanism' and making negative 
reference to Jews such as Trotsky, Dan, Martov and Anatolii Rybakov. 
There is undoubtedly an anti-Semitic undercurrent in the letter and this 
appears to be associated with the 'left-liberal' socialists or 'neo-liberals'. 
Finally, Andreeva makes reference to Aleksandr Prokhanov, using his 
term 'guardians and traditionalists'. Prokhanov was an ardent adherent to 
imperialist Russian nationalism and only six weeks earlier had published 
an article in Literaturnaia Rossiia proposing that the socialist ideal was the 
basis for proceeding with Soviet society. ' It is clear that reference to 
Prokhanov is a mark of respect and support for Prokhanov's views. 
Another example of Nina Andreeva's flirtation with nationalist 
229 
vocabulary and ideas appeared in a question and answer session in Smena 
in 1990. The newspaper quoted a report which Andreeva had given to the 
Co-ordinating Council of Edinstvo in answer to some of the questions: 
... The second group of politicised associations are the patriotic societies, which are 
surfacing from isolation, where they were driven by Zionists to escape from the 'children's 
diseases' of growth, false attributes, religious strivings and sound effects. Their contribution 
to the fight against drunkenness, alcoholism and bourgeois mass culture are undeniable. 
They have done much to restore Russian material and spiritual culture, to unmask 
Russophobia, cosmopolitanism and the denigration of Russian national history. 26 
Edinstvo's programme included both populist and familiar Soviet socialist 
themes. For instance, documents spoke of the group's aims to 'maintain 
peace, avert ecological catastrophes, oppose the exploitation and 
oppression of man by man and oppose the impoverishment of working 
people'. " The Stalinist direction of Edinst vo is detected not only in the 
call for pre-Khrushchevian politics, but in the gravitation towards Stalin- 
style Russian nationalism. In a document entitled 'Address to the Russian 
People', the following was written: 
In the family of Soviet peoples, there was always an elder brother. He was the wisest and 
the strongest. This is what Stalin meant when he named the Russian people as the 'most 
outstanding nation of all nations making up the Soviet Union, possessing a clear mind, a 
steadfast character and patience'. Just as the USSR was always at the vanguard of the 
world communist movement, Russia was the pivot, about which the unique association of 
union states rallied and strengthened. Having gone down a difficult and heroic path, this 
association transformed into a strong superpower (derzhava), acknowledged as such by 
friends and foes in five continents. 213 
Andreeva regularly shared platforms with figures expressing outspoken 
Russian imperialist nationalist views. For example, the newspaper of the 
Russian Popular Front, Vozrozhdenie Rossii, reported that Andreeva was 
present at a concert in Moscow entitled 'Russia - my Motherland'. 
According to the advertising poster, appearances would be made by Viktor 
Astaf'ev, Iurii Bondarev, Vladimir Rasputin amd Il'ia Glazunov, but in the 
final event the crowd were addressed by V. Soloukhin, V. Bondarenko, E. 
Asadov and Nina Andreeva. Some speakers uttered the words, 'We do 
not need great tremors, give us a great Russia! ', echoing the words of Petr 
Stolypin. Bondarenko claimed that a forthcoming demonstration would 
be a 'pogrom against Russian nationality and statehood', adding that 
Russia did not need perestroika, but revival. Nina Andreeva was met 
by a 
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'huge ovation' and ended her speech with the words: 
The nation and the army are one! Are we not Russians? 29 
The article added that Andreeva remained on stage to listen not to 
military-type music, but to 'spiritual' music, including a rendition of the 
Lord's Prayer. 
The test of Edinst vo's convictions can be seen in the alliances that they 
adopted with other nationalist groups: 
At the beginning of 1991 four rival Moscow committees of Edinstvo: Boris Gun'ko's group, 
Viktor Prishchepenko's group, Tat'iana Khabalova's group and the group of Andrei 
Kirsanov. Of these, the Prishchepenko and Kirsanov groups are gravitating towards a 
union with the national-bolshevik wing of 'Pam iat", whilst Gun'ko's group is closer to the 
Moscow United Workers' Front and is even a collective member. 30 
Edinstvo had links with Otechestvo, the All-Russian Patriotic Movement 
Otchizna, the 'International Movements', the United Workers' Front 
(OFT), the Popular Front of Russia, Soiuz and others. It should also be 
noted that Edinstvo participated in the Initiative Congress of the Russian 
Communist Party in Leningrad in April 1990.31 
According to the leaders there were several thousand members in over 
thirty cities across the Soviet Union in 1990. The Moscow branch headed 
by Boris Gun'ko numbered around 300.32 The group attracted more 
notoriety than support, but was very active in backing causes concerning 
Marxism-Leninism and the maintenance of the Union. Its Russian 
nationalism was constricted and always second in importance to the 
maintenance of Marxism-Leninism, but nevertheless played a significant 
role. 
Interdvizhenie, Interfront, Edinstvo (Lithuania), OFT. 
Like Edinstvo for Leninist and Communist Ideals, these groups were 
formed as a reaction to change and, along with Russian nationalist groups 
such as Otechestvo, the Union for the Spiritual Renaissance of the 
Fatherland (SDVO) and the Association of Russian Artists, they all entered 
the 'United Council of Russia' Association. ' This action alone is enough 
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to confirm the groups' imperialist Russian nationalist credentials, but I 
will briefly examine the origins of these groups. 
"Venibe-Edinstvo-Ednost"' 
The 'Inter' movements and Edinstvo in Lithuania arose as a response to 
the independent groups in the republics. For example, the Founding 
Conference of Venibe-Edinstvo-Ednost' on 22 January 1989 followed the 
Founding Conference of Sajudis in October 1988. Indeed, reports claimed 
that Edinstvo was set up in November 1988 to counter Sajudis. TM Under 
its full name, the Socialist Movement for Perestroika in Lithuania 
"Venibe-Edinstvo-Ednost"', the movement recognised the leading role of 
the CPSU; followed Marxist-Leninist ideology; stood for the independence 
of Lithuania's economy within the limits of a unified economy of the 
USSR; supported the 'strict observation of equal rights and the guarantees 
of receiving secondary and higher education in all areas of speciality in 
Russian, Lithuanian and Polish languages'; and that all Lithuanian state 
organs had the responsibility of creating guaranteed conditions for the 
development of all ethnic groups in the republic. ' It was clear that the 
Russian (and Slavic) population was fearful for its status in a more 
independent Lithuania. 
One of the first political actions of Edinstvo was to organise a protest of 
thousands of Russians and Poles against a decree making Lithuanian the 
language of business and government in the republic on 12 February 1989. 
Many of those demonstrating could not speak Lithuanian and complained 
that the law relegated Russian and Polish speakers in Lithuania to the 
status of second-rate citizens. ' Slogans reading: 'No to the discriminating 
decree on languages, which is sowing the seeds of national dissension' and 
'No to Lithuania leaving the USSR' accompanied the demonstration. 37 
Three days later the movement organised protest strikes against the law in 
more -than 60 enterprises in Vilnius. 
' Later in the month, members of the 
Lithuanian Academy of Sciences penned an open letter condemning the 
disruptive activities of Edinstvo: 
'Edinstvo' is trying to undermine trust in the CC of the Lithuanian Communist 
Party and the 
Government of Lithuania; it is offending the honour of the 
Lithuanian people, casting 
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allegations of being 'fascists' and 'nationalists'...; 
'Edinstvo"s practical activities openly express ideas of Great Russian chauvinism, Stalinist ideas about the merging of languages and nations, and other ideas from Russifiers and Polonizers denying the right of small peoples to sovereignty and national statehood, etc. The reactions and objections of 'Edinstvo' to the declaration of Lithuanian as the state language assert that it is an effort to strengthen the position of deformed socialism. 39 
It is understandable that with a law which would require all non- 
Lithuanians to learn the Lithuanian language, the Russian population had 
a grievance and were justified in standing up for their interests. However, 
by April/May 1989 two wings had developed within the movement: a 
liberal wing, which sought a form of legal rapprochement with Sa jud is , 
and a conservative wing, which posed the major imperialist Russian 
nationalist opposition to Sajudis. 40 The group's imperialist behaviour was 
reflected in some of the principles it pursued: to keep Lithuania in the 
USSR; protect the rights of Slavs; oppose the idea that Slavs/Russians 
might have to learn the indigenous language; and totally oppose the 
indigenous national movement. The usual line taken by Edinst vo was 
that it represented the interests of all sections of society, whilst Sa judis only 
represented the ethnic Lithuanian population. An article in the Russian 
nationalist-orientated Army newspaper Krasnaia zvezda quoted a 
Lithuanian woman who said how happy she was with the Russian 
presence in Lithuania and that she was disgusted with the nationalism of 
Sajudis. 41 Regardless of the perfectly reasonable grievances the Russian 
population might have had against the nationalism of the Lithuanians, 
the subsequent alliances (such as those mentioned above) in which 
Edinstvo participated are indicative of the reactive (predominantly) 
Russian nationalism of its members. The socialism which Edinstvo 
advocated was a socialism which sought to keep Lithuania tied to the 
centre and which would allow Russians to remain Russians in a Russian- 
dominated state and not in a foreign land. 
Interfront, Latvia. 
The founding conference of the Latvian Interfront took place on 7 January 
1989. Like Edinstvo in Lithuania, Interfront claimed that it was 
represented by 'various social strata of the republic's population' and a 
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'varied national composition', aiming at first to be an ally of the Latvian 
Popular Front. 42 Of all the Baltic republics, Latvia had the largest 
proportion of Russians (33%) and Interfront represented the interests of 
this largely working class group. At first, Interfont's chief concern centred 
around potential changes in language and citizenship laws. At the 
Founding Conference concern was voiced to maintain Russian as an 
official state language: 
In particular, it is being claimed that the republic's Supreme Soviet took the decision to 
make Latvian the state language in haste and it is being proposed that the same status 
should be also established for the Russian. language.... 
... It is really wrong if one language has an advantage in a multinational republic... 
... Having defined the status of Latvian as a state language, we are trying all in all to 
establish a practical bilingualism, especially in the affairs of Party, Soviet and economic 
bodies and in service areas. The command of both languages should become the normal 
professional duty of the employees of the given institutions and departments. 43 
Later, Tatiana Zhdanok, a member of the Presidium of the Council of the 
Latvian Interfront, said that the most important priorities of the Council 
included: 
continuing the policy of consolidating all healthy forces in Soviet Latvia, taking an active 
part in the elections of people's deputies of the USSR, struggling to improve the ecological 
situation in the republic, and discussing the draft laws on language, on citizenship and on 
ending unregulated population growth. 4' 
Interfront presented the main opposition to the resolution passed on 14 
February 1989 by the republic's Council of Ministers 'On Measures for the 
Cessation of Groundless Mechanical Growth of the Population and the 
Regulation of the Processes of Migration in the Latvian SSR'. Interfront 
attacked the legality of items which sought to deprive migrant workers of 
the right to improved housing. "' The resolution posed a threat to Russians 
who had been resident in the republic for less than ten years and was an 
oblique way of reinforcing rules on citizenship. 
Intorf ro n is other complaints concerned the fact that they considered they 
were being censored; that monuments were being removed and streets 
were being renamed; that they resented the idea that the Soviet Army was 
an occupational force. 
The Chairman of Interfront's Republican Council, I. V. Lopatin, claimed 
that Latvian television, radio and press published only what the Latvian 
Popular Front considered necessary and that Interfront's 
fifteen-minute 
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weekly broadcast was subject to censorship by Latvian Gostelradio. * 
Earlier, another Interfront representative, A. G. Alekseev, declared that the 
movement was seeking access to television, but had been denied this by 
the republican leadership. However, the movement did have access to 
television and radio in Leningrad where they had broadcast their views to 
a Russian audience. "' Lopatin claimed that: 
... the 
Union or Russian reader is poorly informed about what is really happening in the 
Baltic. "" 
This kind of statement sought to. convince Russians outside Latvia that 
Russians were the victims of nationalist discrimination inside Latvia. 
The removal of monuments and the changing of place-names were two of 
the issues which Interfront felt the Russian public should know about. 
The changes which took place involved monuments and place names 
which had been changed or introduced following the absorption of Latvia 
and the other Baltic states into the USSR in 1940. An article in the 
Interfront mouthpiece, Edinst vo, which expressed anger at the removal of 
Lenin's statue in the town of Tukums asked: 
Where and what are we coming to with such feelings of overflowing hate towards 
everything Soviet, Leninist and Russian? 49 
Another article in the same issue addressed the subject of street names: 
An absolute majority of young and middle-aged inhabitants of Riga would not have known 
up until recently that somewhere in the city there were Kungu (Gospodskal), Gretsinieku 
(Greshnikov) and Bariniu (Sirotskaia) Streets. And almost no one, including the oldest 
residents, would not have thought of bringing back the old names. What on earth for? 
What is their attraction? 50 
The author acknowledged that some hasty decisions had been taken in 
Stalin's time and agreed that names which did not render any specific 
merit to Riga should disappear. However, the writer was upset that the 
names of Soviet (and, therefore, mostly Russian) figures should disappear 
from the streets. Besides mentioning Lenin and Marx, he/she singled out 
the 'prosaic' name of Iurii Gagarin -a model Soviet and Russian 
hero. The 
removal of Gagarin's name was brought up by other 
Russians, including 
the aforementioned Lopatin, who enumerated and 
berated the changing of 
several other Russian and Soviet names and monuments: 
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.. since 1 
January 1990 the newspaper of the CC of the republic's komsomol is no longer called 'Soviet Youth',... but 'Latvian Youth'. The words 'Leninist' and 'Communist' have disappeared from many newspapers. Monuments are being dismantled in the Baltic. Last 
year in Liepai on the 22 June, the day on which the Great Patriotic War began, the civic authorities removed the monument to the city's defenders under the pretext of restoration, but this is not being carried out. In Kaunas... they dismantled and scrapped the tank which 
was the first to burst into the town on its liberation from the fascists in 1944: they said it 'spoiled the look of the town'.... In Riga they renamed Lenin Street, Gorky Street, Suvorov 
Street, Komsomol Embankment. In Eglava the street named after hero of the Soviet Union, 
Federov, who died liberating the town in 1944, became Zigru Street - 'Equine' Street. " 
In a fashion indicative of an imperialist nationalist mentality, Lopatin 
cannot comprehend and accept why the Latvians would wish to change 
Russian and Soviet names imposed on their streets since Latvia's 
incorporation into the Soviet Union. Lopatin was also indignant at the 
suggestion that Latvia had been occupied by the Soviet Army in 1940: 
The Session [of the Latvian Supreme Soviet] approved the highly tendentious conclusions of 
the committee studying the conditions of the 1939 agreement between the USSR and 
Germany [the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact], which found as if Latvia had been occupied by the 
Red Army as a result of the agreement. This decision drew a storm of indignation from 
veterans of the Party and the Revolution, and participants of the Great Patriotic War. 52 
The imperialist Russian nationalist attitude is reflected not only by cries of 
'foul' against Russians (and/or things Soviet), but also by ways which 
belittle the importance of the Latvians. A Russian Interfront member 
from Riga, R. Dudnik, said that there was a 'natural process of assimilation 
all over the world" and added that the Latvian population constituted 
'only one per cent of the country'. ' 
In a critical examination of Interfront, a Russian, A. Zhdanok, summed 
up the movement's general attitude towards the supremacy of Russian 
culture: 
We have already come across the following logic of IF [Interfront]: if someone is against the 
dominance of the Russian people in Latvia, it means he is against the Russian people; if 
someone is against the dominance of the Russian language in Latvia, it means he is against 
the Russian language. And, by the same chalk, if you stand up for the values of Russian 
culture, then according to Interfront's understanding, you should come out in favour of the 
unlimited dominance of Russian cultural origins in all multinational regions of the Russian 
empire. T' 
He added that Russian members of the Latvian Society of Russian Culture, 
LORK, who supported the 'cultural and spiritual' renaissance of the 
Latvian people were singled out for vilification by Interfront 
in its 
newspaper Edinstvo. 
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Zhdanok also gave food for thought as to whether Interfront was truly 
ideologically committed to the CPSU, or regarded it as a tool for 
maintaining power. He indicated that Interfront sought to dominate the 
Latvian Communist Party and reduce the number of Latvians in the Party. 
Forty per cent of the Latvian CP were Latvians, whilst the remaining 60% 
were Russian speakers. Of the Latvian membership, 55% were members of 
the Latvian Popular Front in 1989. Interfront wanted to separate the 
Latvian Communist Party from the Latvian Popular Front and even 
supported a multiparty idea, but insisted upon maintaining the leading 
role of the Party. This idea would reduce the number of Latvians in the 
Party whilst keeping power in Party hands - the hands of the Russian- 
speaking population. 55 
Most of Interfront's membership consisted of industrial workers who, 
perhaps, had the greatest fears of unemployment and displacement if 
Latvia broke away from Russia, but despite their efforts to spread fears 
amongst the non-Latvian population, the majority of Russians did not 
support the movement. In fact, more Russians supported the idea of 
Latvian independence. 
Interfront's venom was directed not only at Latvians. Whilst the Latvian 
authorities put effort into encouraging Latvian language teaching, a 
number of non-Latvian speaking schools were encouraged to develop. " 
Interfront criticised the groups representing Ukrainians, Poles, Jews, 
Armenians and others who opened or planned to open 'national' schools. 
Collectively, these groups were represented by ANKOL, the Association of 
National Cultural Societies of Latvia. Members of ANKOL were given 
practical help by the Latvian Popular Front in setting up the schools and 
this led to a number of criticisms in the newspaper Edinstvo 'accusing the 
nationals of all sorts of sins'. ' Besides opposing other national groups in 
Latvia, Interfront reinforced its imperialist credentials by sending 
representatives to Belorussia to mobilize non-Belorussians against local 
nationalism. " 
It is clear that Interfront was Russian-centred and this was reflected in its 
support for the OFT, OSTK and the subsequent alliances which they 
formed, not to mention support for the shadowy 'National Salvation 
Committee' of 1991. Unsurprisingly, the group was sometimes referred to 
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by Latvians as 'Imperfront'. At one stage, according to Lopatin, it had 
300000 active participants, ' a sizeable estimate, but whether or not it was 
accurate, the number of supporters neither matched the Latvians, nor the 
Russians who supported Latvian independence from the Soviet Union. 
Interdvizhenie, Estonia 
Interdvizhenie or the 'Internationalist Movement' in Estonia was 
analogous to the aforementioned Edinstvo and Interfront movements in 
Lithuania and Latvia. Originating in the latter half of 1988, 
Interdvizhenie held its Founding Conference in March 1989 and declared 
similar principles to the other two movements: internationalism and 
socialism; to maintain Estonia within the Soviet Union; condemnation of 
new language and citizenship laws; and opposition to 'discrimination' 
against the Russian-speaking (or non-Estonian) population of Estonia. 
Interdvizheni e's Russian nationalist behaviour was affected to a degree by 
demographic factors. The proportion of Estonians in Estonia had 
decreased from 90 per cent in 1940 to around 62 per cent in the 80s. The 
majority of non-Estonians were Russian migrant workers who were 
concentrated in the north-eastern area of the republic (where the Estonian- 
speaking population had dropped below 5 per cent) and in housing estates 
in the region of Lasnamae on the outskirts of Tallinn. ' In contrast to 
Edinstvo and Interfront in the other Baltic republics, Interdvizhenie 
announced at its Founding Conference that it would consider the idea of 
setting up an autonomous republic in the north-eastern industrial area 
where Russians were predominant, if discrimination against the Russian- 
speaking population continued. This threat later changed to one of 
secession and incorporation into the USSR. So, although Interdvizhenie 
supported the maintenance of the USSR and of Estonia's position within 
it, it also flirted with the idea of breaking Estonian territory away 
from 
Estonia in favour of Russia. Suspecting backing from Moscow, the 
Estonians accepted the threats without making an 
issue of it, but, in 
response, voiced the republic's claim to lands in the 
Petseri region of the 
Russian Federation - an area which 
had been part of Estonia until it was 
annexed by Russia in 1945.62 
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Interdvizhenie opposed legislation that curbed the electoral rights of recent 
immigrants, mostly Russians, to the republic. The movement helped 
organise and participated in a strike of 20 000 Russian workers on 9 August 
1989 in opposition to a law which gave voting rights only to people who 
had lived for two years in a particular electoral district, or five years 
elsewhere in Estonia. `A series of strikes followed and the law was 
eventually rescinded under pressure from Moscow, where the Praesidium 
of the Supreme Soviet declared the law unconstitutional. " Therefore, all 
residents, including Soviet troops stationed in the republic, were 
guaranteed voting rights. 
Interdvizhenie was sensitive to Estonian revisionist statements and 
demands such as the Estonian parliament's description of the republic's 
incorporation into the Soviet Union in 1940 as an 'annexation' rather than 
'liberation'. " It also opposed the introduction of language laws which 
would make Estonian the state language and, therefore, force Russian- 
speakers to learn Estonian. This law was condemned by Russians in 
Moscow who claimed that it would put non-Estonian-speakers at a 
disadvantage, probably infringing their civil rights. ` Interdvizhenie made 
efforts to ally itself with other Russians outside Estonia who had 
sympathies towards the maintenance of the USSR and the status quo 
ante by joining the OFT or the United Workers' Front. 
Other Movements outside the RSFSR 
Besides the 'internationalist' movements in the Baltic republics, an 
International Front Ed inst vo appeared in Moldavia in 1989. In August, 
shortly after the founding congress of Edinstvo in July 1989, the Moldavian 
Supreme Soviet approved new language laws making Moldavian the state 
language. This caused a backlash of strikes by Russian workers throughout 
the republic. 67 Most of the organisation was carried out not by Edinstvo, 
but by a United Council of Labour Collectives, OSTK (Ob"edineenyi sovet 
trudovykh kollektiv). It was largely the efforts of these two groups that 
produced the declaration of a breakaway Russian republic of Transdniester 
in Moldova (Moldavia) in mid-1991. Therefore, whereas the Estonian 
Russian-speaking groups had threatened the automony of a region of the 
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Estonian republic whilst pursuing integration of the whole republic in the 
Soviet Union, the Moldovan Russians actually achieved it. 
OSTK s existed in Moldavia and the Baltic. According to Geoffrey Hosking, 
OSTK originated in Estonia as: 
an economic rather than an ethnic movement and, ironically, it originated in the campaign 
to create the [Estonian] Popular Front. " 
OSTK was originally set up as a body of elected representatives of workers 
in the factories and consisted largely of technical intelligentsia - one might 
say that it represented the nomenklatura elite of all-Union enterprises. 
The Founding Congress of the Council took place in December 1988 and, 
although the movement had been started to pursue largely economic 
problems, the political dimension became unavoidable. Amidst ethnic 
and political tensions, the movement split into Russian and Estonian 
groups: the OSTK representing Russian workers and the Estonians 
forming their own organisation S TKE. 69 Along with Inte rd viz he nie, 
OSTK was responsible for organising much of the Russian protest actions 
against republican legislation.: 
In the course of organising various measures - meetings and strikes -a bloc of forces allied to 
us has formed which includes Interdvizhenie, strike committees, a section of war veterans 
and internationalist sevicemen. 70 
In Latvia, In to rf ro n is inability to organise impressive mass strikes was met 
by the formation of an OSTK. The declaration announcing the formation 
of the movement stated: 
OSTK stands for the unification of all social forces supporting socialism and Soviet power 
(the debating club of Party organisation secretaries, Interfront, the Association of 
Industrialists et al. ) into a broad democratic movement. 71 
It demanded: 
... the return of the republic's media of mass 
information under the control of the Latvian 
Popular Front and their transfer to the Soviets, the state and the Communist Party? 
It is also interesting to note that whilst talking of a 'one and indivisible 
Motherland', one of the movement's main tasks was to : 
assist in supporting the high preparedness for action of the Soviet 
Armed Forces! 
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The first conference of the Latvian movement took place on 3 February 
1990, only weeks before elections for the Supreme Soviet. " An address to 
Latvian toilers issued before the elections used scare tactics by talking of 
'refugees' from other republics and suggesting that the same thing could 
happen in Latvia. 's This could only apply, of course, to the non-Latvian 
population. 
These 'internationalist' movements are rightly termed as adherents to 
Russian imperialist nationalism, rather than true socialist 
internationalists, because although most of their rhetoric was couched in 
internationalist terms, they identified with the Russian centre and fought 
to uphold the unique position occupied by Russians in the Soviet Union 
(for instance, the very fact that Russians resident in Estonia did not even 
have to study the Estonian language would be unimaginable in most parts 
of the world). Along with their efforts to maintain the status quo was an 
underlying Russian national consciousness which was being goaded into 
action by the forces of change. Leokadia Drobizheva summed up the 
situation well when she referred to two factors affecting the growth of 
Russian national consciousness under perestroika: the first was a reaction 
to the national movements and interethnic conflicts in non-Russian 
republics which was initially defensive, but became more belligerent as 
Russians sought to dissociate themselves from 'accusations directed at the 
centre'; the second was the 'psychological chain-reaction' as Russians 
adopted the organizational tactics of the national movements, forming 
their own representative bodies. Drobizheva added that the developments 
in the peripheral republics: 
not only wounded Russian national feelings in these republics, but also led to the 
consolidation of Russians in the Russian Federation. 
76 
OFT 
The United Workers' Front, or OFT (Ob"edinennyi front trudiashchikhsia) 
was a focal point about which the republican 'internationalist' movements 
could unite and which linked them to Russia and other similar-minded 
organisations in the USSR. OFT originated as a Leningrad organisation on 
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13 June 1989. " Moskovskie novosti reported that OFT planned 'side by side 
with the Party, komsomol and trade unions' to 'create political power 
through the working class in union with the collective peasantry and the 
intelligentsia'. ' Even with such a broad social alliance, it is interesting to 
note that the Leningrad OFT included not only Workers' Political Clubs 
'For Leninism and Communist Directions in Perestroika and the Scientific 
Atheism Society', but also the Russian nationalist-orientated Otechestvo 
society. 79 The leader of the small Russian nationalist group Patriot, 
Aleksandr Romanenko, gave a speech to supporters shortly after the 
formation of Leningrad OFT - he claimed that OFT was a 'patriotic 
organisation' and urged his audience to join it. 80 The formation of OFT 
was described in Moskovskie novosti as 'the very consolidation of anti- 
perestroika forces', " i. e. a grouping of conservative pro-Union supporters, 
and this would appear to be reinforced by the fact that the guest speaker at 
the founding conference was Nina Andreeva whose presence 'was greeted 
by thunderous applause'. " 
The Leningrad OFT was followed by the formation of the OFT USSR. The 
founding congress took place between 15-16 July 1989 and was represented 
by 'internationalist-socialist movements and fronts of workers from 
Latvia, Lithuania, Estonia, Moldavia, Ukraine, RSFSR, Moscow and 
Leningrad. ' One of the guest speakers was I. V. Lopatin from Latvia's 
Interfront. "' It should be noted that amongst the documents passed by 
the congress were addresses to the peoples and governments of the Baltic 
republics and to the intelligentsia. 84 These were the only groups singled 
out for an address - it is no coincidence that they were among the most 
prominent groups posing potential opposition to both Soviet power and 
Russian nationalism. 
Shortly after the OFT USSR congress, a Moscow OFT was formed on 27 
July 1989 and this included Nina Andreeva's Edinstvo group. Besides 
other conservative communist groups, Moscow OFT, like its Leningrad 
counterpart, included the Russian nationalist society Otechestvo in its 
membership. ' 
On 8-9 September the OFT RSFSR was founded. This group was described 
by V. Pribylovskii as the OFT of the 'largest real significance'. ' Amongst 
the 103 delegates were members of the Estonian and Moldavian strike 
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committees, as well as the 'internationalist' movements and workers' 
fronts from the Baltic republics. 87 
Taking OFT as a whole, most of its rhetoric is couched in socialist, 
internationalist terms similar to those of Nina Andreeva's Edins tvo. 
When an OFT member was asked in January 1990 if OFT was linked with 
Nina Andreeva, he replied that she was not a member of OFT and, when 
pressed further, he would not say whether OFT was for or against her. 
However, another member firmly put Bogdan Gavrilko, a member of 
Pamiat' and The Union of Spiritual Renaissance of the Fatherland, SDVO 
(Soiuz dukhovnovo vozrozhdeniia Otechestva) and, therefore, someone 
of a an overt Russian nationalist persuasion, on OFT's blacklist. ' 
OFT's underlying Russian imperialist nationalist sentiment can be 
detected in a number of things: its refusal to change the Union and the 
alliances that it entered in order to pursue that goal; its participation in the 
establishment of a Russian Communist Party; the use of the term 
'Russophobia' to describe the behaviour of republican nationalists; 
elements of xenophobia; and the pursuit of a political structure which 
would maintain dominance in the power of the central Russian 
authorities all over the Union. 
OFT's commitment to the Union was consistently stated in its documents 
but perhaps one of the most revealing documents endorsing the Union is 
the 'declaration of socio-political organisations and movements of socialist 
choice about the formation of a working conference of representatives for 
the consolidation of all patriotic and internationalist forces of the country'. 
The declaration's aims included the maintenance of the USSR as a 
federation; confirmation of the socialist choice of a multi-national Soviet 
people and a guarantee of human rights on the territory of the USSR as a 
whole - this latter point upholding equal rights of Soviet citizens 
regardless of nationality and language (amongst other things). The 
interesting point to note is the list of signatories to the declaration. 
Alongside OFT groups were the Soiuz group of People's Deputies, the 
USSR Writers Union, 1nte rd vizhenie, the Association of Russian Artists, 
Otechestvo, OSTK of Moldavia, Nina Andreeva's Edinstvo, the Edinenie 
Society, the Public Political Club Rossiiane, to name but a few. All the 
aforementioned groups can be linked with some aspects of Russian 
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nationalism. " 
In February-March 1991 OFT actively canvassed for people to vote for the 
maintenance of the Union as a unitary state in the 17 March referendum. 
OFT's association with other Russian-orientated groups is illustrated by its 
participation as a founder in the deputies' club Rossiia. According to OFT 
USSR leader and OFT RSFSR co-chairman, Veniamin larin, the club was 
set up as a counterweight to the interregional group of deputies. Other 
founder members included the RSFSR Writers' Union, the Public 
Committee for the Salvation of the Volga and the All-Russian Cultural 
Fund. 90 
OFT was instrumental in setting up the Russian Communist Party. In one 
platform document it supported: 
The reconstitution of a Russian Communist Party as a condition of the integrity and 
independence of the Motherland, of the perfection of the socialist system and of the 
strengthening of the communist movement in the country. "' 
In fact, the newspaper Argumenty i fakty revealed that OFT was the main 
element behind realising such a party: 
'the idea of a Russian communist party is becoming more and more evident.., and it is 
already being announced that on 21-22 April there will be an initiative congress of the 
Russian Communist Party in Leningrad. But who is organising it with such speed and 
without any preparation? It turns out to be the RSFSR United Workers' Fronti92 
OFT was displeased with the Russian Communist Party that came into 
existence and was later instrumental in forming the Russian Communist 
Workers' Party. 93 
The Front rarely used the vocabulary employed by Russian nationalist- 
oriented groups such as Pam is t', but it referred to matters such as 'spiritual 
revival'. In an open letter from the Novgorod branch of OFT to 'members 
of patriotic and internationalist organisations', the group stated that: 
Today the working class and broad strata of labourers, healthy forces of the CPSU, in the 
trade unions and in amateur organisations are beginning to force back the nationalists, 
ideological werewolves and 'knights' of capitalist accumulation who have overstepped the 
mark. The rebuff of cosmopolitans, Russophobes and opportunists is growing 
in ideology, 
literature and art. There is no doubt that the weight and influence of 
healthy forces will 
grow yet further. 94 
The word ' Russophobe' was one particularly used by indignant 
Russians 
who felt a sense of loss and annoyance at the changes 
in non-Russian 
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areas. The use of such a term was usually the sign of reactive Russian 
nationalist sympathies. 
Xenophobia was something that was not expressed openly, but surfaced 
informally from time to time. For instance, OFT did not discuss Jewish 
themes at their conferences, but Sergei Sopov reported that Vladimir 
Turchenko, an OFT conference delegate, had said that: 
The Jews are a concentrated expression of everything bourgeois 95 
Sopov added that nobody had argued with the delegate. 
The maintenance of the Soviet Union did not only mean the maintenance 
of the state and its borders but, to the likes of OFT, it also meant the 
maintenance of a political system which supported the power of the 
proletariat, but effectively kept power centrally in the hands of Moscow. 
For example, in Leningrad, OFT advocated that soviet elections should be 
held according to constituencies based on the place of work rather than on 
territorial considerations. 96 The idea of this was that it would give the 
workers a greater say in affairs, but in reality this method of voting had 
given greater scope to enterprise managers to force officially nominated 
candidates on the voters. The OFT justified their demands by citing 
Lenin, but others criticised the policy and G. Vasiutochkin described it as 
'barrack communism'. 97 
Whilst OFT advocated the equality of all peoples and nationalities of the 
USSR it supported a system that to some extent favoured the Russian 
population. The Front condemned the 'discriminatory laws' introduced 
in a number of republics. It concluded that republican nationalism 
appeared on an economic level: 
In an effort towards economic isolation and wounding the interests of the national 
minorities, including Russians who live in these republics 
and, having highlighted the fact that Russians constituted minorities, 
added: 
We demand the proportional representation of national minorities in all organs of power 
and administration in the union republics. 98 
This sounds a reasonable demand, but when one considers that ethnic 
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Russians constituted the vast majority in the RSFSR and the largest 
minorities in all the other Republics, then this system, coupled with the 
demand for constituencies in the workplace (and many of the Russians in 
non-Russian republics were industrial workers), worked very much in 
favour of Russian influence and domination. 
Other pro-socialist groups 
In addition to the internationalists, there were groups which supported the 
maintenance of the CPSU and socialism in order to maintain the unity of 
the Soviet state, but which made a greater reference to the idea of the 
Russian revival, calling for the establishment of Russian insitutions and, 
in some cases, the rehabilitation of Russian Orthodoxy. These could, to 
some extent, be compared with Dunlop's 'National Bolsheviks'. 
Otechestvo 
Otechestvo was not one group, but a number of different groups in 
different cities. I will briefly describe the two most notable groups which 
were in Moscow and Leningrad. 
The Leningrad group (the Leningrad Russian Patriotic Movement 
'Otechestvo' - LRPD 'Otechestvo') was formed in March 1989 by a number 
of local 'patriotic' groups including members of Pamiat', Patriot and 
Vitiaz'. 99 The idea was that the movement would co-ordinate the 
'patriotic' activity of these groups. Certain members of Pamiat', who 
opposed the leading role of the Communist Party, quit the movement on 
the second day of the Founding Congress, leaving an organisation which 
was favourably disposed towards the CPSU. Supporting the Party's policy 
of perestroika, Otechestvo upheld the idea of the USSR, but focussed on 
the well-being of the ethnic Russian [russkii] people. The establishment of 
USSR was regarded as a Russian feat: 
The Russian people created and united a huge multinational great power. The brotherhood 
of the peoples of the USSR is of the highest value, it is one of the most important 
achievements from the historical legacy of the Russian people, the creator of the great 
power. 101 
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Otechestvo associated the Russian ethnic people very closely with the 
army and backed the reversal of any decline in the army by promoting the 
idea of military service in co-operation with 'political organs DOSAAF, 
veterans' organisations, military-patriotic societies and the Russian 
Orthodox Church'. Supposedly, a strong Russian-dominated army would 
act as a protector of this historical 'great power'. 
The 'national revival of the Russian people' implied not only economic, 
but 'moral' development. This involved the promotion of Russian 
culture and a rehabilitation of the fortunes of Russian Orthodoxy which, 
'in contrast to other religions,... practically never opposed [Russian] 
national statehood'. The movement proposed a 'patriotic' education 
programme for youngsters and teeenagers which would counter 'mass 
culture' and develop a closer attachment to the 'tradtitions, history and 
culture' of the Motherland. The 'revival' was also seen in demographic, 
or, even genetic terms: Otechestvo advocated a number of political 
measures to reverse the declining number of Russians in the Soviet 
population, including a battle against alcoholism and increased state 
provision for child-care. 
Economically, the movement supported 'historical forms of land use, 
which involved the return of the land to the peasantry. It opposed the 
'unjust distribution' of the national income between the republics, 
suggesting that Russia should receive a greater share or her contribution to 
the Soviet budget. In addition, Otechestvo supported a degree of 
protectionism over the USSR's natural resources, suggesting that the 
country should build its economy on technological advance and quality 
production, rather than 'sell off' its raw materials to the 
benefit of 
outsiders. 
Otechestvo supported a stable political system based upon the 
framework 
of a reformed CPSU - whilst focussing all its energies on 
the needs of the 
ethnic Russian people, it seemed to regard the 
CPSU as the structure 
capable of holding the great power together. 
However, the movement was 
troubled by political discord and a number of activists 
left over the course 
of 1989-90, thus weakening any original effort to unite so-called 
'patriots'. 
LRPD Otechestvo never commanded a large support and 
by the time it 
joined the Soiuz group of Deputies at the beginning of 
1991 it was almost 
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as insignificant as some of the Pamiat' groups it had once represented. 
The Moscow group (the Moscow City Voluntary Society of Russian Culture 
'Otechestvo') held its Founding Congress in May 1989, portraying itself as a 
cultural group. However, the Congress participants included, among 
others, members of the Baltic 'international fronts/movements'. The 
Society was initiated by the editorial boards of the thick journals Moskva, 
Molodaia gvardiia and Nash sovremennik reflecting an association with 
members of the literary establishment. Aleksandr Rutskoi, who was later 
to become vice president of Russia, also joined the society, but left in 1990. 
Moscow Otechestvo's aim was: 
to help with the international education of toilers and the development of their political 
activeness in the cultural, historical, economic, ecological and demographic revival of the 
Russian [russkii] people and peoples of Russia... To help actively to strengthen the 
friendship of the peoples of the USSR... lol 
The aims of Russian revival and maintenance of the Union would be 
achieved through supporting socialism and the structures of the CPSU. At 
first, Otechestvo declared that it supported the maintenance of perestroika, 
but later sided with more conservative forces in the CPSU. 
Despite its attachment to Marxism-Leninism and claims of 
internationalism, Otechestvo linked the idea of Russian revival with the 
maintenance of the Soviet state by claiming that: 
it is a feature of the [Russian] national character which makes the Russian people the only 
means of maintaining the integrity of the multinational state: it has been proven 
by 
thousands of years of history. 102 
The society aimed to contribute to the Russian revival 
by propagating 
Russian culture, preserving monuments of Russian culture, 
developing 
Russian national theatre, music and 'material culture'. 
Consequently, it 
conducted lectures and meetings to propagate these 
ideas and published 
material in the three aforementioned thick journals. 
Like many Russian 
nationalist groups, it called for institutional parity with the other republics, 
demanding a Russian Academy of Sciences, television and publications on 
Russian history and culture. 
In 1990, it stepped up its political activity by contesting 
the March elections 
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and forming an Otechestvo group of Deputies in the Moscow City Soviet. " 
It also took part in all the large 'patriotic' meetings and gatherings. 
Otechestvo was a signatory to most of the major 'patriotic' or pro-Union 
intiatives and continued to exist beyond the fall of the Soviet Union. 
However, like most other Russian nationalist-orientated groups, 
Otechestvo was susceptible to splits, the most notable of which occurred in 
1990 when two branches emerged under the leaderships of A. Kuz'min 
and V. Kashuto. The society never emerged with a mass following, but 
was probably better known for some of its high-profile members than for 
its level of support. 
The Union of the Spiritual Revival of the Fatherland (Soiuz dukhovnogo 
vozrozhgeniia otechestva - SDVO). 
SDVO presented itself as a cultural interest group, but it had another 
serious purpose: to keep the Soviet Union intact. This was to be 
approached by a 'moral and spiritual revival' of the Fatherland, in which 
the 'Fatherland' represented the Soviet Union and the 'moral and spiritual 
revival' meant the rejection of anything Western and the adoption of 
'spiritual' Russian ideas supposedly inspired by Slavophile thinkers such 
as Kireevskii and Bulgakov. 104 Basically, SDVO was prescribing a Russian 
solution for the maintenance of a socialist Soviet Union. 
The group supported the 'efforts of the CPSU in strengthening the socialist 
Fatherland', but believed in the participation of other 'social forces'. "' Its 
aim was to unite 'patriotic' organisations and citizens in order to bring 
about the socialist renewal of society. This was not a complete 
endorsement of Marxism-Leninism, but a modified version which 
accepted the principle of internationalism as an integrational feature of the 
state and sought a different economic and cultural solution for the Soviet 
Union. The economy would be reformed to the extent that it would reject 
quantitative output and focus on other 'spritual' goals such as quality of 
life and ecological concerns. As far as culture was concerned, the Union 
opposed the idea of the merging of nations - it aimed to 'overcome the 
unification of national cultures' and maintain national languages, cultural 
traditions. 
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SDVO presented a package of ideas which expressed conservative values, 
but provided a focus on Russian national issues and concerns: ecological 
concerns included preventing the 'senseless' sale of the country's natural 
resources abroad; there was opposition to the 'destructive' influence of 
'mass culture'; the Union wished to return women to the home to look 
after the family; and it aimed to fight alcoholism. It also expressed an 
interest in the demographic situation, aiming to reverse the high 
mortality-rate/low birth-rate and increase the life expectancy of peoples 
'close to extinction' (i. e. Russians). The Union's Russian focus was further 
reflected by its interest in Russian Orthodoxy, its aim to 'defend' ethnic 
Russians living on the whole territory of the USSR and the 'strengthening' 
of Russian sovereignty. 
SDVO's leader, Mikhail Antonov, used highly anti-Western rhetoric, 
suggesting that the West was trying to colonise Russia, and called not only 
for economic protectionism, but also for distancing the Soviet Union from 
the world community, including the reduction of embassies and missions 
abroad and withdrawal from the UN. 106 At the same time, Antonov 
believed that the country was occupied by a malyi narod (small people) -a 
stratum of the intelligentsia which had been imposing 'endless social 
experiments' on the bol'shoi narod, the majority of the population. This 
was a condemnation of the Soviet regime and its application of socialism. 
The Union considered it had an educational role to propagate the values of 
Russian culture and history amongst the people, but it also participated in 
most of the 'patriotic' political alliances. For instance, it was a member of 
the United Council of Russia (OSR), the Bloc of Patriotic Movements of 
Russia, the Soiuz group of Deputies, Mezhdunarodnyi Slavianskii Sobor 
and the Co-ordinating Council of the Patriotic Forces of Russia. In 
addition, it worked closely with Edinenie, Moscow's Otechestvo and a host 
of other 'patriotic' organisations. 
SDVO's influence on political processes was minimal, but it did provide a 
focus, for the synthesis of socialism with a Russian 'third way' as a solution 
to the Soviet Union's problems. Its priority was not to preserve socialism, 
but to revive Russia's cultural and spiritual tradition. 
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Conservative revivalists 
These groups supported the unity of a Soviet Union/greater Russian state 
which featured a revival of Russian culture and values. Many of their 
members looked towards Russian Orthodoxy rather than Marxism- 
Leninism as a guiding principle, but there was sometimes a close 
association with the conservative establishment. Even the Christian 
Patriotic Union, which declared that it supported neither communism nor 
democracy and included figures from outside the establishment, suggested 
that it would support any political system as long as it respected Russian 
Orthodoxy and the needs of the Russian nation. 
The Association of Russian Artists, The Foundation for Slavonic Writing 
and Slavic Cultures, Movement Edinstvo/VAOSK Edinenie. 
A sizeable proportion of Russian nationalist expression came from writers 
and critics in the early days of Gorbachev's power. Subsequently, a number 
of groups representing and propagating Russian culture and Russian ideas 
developed. These were platforms or fronts for the RSFSR Writers' Union, 
which was itself vocal at the outset of perestroika on Russian nationalist 
issues, but opted to become the driving force behind groups which might 
attract a larger and broader level of support. 
The Association of Russian Artists (Tovarishchestvo russkikh 
khudozhnikov) 
The Association was founded in November 1988 and brought together a 
large group of writers, cultural figures and academics. The Association 
described itself as: 
a union and movement, which will do its utmost to promote the 
development of the 
spiritual, cultural and business life of Russia. 
"' 
Its membership included writers and critics such as Vasilii 
Belov, Valentin 
Rasputin, Viktor Astaf'ev, Viktor Likhonosov, Iurii Loshchits, Vadim 
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Kozhinov, Mikhail Lobanov, Apollon Kuz'min. Its initial address 
appealed to the Russians, and 'brothers in spirit beyond her [Russia's] 
borders' to put all their efforts into waking and strengthening Russian 
national consciousness. It mentioned first and foremost Russians, 
Ukrainians and Belorussians, referring to the courage of the people and all 
the sacrifices they had made. 1 ' 
The Russian imperialist nationalist stance is illustrated by the equation of 
Russia and the Soviet Union: 
Our ancestors paid a too costly price in creating a stronghold state, bearing the proud name 
over all time of Russia and the Soviet Union. 109 
The programme which the association produced listed seven priorities: 
national (n a ro dno e) culture; historical memory and a national memory 
fund; nature and economics; population and brotherhood; the army and 
the people; national information; and a publishing programme. 11° 
'National (or folk) culture' involved the support of national culture, 
encouraging the development of traditional music and culture. This also 
involved 'cleansing' culture of 'harmful' influences. 'Historical memory' 
involved the maintenance of libraries and archives, and projects such as 
the restoration of architectural monuments etc. 'Nature and economics' 
involved the 'salvation of Russia' through ecological measures and 
through study of the national economy (supposedly to produce an 
economy which was successful, but suitably 'Russian' in design). 
'Population and fraternity/brotherhood' involved propagating the 
'histories of mutual relations and joint life experience of peoples 
populating Russia - the Association advocated the maintenance of cultures 
within a multinational framework, but did not speak of the right to self- 
determination for minorities. 'The army and the people' mentions the 
task of fulfilling the military-patriotic education of young people and the 
fundamental aim is to 'educate the people in a spirit of respect towards 
Russian history and traditions of military duty. ' 'National information' 
referred to the establishment of a Russian national information and media 
system, including an information bureau called the 'Voice of 
Russia', 
national radio and television, and the development of 
the Russian 
national press. Finally, the 'publishing programme' aimed 
to propagate 
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national art. 
Rather than being merely a Russian cultural interest group, the 
Association was offering a vague programme for Russian national 
renewal, where Russian ethnic demands were at the top of the list, but the 
national renewal was viewed within the framework of the Soviet Union. 
There were representative groups all over Russia and the Moscow group 
had over 500 members. 
The Association had links with the All-Russian Cultural Foundation, 
Otechestvo the International Foundation for Slavic Writing and Slavic 
Culture, SDVO, the Fund for the Restoration of the Church of Christ the 
Saviour, the Public Committee for the Salvation of the Volga and others. 
In an open letter the Association issued a warning to national movements 
in the union republics. 
We hope that international, national and Russian-speaking movements in the union 
republics will look for a way of uniting and for a dialogue to oppose extremist groups and 
unions on the basis of mutual co-operation... "' 
It later stated that: 
... the Association of Russian Artists is appealing to all citizens of the Soviet Union 
irrespective of their denomination and nationality to strengthen the unity in opposing all 
destructive forces and elements intent upon destroying our historically state-formed 
brotherhood. "2 
The Foundation of Slavic Writing and Slavic Cultures (Fond slavianskoi 
pis'mennosti i slavianskikh kul'tur) 
This organisation, founded in March 1989, was closely linked to the 
Association of Russian Artists. The Foundation expressed a stronger 
concern than the Association of Russian Artists about the maintenance of 
the unitary state. Its members included founders of the Association of 
Russian Artists, such as Valentin Rasputin, and other Russian nationalist 
writers such as Iurii Bondarev and Vladimir Krupin. The organisation 
also included members from the Slavic Republics of Ukraine and 
Belorussia and the Russian Orthodox Church supported its formation. 
The Foundation was an attempt to draw together cultural luminaries from 
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the other Slavic republics in order to establish Slavic solidarity and a Slavic 
core about which great Russian/Soviet statehood might be maintained. As 
John Dunlop observed, the Foundation gravitated towards the ideas of Pan 
Slavism and Russian Orthodoxy as unifying factors rather than the "glue" 
of Marxism-Leninism, which was holding the Soviet Union together. 113 
The Movement of Lovers of Russian Literature and ultureEdinstvo 
VAOSK Edinenie 
Edinstvo (not to be confused with the movement in Lithuania and Nina 
Andreeva's group) came together in the latter half of 1989. The movement 
announced its formation by way of an open letter in the Russian 
nationalist-oriented newspaper Literaturnaia Rossiia under the title 'For 
Unity and Friendship'. It provoked a great deal of interest and 
correspondence in the newspaper in September-December 1989. Edinstvo 
sought to maintain the unity of the Soviet Union and sharply criticised 
destructive processes at work in the Soviet Union, particularly in the Baltic 
and Moldavia. Like the associations of Russian Artists it aimed to 
promote 'patriotic' and 'cultural' education of young people. The group 
spoke of the genius of ancient Rus' and of the genius of Russians, 
Ukrainians and Belorussians. Like the Foundation for Slavic Writing it 
wished to unite the three 'fraternal' Slavic peoples as a nucleus about 
which the Union could be preserved. Its membership included Secretary 
of the RFSFR Writer's Union, Felix Kuznetsov, the writers Valentin 
Rasputin, Vasilii Belov, Valentin Pikul', Iurii Bondarev, and economics 
writer Anatolii Salutskii. Their call for the preservation of the Union 
showed no respect to independence activists in the republics: 
... either we halt the tendency towards 
heightened national conflict in our Soviet society, or 
the nationalistic ambition and demagogic anarchy going under the flag of Perestroika and 
Glasnost will rock the ship of our multinational superstate even more. 
114 
The letters to Literaturnaia Rossiia were from sympathisers and people 
who wished to join the Movement. One reader wrote: 
For the third time in the course of the 20th Century Russia is threatened with 
downfall! It 
is high time to stand shoulder to shoulder like our 
forefathers of old in defence of the 
Motherland and Honour to defend Rus' from desecration. 
1. The Association should not 
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limit itself to cultural problems but should participate in political ones. 2. It would be good to work out a programme for resurrecting the Russian village. "' 
The editorial decision to print such a letter is revealing - after all, 
Literaturnaia Rossiia sympathised closely with the Movement. The letter 
might indicate that, although Edinst vo sought to portray itself as a cultural 
group, it was intent on developing its political influence. It is no surprise 
that this 'cultural' movement became a member of the Bloc of Public- 
Political Movements of Russia in the March 1990 election campaign. 
'The All-Russian Association of Lovers of Patriotic Literature and Culture 
Edinenie"(VAOSK Edinenie) held its founding congress on 14 June 1990 in 
Moscow. This group was a continuation of Edinstvo, but had changed its 
name to avoid confusion with the group headed by Nina Andreeva. 
Edineni e's president was the writer Iurii Bondarev. The Association 
included V. Bondarenko, V. Gorbachev (deputy editor of Molodaia 
gva rd i ia), A. Prokhanov, S. Kuniaev, V. Krupin and Patriarch Aleksii II: it 
was full of Russian nationalist writers and editors of Russian nationalist 
publications, but also included the head of the Russian Orthodox Church-"' 
Most of the participants at the founding congress were of the older 
generation. They criticised popular culture and the work of writers who 
had become popular under the new system of 'market relations'. Iurii 
Prokushev condemned the 'individual and group egotism' which was 
growing daily in society, whilst speaking of the 'spirituality of the Russian 
people' - this was an oblique condemnation of the perceived 
'Western' 
influences introduced by perestroika. Iurii Bondarev suggested that there 
was a battle to be won: 
Russia is still no one's country, but Russia should be ours. 
117 
This comment suggests that there was an enemy - an anti-Russian enemy. 
The composition of the Congress and the comments passed reveal much 
about Edineni e's direction. The lack of young participants and the 
opposition to change within the literary world indicate elements of 
conservatism. The participation of the Russian Orthodox clergy 
indicates 
that most of the members had embraced or accepted 
Russian Orthodoxy, 
255 
which, for its part, could fulfil two roles: firstly, it could embody Russian 
national values, representing 'spirituality' and serving as a possible 
replacement ideology or even as a buttress to the established order; and, 
secondly, it could play an imperial role in keeping 'fellow Slavs' together as 
the essential core of the Union. 
In October 1990 Edinenie addressed the Ukrainians and Belorussians with 
a call for Slavic unity. Recalling the achievements of the historical state- 
makers, Aleksandr Nevskii, Bogdan Khmel'nitskii and the princes of 
Polotsk, the Association declared: 
We, the Slavs, do not claim primacy or superiority, but we cannot forget that our peoples 
were always the strong shield for the whole of the multi-national state. 
These words illustrateEdinenie's Slavic Russian pride as first among 
equals and their desire to hold the Russian empire together. 
Edinenie did not form a political party, but retained its identity as a 
'cultural' organisation. In this way, it hoped to broaden its appeal and 
influence the development of Russian national consciousness, whilst 
promoting the idea of Slavic unity in order to maintain the Great Russian 
State. 
The Christian Patriotic Union (Khristiansko-patrioticheskii soiuz - KhPS) 
The Christian Patriotic Union was founded in December 1988 and was the 
forerunner to the 'Christian Revival' Union (Jan. 1990). 118 The Union's 
founders included Evgenii Pashnin and Vladimir Osipov, who like the 
leaders of Pamiat' came from outside the Soviet establishment. KhPS did 
not support Marxism-Leninism and the CPSU, although it declared that it 
supported the initiative of the Soviet Government and the CC CPSU to 
democratise Soviet society. "" The organisation's concern was with the 
interests of the Russian Orthodox Church and the Russian ethnic people. 
KhPS considered itself to be the inheritor of the Slavophile tradition, 
supporting the principles of Orthodoxy, patriotism and conciliarism. 
The 
Christian Patriotic Union's programme of Russian revival looked to the 
Russian past, wishing to revive national historical symbols; return 
former 
(pre-revolutionary) place-names; introduce the learning of old 
Slavonic 
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and Russian folklore in schools; and to return the Russian Orthodox 
Church, its Saints, buildings and religious holidays etc. to their former 
position of prominence in Russian society. 12° KhPS considered that the 
ethnic Russian people shared an unequal place in the Soviet Union and 
was entitled to equality with the other peoples of the USSR: it should be 
able to develop its own culture, have its own Academy of Sciences and its 
own republican capital. 
KhPS supported the integrity of the greater Russian state/Soviet Union 
and sought to 'develop friendly feelings and relations between all peoples'. 
This would be achieved by, among other things, informing peoples of 
other republics of the 'true role of Russia and the Russian people in their 
history'. This unifying core of Orthodox ethnic Russians would be the 
centre of a unified great power, rather than of a union of republics: 
Our salvation can only be found in a return to a religious world outlook. We do not need 
ideology, but faith; we need no politics, but spirituality; no democracy, but conciliarism; no 
union of republics, but a Unified, Great Power! ' 2' 
KhPS, and a successor organisation, the 'Christian Revival' Union" both 
supported the reinsitution of a monarchy to rule the 'Great Power'. They 
rejected socialism and democracy, declaring that Russia would follow its 
'own path' as a Russian Orthodox state - Russia's future (and succession to 
the monarchy) would be decided by the convocation of a Zemskii Sobor 
(Land Assembly). 
KhPS/'Christian Revival' Union both supported conservative family 
values and condemned alcoholism in Russia - themes which became 
common amongst certain Russian nationalist groups. They believed that 
the disruption of the family and alcoholism were contributing to the 
physical extermination of the Russian ethnic people and wished 
to 
replenish the biological gene stock of the nation. 
Other features of Russian 
revival included the maintenance of historical and cultural monuments, 
and the re-establishment of the peasantry through return of 
land and 
private property. 
The establishment of a fundamentally Orthodox 
Russia would seem to be 
at odds with the idea of maintaining a re-integrated 
Russian multinational 
'Great Power'. After all, a large percentage of the 
Soviet Union's 
population belonged to other religious 
denominations. KhPS believed in 
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a Eurasian idea, whereby the majority Russian population, guided by 
Russian Orthodoxy would exist symbiotically with, and lead the fates of, 
the rest of the peoples of the Russian Great Power. This idea became 
apparent in October 1991, when the leaders of the 'Christian Revival' 
Union also became members of the Party of Revival. The new Party 
declared in its programme that: 
We all hope that there is... an awakening of the national consciousness of Russians [russkie] 
which will become the spiritual basis for a possible revival and strengthening of Russian 
[ro ssiis ka i a] Eurasian statehood within its NATURAL GEOPOLITICAL BOUNDARIES. ' 23 
KhPS and Osipov's 'Christian Revival' were both marginal groups with a 
small following, although they were active in organising meetings/ 
lectures and publishing their views. 'Christian Revival' Union had two 
representatives in the Moscow Soviet and five in the regional Soviets 
following the March 1990 elections. However, it did not increase its 
political representation or support. Osipov and others remained in the 
'Christian Revival' Union, but also joined the Party of Revival in October 
1991, in order, probably, to renew their own political fortunes. 
Populists 
The 'populists' are represented by Zhirinovskii's LDP and Skurlatov's 
RNF. These two organisations tried at first to mobilise support by posing 
as democratic alternatives to the CPSU, but as time passed, they revealed a 
strong interest in the maintenance of the state and Russian nationalism. 
Curiously, they displayed a certain respect for the CPSU and co-operated 
with it to some extent - unlike other 'democratic' organisations. 
The Liberal Democratic Party of the Soviet Union (Liberal'no- 
Demokraticheskaia partiia Sovetskogo Soiuza) 
At its inception, the LDP did not show any signs of inclination towards 
Russian nationalism. The Party's origins date 
back to May 1988, but the 
founding conference did not take place until 31 
March 1990. At this stage 
LDP had around 3,000 members. The Party's activity started 
before the 
258 
founding congress and V. I. Koval' dates the Party's formation from 13 
December 1989.124 It was around this time that Vladimir Zhirinovskii 
produced a pre-election programme in which he made the following 
points about the conduct of deputies, the national question and foreign 
policy: 
... The 
deputy always opposes cult of personality, the phenomenon of a great leader 
(vozhdizm), idolatry ... 
The national question. ... the principles of creating a union state are self-determination 
right up to secession, confederation, federation, unitary state... 
Foreign policy. A principal of neutrality. Withdrawal from blocs. Trade and cultural 
relations with all countries. The first task of foreign policy is to satisfy the interests of the 
population of our state. l5 
The contents of the programme were not very striking and put forward 
ideas reflecting Western liberal democratic values. However, the 
aforementioned points are interesting in light of Zhirinovskii's 
subsequent behaviour and the contents of the Party programme passed at 
the first congress on 31 March 1990. In the latter programme, the clause 
over self-determination and secession was omitted and, on the subject of 
foreign policy, Zhirinovskii maintained a principle of neutrality, but aimed 
to shift the emphasis from 'East-West' relations to 'North-South' 
relations. 126 These points indicate Zhirinovskii's opposition to a break-up 
of the USSR and his desire to spread Russia's sphere of influence to the 
South. The 1990 programme also ruled out any kind of interference in the 
affairs of other states, but he was later to suggest expansion into Poland and 
even Alaska. "' 
The Party aimed to create a state based on the rule of law; a multi-party 
system; private enterprise and free market relations; various forms of 
property ownership; and freedom of conscience. Besides this, the Party 
supported freedom of movement, freedom to travel and emigrate, and 
freedom to settle wherever one desired (without the 'pro pis ka' residence 
permit). In addition, it was decided that the army should be 
professionalised and that the army and other law enforcing organs should 
not be attached to a political party. 
The LDP of the Soviet Union started to establish links with 
liberal 
democratic parties in other countries. By its own admission, the 
LDP was 
a centrist party espousing a number of Western liberal 
democratic values. 
At the end of 1990 - beginning of 1991, the 
LDP was participating within the 
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Centrist bloc of political parties and movements. However, this bloc was 
also represented by Chairman, V. Voronin, Skurlatov's Russian Popular 
Front and various other tiny groups, some of which were of a Russian 
nationalist orientation, and most of which supported the maintenance of 
the Union and opposition to separatist movements. 
In a 1990 article in Argumenty i Fakty, Zhirinovskii declared that he was 
against political organisations which based their deeds or ideas of changing 
the state and social system by way of violence and national hatred. He also 
declared that he supported presidential power. In a slight change on the 
nationality issue he stated that nationality was only to be shown on 
documents if one wished, whereas earlier it was not to be shown at all. 
However, 1990 marked the point when much of what Zhirinovskii said 
did not coincide with the Party programme or liberal democracy. 
Zhirinovskii's participation in the Centrist bloc marked the Party's 
fundamental move to a pro-Union stance. The Party called for the 
creation of national salvation committees to keep order in the republics 
and even advocated the abolition of all political parties. 12' 
The Party programme passed in March 1990, and amended in October of 
that year, said that: 
There will be as much centralisation as is necessary. 129 
The attempt to integrate potentially separatist republics and regions from 
the Union were countered by the establishment of union-wide branches of 
the Party: 
The formation of regional organisations is taking place all over the country - from the 
Baltic to the Pacific, from Moldova to Chukotka, from Murmansk to Kushka - almost in 
every union republic, but most actively in the Russian Federation. In the union republics the 
Party support is basically the Russian-speaking population creating, on the basis of the 
LDP, regional organisations of an all union political party. 
13° 
Although the Party attracted the support of Russians and Russian speakers, 
it did not officially discriminate against other nations. Under the 
heading 
'Development of Nations and Peoples', the Party programme 
declared in 
tones reminiscent of CPSU rhetoric: 
All representatives of different nationalities living on 
USSR Territory are citizens of the 
Union state without any discrimination on national grounds. 
13' 
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According to the programme, the 'development of nations' were subject to 
the USSR Constitution and the Union. The programme also listed 
principles of reform which included the 'maintenance of the state within 
the framework of the presently functioning constitution' and 'a strong 
presidential regime' with 'direct presidential rule on the whole territory of 
the USSR'. 
A section of the programme entitled 'Political Organisation as a Sub- 
System of Soviet Society' reflected Zhirinovskii's ambitions to establish a 
Russian state: 
The state is the most important institution of the political system. Its historical name - Russia - must be returned. In the current union formation the RSFSR will be a single 
(unitary) state. The union republics will be joined to it on the legal basis of federation or 
confederation... In this way the union and a territorial integrity of a great power will be 
maintained. 
132 
The promise of a federal or confederate structure for the Union seems a 
concession from someone with 'imperialist Russian nationalist' 
ambitions, but one must bear in mind the principles of a strong presidency 
and direct rule advocated by Zhirinovskii. In addition, Zhirinovskii 
suggested to the newspaper Krasnaia zvezda that a swift and effective 
solution to the national question would be to give up national-territorial 
divisions and set up provinces (gubernii) run by governors. He also 
stressed the necessity of strictly centralised power in order to see through 
reforms. " 
The conclusion to the LDP's 1990 Party programme was unambiguous 
about the identification of Russia with the Soviet Union. Not only had 
the text already called for the return of the name Russia, but the 
conclusion expressed the idea of the Soviet Union as the inheritor of an 
historically formed Russian Empire: 
The threat of the demise of the Fatherland - the break-up of the Union - should unite all of 
us, give a second breath to the re-birth of a great power. Together we can maintain our 
state, created by our forefathers a thousand years ago. It is time to extinguish 
the first fires 
of civil war. We must calm the population of all regions 
by proclaiming a moratorium on 
destructive acts in the country ... 
... we must submit to one central government 
headed by the President. ' 
Naturally, the LDP supported the motion to maintain the 
Union in the 
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1991 referendum. One LDP representative, Khalitov, had very strong 
views on what should be done if any republic did not observe the 
successful approval of the Union: 
We support the Communist Party in conducting the referendum... I think that 70-75 per cent 
will vote for the Union... I have no doubts: the Union will not be destroyed. As for the 
Baltic, for example, I stress the following. If, according to the referendum, there is one 
person, let us say, in Vilnius, who declares: I live here. This is my flat, but I consider myself 
to be a citizen of the Soviet Union - it is our moral, material and military duty to provide 
him with a guarantee. We must defend this person's rights with the full might of the 
135 state. 
In June 1991 Zhirinovskii ran for the presidency of Russia, after he was 
nominated as a candidate by the LDP. His electoral programme contained 
very few points: he promised to slash the price of vodka and return the 
name 'Russia' to the USSR, thus restoring Russia it to a position of 
greatness and pride. He also supported the idea of keeping Soviet troops 
stationed in Europe until a time that Russia felt fit to bring them back. 
Boris El'tsin won the election with 57.3% of the vote and Zhirinovskii 
came a creditable third with 7.81% of the vote -a surprisingly large vote for 
someone with his particular nationalist agenda. This election result 
appeared to boost Zhirinovskii's confidence and precipitated a series of 
even more alarming statements. In August he supported the putsch, 
(although he later ridiculed it as a non-event) and in October 1991 
Zhirinovskii reiterated the idea expressed earlier that year that all political 
parties should be suspended. " He constantly referred to the primacy and 
qualities of Russians and was always prepared to put their interests first. 
For example, when he was asked about the correlation between politicians 
and morality, he replied with a populist and nationalist slant: 
Morality occupies first place in the interest of Russia and Russians and then in the interest 
of other peoples. 137 
Up to and beyond the end of 1991, Zhirinovskii continued this Russian 
imperialist nationalist stance. Over the course of his political career 
Zhirinovskii has threatened not only to re-absorb the Baltic republics, but 
also to take back Finland, Poland, Alaska, as well as invade every country 
as far as the Indian Ocean. 
The changes in the LDP's values were 
dramatic. The 1990 Party 
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programme called for foreign investment and free market relations - by 
1993, even these vestiges of (relatively) 'liberal democratic' values had 
disappeared from the LDP's programme, illustrating that the 'liberal 
democratic' values of 1989-91 were probably always very shallow and that 
the demands of opportunism and the underlying Russian nationalism 
were much stronger: 
(1993 'programme' from 'Liberal') 
The Liberal-Democratic Party of Russia is addressing you, the Russian, with its programme: 
... No to foreign capital and speculators. 'No' to the mafia robbing the country. 'No' to the 
policy of free prices'38 
It should be noted that there were suspicions concerning the origins and 
finances of the LDP. In 1991 the LDP met with the USSR President, M. 
Gorbachev, as well as the Chairman of the KGB, V. Kriuchkov. It was 
rumoured that the LDP had been set up and sponsored by the KGB, partly 
due to the huge amount of publicity and apparent funds that the LDP 
seemed to have - rumours which the LDP denied. 139 Valerii Solovei has 
interviewed many KGB operatives who admit that the KGB infiltrated all 
the new political groups, but there is no proof that the LDP is a special case, 
or that it received any funding from the centre. "' 
Zhirinovskii's approach to both politics and Russian nationalism was 
characterised by populism and opportunism. At first, the LDP put forward 
a democratic programme, appealing to those disillusioned with Marxism- 
Leninism - one might even assume that the LDP was trying to appeal to 
the intelligentsia. Zhirinovskii stressed the fact that he had never been a 
member of the Communist Party, but also co-operated with the 
establishment. Later, the Party tried to appeal to the Russian population, 
stressing the need for the maintenance of the Union, but within the 
framework of a state called 'Russia'. Zhirinovskii's brand of nationalism 
sought to appeal to the common Russian man: who was disaffected with 
the system, but even more afraid of change; whose national pride had 
been wounded; who could identitfy with a Russian muzhik; who would 
feel safe under the stability and paternalism offered by Zhirinovskii. There 
is no doubt that Zhirinovskii was, himself, a convinced believer in the 
unique virtues of the Russian people and the Russian state - however, the 
degree to which his Party exploited Russian nationalism seemed linked to 
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his quest for popular support. 
Rossiiskii narodnyi front (RNF) 
RNF (the Russian Popular Front)was founded on 15 December 1988 and 
lasted until around October 1991.141 It originally modelled itself on the 
Baltic popular fronts, but did not succeed in attracting the same republic- 
wide support. Vladimir Pribylovskii reported that: 
RNF grew to a workable political size - not as a Russian-wide formation, of course, but as 
one of the most noticeable phenomena on the Moscow political stage. 142 
The party's December formation was announced on 14 February 1989 by 
the Russian nationalist-orientated Sovetskaia Rossiia which revealed that 
RNF would support the CPSU's line of revolutionary perestroika and seek 
to 'strengthen the integrity of the country'. 
The Front's leader was Valerii Skurlatov, who had been the author of a 
document in the 60s entitled 'A Statute of Morals', designed to militarise 
the country's youth through the 'military-patriotic education' of the 
komsomo1. It was also revealed that Skurlatov had links with the early 
Pamiat' movement. 143 
The main aims of the Front's first programme were the 'material, spiritual, 
national, democratic revival of Russia'. This involved the privatisation of 
state property, the encouragement of enterprise, a free market and the 
introduction of foreign capital under the control of Councils. 14' 
In June 1989, Skurlatov told a group of students and workers in the oil 
industry that he wanted the people to live a normal life such as in 
'developed, civilised countries'. He declared that he was an 
internationalist and wished to maintain and strengthen the Soviet Union 
and, expressing approval of the Estonian Popular Front, he suggested that 
there would be no 'Finlandisation' of Estonia. "" 
In May 1989, Secretary of the Front, V. Ivanov, produced a programme 
which totally rejected communism. The programme called for: 
The maximum independence of union republics, including Russia - the biggest, most 
ungovernable republic, the one most deprived of its rights. 
146 
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Besides the oblique focus in this comment, there was very little to suggest 
that Ivanov had any kind of nationalist agenda. In the same month the 
Secretariat distanced itself from 'Russian patriots', members of Pa m is t' and 
its supporters, as well as a group of RNF members headed by E. Dergunov 
who tried to take over the leadership of the Front and introduce a 
programme based on 'democracy and patriotism'. The Secretariat's attack 
on Pa m is t' and other Russian nationalists declared that Russia did not 
need to pursue a 'special' path and it defended itself against nationalist 
allegations of 'Zionism', whilst upholding the rights of the Jewish people 
and condemnning Pamiat' for 'Satanising' the Jews. The newsletter which 
contained all this information also criticised the views of Skurlatov as 
expressed in his 'Statute of Morals' from the 1960s. The Secretariat made it 
clear that they did not wish to be associated with Skurlatov's 'right-wing 
extremist views'. 147 
In autumn 1989, the Front splintered into two fractions - the 'centrists' 
under Skurlatov and the 'radicals' under Ivanov. The centrists opposed 
Marxism-Leninism, but found the communist ideal acceptable and were 
willing to work with 'healthy forces' within the CPSU. The radicals were 
convinced anti-communists and were prepared to work only with 'healthy 
forces' outside the CPSU. '" At the beginning of 1990, Ivanov was expelled 
from the Secretariat and in March of the same year he was expelled from 
the Front. Ivanov reacted by expelling Skurlatov and another member, S. 
Gorbachev, from the RNF and set up his own organisation under the same 
name. 
149 
Skurlatov's RNF subsequently displayed its imperialist Russian 
nationalist credentials, most notably during the final year of the Front's 
existence. In December 1990, the newly named newspaper Rossiiskoe 
Vozrozhdenie carried an editorial article which stated: 
The overriding task of the RNF is the resurrection of Russia, the birth of a new young- 
Russian [m 1ado ro ss ki i] nation from the dust and wreckage of what remains of the great old- 
Russian people ... 
1-50 
Skurlatov penned an article in the same issue which outlined a number of 
his Russian nationalist positions. First, he opposed the right to self- 
determination of nations: 
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... the 'Bantustanisation' of the USSR, which is based upon 'the right of nations to self- determination', is a fateful error. 151 
Skurlatov went on to say that the destabilising factor causing interethnic 
feuds in the USSR was the disappearance of the 'old Russian' nation and 
that there was no such thing as: 
a new Russian battle-worthy nation of owners and proprietors which can take the defence of 
life, property and the honour of their fellow tribesmen into their own brutal hands. 152 
He suggested that the Jews and Turks were not capable of saving Russia 
and that: 
the least death-dealing integrational domestic force would be a new Russian-speaking 
nation, which Stolypin tried to create in his day. ' 
One of the proposed measures for solving the 'Russian question' and 
creating a 'new Russian' nation was to defend the Russian population 
from 'armed detachments of other nationalities' by creating 'Russian 
National Armed Formations'. Once again, Skurlatov was echoing his old 
idea of militarising the nation. 
In addition to the idea of forging a 'new Russian' nation, the RNF allied 
itself with the LDP when it joined the Centrist Bloc of Political Parties and 
Movements in August 1990. The Centrist Bloc firmly believed in the 
maintenance of the Union and the RNF remained a member until the end 
of March 1991. However, this did not end its alliance with the LDP. 
Vladimir Zhirinovskii received a warm welcome as a guest at the Front's 
First Congress on 1-2 June 1991. Iurii Blokhin of the Soiuz group of 
deputies and Sergei Baburin of the Russian parliamentary group 'Rossiia' 
were also present. 
The Congress discussed the subject of the Union: 
The Congress spoke decisively in favour of the unconditional territorial integrity of the 
country and rejected the efforts of left-radicals and separatists to 
divide it into a kind of 
'union of sovereign states 
Furthermore, the Congress supported a proposal to create a voluntary 
military force of Cossack regiments. 
At a meeting of the Front's ruling body, one member, 
Mikhail Gus'kov, 
likened the organisation to the LDP, concluding that the main 
difference 
between the two groups' positions was that the LDP programme was aimed 
at the intelligentsia and the elite, whilst the 
RNF aimed to make all toilers 
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private owners. During the same meeting, Iurii Riso paid attention to the 
'peculiarities of the traditions and psychology of the Russian person' 
which, in his opinion, ought to be harnessed for the 'cultural and moral 
revival of Russia'. The emphasis was upon examining characteristics 
related to the development of the Russian state. The moral revival 
entailed the revival of a feeling of honour, respect for the law, the priority 
of honesty and the 'ability to recognise what is best'. 155 
Following the June Congress, the Front rapidly began to lose its support. 
By October 1991, there were only 40 members and another 100 
sympathisers. The Front had started as a popular front, had expressed 
values of democratic reform, but under the influence of Skurlatov's 
leadership revealed an obsession for a new Russian nation. The Front 
would not tolerate the secession of any part of the USSR or of its envisaged 
new Russian state and threatened the use of military force and discipline 
to keep it that way. Although it never achieved huge support, the Front 
faded away like many of the small Pam ist' groups it began to reflect. 
In October 1991, the leadership of the RNF became founder members of 
theVozrozhdenie Party (the Party of Revival). This party, which included 
such figures as Vladimir Osipov who came from the imperialist Russian 
nationalist-orientated Khristianskii patrioticheskii soiuz (Christian 
Patriotic Union), 156 also claimed that it was a 'centrist' party and had a 
similar programme and outlook to that of the RNF. 157 
Unifiers 
Otchizna and ROS appeared in 1991 and represent efforts to attract 
imperialist Russian nationalists of all political persuasions to unite behind 
a Russian flag in the interests of maintaining the Union. ROS did not 
make any effort to appeal to communist-orientated nationalists, but the 
Communist Party had been suspended by the time ROS formed. However, 
its style of imperialist Russian nationalism was designed to catch the 
imagination of a broad range of Russian nationalists. 
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Otchizna 
Otchizna ('Homeland') formed in June 1991, when the joint 'patriotic' 
forces appeared to have lost direction and momentum. It formed from a 
group of 145 People's Deputies and considered itself to be an 'independent 
public movement uniting the patriotic forces of Russia in the interests of 
maintaining the integrity of the RSFSR within the structure of the Soviet 
Union'. Its aims included the 'economic, political and spiritual revival of 
the Russian [rossiiskie] peoples, based on the values of traditional Russian 
and Soviet statehood'. The movement was an attempt to draw together all 
'patriots of Russia' irrespective of their party affiliations and ideological 
convictions. 
Seeking a 'broad patriotic movement', Otchizna focussed most of its 
attention on the revival of the 'peoples of Russia'. However, it was not 
consistent in promoting the interests of all the peoples of Russia and 
frequently lapsed into supporting the interests of the ethnic Russian 
[russkii] people. Otchizna announced that it opposed nationalism and 
national sovereignty, but believed in the maintenance and revival of 
cultural heritage and the 'development of unique national cultures'. 
However, Otchizna's leader, General B. Tarasov, suggested that the Russian 
ethnic nation required more than the development of its unique national 
culture - he declared that whilst protecting Russian statehood, it was 
necessary to 'defend the sovereignty and national dignity of the Russian 
[russkii] people'. " In addition, the movement gave support to the rights 
and freedoms the Russian-speaking population outside the RSFSR. 
Otchizna promoted certain conservative values, calling for the 
strengthening of the family and the 'protection of motherhood'. It showed 
a particular concern for the scourge of alcoholism and its negative effects 
upon the growth of the Russian population. However, its biggest concern 
was to prevent national-separatism 'decisively', 'maintain the traditions of 
patriotism and revive the national consciousness and culture of the 
peoples of Russia'. This would be achieved by strengthening the country's 
defence capability, strengthening Russia's sovereignty and heightening 
its 
role in the consolidation of the union state. 
Otchizna referred to other familiar Russian nationalist themes, 
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condemning manifestations of 'Russophobia' and opposing the 'mass 
culture' of the West, berating it for its lack of spirituality [b ez du kh ovnos t']. 
It appears that the movement combined the ideas of Russian statehood, 
Russian [both rossiiskii and russkii] national revival, conservative values, 
anti-Western feeling and the strengthening of the army to draw people 
together to maintain the Union. It was a further effort by Russian 
nationalist forces to forge a Union based upon the strength and unity of a 
revived Russian Federation and the Russian speaking population outside 
the Federation. 
Otchizna's attempt to become a magnet for all imperialist Russian 
nationalist-orientated forces was foiled by the attempted coup of August 
1991. Otchizna condemned the GKChP's actions, but the movement's 
association with the idea of maintaining the unitary state hindered its 
progress. However, it continued to exist and towards the end of the year 
attempted to revive its fortunes. 
The Russian Popular Union (Rossiiskii obshchenarodnyi soiuz - ROS) 
ROS appeared following the August coup attempt and represents another 
attempt to rally 'patriotic' forces. It was formed on 26 August under the 
leadership of Sergei Baburin, who was leader of the Rossiia group of 
Deputies in the Russian Congress of People's Deputies. ROS was opposed 
to the Western-orientation of the democrats and did not support the 
reinstitution of a socialist fatherland under the guidance of the CPSU 
(which had, by this time, been suspended), but introduced a Russian state 
ideology, based upon the principles of 'democracy, patriotism and justice' 
[narodovlastiie, patriotizm, spravedlivost']. " This formula opened_ the 
way for 'atheists and believers, people affiliated or unaffiliated to parties' to 
join ROS under a Russian national banner. 
The Union called for national reconciliation and called off any 
'witch 
hunts' or searches for the 'enemy within'. It also advocated political 
pluralism which would not allow a monopoly of power such as 
that 
enjoyed by the CPSU. 
The revival of Russia was considered to 
be a task 'concerning all--the 
Russian people' [obshchenarodnyi], which should 
be fulfilled by a new 
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force of 'civic patriotic unity'. 16° This force included ethnic Russians and all 
the other minority peoples of the Russian Federation - the main criterion 
was that the movement's members felt 'love towards... mother Russia'. 
One of the movement's main political aims was to maintain the territorial 
integrity and 'state unity of the country'. This meant maintaining not only 
Russia, but also the USSR. 
ROS displayed a certain mistrust of the West - it called for a review of 
Russia's 'one-way orientation towards the West' in the area of 
international relations and called for 'mutually beneficial relations with all 
countries'. It also called for a fight against political forces and figures who 
were 'bringing about the break-up of Russia'. These points were criticism 
of the policies of the democrats, who supported liberal democracy and 
national separatism of the republics. 
In the area of economics, ROS supported the immediate restoration of 
central control over the state sector economy until new structures could be 
introduced. The centrally-planned economy would be replaced by a 
market economy which would be gradually phased in by annually 
reducing the number of state orders. ROS supported the development of 
'traditions of Russian enterprise'. Special measures would be taken to 
ensure that the country would not be 'pushed into the ranks of poorly 
developed states which serve the USA, Japan and Western Europe'. 
In the cultural sphere, ROS supported the restoration of the traditions of 
Russian [rossiiskaia] 'spirituality' and the promotion of culture as one of 
the priorities of state policy. 
The Union revealed that it regarded the unity of the Eastern Slavs to be the 
basis of Russian [bothrusskaia and rossiiskaia] statehood, indicating that it 
aimed to establish a union of Slavic states as a basis for renewing the 
Union. At the same time, it supported the 'unconditional defence of rights 
of the Russian-speaking population living outside the RSFSR'. This 
included providing them with 'close links to their historical motherland' 
and 'democratic self-determination' in areas outside the RSFSR where they 
constituted the majority of the local population. 
On the whole, ROS promoted a rossiiskii nationalism - this served the 
purpose of restoring the historical (multinational) Russian state. 
However, it produced an 'Address to the Peoples of the Former Russian 
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State' justifying the ethnic Russians' role in that state: 
Russian people have grounds to assert that belonging to Russia was beneficial to its non- Russian periphery economically, politically and culturally. 161 
ROS asked the 'peoples of the former empire' to unite, because a splintered 
state would be of advantage to the West. ROS 's anti-Western stance is not 
unlike that expressed by Soviet nationalists. There is much in common 
between ROS's rossiiskii nationalism and Soviet nationalism. However, 
in contrast to Soviet nationalism,. this, rossiiskii nationalism did not use 
Marxism-Leninism as the legitimising cement, but used a national 
ideology of narodovlastiie, patriotizm, spravedlivost' : narodovlastiie 
represented a form of Russian democracy, distinct from Western 
democracy; patriotizm assumed a devotion to the idea of the greater 
Russian state; and spravedlivost' represented the values by which all of the 
multinational population would live. 
Pamiat' 
Pamiat' is a fairly unique phenomenon and merits an analysis of its own. 
It was not a single, unified organisation, but a movement which splintered 
into several smaller groups expressing different views on the questions 
socialism, Russian Orthodoxy, etc. Some of the splinters retained the 
name Pa m is t' in their title. 
There is some reason to suggest that certain members of Pa m is t' gravitated 
towards isolationist nationalism, but a larger body of evidence suggests 
that Pa mia t' was mainly imperialist nationalist in its orientation. 
Pa m is t "s origins can be traced back to cultural societies in the 70s, but the 
movement did not come to prominence until the second half of the 80s. 
In the latter half of 1985 a politicised organisation emerged under the 
leadership of Dmitrii Vasil'ev and Kim Andreev. During 1986 Pamiat' 
became one of the first mass movements in Russia with representative 
organisations in dozens of Russian towns. Pa m is t "s main concerns were 
with the preservation of Russian culture but as early as 1985 had become 
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obsessed with the idea of a Zionist-masonic plot being responsible for all 
the ills of Russia and the Russian people. 162 In 1987, Pa m is t' staged a 
number of demonstrations which raised their public profile, particularly 
after they met Boris El'tsin, the then first secretary of the Moscow City 
Party Committee. " Thereafter, Pamiat' split, re-split and reformed into a 
number of factions nearly all claiming to be the main proponent of the 
Pamiat' movement. '' The most notable of these groups included: the 
National-Patriotic Front "Pa m is t "' led by Vasil'ev; the National-Patriotic 
Front "Pam iat "' led by Filimonov; the All-World Anti-Zionist and Anti- 
Masonic Front "Pam ist "' led by Emel'ianov; the Patriotic Union "Ross ii a" 
led by Sychev, which later became the Russian Popular Front "Pa m is t "' 
and then the Russian Popular Democratic Front "Pamiat"'; the Russian 
Popular Patriotic Movement "Pamiat"' led by Igor' Siniavin165 ; the Co- 
ordinating Council of the Patriotic Movement "Pa m is t "' led by the Popov 
Brothers; the Union for National Proportional Representation "Pam ist "' 
led by Smirnov-Ostashvili, which allied itself with Kulakov's splinter 
group from the National-Patriotic Front "Pamiat"' (under Filimonov) to 
form the Orthodox National Patriotic Front "Pamiat"; the Leningrad 
branch of the National Patriotic Front "Pamiat"' led by Zherbin and 
Demidov; and various other regional branches throughout Russia, e. g. 
Sverdlovsk, Cheliabinsk, etc. 
Although, due to their notoriety, Pamiat' achieved a publicity in the West 
disproportionate to their popularity, none of the splinter groups succeeded 
in gaining mass support. At its inception as a political movement, 
Pamiat' did achieve a mass interest, if not following, but was unable to 
consolidate upon its initial popularity. There are a number of issues 
which unite the Pamiat' groups, namely the re-establishment of a Russian 
state, concern for the Russian heritage, anti-Semitism and anti- 
Westernism. They disagreed on a number of things, including differences 
in religion (e. g. some advocated Russian Orthodoxy, others opted 
for 
paganism) 166 and their relationships with communism. 
In 1988 John Dunlop published an article in a special edition of a Radio 
Liberty Research Bulletin describing Pamiat' as 'emotional fellow travellers 
of the centrist nationalists'. 167 By 'centrism' Dunlop 
did not mean liberal 
nationalism nor did he refer to Russian nationalists who subscribe 
to some 
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form of Marxism-Leninism to achieve their political aims (National 
Bolshevik). The 'centrists' were anti-communist and sought a Russian, 
anti-Western solution for Russia. Dunlop suggests that Pamiat' was both 
anti-communist and, to some extent, isolationist, in that the maintenance 
of the Soviet Union was not one of their prime objectives. It is my belief 
that Pamiat' were more inclined to an imperialist form of Russian 
nationalism. 
Although there were many Pamiat' groups, most had only a very small 
following and are consequently insignificant. I shall briefly focus on some 
of the groups in order to establish Pa m is t "s imperial Russian nationalist 
orientation. 
The National-Patriotic Front (NPF) "Pa m is t "' of Dmitrii Vasil'ev was the 
largest of the Pamiat' groups and was based in Moscow. In its early days, 
the whole Pamiat' movement was said to have 'hundreds, if not 
thousands of supporters'' and Darrell Hammer pointed out in 1988: 
'Pamyat" is, or threatens to become, a mass organization. 169 
However, by the beginning of 1989, Vasil'ev's Moscow organisation had an 
estimated 400 members with divisions in a further 30 towns. 17' Over fifty of 
these members departed in 1990171 and the last estimate in 1991 gave the 
Moscow group less than 200 members. " 
Of all the major Pa m is t' groups, Vasil'ev's NPF "Pam is t "' was, perhaps, the 
least imperialist in its orientation. There were features which suggested 
that it support a 'third way': it opposed the CPSU, the democrats and 
supported a renaissance of the Russian Orthodox Church, adopting a 
church bell as its symbol. The group advocated the return of the land to 
the peasants and 'those who wish to work it'. 173 From 1989, the NPF 
confirmed their monarchist position, having earlier quoted the slogan, 
'For Faith, the Tsar and the Fatherland! '1'4 
The Front's conception of the Russian state was not always clear. 
Throughout its addresses and interviews it spoke of the 'Motherland' 
(Rodina), the 'Fatherland' (Otechestvo), Russia (Rossiia), Rus', the 
'Russian Empire' (Rossiiskaia imperiia) and 'great Russian Power' 
(velikaia Rossiiskaia Derzhava). In one interview, Vasil'ev mentions 
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three different terms to describe Russia: 
We should turn our attention to the legendary heroes of our Fatherland, who created the 
great Russian Power and whose efforts built up the glory of the Motherland. 175 
The NPF put a great deal of emphasis on Russian ethnic issues - it claimed 
that it supported each nation's right to follow its own culture. One 
member, Aleksandr Shtil'mark, rejected accusations of Russian supremacy 
and stated that, besides Russians, the NPF had members who were 
'Ukrainians and Belorussians, ... Armenians and Azeris, Moldavians and 
Tartars, Kalmyks and Swedes, Germans and Jews'. 17' However, whilst 
championing the causes of the Russian ethnic nation and claiming respect 
for the national aspirations of others, NPF also supported the Russian 
imperial State: 
WE WILL FINALLY LIFT THE RUSSIAN NATIONAL BANNER OF REVIVAL. LET THE 
RUSSIAN EMPIRE ENTER THE THIRD MILLENNIUM with all her state foundations, 
laws and bases of spirituality and morality! 17 
Earlier, in 1986, the Pamiat' movement had made an address to 'the 
brothers and sisters of Latvia and all peoples of the Homeland 
(Otchizna)', 178 where 'Homeland' and 'Fatherland' were read to mean 'the 
USSR'. The association that Vasil'ev's NPF made between Russia and the 
USSR can be seen in the following lines from June 1990: 
Today we are addressing the Russian People, for the awakened national forces in many 
republics are stubbornly and selflessly asserting their independence, and it is only the voice 
of the Russian people that cannot be heard amidst the discord of peoples populating the 
Great Russian Empire. The demands of nationalist forces in the republics, in spite of 
prohibitive measures from the central powers, ... are 
being fulfilled in the main at the 
expense of the interests of the Russian People. The fact that the Fatherland created 
by Our 
Ancestors practically no longer belongs to us today provokes an extreme 
degree of 
indignation. The historical name Russia is being substituted by the term 'non-black earth'. 
If we refer to Russians (Rossiane), then we mostly mean people of non-Russian 
descent... 179 
It is clear from this that Vasilev's group considered 'Russia' to 
be the 
former Russian empire and was uncomfortable with the prospect of the 
disintegration of the Soviet Union. However, it can also 
be detected in this 
address that the NPF was beginning to 
distance itself from non-Russians, 
referring to them as foreigners 
(chuzhestrantsy), foreign guests 
(zarubezhnie gosti) and 'representatives of other nationalities'. 
There is other evidence to suggest that this group associated 
Russia with 
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the Soviet Union. In June 1989, a photograph of a bearded Aleksandr 
Shtil'mark sporting a Pamiat' t-shirt bearing an imperial crown 
accompanied an article which supported and justified the NPF Pamiat'. 
Shtil'mark rejected allegations that the NPF were chauvinistic, anti-Soviet, 
anti-Semitic, lacked internationalism and that they were searching for 
enemies. Shtil'mark acknowledged that allegations of anti-Sovietism were 
rare, but, nevertheless, found it necessary to point out that the NPF had 
never carried out any actions against Soviet power. The credibility of this 
comment may be devalued by the fact that Shtil'mark also denied that NPF 
Pamiat' was anti-Semitic, but it is interesting that Shtil'mark should 
emphasise that he identifies with both Russia and the Soviet Union. 180 
In one 1989 political address, there is a suggestion that the 'Fatherland' 
(Otechestvo) is, at least, a union of the Eastern Slavs: 
We are Slavs. 
The heroic deeds of the Slavs and their great history is today divided into Russian, 
Ukrainian and Belorussian nations, hereby bringing together a Slavic people between them. 
This trick will not work. We are one and will stand up together for the ideals of our 
Fatherland. 
We will not allow our Motherland to be desecrated. 18' 
To a large extent Vasil'ev's group's idea of what constituted Russia remains 
vague. Most of their rhetoric focussed on the threat of a Judeo-masonic 
conspiracy and the fate of ethnic Russians, but it is also clear that the 
group's members had a fondness for the idea of the Tsar and a Russian 
imperial state. I can only assume that 'Fatherland', 'Motherland', 
'Homeland', etc. meant the 'whole of the Russian Empire', but this is 
obscured by frequent reference to the vague term 'Rossiia' and supported 
no further by the frequent use of the term 'ethnic Russians' (russkie) as 
opposed to rossiiane. However, the most lucid revelation of Vasil'ev's 
imperialist nationalism came about in September 1991 in an interview in 
the Moscow publication, Panorama. In the aftermath of the attempted 
coup, he commented on the possibility of El'tsin reviewing the USSR's 
borders: 
If El'tsin is pursuing the aim of occupying the borders within the lands of the Russian 
empire, then he is acting correctly and wisely. 
182 
One of the first splits in the Moscow Pamiat' group arose in 1986 when 
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founder members, the Popov brothers, were expelled by Vasil'ev for their 
'national-communist ' convictions. In 1988 they operated under the name 
the Patriotic Movement "Pamiat", which became the Co-ordinating 
Council of the Patriotic Movement "Pa m is t "' at the beginning of 1989.1' 
The Popovs were very anti-Semitic, supported the idea of a Soviet 
communist regime and the maintenance a Soviet/Russian state. This 
stance continued through 1991, when the television news programme 
Vremia reported that activists of the Co-ordinating Council participated in 
proceedings at a meeting held by the pro-Soviet, pro-Russian United 
Workers' Front (OFT) which condemned deviations from socialism in the 
country. There were anti-Zionist posters at the meeting and, according to 
the commentary, the slogans of the Co-ordinating Council: 
Did not sound out of place with the calls of others at the meeting. " 
This group remained quite insignificant, with the number of activists 
oscillating between 2-5 people and supporters numbering around 20.1' 
A more significant split occurred in November 1987 when Igor' Sychev 
and Tamara Ponomareva broke away from Vasli'ev's NPF. Sychev, a little 
known artist, claimed after a disagreement with Vasil'ev that his group 
was: 
The other "P amiat "', neither anti-Semitic, nor anti-Soviet. '86 
The group called itself the Pamiat' Movement, which included the 
Patriotic Union "Rossiia". Sychev's group was later to become the 
Russian Popular Front Movement "Pamiat""'(from summer 1989 to May 
1990) and finally the Russian Popular-Democratic Front Movement 
"Pamiat"' (RNDF DP). Ponomareva's group became the Russian Cultural 
Centre. 18' 
Sychev's group differed from Vasil'ev's in that it was more socialist 
(possibly, even, 'Stalinist') in its orientation. The RNDF DP (and its 
previous incarnations) was manifestly imperialist nationalist in its 
orientation. A 1989 manifesto (while it was still the 
'Russian Popular 
Front') declared: 
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The RNF DP puts its main task to be the struggle for the salvation of the Russian people and 
Russian national Renaissance... 
The RNF DP , on a position of genuine socialism, considers it necessary that our Soviet state 
changes from a situation of state socialism, having forgotten the individual, to a situation 
of popular socialism.... 
... The 
Russian people is understood to consist of a triune people: Russians, Ukrainians and 
Belorussians... 
The RNF DP demands the creation of a full state structure in the RSFSR, as takes place in 
other republics. It is necessary to create a Russian bureau of the CPSU, a Russian Central 
Council of Trade Unions, a Russian Komsomol, a Russian KGB, Russian academies for 
Agriculture, Medicine and Pedagogy; a Russian Foreign Ministry, A Russian Ministry for 
External-Economic Links, Russian radio and television channels, the introduction of RSFSR 
citizenship. GIVE US RUSSIAN STATEHOOD. 
The RNF DP demands recognition of the historical white, red and blue flag as the flag of 
the RSFSR. 
The RNF DP demands the renewal of a state ideology, taking into account Russian national 
values from the Christian and pre-Christian periods... GIVE US A RUSSIAN NATIONAL 
IDEOLOGY! 
The RNF DP demands the strict observation of proportionally-classed representation in the 
higher echelons of central power. 
... OUR 
STRENGTH IS IN THE UNITY OF ALL PEOPLES OF THE USSR! 'm 
It is clear from the above extracts that Sychev's group supported RSFSR- 
wide institutions and something similar to statehood, but at the same time 
it supported the maintenance of the Soviet Union and Russian 
domination of that Union through national-proportional representation 
(Russians were described as 'Russians, Ukrainians and Belorussians' who 
together constituted a significant majority). The RNDF DP' commitment 
to socialism, Russian nationalism and the maintenance of the Soviet 
Union was highlighted by Marina Katys in an Ogonek article in 1990. 
She 
quoted a speech by Sychev, in which he claimed: 
The Russian Popular Front Movement (RNF DP) is the vanguard of Russia's socialist 
Marxist-Leninist patriotic forces.... Lenin's word is sacred to us... 
As sons and daughters of our fatherland 
Russia, we should think first and foremost about 
Russia, about the Russian people. 
'89 
Sychev then went on to justify some of the actions of 
Stalin, putting the 
blame for past atrocities on Jewish figures such as 
Kaganovich and 
Ginzburg. 
Katys than quotes from a tribute made 
by Sychev at the grave of Stalin on 5 
March 1989: 
The role of Iosif Vissarionovich 
Stalin and his services to our Fatherland and 
Motherland 
are invaluable.... 
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which continues: 
Anti-Soviet, anti-state formations such as Democratic Union and the national fronts are the 
outcome of all [these] anti-popular forces... 
... we relate to the 
Baltic republics in two ways. On the one hand, the national interests of 
each people are sacred. In the Baltic we are observing the fight for national rights 
escalating into nationalism. It is ushering in all sorts of anti-Soviet and anti-socialist 
forces which want to break up our Great Power. We are for the national revival and unity of 
all the peoples of our Great Power. It would be much better if we fought for our national 
rights together. The Baltic peoples should not leave the great Russian people in trouble. 
The Russian people was very rightly considered by other peoples to be the elder brother in 
the great family of nations. 190 
This imperialist-nationalist view changed somewhat after 1990. According 
to Pribylovskii, Sychev's group: 
Evolved from Stalinism towards an Orthodox-monarchist ideology. In summer 1990 the 
RNDF DP distanced itself from other national-patriotic groups and made efforts to draw 
itself closer to the democrats (in particular, Democratic Union). Membership fell sharply in 
1990: no more than twenty people. 191 
And from mid-1990, the group preferred to be called the Russian Popular 
Home Guard for the Defence of Democracy and Culture (Rossiiskoe 
Narodnoe opolchenie (RNO) za zashchitu demokratii i kul'tury). 
The alliance with democracy seemed to severely affect this group's 
following, although it is quite remarkable that a group with such extreme 
views on Stalinism and Russian nationalism should make such a volte- 
face - as it had formerly opposed the break-up of a 
Russian-dominated 
empire and called for the introduction of a Russian ideology, one must 
seriously question the motives and sincerity behind the change 
from 
Stalinist Marxism-Leninism to democracy. 
In summer 1988, it was the Leningrad branch of the NPF which 
became the 
centre of activity, staging demonstrations and attracting the attention of the 
press. This led to a split from Vasil'ev's group 
in October 1988, after the 
latter accused the Leningraders of 'extremism, conducting pogroms and 
hooliganism. "" In fact, the Leningrad group itself splintered into three 
groups: two opposing Vasil'ev and one supporting 
him. 193 
Shortly before their final split from Vasil'ev, Demidov and Zherbin, who 
would lead one of the opposing groups, 
issued a document explaining the 
Leningrad Pamiat"s aims and objectives. They called 
for a national 
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renaissance of not only the Russian people, but also Ukrainians and 
Belorussians. Referring to the USSR, they claimed that over the present 
century: 
Our country has lost 60 million people, most of whom were from the Slavic peoples. " 
The group called for RSFSR-wide bodies such as a Russian Academy of 
Science and for the introduction of a history textbook specifically on 
Russian history. They voiced concern over the low Russian birth-rate and 
the high mortality rate caused by alcoholism. Besides these concerns the 
group supported: the guiding influence of the the Russian Orthodox 
Church and the separation of atheism from the state; social and economic 
reforms, including the return of land to the peasants and of enterprises to 
the workers; the possibility for 'women to return to the family' with 
sufficient social security to bring up children; the re-establishment of 
Russian symbols and restoration of historical place names; the 
establishment of an independent Russian national press. In essence their 
programme did not differ from that of Vasil'ev's Moscow group and, 
indeed, according to Valerii Solovei, it was not programmatic differences 
that divided the group, but Vasil'ev's overbearing and dictatorial 
character. 
195 
Although the Leningrad group(s) recognised the structure of the Soviet 
Union and spoke of Russia as a "Great Power" (Derzhava)196 , there is a 
suggestion that, like Vasil'ev's group, it might have had isolationist 
leanings. For example, besides the call for RSFSR-wide institutions, some 
thought was focussed on the status of RSFSR within the Union, resulting 
in concern for Russia's economic independence and its right to run its 
economy independently : 
... we suggest: 
that starting from the new financial year the basis for economic life and future economic 
politics in the USSR will be the principle of self-financing in the republics and ability to 
pay one's way without sudsidy in the autonomous republics and territories. 197 
This attitude suggests that members within Pa m is t' were quite happy to 
relinquish influence over economic responsibility in the non-Russian 
areas in order to focus the fruits of the Russian economy on the Russian 
people. In all probability, such a model would have provided Russian 
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control over the other economies and it would have also given the 
Russians the right to withdraw subsidy when and wherever they liked. 
In autumn 1988, another group broke away from Vasil'ev's Moscow group. 
Confusingly, this group also named itself the National-Patriotic Front 
"Pa m is t "'. Based in Moscow, it was headed by A. Filomonov, K. Sivolapov 
and S. Vorontytsev. 198 On 12 January 1989, Filomonov's group produced a 
manifesto which was subsequently published in the newspaper Sovetskii 
is i rk with, according to 'Garem Razh'199 
a commenta oy showing textual similarities between the 'Manifesto' and Hitler's party 2 programme. 
The Manifesto listed 62 points, some of which resembled the principles 
listed by other Pa m is t' groups. For example, it called for the restoration of 
worship in all churches and the return of all property formerly belonging 
to the Orthodox Church; the withdrawal of troops from Afghanistan; the 
strengthening of the Army; protection of the environment; action against 
female and child labour which causes the destruction of the family; land 
reform which would give the land to 'those who work it'; legal measures 
against those who carried out 'falsification of the history of the Fatherland'; 
and participation of the toilers in sharing the profits from industrial 
enterprises and natural resources. "' 
Some of the Russian-centred items include the following: 
We demand that the Great Power is led out of its status as a colony... 
... Great Russia is eternal. 
... School should teach children the 
history of our Great Power at the very beginning of 
conscious life. Study of the Fatherland should become a main subject. 
... We demand equal rights 
for the Russian people with the other peoples of our country. We 
insist on the creation in Russia of our own Academy of Science, Conservatory, Institute of 
Russian History, Centre of Russian Culture, Russian Theatre, Russian Cinematography, 
edition of a Russian Encyclopaedia. 
... We demand that the purity and wealth of 
the Mother tongue is protected from the 
pernicious influence of newspaper jargon by the creation of an Academy of the 
Russian 
Language which has informative rights and similar establishments in other republics. 
... We 
demand the recognition of the traditional Russian national Flag and Coat of 
Arms. 202 
On the question of the nature of the Filimonov NPF's Russian nationalist 
orientation, it is undoubtedly imperialist nationalist. 
However, within its 
principles it does present a somewhat ambiguous picture. 
On the one 
280 
hand it acknowledges: 
the legal right of each people to develop on its own primeval land within the framework of the historically formed community and the right to defend one's national dignity203 
On the other hand it does not tolerate any threat to the Union: 
We consider all instances of separatism and hostility between nations in the country to be a dirty Zionist-masonic provocation and demand the revelation of all the real names of the initiators and their punishment. 
... We demand the true autonomy of republics within the framework of a One and Indivisible Great Power. 204 
Like the Leningrad NPF, this group calls for the 'economic autonomy of all 
republics', whilst also demanding: 
... proportional representation in the ruling apparatus, and also in the fields of art, science 
and education. 205 
When Filimonov's NPF talks about 'our country' in the above-mentioned 
Point 42, it is clearly the 'One and 'Indivisible Great Power' dominated by 
the greater (national-) proportional representation of the Russian people. 
This idea is supported by an address from the Front which appeared in 
September 1989: 
BROTHERS AND SISTERS, COMPATRIOTS! 
Taking into account the dangerous moods in our Russian [R ossiiski i] home, "P amiat "' does not 
consider it possible to keep silent any longer. 
This is not the first year that Russia has suffered. We are convinced that the reason for the 
grave situation in which the Great Russian Power finds itself is the apostasy of the Russian 
intelligentsia and the deeds of evil intent from hostile forces - talmudic atheism (Marxism) 
and cosmopolitan usury.... 
But we believe that RUSSIA LIVES! Let our Homeland be renamed, but let the territory of 
the Russian Empire remain basically untouched. There are healthy forces amongst the 
Russian(russkie) peoples. They are rising from the yoke and returning to the Faith of our 
fathers. The Russian Army is also alive. 
However, the enemies of Russia have set themselves the task of finishing off the Great 
Power. Using so-called 'glasnost' and 'perestroika' they have deployed a widespread 
propaganda of separatism and Russophobia. 206 
This attack on separatism is aimed at the independence parties in the 
republics who were threatening the integrity of the USSR and, thus, as the 
address states, the integrity of the Russian empire. In 1990, Filimonov's 
group confirmed the strength of its imperialist nationalist convictions by 
allying itself with several other imperialist nationalist groups to form a 
'Co-ordinating Council of Patriotic Movements'. Present at the founding 
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conference, organised by the All-Union Central Council of Trade Unions 
and the Moscow City Committee of the Komsomol, were several self- 
proclaimed 'internationalist socialists' such as Nina Andreeva's Edinstvo 
and the Edinst vo movement of Latvia, as well as the Moscow branch of 
Otechestvo, Filimonov's Pamiat' and the Anti-Zionist Front. 207 
The Union for National-Proportional Representation "Pamiat"' gained 
notoriety mainly for the activities of its leader, Konstantin Smirnov- 
Ostashvili who was the first member of a nationalist-oriented group to be 
convicted for infringing national rights of equality. 
The group was formed in late 1989 after it broke away from Sychev's group. 
Several months later (February 1990) it joined the umbrella group, the 
Popular Orthodox Movement, along with Kulakov's Orthodox National- 
Patriotic Front "Pamiat". Smirnov-Ostashvili led 20-30 activists and a 
further 100 or so followers, despite his claim that his group was: 
... a serious movement with many thousands of people. 
208 
In September 1990, the UNPR produced a programme with the name of 
Smirnov-Ostashvili attached to it, but Valerii Solovei believes that it was 
written by a journalist who went under the name 'Aleksei B'. 209 This 
'programme' is mostly an anti-Semitic document and resembles the anti- 
Jewish ramblings of Hitler in Mein Kampf. It supported the maintenance 
of the USSR and called for national-proportional representation, 
particularly of Jews, in all areas of public and social life. "' This would 
mean that Jews would occupy positions of responsibility in a number 
proportional to their (miniscule) percentage of the population. Russians 
would, likewise, dominate all institutions. 
In a newspaper interview in May 1990, Smirnov-Ostashvili declared that 
he supported the communists and was prepared to form a bloc with them; 
was 'in solidarity with healthy patriotic forces in the CPSU, the army, KGB, 
Ministry of Internal Affairs, the militia'; supported Nina Andreeva; and 
was studying the question of a monarchy. 211 The Union for Proportional 
Representation's views were little different from a mixture of those of 
Filimonov's and Sychev's groups, but, as the criminal conviction of 
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Smirnov-Ostashvili demonstrated, the group was really a vehicle for the 
dissemination of anti-Semitic propaganda. Such was the extent of this 
anti-Semitism, that the Secretariat of the Anti-Zionist Committee of the 
Soviet Public felt it necessary to issue a declaration in Literaturnaia gazeta 
condemning the group's programme. 212 
The final Pamiat' group to be covered in this section is by no means the 
most significant, but the words of its leader demonstrate clearly the 
imperialist Russian nationalist nature, of Pamiat'. Igor' Siniavin's group 
Pa m is t', which became the Popular Patriotic Movement "Pa m is t"'213, 
compiled a document outlining the ideology and programme of the 
'Russian Popular-Patriotic Movement'. Under the heading 'We will save 
sacred Rus", the document listed its fundamental principles: 
The Russian Popular-Patriotic Movement is being developed on the basis of ideals 
accumulated by the Russian [russkaia] nation over the course of all its history. It is a 
manifestation of the faith of the people in the Great Historical Mission of Russia.... 
Our main task is: 
The rebirth of the vitality and spiritual strength of the Russian people. We understand the 
Russian people to be a triune people: the Russians, the Ukrainians and the Belorussians. 
The fight for the unity and indivisibility of Russia (officially called the USSR at the 
present level of her development) on the basis of a fraternal union of indigenous nations all 
enjoying equal rights. 214 
Later on in the document, Siniavin outlined the Russian state structure 
that he envisaged. He wished to: 
Change the name of the state from the USSR to RUSSIA. The Union Republics will be 
named: Estonia, Ukraine, Kirgizia atc. The RSFSR will be named only by territories. All 
the higher organs of power in the RSFSR should be abolished. In the republics we should 
eliminate all supreme soviets, national parties, councils of ministers.... Republican borders 
should serve only as ethical and cultural lines of demarcation... 
There should be no economic borders within the state. 
215 
Besides the establishment of a Russian state, Siniavin was concerned with 
a social renaissance of the Russian people. This involved the elimination 
of bad (sometimes perceived to be 'Western') influences. He provided a 
spectrum of alarming answers to social problems such as the 
banning of 
rock music, sterilisation of alcoholics and isolation zones 
for AIDS- 
sufferers. Later in the year, when proposing a draft statute 
for the creation 
of a Russian National Party, Siniavin repeated the 
idea of eliminating 
alcoholics and also called for a ban on 'mixed marriages'. 
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Siniavin's solution is fairly typical of Pa m is t "s attitude - whilst supporting 
the rights of each people to flourish, it stresses the importance of Russian 
national renaissance, providing an ethnic Russian national solution for 
Russia. 
Summary of Pamiat' 
Pamiat' started as a Russian cultural movement promoting Russian 
history, culture, ecology and the preservation of historical monuments. 
The politicisation of the movement revealed a common belief in the need 
- to resurrect Russia, which had fallen victim to a Zionist-masonic plot, but 
it also revealed a broad spectrum of political views. All the groups shared 
the view that the resurrection of Russia meant the reconstitution of the 
Soviet state as a Russian state. At first, Pa m is t "s Russian focus attracted a 
degree of sympathy, if not support - not least from some of the leading 
Russian nationalist figures in the literary world. However, it was 
tarnished by its concentrated anti-Semitism and by the discord amongst its 
leaders. As the movement splintered throughout the Gorbachev period, 
its chances of becoming a mass Russian movement faded away. 
Pamiat"s contribution to the development of Russian nationalism was 
that it provided an early focus for the Russian national question. It also 
alerted people to the fact that there was a Russian national question which 
could be discussed openly. However, it also created the view that Russian 
nationalism was necessarily anti-Semitic and extreme. It might well have 
distanced some people from the idea of extreme Russian nationalism. 
Pa m is t "s lasting contribution was that it served as a nursery for subsequent 
Russian nationalist parties such as the National Republican Party of Russia 
(RNPR/NRPR) and Russian National Unity (Russkoe natsional'noe 
ed instv o) whose leaders, Nikolai Lysenko and Aleksandr Barkashov, 
had 
both been members of Pa m is t'. 216 
Anti-communist fringe 
Although I have already listed a number of Pamiat' groups which were 
opposed to communism and mentioned the 
fact that there were Russian 
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'revivalists' within the cultural establishment who opposed Marxism- 
Leninism, there were others outside the establishment who took a 
principled stand against communism as an anti-Russian ideology. The 
extreme right-wing RNE represents such a movement. 
Russian National Unity (Russkoe natsional'noe edinstvo - RNE) 
RNE was one of the organisations which grew out of the Pamiat' 
movement and managed to achieve renown or notoriety in its own right. 
Founded in October 1990, RNE consisted of, what were claimed to be, the 
'most active representatives of NPFPamiat'. The movement was led by 
Aleksandr Barkashov, a thirty-seven year old former bodyguard of Dmitrii 
Vasil'ev. 
During its formative days, the movement was known as the 'National 
Unity' Movement for a Free Strong and Just Russia! This group decided 
that action should be taken to determine Russia's 'national and state 
priorities' and came up with four important areas of action: utmost 
support for the Russian Orthodox Church; the creation of an ideology 
capable of building statehood and maintaining structures which guarantee 
state sovereignty; to organise a national system of business relations; to 
educate the youth in the spirit of the nation. 21' 
When renamed RNE, the movement stated that its main aim was the 
'spiritual, moral and physical revival of the Russian [Russki i] People and 
to return to the Russian People its historical place and role in the state and 
the world'. 21' The movement declared that any political system or religious 
and philosophical outlook adopted to achieve this aim constituted means 
to this end and that those means might change or transform themselves 
depending on circumstances. Therefore, RNE made it quite clear that it 
had a policy of 'Russian nation first'. "" This was closely bound with the 
idea of the maintenance of the greater Russian state. 
Barkashov's movement opposed Communism, which it described as 'a 
method of destroying the best national forces', adding that it had destroyed 
the 'clergy, the army and the peasantry' in Russia. u° RNE also opposed the 
'democratic movement' which, it believed, could 'bring nothing positive 
to the Russian People, nor to any other indigenous people of our country'. 
285 
It criticised the democratic movement for being a narrow, class-based 
movement which poorly represented Russian people. It also disapproved 
of what it considered to be the democrats' pro-American orientation in 
foreign policy. 
RNE was both anti-Western and anti-Semitic, believing that there was a 
Jewish 'financial oligarchy' planning world domination. The movement 
believed that this oligarchy, using the USA as its base, was bent upon 
dismembering the Russian state in the interests of world domination and 
of obtaining Russian raw materials. " . 
Barkashov espoused right-wing ideas, calling for order and placing an 
emphasis upon the importance of the Russian Army. In an address 
published in November 1990, Barkashov declared that: 
All of Russia's most dramatic and tragic times have ended in victory for the Russian Army 
and, thus, the Russian People. 222 
He went on to say that the Army was the only force which could put a 
decisive end to the break-up of the Russian state (Soviet Union) and called 
for the Army's prestige to be restored. He suggested that 'if 70% of the 
Russian national income had not been wasted on parasitical peoples (non- 
Russians)... but spent on the Army... then our Army... would have long ago 
established order within the country and then in the world'. ' 
This authoritarian tone was further highlighted in February 1991, when 
RNE produced an address suggesting that Russians were suffering 
genocide as a result of national-separatism. Barkashov declared that there 
was no other way to stop this 'genocide' than to turn to the Armed Forces 
and demand that they fulfil their 'constitutional duty' and act to maintain 
the territorial integrity of the (Russian) state. He also demanded that a 
temporary state organ including Afghan veterans, KGB members and 
members of the Armed Forces be formed to restore the state's defence 
capability and also to take 'measures to stabilise domestic politics and the 
economy'. " 
RNE only had marginal support, but it took part in many 
'patriotic' 
meetings and became a leading member of 
Slavianskii Sobor. Its 
membership numbered around 500 at the end of 
1991 and most of these 
were young people in their twenties. They represented 
disaffected young 
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Russians who sought an authoritarian solution to the break-up of the 
greater Russian state. They had no fixed ideology, other than 'that which 
serves the Russian nation serves us best'. 
Umbrella Organizations and Blocs 
A number of organizations appeared between the end of 1989 and the end 
of 1991, seeking to unite and co-ordinate the efforts of groups inclined 
towards imperialist Russian nationalism. The first of these was the 
United Council of Russia (Ob"edinennyi sovet Rossii), which was founded 
on 9 September 1989. The United Council embraced the Association of 
Russian Artists, Interdvizhenie, Interfront, the 'international' Edinstvo 
movements of Lithuania and Moldavia, the Moscow and Leningrad 
branches of the OFT, Otechestvo groups, the All-Russian Cultural 
Foundation, the Public Committee for the Salvation of the Volga, the 
Union for the Spiritual Revival of the Fatherland (SDVO), the Union of 
the Struggle for Popular Sobriety as well as a number of other 
organizations. The Council aimed to maintain the state sovereignty of the 
USSR whilst developing the sovereignty of the RSFSR and establishing 
international status for the RSFSR within the UN. Other aims included 
the prevention of the 'barbaric' looting of Russia's natural resources; the 
revival of the 'spiritual origins' of the Russian people and other peoples of 
the USSR; the adoption of a state programme for the maintenance of 
Russian culture in the non-Russian republics. The Council also expressed 
a desire to develop an education system based upon 'Russian national 
traditions'. ' 
One of the declared intentions was to defend the rights and interests of 
Russians and non-titular language speakers in union republics and this 
intention was backed up by subsequent efforts in the summer and autumn 
of 1990 to develop 'charitable action', to offer help to Russian refugees and 
to create fora for discussing problems surrounding the revival of Russia 
and the Russian people. 226 
The United Council of Russia also participated in the Bloc of Public and 
Patriotic Movements of Russia. This bloc consisted of several 
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organizations which sought to pool their collective efforts before the 
elections to the local soviets and for the RSFSR Congress of People's 
Deputies in spring 1990: OSR, the Edinstvo Association for Lovers of 
Russian Writing and Art, the Rossiia Club of USSR People's Deputies and 
Electors, the All-Russian Cultural Foundation, the All-Russian Society for 
the Protection of Historical and Cultural Monuments, OFT of Russia, the 
Public Committee for Saving the Volga, the Association of Russian Artists, 
the Russian Branch of the International Foundation for Slavonic 
Literature and Slavic Cultures, the Union for the Spiritual Revival of the 
Fatherland, the RSFSR Voluntary Society of Book-Lovers, the Foundation 
for the Restoration of the Church of Christ the Saviour (some of these 
already came under the umbrella of, or were connected with the United 
Council of Russia). Their united platform was published in Literaturnaia 
Rossiia on the 29 December 1989 and in Sovetskaia Rossiia the following 
day. 227 
The Bloc supported the idea of developing a Russian political system (i. e. 
creating a Russian Communist Party), establishing a Russian Academy of 
Sciences (including an Institute for the Ecology of Russia, an Institute for 
the Economy of Russia, an Institute for Russian History and Culture), 
Russian state radio and television. On fiscal matters, the Bloc stated that 
the Russian republic's contribution to the Union budget should not be 
used for the 'artificial raising of living standards' in other Union republics 
and suggested that it should be used 'for the sake of the peoples of Russia'. 
The Bloc proposed the establishment of RSFSR representative bodies in 
all the Union republics to serve Russian peoples resident there. In the 
event of any 'discrimination' against them, Russia would take appropriate 
measures according to the 'international practice of defending human 
rights'. 
Significantly, the pre-election programme stated that, in the event of a 
republic seceding from the Union, Russia would strive to ensure that the 
republic's sovereignty 'extended to all lands genuinely belonging to its 
numerous peoples. ' This suggested that the Bloc would respect the 
sovereignty of other republics, but that the sovereignty of certain territories 
with non-titular (i. e. Russian-speaking) majorities 
in those republics 
might be reviewed. However, as the rallying election call 
indicated, the 
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Bloc was certain that Russia should remain intact as the Soviet Union: 
... WE NEED A 
GREAT SOVIET RUSSIA! 
RUSSIA ALWAYS WAS, AND SHALL REMAIN, A GREAT WORLD POWER! 
SHE WILL DO EVERYTHING TO ENSURE THAT THIS IS AND SHALL REMAIN THE 
SOVIET UNION! 
NO TO SEPARATISM, CHAOS, NATIONAL ENMITY AND CIVIL STRIFE! m 
This message failed to secure significant support in the 1990 elections. 
Perhaps the most significant bloc advocating imperialist Russian 
nationalism over the Gorbachev period was the parliamentary faction 
within the USSR Congress of People's Deputies, the Soiuz Group of 
Deputies. Soiuz announced its formation on 14 February 1990. At that 
moment it claimed the support of 110 People's Deputies, but by 1 December 
of that year the number had risen to 472. '9 
Key figures in Soiuz were Colonel Viktor Alksnis from Latvia, Iurii 
Blokhin from Moldavia, Colonel Nikolai Petrushenko from Kazkhstan 
and Evgenii Kogan from Estonia. These men were all from the Russian 
periphery and considered Soiu z's task to be the maintenance and 
strengthening of the Soviet federal state. The support for a united Soviet 
Union reflected conservative resistance to change and suggested that the 
deputies' group was following an 'internationalist' line - it included a 
number of non-Russians. However, like OFT and the 'intermovements' 
in the Baltic, Soiuz displayed imperialist Russian nationalist leanings, 
which were to grow as time past. 
Many supporters of Soiuz were Russians in the periphery, including 
members from the Baltic and Moldavian 'international' movements. The 
group also had links with Russian nationalist orientated publications: in 
July 1990 the Russian nationalist-orientated journal, Molodaia gvardiia, II 
published an article in support of Soiuz. The author, aSoiuz 
deputy, was 
critical of developments in Lithuania and suggested that there was 
discrimination against members of the Russian-speaking populations in 
Lithuania and Moldavia. He mentioned that the group sought to combat 
such problems through 'dialogue', but suggested that 
the situation was 
more acute than that: he revealed that 
Soiuz proposed to set up a 
foundation for refugees from areas of interethnic conflict. 
° 
By the end of 1990, Soiuz had increased 
its contacts with Russian 
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nationalist-orientated groups and increased its support significantly. 231 At 
the group's second congress in April 1991, delegates voted to transform 
Soiuz into a mass movement. The congress also produced a draft 
declaration aimed at creating a 'third way' based upon developing 'all- 
Russian patriotism'. 232 Some of the participants of the congress were 
representing groups of a Russian nationalist inclination, including: the 
RSFSR Union of Writers, Inte rd vizhenie, the Union of Patriotic Forces, 
the Otechestvo Russian Cultural Society, the Union for the Spiritual 
Revival of the Fatherland, the Russian Popular front, the Association of 
Russian Artists, the Union of Russian Refugees, the Russian Centre, the 
All-Russian Association of Lovers of Patriotic Culture Edinenie, OFT, the 
All-Union Edinstvo Society, the Committee for the Salvation of the 
Volga. ' 
Soiuz became a sizeable group with a growing influence. One of its leaders 
claimed in May 1991 that it had more than 740 out of the 2250 members of 
the USSR Congress of People's Deputies, i. e more than a third of all the 
deputies. ' Around this time, Soiu z's size in the USSR Congress was 
similar to that of the Communist Party and larger than the Interregional 
Group which represented the 'liberal' voice in the legislature. It also 
expanded its ranks beyond the USSR Congress to encompass republican 
and regional people's deputies. However, when the Soviet Union faltered 
after the August coup attempt, Soiuz effectively ceased to exist and 
members joined other organisations. 
Slavianskii Sobor formed in January 1991 with the aim of 'maintaining 
and strengthening Slavic values, protecting the rights and interests of the 
Slavic peoples and developing Slavic cultures'. 5 The organisation 
ostensibly supported all the Slavic peoples, but displayed a certain focus 
upon the Russian people, which is reminiscent of the Russian attitude to 
Pan-Slavism following the Moscow Pan-Slavic Congress of 1867. ' The 
leadership and the Duma of Slavianskii Sobor were to meet in Moscow 
and the official language was Russian. Most of its members either viewed 
the brotherhood of the Eastern Slavs as the essential core of Russian 
statehood, or regarded the Russian people-to consist of 
'Great Russians', 
Ukrainians and Belorussians. 
Members included Russian National Unity, the Slavic Party, the United 
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Council of Russia, Leningrad's Otechestvo, Moscow's Otechestvo, Soiuz 
Vene dov, the Public Committee for the Salvation of the Volga, Ed i nen ie 
and others. Slavianskii Sobor's umbrella covered both pro-socialist and 
anti-CPSU groups, and groups which originated both from within and 
outside establishment circles. The two unifying features appeared to be the 
desire for a Russian national revival and the maintenance of the historical 
Russian state. The Founding Congress did include representatives from 
Ukraine, Belorussia and Poland, but the vast majority of delegates were 
Russians. The Congress discussed not only themes of Slavic co-operation, 
but also themes such as 'the Modern Position of Russians in the Country 
and Abroad'. ' 
At the organisation's Second Congress in May 1991, Slavianskii Sobor 
passed resolutions which paid attention to 'anti-Russian extremism' and 
'the war of sovereignties'. The former resolution expressed demands: for 
the Russsian people to be given the 'elementary right to life'; to pass a 
separate law against 'anti-Russian extremism'; to consider publications 
such as Ogonek and Moskovskie novosti guilty of fanning anti-Russian 
extremism; to enforce Article 74 of the RSFSR Criminal Code for 
provocation of anti-Russian feeling up until the establishment of a law 
against 'anti-Russian extremism'; to ban the activity of all organisations 
advocating 'anti-Russian extremism'. ' The latter resolution criticised the 
idea of state sovereignty in the Union republics, referring to it as a return 
to 'feudal times'. It declared that the existing borders between the republics 
were 'unfair' and a 'particular blow... inflicted on the Great Russian 
people'. '9 These resolutions were passed in response to the growing calls 
for national-separatism in the non-Russian republics. 
At the end of August, the organisation held a conference on the theme of 
the 'Russian Idea and the Revival of Russia'. The conference concentrated 
on two particular issues: the events connected with the attempts to 
confiscate the RSFSR Writers' Union building; and the position of 
Russians in the Union republics. The conference centred on the most 
pressing Russian nationalist issues of the moment - one reporter 
commented that there were very few suggestions concerning the 
conference's theme: how to revive Russia. 24° 
It is clear that, although it attempted to address some Slavic issues and 
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invited representatives of other Slavic countries to its Congresses and 
meetings, Slavianskii Sobor was very much concerned with Russian 
issues. As a forum of discussion, it brought together a broad range of 
imperialist Russian nationalist groups from the Baltic 'international 
movements' to Russian National Unity and members of the Russian 
Orthodox Church. 24' 
Shortly after its formation, Slavianskii Sobor suffered a split, with some of 
the members leaving to form an alternative Vseslavianskii sobor. This 
early split was indicative of the organisation's failure to become a real focal 
point of 'patriotic forces'. Although Slavianskii sobor commanded the 
support of members of its constituent organisations totalling several 
thousands, the idea of developing Russian [russkaia and rossiiskaia] great 
power themes brought little appeal to the Russian public, let alone to 
organisations from Ukraine and Belorussia. 
Conclusion 
Imperialist Russian nationalism represented a broad range of views, but 
the alliances and coalitions which existed suggest that these differences 
could be laid aside in the interests of preserving the greater Russian state. 
To some extent, the imperialist Russian nationalists were allied with 
Soviet statists (or Soviet 'nationalists') who were also concerned with 
maintaining the unitary state, but, in many instances, the understanding 
of the terms 'Soviet' and 'Russian' became interchangeable" - for most 
Russians, the 'Motherland' was regarded to be the USSR rather than the 
Russian Federation (for example, a poll of Muscovites in 1987 revealed 
that 68.6% considered their Motherland to be the whole of the Soviet 
Union, while only 14.2% named the RSFSR). ' 
There seemed to be three ways in which imperialist Russian nationalists 
referred to Russia and the Soviet Union: in many instances, they 
supported the maintenance of the Union, whilst strengthening the state 
identity of the Russian republic and the Russian people; in some 
instances, 
they failed to draw a direct distinction between Russia and the Soviet 
Union, suggesting that they were one and the same, or that one was a 
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direct continuation of the other; in other instances, the organisations were 
bold enough to state that the Soviet Union should be regarded as, or 
renamed, 'Russia' (e. g. LDP, the Popular Patriotic Movement "Pam ist "'). 
Certain organisations attempted to portray themselves as something other 
than groups representing Russian interests. The Russian nationalist- 
orientated movements in the Baltic claimed to be 'international', but they 
consisted mainly of Russians and Russian-speakers who feared the winds 
of change. In 1991 in Estonia, there appeared to be a correlation between 
the number of Russians who expressed support for Interdvizheniie and 
OSTK and the number of them who could not speak Estonian: 37% of 
Russians expressed an interest in the two organisations, whilst 36% of 
Russians knew no Estonian language at all. 244 In addition 31% of Russians 
thought that they would lose their jobs if Estonia gained state 
independence [samostoiatel'nost']. 245 These figures suggest that the 
movements drew support from Russians looking out for their own 
interests. The 'international' movements revealed the extent of their 
'international' intentions by participating in the founding of Moscow's 
Otechestvo and by joining the United Council of Russia - organisations 
with an open pro-Russian agenda. 
Nina Andreeva's Edinstvo stated quite clearly that it supported 
internationalism and condemned manifestations of nationalism, whilst, at 
the same time, pursuing a limited form of Russian nationalism. 
Edinsvto's neo-Stalinist formulation of Russian nationalism was 
unsatisfactory to many, but Nina Andreeva still won the respect of many 
self-styled Russian 'patriots'. 
Throughout the Gorbachev period, various imperialist Russian nationalist 
groups expressed support for each other or joined in coalitions, for 
example: early on, Pamiat' were shown a degree of sympathy by members 
of the creative intelligentsia; later, 'international' movements and 
'cultural' movements came together under the umbrella of the United 
Council of Russia and the Bloc of Public-Patriotic Movements; communist 
and non-communist imperialist Russian nationalists 
(and Soviet statists) 
united within the Soiuz group of deputies; 
Slavianskii Sobor united 
imperialist Russian nationalist groups from communist and anti- 
communist backgrounds and from within and outside 
the establishment. 
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However, despite these efforts, there were personal and political 
differences which hindered the formation of a unified movement 
dedicated to the formation of a Russian-dominated Soviet state/Russian 
empire. Those who tried to unite were not sufficiently organised and 
many were discredited through the eyes of the public for their association 
with the Communist Party, the conservative establishment. or anti- 
Semitism. 
Otchizna represented an attempt to. draw imperialist Russian nationalists 
(including 'neo-Stalinists' such as Nina Andreeva) from across the 
spectrum. It condemned neither communism, nor Russian Orthodoxy, 
nor the idea of monarchy, but attempted to appeal to the common 
denominators which might unite the different strands of imperialist 
Russian nationalist feeling. Unfortunately for Otchizna, this approach was 
adopted too late: the confidence and support which the organisation were 
trying to build were dealt an early and severe blow by the attempted coup 
of August. 
It would have been a very difficult task to accommodate all the 
aforementioned groups under one political umbrella -a great deal of 
compromise would have been required. Perhaps, some of the less flexible 
'internationalist' members of Andreeva's Edinstvo would have been 
unwilling to compromise, but others had already showed a willingness to 
adapt: non-communist organisations co-operated with the Communist 
Party; others suggested that the political system was not important as long 
as certain Russian priorities were fulfilled; and the Russian Communist 
Party showed a much greater sympathy towards Russian issues and even 
Russian Orthodoxy than the CPSU had ever done. 
It is feasible that, given time, imperialist Russian nationalism would have 
achieved a greater degree of unity, although it is doubtful whether it would 
have lasted very long. I imagine that a Eurasian solution to the greater 
Russian state would have satisfied most adherents to imperialist Russian 
nationalism, but even this would have caused disagreement. 
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Connected with the Tendency 
Introduction 
a 
Liberal Russian nationalism was concerned with the maintenance and 
development of Russian culture, but within the framework of political 
democracy and a market economy. It was opposed to Marxism-Leninism 
and allied itself with liberal democracy, accepting certain Western values 
whilst promoting Russian national traditions and usually displaying an 
attachment to Russian Orthodoxy. Adherents to this tendency joined and 
encouraged the democrats to fight for the institution of a sovereign or 
independent Russia. In principle, it supported the self-determination of 
the non-Russian republics, although it did not rule out the institution of a 
voluntary union, federation or confederation of republics. It promised a 
democratic system in which everyone was guaranteed nationality based 
upon citizenship rather than ethnicity and expected the Russian [ethnic] 
nation, its traditions and values to flourish through the freedoms and 
opportunities of a pluralistic society. 
During the earlier Gorbachev years, liberal Russian nationalism was 
represented by influential figures such as, for example, Dmitrii Likhachev 
and Alla Latynina. Likhachev established himself as an authority on 
Russian culture and whilst analysing and stressing the importance of 
Russia's cultural heritage, he also highlighted the greater need for 
democracy and identified Russia as part of European civilisation, rather 
than as a land apart. The literary critic, Latynina, stressed the 'creative' 
importance of national self-awareness, whilst supporting the 'Western' 
values of 'liberalism' - liberty, human rights and freedom of conscience. ' 
Besides the pronouncements of figures from within the establishment, 
liberal Russian nationalism found expression within the democratic 
movement, most notably through the umbrella of the Democratic Russia 
movement. This was responsible for championing not only the principles 
of liberal democracy, but also the aims of liberal Russian nationalism in 
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establishing Russia's sovereignty and independence. The most 
pronounced example of liberal Russian nationalism came from one of 
Democratic Russia's constituent members, the Russian Christian 
Democratic Movement, which sought the establishment of a Russian 
democratic state guided by an 'enlightened patriotism'. 
Balakhonov 
Liberal Russian nationalists believed that the only way of saving the 
Russian nation was through the institution of democracy as an antidote to 
Marxism-Lenininsm. One of the earliest proposals for a democratic system 
designed in the interests of saving the 'Russian nation' was that proposed 
by Vladimir Balakhonov, which formulated a plan to re-establish Russia as 
a democratic nation-state/states separate from the other union republics. It 
appeared in the Democratic Union newspaper, Svobodnoe slovo, in April 
1989 and qualified the organisation's support of national independence 
movements! The same issue of the newspaper printed a resolution from 
a Democratic Union congress supporting the 'disintegration of the 
totalitarian empire'; the rights of the republics to self-determination and 
secession from the USSR; the rights of peoples deported in the past to 
return to their 'traditional places of residence'; and the strengthened status 
of the languages of the titular peoples in the republics and regions. ' 
Balakhonov focussed on the plight of the Russian nation and the possible 
options it faced in view of changes. He claimed that the Bolshevik regime 
had reconstituted the Russian state system and referred to the 'imperial 
instinct of Russians' which had survived as a result. Criticising both 
Pamiat' and the RSFSR Writers' Union for their imperialist outbursts, 
Balakhonov suggested that the Russians' choice was between 'empire or 
freedom, great power or democracy'. He recommended that Russians 
'reconstruct' their consciousness in order to survive as a nation and that 
they should understand the necessity of not only seceding from the USSR, 
but also dividing the large territory of the RSFSR into three or 
four 
separate Russian states. " He made a negative reference to 
Russian 
'messianism' and to the Russian paranoia of living in a 'fortress under 
siege', thus condemning any idea of isolationism. 
Asserting that Russians 
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were the empire's 'main instrument for enslaving other peoples', 
Balakhonov summed up the Russians' stark choice: 
... either the division of an overpowering colossal empire, the self-preservation and free 
national development of Russians and other peoples within the framework of sovereign democratic states, or a military, national-political, social and economic catastrophe with 
the physical destruction of the Russians (the disappearance of the Russians as a nation). ' 
This scheme was not very attractive to most Russian nationalists, for 
whom the integrity of the Russian state would be paramount. In fact, 
Balakhonov's idea about dividing the Russian Federation into four 
different states contradicts all trends in modern nationalism which seeks 
to unite a nation and its territory, rather than divide it. 
El'tsin and Russian Sovereignty /Independence 
Whereas Balakhonov focussed on the survival of ethnic Russians 
[russkie] at the core of an independent Russian state (or states), Boris 
E1'tsin played the Russian nationalist card to focus upon the creation of a 
Russian state inhabited by all the peoples within her territory [ros si is n e] - 
El'tsin used the instrument of civic nationalism to unite Russia against 
the centre. 
E1'tsin did not ignore the ethnic Russian factor - he acknowledged that he 
was an ethnic Russian and said at the beginning of 1990 that more 
attention should be paid to the ethnic Russian population, arguing that it 
was not a matter of nationalism [chauvinism], but a necessary condition 
for national revival. ' He voiced concern for Russians and Russian- 
speakers living in non-Russian republics and offered to extend help to 
them. He suggested that discrimination against Russians in these 
republics might be punishable by the use of sanctions and promised those 
who wished to return to Russia the opportunity to do so. ' In addition to 
this, El'tsin enhanced his image as a national figure by appearing (and 
being photographed by the press) at Russian Orthodox church services and 
called for a restoration of the moral role of the Church. ' However, these 
issues are peripheral to El'tsin's real use of nationalism - the attempt to 
forge an independent Russian state as a powerbase for opposition to the 
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centre. 
El'tsin's practical and opportunist use of the politics of Russian 
nationalism did not materialise until the beginnning of 1990. His election 
platform of 5 February 1990 aimed to establish a Russian Communist Party 
(to compete within a multiparty system), a Russian Academy of Sciences, 
Russia-wide media of communication, a new Russian Constitution, 
Russian territorial militias, but more significantly pledged to adopt a law 
on Russian citizenship and spoke of Russian 'economic sovereignty'! 
The proposal to bolster Russia's institutional independence was a direct 
challenge to the centre. On the 22 May 1990, one week before he was voted 
Chairman of the RSFSR Supreme Soviet, El'tsin addressed the Congress of 
People's Deputies and criticised the centre for its imperial policy, speaking 
of the uncertainties that it had produced, particularly within Russia, 
which: 
suffered the greatest damage from the command-administrative system" 
E1'tsin stressed that: 
The problems of the republic cannot be solved without full-blooded political sovereignty. " 
With this in mind, he enumerated a number of principles which would 
serve as the basis for a new republican Constitution: 
The Russian republic is a sovereign, democratic, law-based state of peoples enjoying equal 
rights who have voluntarily joined together within it... 
Today it is not the centre, but Russia which must think about which functions to transfer [to] 
the centre, and which to keep for itself... 
... the republic implements its 
domestic and foreign policy independently... 
A single republican citizenship is established in Russia... 
A review of Russia's symbols, envisaging, in particular, the creation of an anthem for the 
republic. 
The economic sovereignty of Russia is possible only on condition that republican ownership 
is formed... It is necessary to guarantee in law that they are used exclusively in the 
interests of Russia. 12 
Enshrined within these principles was the foundation for an independent 
Russian state where the nation was determined by Russian citizenship 
rather than by ethnicity. Towards the end of his speech, El'tsin added: 
national and patriotic forces must rally in the struggle for the construction of a 
democratic 
and civil society in Russia. 13 
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El'tsin was appealing primarily to adherents to liberal Russian 
nationalism, for whom the establishment of a democratic rossiiskoe state 
was an important building block in the revival of both ros si is ne and the 
russkii people. 
With the backing of Democratic Russia and others, Russia declared its 
sovereignty on 12 June 1990. Elt'sin continued to identify the Russian 
Federation as a separate national entity and spoke in terms of national 
renewal: 
The Russian federation is experiencing one. of the most complex and dramatic moments in its history. We still have to work out... why a people numbering many millions, with a great 
culture and the richest traditions, today feels a spiritual crisis and a shortage of belief. 
And, yet, Russia's potential for renewal is far from exhausted. 14 
Throughout 1991, El'tsin and his backers continued to strengthen Russia's 
political independence. The creation of a presidency was accompanied by a 
strengthening of executive presidential powers, a fact which helped to 
reinforce Russia's image and status as an independent actor. Following 
the attempted coup, Russia took responsibility for economic and natural 
resources located on Russian territory and gradually took over USSR 
Ministries, financial, economic and other organisations. The re- 
identification of Russia as a political unit for rossiiane, served as an 
effective platform for El'tsin and the democrats in their challenge against 
the established centre. He did not ally himself with the more imperialist 
or isolationist expressions of Russian nationalism, although he did choose 
Aleksandr Rutskoi, who had earlier participated in the Russian 
nationalist-orientated group Otechestvo, as his presidential running mate. 
This move reflected El'tsin's highly pragmatic approach towards the 
question of Russian nationalism. He realised that he needed to harness 
not only the support of the democratic movement, but needed to pay 
attention to Russian nationalist sentiments both within and outside the 
movement. 
Groups and Parties connected with liberal Russian nationalism 
The organisations related to this tendency are represented by members of 
the Democratic Russia movement and by the Rossy Association. 
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The majority of the Democratic Russia movement were democrats, who 
wished to see the removal of the communist system and the institution of 
a pluralist system guaranteeing civil rights, freedom of conscience, the rule 
of law, a market economy, etc. However, within the Democratic Russia 
movement was a minority of members for whom the revival of Russia 
and the promotion of 'patriotism' and perceived ethnic Russian values 
were also of great significance. The groups which placed a greater 
emphasis on 'patriotism' were the Russian Christian Democratic 
Movement and the Constitutional Democratic Party. Others, such as the 
Democratic Party of Russia and the Republican Party of the Russian 
Federation, had members within their ranks who were concerned about 
ethnic Russian issues, but the parties focussed their Russian concerns on 
establishing a Russian [rossiisskii] state identity. The latter approach 
fulfilled two criteria: on the one hand, it pursued the parties' aims of 
establishing democratic principles and structures; whilst, on the other 
hand, it pursued the development of a Russian [rossissiskii] national 
identity and Russian [rossisskii] institutions, which Russian nationalist 
spokesmen had for a long time considered a pre-requisite for the revival 
not only of the peoples of the RSFSR, but also of the ethnic Russian 
[russkii] people. In this way, the parties satisfied both the majority of their 
members, whose primary concern was the institution of a democratic 
political system, and the minority of members who were also concerned 
with Russian national issues. The Democratic Russia movement as a 
whole represents this trend - it appealed to both supporters of democracy 
and adherents to liberal Russian nationalism. 
The Rossy Association represents an attempt by Russian intellectuals in 
Leningrad to focus on the revival of the Russian nation through the 
establishment of a Russian state on the territory of the RSFSR. Although 
the Association's priority was to revive a Russian nation, which was based 
upon subjective affiliation (to Russian language and culture, etc. ) rather 
than ancestry, it eschewed the idea of Russian fundamentalism and opted 
for the idea of a multiparty, democratic presidential republic. Rossy 
distinguished themselves from Democratic Russia in that they displayed a 
more fervent attachment to the plight of ethnic 
Russians and criticised 
'democratic' organisations for their indifference to the Russian nation. 
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Dvizhenie 'Demokraticheskaia Rossiia' (Democratic Russia movement) 
The banner of Democratic Russia first appeared at the beginning of 1990 as 
an electoral alliance under which the March 1990 elections were 
successfully contested. The decision to form the Democratic Russia 
movement was taken in June 1990 chiefly by the Moscow Voters' 
Association (Moskovskoe ob"edinenie izbiratelei). The Founding 
Conference followed on 20-21 October 1990 when the Russian Christian 
Democratic Movement were joined by the Democratic Party of Russia, 
Democratic Platform (later the Republican Party of the Russian 
Federation), and the Social-Democratic Party of Russia. 15 The latter three 
parties made a joint declaration at the conference announcing their 
intention to form a political coalition which aimed to support the 
economic programme of the Russian Government; called for the 
resignation of the Union Government; and pledged to support the 
Democratic Russia movement. 16 Other conference participants and 
movement members included the Voters' Movement and a few members 
of the CPSU, as well as representatives of a number of other organizations 
including Memorial, Sh ch i t, the Peasant Party of Russia, the Anti-fascist 
Centre, the Aprel' Society, the Constitutional-Democratic Party and the 
USSR Academy of Sciences Voters' Club. The movement was to represent 
an association of parties, individuals, social movements and organizations 
committed to introducing: 
progressive, radical, political and socio-economic reforms in Russia aimed at creating a 
civil society. '7 
Democratic Russia represents one manifestation of Russian nationalism in 
that it pursued the idea of Russian statehood (gosudarstvennost') for the 
RSFSR and provided Boris El'tsin with support in his opposition to 
Gorbachev and the Soviet centre. Indeed, it was largely due to Democratic 
Russia's efforts that El'tsin was voted Chairman of the RSFSR Supreme 
Soviet on 29 May 1990 and that the Russian Congress of People's Deputies 
adopted a declaration of Russian sovereignty two weeks 
later on 12 June 
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1990. One of the movement's aims established at the Founding 
Conference was to bring about secession from the USSR 'in the event that 
the USSR President or the USSR Supreme Soviet takes action detrimental 
to Russia's sovereignty'. " This was neither a Russian nationalism which 
sought a 'return' to fundamental 'Russian' values, nor a nationalism 
which advocated the maintenance of a Russian/Russian-dominated 
empire. Democratic Russia's manifestation of Russian nationalism is born 
out of pragmatism, opportunism and the movement's political values - its 
quest for Russian sovereignty and self-determination was one which 
addressed the changing situation within the Union; provided a readily 
acceptable and identifiable platform of opposition to the Soviet centre; and 
did not contradict the ideas of democracy which members of the 
movement advocated. Democratic Russia sought to establish a political 
entity distinct from the USSR which could develop its own 
Russian/RSFSR institutions, including administrative and governmental 
bodies. This included backing the idea of creating a Russian presidency 
which would wield greater executive powers than the existing Russian 
institutions. Democratic Russia's aims were made clear by the words of 
Orgcommittee Chairman A. N. Murashev in November 1990: 
The Movement's most important tasks in the immediate future are: first, to facilitate the 
earliest implementation of a national referendum on a new Russian Constitution, which 
would put an end to the Soviet socialist period of Russian history and which would serve as 
a legal basis for the revival of Russian statehood; and, second, to participate in the direct 
national election of a Russian president in accordance with this new Constitution, which 
would be able to settle the problem of Russian power in Russia's favour and to neutralise the 
destructive activities of the communist imperial centre. 19 
Democratic Russia's direction was rewarded not only with the 
introduction of a Russian presidency, but also with the victory of its 
presidential candidate, Boris El'tsin, in the June 1991 election. 2° 
The move to strengthen Russian political institutions encouraged the 
development of a Russian identity. The movement set up working 
committees on the cultural renaissance of Russia and on links with 
Russian citizens living in other republics and 'compatriots' living 
overseas. This was all part of Democratic Russia's contribution to Russian 
'revival'. 
Democratic Russia represented a Russia-wide movement promoting 
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democratic ideas throughout the country in opposition to the CPSU, 
conservative forces and more extreme Russian nationalist-orientated 
groups. However, Democratic Russia was handicapped in that it was not a 
single political party, but an umbrella group representing a range of 
different views and egos. One of the issues which split the movement was 
the composition of the Russian state. All members of Democratic Russia 
supported the idea of Russia-wide institutions and were unified in their 
opposition to the communist-controlled centre. All had, in principle, 
accepted the rights of other nations (Union republics) to self-determination 
and secession - and that any union of states should be formed on a 
voluntary basis. However, whilst the majority of the movement 
continued to uphold these principles, others took a more imperialist- 
nationalist view, insisting that the historically-formed Russian state was 
indivisible and that the Union should be preserved. On 19 April 1991, a 
group named Narodnoe soglasie (Popular Accord) was formed within 
Democratic Russia by the R Kh D D, DPR and the Constitutional Democratic 
Party. 21 This group stood for the maintenance of the 'state unity of the 
Union of republics" and supported other ethnic Russian issues: 
In contrast to the leaders of Democratic Russia (Iu. Afanas'ev, L. Ponomarev, G. Iakunin, V. 
Bokser) Narodnoe soglasie supported the Novo-Ogarevo project on the Union Treaty and 
openly favoured the side of the Dniester republic against the Moldovan leadership. 23 
In the aftermath of the coup attempt, the differences within Democratic 
Russia began to broaden, particularly over the re-constitution of the 
Union, the identity/ integrity of Russia and the fate of ethnic Russians 
outside the borders of the RSFSR. By November 1991, the minority 
Narodnoe soglasie bloc, increased its imperialist-nationalist stance and left 
the movement. Narodnoe soglasie considered the break-up of the USSR 
to be the disintegration of a historical Russian political and social 
community, whilst others in Democratic Russia happily accepted the event 
as the delayed dismantling of the old Russian empire. 
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Democracy and 'enlightened patriotism' 
RKhDD and KDP were the two groups in the Democratic Russia 
movement which supported the introduction of liberal values, but 
displayed an obvious Russian-nationalist orientation. Both supported the 
idea of 'enlightened patriotism' as a necessary accompaniment to 
democratic values. RKhDD supported the state, spiritual and cultural 
revival of Russia, whilst KDP's orientation was described as 'a platform of 
European conservatism with Russian specific characteristics [spetsifika 
Rossii]'. 24 
The Russian Christian Democratic Movement, RKhDD (Rossiiskoe 
khristianskoe demo kraticheskoe dvizhenie) 
The RKhDD's inclusion under the liberal nationalist tendency is governed 
by three factors. Firstly, it intended to recreate and establish a Russian state 
with national values and recognisably 'Russian' characteristics. Secondly, 
it did not prescribe a greater Russian state for all the republics of the Soviet 
Union - it guaranteed other nationalities the right to decide their own 
status and secede if they so wished. ' Thirdly, the Movement was 
committed to a pluralist, liberal civil society in which individuals were 
guaranteed equality before the law and basic human rights, irrespective of 
their nationality. 
The RKhDD was of some significance, because it was one of the bigger 
parties in 1990-91. For example, in early 1991, Sovetskaia Rossiia reported 
that only four parties in Russia had the minimum number of members to 
be officially registered - the CPSU, Travkin's DPR, the Social Democratic 
Party and the RKhDD - and by December 1991 it had 16 500 members. 26 
The Founding Conference of the RKhDD took place on 8-9 April 1990 in 
Moscow, although the movement's origins can be traced back to 1987 with 
the publication of Vybor. One of the aims of the movement's work was 
the 'state, spiritual and cultural renaissance of Russia on a civilised basis'. Z' 
The RKhDD's Russian nationalism focusses on these dimensions, where 
'de-ideologisation' of the Marxist-Leninist structure is a priority along with 
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the establishment of a civil society, albeit one in which Christianity is 
encouraged to play a guiding role. 
The RKhDD proposed to create a peculiarly Russian government and state, 
supporting the convocation of an All-Russian Zemskii Sobor (Assembly 
of the Land) to guide Russia towards a suitable form of government: 
The RKhDD considers that only an All-Russian Zemskii Sobor is competent to resolve the 
problem of which form of state structure suits Russia. "' 
In the interim period before convoking a Zemskii Sobor, the RKhDD 
supported a presidential republic where the president is elected by a 
universal and secret ballot, and his power is limited by the principle of a 
separation of powers (legislative, executive and judicial) and also by local 
and public government. 
Besides resurrection of a Zemskii Sobor, the RKhDD also called for the 're- 
establishment of Russian national state symbols' and the 'return of 
historical place- and street-names'. 29 
Russian national values 
Identification with Russia was encouraged by promoting the idea of 
patriotism: 
Patriotism is love of the Motherland... Patriotism of the true Christian lies in the fact 
that the culture of his people is dear to him, that it is based on a higher truth - Christian 
ideals... 
... The renaissance of true patriotism is the renaissance of world-wide responsiveness, of the 
open nature of the Russian people. 
Enlightened patriotism is the recognition of responsibility for one's history, culture, habitat 
and spiritual inheritance... It is a vision of a new Russia... 
Patriotism is faith in one's Motherland. Faith in her calling, in the creative force of her 
spirit, in the future heyday that awaits her. Simply we - Russian patriots - believe that 
our Motherland, undergoing a cleansing repentance, will be able through the feat of work 
and prayer step out onto that path from which she was led by 'earthly evil spirits'. 
30 
Here we witness the, evocative language of nationalism - it is an attempt to 
encourage Russians to identify positively with the national group. The 
emphasis on history, culture and religion is a rallying call to a new 
national ideal, albeit one which has a continuity/ connection with the pre- 
revolutionary past. The language has a positive, optimistic note to 
it - any 
criticism is directed against the (communist) 
diversion from Russia's true 
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path - this contrasts from the negative anti-Baltic or anti-Semitic overtones 
evident in much imperialist Russian nationalism. 
Like other movements, ' the RKhDD considered Christianity to be the basis 
for overcoming the legacy of communist rule. However, the movement's 
specific propagation of Russian Orthodoxy and its images must be regarded 
as part of the process of national renewal. The RKhDD newspaper Put' was 
was headed by an image of St. George - Russia's patron saint - and the word 
"Put" was written in pre-revolutionary/ecclesiastical letters. Each copy of 
Put' had a 'prayer for the salvation of Russia' on the front which was also 
printed in an ecclesiastic-styled font. The newspaper addressed political, 
religious and social issues, but it also addressed the subject of national 
renaissance. Just to take the example of one issue - the Christmas issue of 
January 1991- there was a reprint of a speech by Petr Stolypin and an article 
by Vladimir Karpets discussing the 'Russian idea'. 32 
The nationalities question 
Addressing the 'national question', the RKhDD programme supported the 
principle that: 
nations (narody) are guaranteed the right to national autonomy. 33 
Further down, the document speaks of 'full and mutually beneficial 
national self-determination' and, most importantly, it lists the right to 
secede: 
The RKhDD supports the 'de-imperialisation' of an ideocratic monster - the USSR. The 
R Kh DD will try to work out how to balance this de-imperialisation taking into account 
world experience. Nations (na rod y) wishing to secede from the metropolis, should be given 
the possibility to do so. On the other hand, the process of separation should not degenerate 
into a mindless and irresponsible break-up of the country. The R Kh DD believes that, under 
the conditions of the Russian state, the question of complete secession should have deep 
historical, cultural and economic foundations. ' 
Although the principle of secession is qualified by a proviso, it 
nevertheless provides a basis from which secession can be approached, 
which completely differs from the attitude expressed by imperialist 
Russian nationalists. Other nationalities are given the opportunity to 
secede should they so wish, but, equally, they would n ot 
be forced to 
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separate. 
As for Russians affected by potential secession, the movement also 
declared that the Russian state should work out an effective programme to 
defend the interests of those Russians (rossiiane) who are left in territories 
which have seceded from the centre (the term rossiiane indicates the 
movement's 'civic' rather than 'ethnic' interpretation of the new Russian 
nationality, although most displaced rossiiane would be ethnic Russians - 
russkie). 
The RKhDD's leader, Viktor Aksiuchits, revealed his Russian nationalist 
orientation in 1989 when he expressed caution over the effects that 
'Westernizers' and imperialist Russian nationalists might have on the 
renewal of Russian society. He was particularly worried about indifference 
to the fate of Russians, whilst voicing his opposition to the maintenance of 
empire: 
If Russian patriots fight for the preservation of the Soviet empire... it is just a 
demonstration of very anti-Russian forces. One can understand that, due to their mind-set, 
Westernizers would not be particularly worried by the fate of Russians. But it is completely 
ridiculous that Russian patriots in an imperialist rage should ignore the Russian nation's 
primary interests. 35 
In 1990, Aksiuchits addressed the Congress of People's Deputies of the 
RSFSR, after which he was posed several questions. In answer to a 
question as to how he would resolve national conflicts in the Soviet 
Union, he replied: 
I am deeply convinced that the border peoples of our country will flee from this political 
regime, not from Russia. No-one can be held by force. The more force is displayed, the 
stronger will be the demarcation in the national border areas. It is essential now to let go 
those who wish to leave. Only this will open the way to constructive consolidation ... 
36 
These words indicate not only the view that communism was the enemy, 
but they also provide a clear distinction between the idea of a Russian 
nation and a Russian empire. 
Aksiuchits went on to say that national problems would not be resolved 
until Russia became democratic. However, 
he indicated that he envisaged 
a state system which would involve 
federation or confederation. 
Although the RKhDD operated in the Russian Federation, it did have 
groups in non-Russian republics such as 
Ukraine and Latvia. 37 
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Interestingly, when the break-up of the Union became a real prospect 
certain elements in the RKhDD revised their principles and the 
movement shifted towards a more imperialist viewpoint. This led to 
disagreement and certain members left the movement. ' 
Despite the RKhDD's intentions to produce a renewed Russian state 
structure with a national character, the movement was not unresponsive 
to outside influences - the programme was not one of radical Russian 
fundamentalism, but expressed a tolerance of views, rights, faiths and 
beliefs. The programme supported freedom of conscience and freedom to 
practise one's faith. It guaranteed freedom of speech and assembly, 
although it proscribed the propagation of racist or misanthropic views 
which would lead to acts of violence. Whilst Aksiuchits had called for 
'spiritual regeneration, in particular religious and national regeneration', " 
this did not prevent the propagation of 'un-Russian' views imported from 
other parts of the globe. The freedoms stated in the party programme 
guaranteed this. 
Of all the members of Democratic Russia, RKhDD had the most Russian 
nationalist programme - it combined liberal democratic values with 
perceived Russian national values, whilst at the same time promoting 
'enlightened patriotism'. The ultimate shift towards a more imperialist 
Russian nationalist position at the end of 1991 is, perhaps, not all that 
surprising. Those who disagreed with this view left the Movement, but 
those who backed Aksiuchits had probably united behind the 'democratic' 
banner more out of opposition to communism than their desire to 
introduce liberal democracy. The alliance with democrats in the 
Democratic Russia movement became shaky once communism faced 
defeat - RKhDD was able to focus upon its differences with people in the 
democratic movement. As a result, its concerns centred on issues such as 
the fate of ethnic Russians outside the RSFSR and the fear of possible 
wholesale adoption of foreign, 'Western' influences by the democratic 
movement. The evolution of Aksiuchits' own political views progressed 
to the point that, by the end of 1991, he had turned against his former 
democratic allies and with the turn of the year had allied himself with 
Democratic Russia's former Russian nationalist opponents. 
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The Constitutional Democratic Party (the Party of Popular Freedom) 
(Konstitutsionno-demkraticheskaia partiia (Partiia narodnoi svobody) - 
KDPIPNS) 
KDP held a session which was recognised as its de facto founding 
conference in September 1990, but was only officially formed at a 'Congress 
of Restoration' in June 1991. It described itself as a 'conservative-liberal' 
party supporting freedom of the individual, civil rights and the 'widest 
possible form of self-rule'. 40 
In its 1990 programme, the Party expressed its loathing for the communist 
system and a desire for the introduction of democracy - it declared that 
only a transfer from totalitarianism to democracy could open the way to 
the revival of all the peoples of Russia. The Party later reinforced this idea 
of opposition to totalitarianism: 
the state authorities do not have the right to declare any faith, conviction, or political and 
religious teaching harmful or dangerous unless they are recognised as such by international 
law. 4' 
The national question was regarded as 'one of the most difficult in the 
country' and the Party paid particular attention to the fact that the ethnic 
Russian [russkii] people had suffered along with all the other peoples. It 
also suggested that the lack of state structures for the Russian Federation 
and the consequent identification of Russia with all-Union structures 
complicated relations between the Russian peoples and the peoples of 
other republics. As a result, one of the Party's goals was to achieve 
sovereignty for the Russian Federation. 
Like the RKhDD, the KDP encouraged a significant role for 'patriotism' 
declaring that it was a party of 'strong statehood and enlightened 
patriotism'. It was fairly obvious that this 'patriotism' 
had a Russian 
dimension. The Party declared that its activity was based upon the 'general 
heritage, cultural traditions and religious values of the peoples of 
Russia'. 
In addition, the KDP supported the cultural revival of 
Russia, its religious 
traditions and its cultural environment, including monuments of 
architecture and historical names. It also called 
for the 'return of Russia to 
the history of mankind and the return of Russia's 
history to her peoples'. 
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However, this idea of Russian revival was not stuck wholly in the past. 
KDP believed that: 
politics are an evolutionary process, developing with historical experience in mind and maintaining everything of value which is in it, but, at the same time, being receptive to 
everything new and progressive-42 
The above words indicate that, whilst supporting a Russian revival and 
observing 'historical experience', the KDP would be prepared to accept 
progressive, possibly 'foreign' ideas. This was illustrated by the Party's 
proposal to join the European Democratic Union, in order to co-operate 
with 'foreign parties and public organisations of a liberal-conservative 
orientation". 43 
In principle, the Party supported the maintenance of a multi-national 
union and even proposed the creation of a European-Asian 
Commonwealth of States for the Union republics. Membership of this 
Commonwealth was voluntary and members maintained the right to 
leave. ' A Party resolution on a new Union Treaty declared that it would 
recognise the legal governments of the republics who did not enter the 
federation (Union). However, it also called for areas outside the 
'federation' which were densely populated by its constituent core 
nationalities to be granted citizenship of the federation and, likewise, for 
their territories to be incorporated into the federation. This was a reference 
chiefly to areas in non-Russian republics densely populated by ethnic 
Russians and Russian-speakers. 
KDP was one of the constituent members of Narodnoe soglasie and, like 
R Kh D D, ended 1991 supporting the ideas of Russian state integrity, a re- 
constituted union and focussing on ethnic Russians in the non-Russian 
periphery. KDP's leader, Mikhail Astaf'ev adopted a similar position to 
that of Viktor Aksiuchits and later worked in alliance with former 
opponents. The Party's self-professed 'conservatism' eventually drew it 
towards imperialist Russian nationalism rather than towards liberal 
democracy and its perceived Western values. 
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Democracy and the rossiiskoe state 
The DPR and RPRF represent organisations which concentrated their 
efforts on introducing democratic values, but also reviving the idea of 
Russian [rossiiskaia] statehood. There were elements within these 
organisations which which focussed on specific ethnic Russian values and 
issues - there was a 'Russian faction' within the DPR, which later left to 
join the RNPR, and the RPRF contained members who believed in 
pursuing a Russian path - however, the main aim of these two groups was 
to create a democratic Russian state and develop a sense of rossiiskii 
national identity. With the collapse of communism and the prospective 
fall of the Soviet Union, DPR leader, Nikolai Travkin, paid particular 
attention to the plight of ethnic Russians and Russian-speakers living 
outside the RSFSR and joined his Narodnoe soglasie allies in calling for 
the maintenance of the unitary state - however, he did not go as far as 
Mikhail Astaf'ev or Viktor Aksiuchits in identifying himself with an 
alliance of re-grouped 'patriotic' forces in opposition to Democratic Russia. 
Demokraticheskaia partiia Rossiia, DPR (The Democratic Party of Russia). 
TheDPR's founding conference took place between 26-27 May 1990. On the 
second day of its founding congress, the DPR suffered its very first split. 
Marina Sal'e, Garri Kasparov, Lev Ponomarev and others clashed with 
Nikolai Travkin, labelling him 'authoritarian". "' Although Travkin 
prevailed and others came back to the fold, the Leningrad group of Sal'e 
and Il'ia Konstantinov broke away to form the Free Democratic Party of 
Russia. However, they would remain allies for a while within the 
framework of the Democratic Russia movement. The DPR was a 
significant party with many notable political figures and at the end of 1990 
it had almost 29 000 members, second only to the CPSU in size. 
In 1991, A. Novikov described the DPR as an 'anti-communist CPSU' and 
that in relation to the Russian national question: 
it is formally trying to combine democratic and patriotic approaches. It is in 
favour of the 
state integrity of the RSFSR as desperately as the central apparatus of 
the CPSU is to 
maintain the Union. 46 
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A supplement to the party's first edition of its newspaper 
Demokraticheskaia Rossiia carried a declaration passed at the founding 
conference which claimed: 
Our aim is the political, economic and spiritual revival of the [Russian] republic's peoples. Our principal task is the revival of Russian statehood in the form of a sovereign democratic federal republic with a multiparty system. 47 
And the slogan which accompanied each section of the supplement read: 
Towards a flourishing Russia through rights of the individual, a civil society, economic 
freedom and state sovereginty. " 
Therefore, Russia's national renewal was understood in terms of a new 
social and political system within the framework of a Russian state. The 
democratic principles espoused were extended to the non-Russian 
republics, with a guarantee of self-determination. The proposed party 
programme recognised: 
the unconditional right of every republic in the Union to self-determination, including the 
right to secession. 49 
The DPR's commitment to a Russian national state seemed to be 
confirmed by its inclusion in the Democratic Russia movement, thus 
allying itself with other forces opposing the Soviet centre and supporting 
the idea of a democratic political system within a Russia which would 
have a strengthened identity and strengthened national institutions. The 
DPR even adopted the Russian tricolour and the Russian imperial coat of 
arms (the two-headed eagle, but without the crown and sceptre) as its 
symbols. 5° 
A draft project on the Union Treaty and the future of the USSR produced 
by the DPR in Sverdlovsk on 6 April 1991 rejected the idea of maintaining 
the Union: 
the effort is being made to destroy a sovereign Russian Federation and to maintain a unitary 
'Union' state with a so-called strong centre... 
We believe that no Union treaty, no referenda with tangled questions will 
be able to 
maintain that which has become obsolete - the Soviet Union... 
It is obvious that the republics should be free to realise their rights 
to self-determination, 
while state property situated on republican territory should 
be handed over to the republics 
free of charge... 
We are not against a union of sovereign states, 
but to keep the USSR for the sake of 
maintaining the CPSU and today's ruling nomenklatura class 
is criminal. We are for the 
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sovereignty of individuals and nations. 5' 
However, this only reflected the DPR opposition to a USSR governed and 
influenced by the CPSU etc. At the Second Congress of the DPR at the end 
of April 1991, the party ratified a declaration on creating the Na rodnoe 
soglasie bloc and firmly committed itself to the maintenance of a union 
state on the territory of the Soviet Union. Therefore, whilst pursuing the 
establishment of Russian statehood with its symbols and institutions, the 
DPR also denied the other union republics their right to independent 
statehood. The overwhelming - majority of the Party's membership 
accepted this stance and in November 1991, the DPR left the Democratic 
Russia movement. Several regional organisations of the Party did not 
agree with this position and split from the DPR, opting to stay within 
Democratic Russia. 52 
Like the other members of Narodnoe soglasie, the core of the DPR reneged 
on its previously-stated policy of respecting the right of every republic to 
secede from the Union. Although the DPR had fought for Russian state 
sovereignty and to create a Russian state identity, it ultimately viewed this 
within the framework of a larger Union. This could be for a number of 
reasons: the DPR could not envisage the feasibility of the Soviet Union 
existing as a number of independent states; the Party was still affected by 
the thinking that the Soviet Union constituted a historically indivisible 
(therefore, Russian) state; it was concerned that the break-up of the Union 
would weaken Russia defensively and economically (in relation to the 
West, perhaps); there was an overwhelming concern for the ethnic 
Russians and Russian-speakers who would become 'displaced' minorities 
in a foreign land. Whatever, the reason(s) were, there were elements 
within what was left of the Party who put Russia's concerns 
first. The 
DPR may not have had an ethnic Russian nationalist agenda, 
but it was 
sensitive to Russian . nationalist sentiment within 
the Party. 
Respublikanskoe partiia Rossiiskoi Federatsii, RPRF (the Republican Party 
of the Russian Federation) 
The RPRF held its founding conference on 17-18 November 1990. 
Based 
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on the 'Democratic Platform in the CPSU' which later (July 1990) became 
the 'Democratic Platform Outside the CPSU', the nine hundred delegates to 
its founding conference represented more than 20 000 people. 53 However, 
at the beginning of 1992 there were officially five thousand actual party 
members. ' The party's main political task was: 
... to support the sovereignty of the Russian republic, the renaissance of Russia based upon values common to all mankind, the provision of social guarantees and political rights for 
each citizen. " 
One source reveals that, at its inception, the RPRF represented a spectrum 
of opinion on Russia's future course: 
There is no unity amongst the membership concerning Russia's historical perspective. According to sociological surveys conducted by 'Monitoring' at the RPRF's founding 
conference, 67% of the delegates questioned drew parallels between Russia's future and the development of countries such as the USA, Western Europe and Japan; 24% considered that 
Russia should have its own peculiar path, differing from the rest of progressive mankind; 
5% suggested that each of the peoples of the RSFSR should have their own fates and 
various paths of development. More than 90% supported the Supreme Soviet of the RSFSR, 
whilst 40% of the members of RPFR supported the Supreme Soviet of the USSR. 56 
These surveys indicate that a significant minority of the Party's delegates 
were in favour of a specific 'Russian path', representing a constituency 
which had to be satisfied not only by the RPRF, but also by the Democratic 
Russia movement. Therefore, whilst the Party was concerned primarily 
with the development of a democratic system, it had to accommodate a 
strong lobby concerned with Russian national issues. To a large extent, this 
lobby would be satisfied by Democratic Russia's success in establishing a 
Russian state identity and Russia-wide institutions. 
RPRF's 'democratic' values advocated a multiparty parliamentary system, 
privatisation of property, a market system and the provision of social 
security for all citizens. These values would be applied to a sovereign 
Russian state distinct from the USSR: 
We support the real fulfilment and defence of Russia's sovereignty, the reconstruction of her 
statehood in the form of a democratic republic... 
We are convinced that the friendship of peoples inhabiting 
Russia can be revived only 
when a free union of sovereign national-governmental bodies is formed, on the basis of an 
All-Russian goods, capital and labour market. 
' 
The nationality policy towards the other peoples of the USSR was one 
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which supported their rights to self-determination and separation: 
All peoples of the USSR were victims of a system which totally destroyed personality, 
nature culture. It is with great tact and understanding that we should treat the growth of peoples' national consciousness and their striving for self-determination, right up to the 
possibility of secession... It is better to have neighbours as friends outside the state borders 
than enemy nations within a single and indivisible state. -8 
However, the independence of these states was envisaged within the 
framework of a federation, confederation or in ternational community: 
The economic and political interests of Russia's peoples, and her geographical position, dictate the necessity to conclude an economic and military-political union with other 
sovereign states, former republics of the USSR. We see this union as a commonwealth of 
sovereign states delegating certain executive functions to a central co-ordinating organ to 
solve common problems. 59 
By June 1991, the Party's position more clearly favoured maintaining the 
Union. A proposal on the problems of the Union and Federation to be 
aired at the second congress stated: 
The first and main thing that we believe all Russian democrats should recognise is how 
necessary and inevitable it is for the fate of democracy in Russia to maintain the state 
which is today called the USSR. Moreover, the disintegration of the Union will be the 
death sentence of Russian democracy. 60 
The document went on to highlight the problems of ethnically-displaced 
people and the prospect of refugees flooding into Russia. Repeating that a 
Union was 'inevitable', the proposal suggested that Russia faced a situation 
similar to Ulster 'in many parts of the country'. Particular attention was 
paid to Russian-speaking people all over the Union. It appears that the 
RPRF considered the Union necessary for the security of Russians and 
Russian-speaking people: 
The distribution of democratic ideas in the Russian-speaking environment of all republics is 
the most important task for Russian democracy, but it can only be resolved if the national 
democrats understand the worries and fears of their Russian-speaking neighbours. 
Make no 
mistake, the republics will not be able to solve their problems unless they 
face the concerns 
of their national minorities, including Russians. 
61 
RPFR's aim was to strengthen Russia's identity as an independent actor 
within the Union. It advocated a Russian 
federal state as an independent 
political unit, governing its own industry and not answerable 
to the 
existing central Soviet organs. Some of the relevant views were contained 
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in a document on the party's tasks passed at the Second Congress under the 
section on 'international and inter-state relations': 
Acknowledging the right of nations to self-determination, we recognise the right of each 
republic to freely choose interrelations with other republics. 
We support the initiative...... to prepare an Agreement on a Commonwealth of Sovereign States. The Commonwealth here is understood to be a voluntary association of sovereign 
states... 
In view of the priority of Russian sovereignty in all matters concerned with a union 
agreement, we think it feasible and necessary that it should be signed according to the following conditions: 
guaranteeing the state integrity and sovereignty of the Russian Federation;... placing 
industry on the RSFSR's territory, including the MIC [military-industrial complex] 
industries, under Russia's jurisidiction; for the formation of union organs of power to be 
carried out solely by the republics; the abolition of the USSR Congress of Peoples' Deputies 
and the USSR Supreme Soviet six months from the signing of the new Union Agreement. 62 
It is clear from the above that the RPRF expected the continuation of some 
form of union or commonwealth and could not envisage a complete 
break-up of the union. However, the congress document did stress the 
autonomy of actors within that Union and that each party was free to 
determine its relations with others within the Union. 
Following the putsch of August 1991, the party welcomed the fall of 
totalitarianism and declared that the 'empire had collapsed'. However, it 
still called for the renewal of some kind of Union Agreement, albeit based 
on democratic lines. ' 
Like fellow members of Democratic Russia, the RPRF supported the idea of 
strengthening Russian [rossiislCii] sovereignty and identity, and it 
supported the presidential candidacy of El'tsin as a Russian focus of 
opposition against the communist-dominated centre. It was uneasy with 
the idea of a break-up of the Union and the consequences which that 
might have posed to Russian-speaking populations (and others) outside 
the Russian federation, but the Party did not join Narodnoe soglasie; ' did 
not leave Democratic Russia; and did not subsequently side with other 
'patriotic' Russian-nationalist groups against the democrats. 
The RPRF was not a 'Russian nationalist' organisation, but defined itself 
as a 'party of the centre, a party of reform, a party of civic peace and 
accord'. ' However, in its pursuit of Russian republican structures, 
it did 
manage to accommodate the supporters of 
liberal Russian nationalism 
within its ranks. 
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Rossy - grazhdanskoe ob"edinenie 'Rossy' (The Rossy Civil Association) 
The Rossy described themselves as a 'civic (and from summer 1990, socio- 
political) association for a sovereign republic of Rus'. This small group 
called for a presidential Russian republic with a multiparty system, whilst 
placing a significant emphasis upon the plight of the Russian person and 
Russian culture. Indeed, theRossy's emphasis on Russian statehood and 
culture even displayed elements of isolationist Russian nationalism. 
However, like the democrats, the Association was opposed to the existing 
political regime (the CPSU, etc. ), the reconstitution of an imperial Russian 
state and advocated a democratic solution to Russia's problems. 
The Association formed at the end of 1988 in Leningrad and its aims were: 
to facilitate the national self-determination of Russians [russkikh]; to develop their 
national consciousness; the spiritual, moral and political revival of Russia; the creation of a 
presidential Rus' republic; Russian national autonomies within the structure of Russia; and 
Russian cultural autonomies within the union republics. 66 
In a conversation with Sovetskaia molodezh', Vladimir Bogomolov, a 
member of the association's Duma expressed Rossy's position: 
The RSFSR should in fact become an independent sovereign republic and not an ownerless 
union appendage. When Russia finds sovereignty, we will be able to hold a conference of all 
peoples of the USSR and conclude a new union treaty. Rossy support the idea that no one 
will be forced into it. If any republic stands up for secession, then that is their right. 67 
Rossy had already demonstrated its anti-imperialist position in a general 
address to the public in 1989 when it accused the Soviet establishment of 
being the common enemy and claimed that it was attempting to 'stir up 
imperial feeelings' in Russians against non-Russian brothers. ' 
Like Democratic Russia, Rossy called for Russian 'sovereignty' and 'self- 
determination' and 'statehood' (gosudarstvennost'). The leader of Rossy, 
Ekaterina Miasnikova, stated that: 
Before we can solve economic, cultural and other problems... .. we must solve the main 
problem - to create Russian statehood69 
However, the subject of Russian culture and the Russian national interest 
was more of a burning issue for the members of Rossy than 
it was for 
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Democratic Russia. The Rossy publication Rus' lamented the absence of 
Russian national culture: 
After 70 years of barbaric cultural politics, Leningrad... ... has almost totally lost its national spirit! 'Neither a Russian theatre, nor a Russian newspaper' - to paraphrase a 
great poet. Where are the institutes of Russian culture, newspapers, a national television 
channel?... 
Today many people simple-heartedly think that our television, newspapers and radio are Russian. But have you really seen articles, programmes and films which address the 
national feelings of Russians or calling out to the revival of our national honour? 70 
Rossy proposed the idea of national schools, national centres of culture, 
conservatories, museums. Vladimir Bogomolov proposed that Russians 
in other republics should be given cultural autonomy, but not political 
autonomy. 71 
Despite their vigorous utterances in favour of propagating Russian 
culture, Rossy did not play the racial card and opposed anti-Semitic groups 
such as Pamiat'. V. Dobrovolskii asserted that national membership was 
according to one's language and one's association with culture rather than 
by blood. The 1989 programme described a 'Russian' [russkii] as anyone 
who lives in the RSFSR and who 'genuinely considers himself to be 
Russian'. 72 
The Association proposed a political alternative to the 'totalitarian regime' 
of the CPSU. It supported a presidency elected by universal suffrage. 
Nominations for the presidency would be made by parties, which would 
also contest seats in a national legislature. The government would be 
formed by the president from members of his party and other allies. The 
non-Russian nationalities in the Russian federation would be represented 
by national autonomies, whose leaders would come from locally elected 
deputies and be appointed by the president. 
The Rossy Association represented an attempt to design a democratic 
system for Russia which would take into account the development of the 
Russian nation and the development of other Russian peoples. National 
minorities living within their own territories would not only have 
political autonomy, but cultural autonomy, with the right to 
form 
independent cultural associations, open national schools, classes and other 
forms of community connected with the national culture. 
Those minority 
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nationalities without their own territory would have their rights broaden 
to create national theatres, secondary schools, etc. 
Rossy opposed the activity of anti-Semitic or imperialist Russian 
nationalist organisations such as Pamiat', OFT and Edinstvo and 
represented a tendency which sought a Russian state with a civil society 
and a strong Russian national identity. At the same time, it was critical of 
the Leningrad Popular Front (LNF) and other 'democratic' organisations 
for failing to demonstrate an appreciation of 'Russian problems' 
[problemy russkikh]. The Association's concern for Russian problems 
stretched beyond the borders of the RSFSR - it declared that it would offer 
help to Russians outside the RSFSR who were subject to discrimination on 
grounds of nationality. 
At times, the Association attracted members who had links with other, less 
'democratic' organisations - it was even accused of 'chauvinism' in the 
newspaper Vechernii Leningrad after picketting the newspaper Smena 
with members of the National Democratic Party and others, accusing the 
editorial board of publishing anti-Russian articles. ' However, Rossy had 
limited connections with other so-called 'patriotic' organisations. 
Despite being the very first group to advocate the idea of an independent 
Russian state within the territory of the RSFSR, championing the cause of 
ethnic Russians, Rossy was a fairly insignificant force with around 30-40 
activists and several hundred supporters - its activity was limited mostly to 
the city of Leningrad. It had little success when it contested the March 1990 
elections and in the middle of 1990, the rump of theRossy association 
became the Humanist Party. 
Conclusion 
Liberal Russian nationalism was the force which succeeded most in 
fulfilling Russian nationalist aims. It combined the development of 
Russian national institutions and values with the introduction of 
liberal 
democracy, regarding the latter as an ally rather than as a 'Western' enemy. 
At first, Liberal Russian nationalism was represented by scholars such as 
the aforementioned Dmitrii Likhachev, who welcomed the changes 
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brought about by perestroika and identified with a European democratic 
culture, but also focussed on aspects of Russian culture and the importance 
of Orthodox Christianity. Igor' Vinogradov, who supported the idea of 
democracy as an alternative to communism, believed that democracy 
should observe Russian specific characteristics. He suggested that some of 
the answers lay in the legacy of past Russian thinkers and philosophers: 
In our present desperate search for a genuine and stable foundation for our social being and historical evolution, we cannot ignore the great spiritual and philsophical achievements 
we have inherited from those who to this day remain our closest allies or adversaries, 
supporters or opponents. 74 1 
This reflected Vinogradov's view that democracy could exist in tandem 
with a 'Russian idea'. 
If the abovementioned organisations did not champion a russkaia idea, 
then they championed a rossiiskaia idea. The appearance of Rossy 
represented one of the first attempts to define a state which would nurture 
the cultural and political identity of 'Russians'. The Association did not 
prescribe a fundamental Russian ideology, but advocated the idea of a 
rossiiskoe pluralist state (although the Association referred to it as a 
russ ko e state) in which those who considered themselves to be Russians 
could thrive - this would be achieved by the establishment of Russian and 
other national autonomies within the state. 
The Democratic Russia movement was fundamental in establishing 
Russian sovereignty, a Russian presidency and promoting the idea of 
Russia-wide institutions. Of Democratic Russia's constituent members, 
the DPR and the RPRF represent two organisations which were committed 
to the idea of establishing Russian [rossiiskii] state sovereignty. They did 
not promote ethnic Russian 'values', but the establishment of Russian 
state structures provided a focus for the development of both rossiikie and 
russkie national values. 
The movement which paid the most attention to Russian 'specific 
characteristics/values' was the Russian Christian Democratic Movement. 
Like its smaller ally, the KDP, it promoted the idea of 'enlightened 
patriotism'. This approach was not without success, for RKhDD became 
one of the biggest Russia-wide political movements /parties in 1991. 
It 
appears that the synthesis of liberal democratic values with 
Russian 
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characteristics was of interest to a certain section of the population. 
However, Democratic Russia's priority was to introduce 'progressive, 
radical, political and socio-economic reforms' with the aim of creating a 
'civil society'. It was liberal democratic values and opposition to 
communism/the centre which drew Democratic Russia support. Liberal 
Russian nationalism was a beneficiary of the democratic movement rather 
than a significant contributor to it. 
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r 7: Isolationist Russian Nationalism: Grouvs and Parti 
Connected with the Tendency 
I resolutely disagree with those who seek the salvation 
of Russia in isolation, seclusion, and even withdrawal 
from the USSR. Could it be that someone thinks Russia 
will develop more successfully outside the Union? This 
is nothing more than an illusion. ' 
M. Gorbachev at Russian party conference of CPSU. 
Introduction 
Isolationist Russian nationalism was a relatively small tendency 
marginalised by imperialist Russian nationalism and liberal Russian 
nationalism. It represented a Russian nationalism which was not only 
anti-Western, but also opposed the potentially 'harmful' influences of the 
non-Russian periphery. 
I have already pointed out that those who supported imperialist 
nationalism represented an extraordinarily broad range of political views, 
but seemed to be overwhelmed by the urgency to identify the Russian 
[bothrossiiskii and russkii] nation with the greater Russian state/Soviet 
Union. Many of the imperialist Russian nationalist groups and figures 
supported the development of Russian institutions within the framework 
of the Russian Federation, whilst at the same time supporting Russian 
dominance within the USSR. They also alluded to the possibility of a 
'Russian idea', whether based on socialism, Orthodoxy or monarchy. 
There is little doubt that imperialist Russian nationalism sought to isolate 
the Soviet Union/Russian imperial state from the West, if not the rest of 
the world. However, they did not wish to isolate Russia from the rest of 
the non-Russian Soviet periphery. 
There were two notable occasions when supporters of imperialist Russian 
nationalism passed comment suggesting that Russia might itself secede 
from the Soviet Union. The first was made by Valentin Rasputin in a 
speech to the Congress of People's Deputies in spring 
1989 when he 
suggested that Russia should, perhaps, leave the 
Union in order to sort 
out its own affairs. 2 The comment was made 
in response to nationalist 
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sentiments and, what Rasputin perceived to be, outbreaks of 
'Russophobia' in the periphery. It was not a serious proposal, but more of 
an attempt to ridicule those who pursued separatism in the periphery. ' 
The sentiment of this comment was echoed by the words of Aleksandr 
Prokhanov the following year, when he suggested that Russia should 
stand on its own and cast off its 'thankless neighbours"! Throughout the 
Gorbachev period, Prokhanov was one of the strongest advocates of Soviet 
unity, which was justified in Marxist-Leninist terms at the beginning of 
1988, but very clearly became associated with a 'Russian idea' by 1990. 
There is little doubt that Prokhanov's comment was written in anger 
against the national independence movements in the periphery, although 
it should be noted that both his comment and Rasputin's outburst drew 
attention to the fact that Russians were focussing on their own needs. 
The democrats, aided and abetted by liberal Russian nationalists, began to 
focus on issues concerning Russia's independent development. Liberal 
Russian nationalism envisaged Russian national values flourishing 
within a pluralist, liberal democratic environment. Russia's sovereign 
and independent development was the frist step towards developing 
Russia's cultural and national identity. Liberal Russian nationalism was 
concerned with nation-building, but not to a specific Russian recipe - it 
was responsive to the West and Europe in its development. 
Isolationist Russian nationalism, on the other hand, was closer to the 
Slavophile tradition, believing that Russia's development lay in values 
which were completely different from those of the West. Isolationism 
provided an opportunity for Russia and the Russian nation to develop 
without the 'poison' of foreign influence and without the burden of 
empire. 
A 'Russian path' entailed the rejection of both communism and Western 
democracy: 
Have you ever had to answer the question: "Who are you inclined to trust more - 
the 
'democrats' or the CPSU? " 
... Tell me, is there a 
difference between them? They and others worship ideals alien to the 
Russian people, completely ignoring the national peculiarities of the 
Slavs. These and 
others are ready to use the people like experimental rabbits 
for their own interests... 
After all, for a thousand years, Russian history was familiar with neither 
these nor other 
systems...... Russia can only continue on its own unique path. 
' 
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This was a view shared with some imperialist Russian nationalists, but 
isolationist Russian nationalism tried to present a fundamental Russian 
way for the Russian people - it was not concerned with the complications 
of maintaining a vast non-Russian periphery, to which it would have to 
justify its 'Russian path'. 
Igor' Shafarevich's vision of a Russian future reflected values advocated by 
the Slavophiles of the 19th Century, including spirituality, communality 
and conciliarism [sobornost']. His Russian path paints a somewhat 
authoritarian picture of Russian society, rejecting the idea of democracy 
and advocating that state structures are subject to the moral guidance of a 
spiritual authority. ' 
Aleksandr Solzhenitsyn's programme in 1990 aimed to build a 'democratic' 
Russia, but rejected the existing Western political models. His solution 
also advocated the existence of a 'higher moral' body consisting of 'the 
most authoritative voices' to guide the activity of state structures. This 
system would also require the observation of the principle of conciliarism, 
which Solzhenitsyn described as a 'system of trust' - others might describe 
it as a replacement for political pluralism. 
Solzhenitsyn's programme, which drew interest from across the Russian 
nationalist spectrum, was the most detailed manifesto of isolationist 
Russian nationalism, providing a distinct Russian solution for the 
Russian/Slavic nation. 
Solzhenitsyn 
Solzhenitsyn's proposal was laid out in a pamphlet entitled Kak nam 
obustroit' Rossiiu? (How Are We to Rebuild Russia? ), which appeared in 
the Soviet press in September 1990.7 The proposal outlines a structural 
organization of a democratic Russian political system, designed to suit the 
national peculiarities of Russian society. Solzhenitsyn stresses that 
his 
ideas are not meant to be an ultimate solution, but a starting point 
for 
discussion. He adds that the foundation of his work contains the ideas of 
many Russian figures and that they might serve as a 
basis for 'fruitful' 
beginnings. 
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Solzhenitsyn's programme covered Russia's future outside the Soviet 
empire; the composition of a new Russian state; economic and agrarian 
reform; social reform; a discussion of the existing models of democracy in 
the world; and the political structures which might be put in place to 
achieve a democracy which suits the Russian national identity. 
The document began by declaring that there was no future for a 
'monstrous' USSR whose activities would always be attributed to 
'Russians' by others all around the world. Solzhenitsyn suggested that the 
Union should break up and qualified the idea by saying that this had to 
happen for the Russian nation to survive: 
We now need to make a hard choice: between the Empire which is destroying, first and 
foremost, us - or the spiritual and physical salvation of our people. It is well known that 
our mortality rate is rising and our birth rate is falling - such that we will disappear from 
the Earth. The maintenance of a great Empire entails killing off our own people! Why do 
we need this multicoloured fusion? - so that the Russians lose their unique face? 8 
Solzhenitsyn's overriding concern for the Russian people supports the 
simple secession of eleven of the fifteen union republics: the three Baltic 
republics, three Caucasian republics, four Central Asian republics and 
Moldavia. However, on the question of the other republics, he suggested 
that Kazakhstan be divided into a southern part which was the deep- 
rooted 'home' of the Kazakhs and the northern part which was inhabited 
largely by Russians: the southern part should secede if it so wished, but 
the northern part would be joined to Russia, which along with Ukraine 
and Belorussia would form a new Russian Union [Rossiiskii Soiuz]. 
Solzhenitsyn wrote that through the secession of the twelve (including 
Southern Kazkahstan) republics, Russia would be freeing itself for its oven' 
'valuable internal development' and that: 
If it is true that Russia gave away its vital juices to the republics over these decades - then 
we will not suffer any economic losses, just a saving of manpower. 
9 
The Ukrainians and -Belorussians were considered 
to be part of the greater 
Russian brotherhood and Solzhenitsyn could not separate them from 
Russia. He viewed the three peoples as a close 
family, which was 
particularly influenced by his own Ukrainian connections and 
the time he 
spent in Belorussia during the war. However, 
despite his view that these 
three peoples formed a Great Russian people 
[veli ko ross y], he could not 
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deny both the Ukrainians and the Belorussians the right to secede 'if they 
really wanted to' - Russia would not hold them by force. He also qualified 
this statement by saying that Ukrainians (and Belorussians) should be able 
to vote on a territorial [oblast] basis to decide whether their local 
population should be incorporated into the Russian Union. He 
recommended that the minority peoples of the Russian Federation be 
incorporated into the Russian Union - the national features of their 
cultural, religious and economic needs would be respected, but it would be 
in their interests to remain part of Russia. 
On the subject of displaced peoples following a partition of the Soviet 
Union, Solzhenitsyn did not recommend mass resettlement, but said that 
that commissions of experts and state compensation would have a 
responsibility. In addition, new states would have to guarantee minority 
rights. 
On an economic level, Russia would cancel all foreign aid to former 
satellites such as Cuba, the defence budget would be curtailed and Eastern 
Europe would have to buy Russian raw materials at non-subsidized world 
prices. 
Solzhenitsyn referred to the ideas of Stolypin when addressing the issues 
of land reform and the national economy. Stolypin was the pre- 
revolutionary prime minister (1906-11) who advocated liberal economic 
reforms, including the distribution of land to create small family farms - 
all of which was expressed amidst calls to make the Russian state great. 
Solzhenitsyn's economic set-up advocates a market with individual 
intiative, but rejects the establishment of monopolies and 'unrestrained 
concentrations of capital'. 
In the social sphere, Solzhenitsyn focusses upon the falling birth-rate, on 
the family and on school. He believes that women should be given the 
opportunity to stay at home to bring up the children, whilst men bear the 
chief responsibility for earning. He also warns against harmful influences 
from the West, claiming that whilst the Iron Curtain had cut Russia off 
from all that was good in Western society - civic confidence, respect for the 
individual, variety of individual activity, general welfare and charitable 
organizations - it had let the bad influences such as 
'popular culture' and 
'vulgar fashion' creep under it. Here Solzhenitsyn is revealing his colours 
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by claiming that undesirable youth culture is from the West and therefore 
un-Russian. 
Solzhenitsyn sums up his attitude towards developing a Russian state 
structure with the following words: 
We need to find our own path. At present there is the auto-suggestion that we do not need to find our own path, that there is nothing to ponder - just quickly copy 'how they do it in the West'. 
However, in the West they do it in so many different ways - each country has its own tradition. '° 
Solzhenitsyn's Russian path advocates a presidency and supports the idea 
of a strong executive president in the interim between the genesis of the 
new Russian state and the effective functioning of its new democratic 
institutions. Rejecting existing models of democracy, he revives the 
names of old Russian institutions to give nomenclature to his vision of 
Russian democracy. These include the zemstva, elected bodies existing on 
four levels - local, regional (uiezd), territorial and nation-wide; 
Vsezemskoe Sobranie, a body of delegates from the zemstva; and a Duma, 
consisting of people from the professions whose task it is to monitor and 
decide society's moral questions, somewhat like the Zemskii Sobor of 
former Russian times. Therefore, Solzhenitsyn's view of Russian 
democracy involves an element of indirect election/nomination of 
decision-makers. 
The suggestion of a Duma highlights one of Solzhenitsyn's leading 
assumptions - that Russian society will recognise high moral 
responsibilities. Solzhenitsyn mentions morality several times and says 
that the 'possibility of improving society purely by political means is slim'. 
The concepts of morality and spirituality are vague and undefined, and are 
frequently used by Russian nationalism to evoke something unique. 
Solzhenitsyn's references suggest that the Russian people have a unique, 
inherent sense of morality which can be harnessed to make Russian 
democracy function successfully. 
There are other features in Solzhenitsyn's pamphlet which highlight 
isolationist Russian nationalism. He wants to build a Russia which: owes 
nothing to the periphery; enjoys its own economic fruits; will resist the 
power of 'concentrated' (and, therefore, foreign) capital; will keep out the 
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'bad' influences of mass culture from the West; rejects any other model of 
democracy as foreign to the Russian spirit. 
One might accuse Solzhenitsyn of having imperialistic designs on 
Kazakhstan and the two Slavic republics. This may well be interpreted in 
such a way, but one should observe that Solzhenitsyn is trying to address a 
demographic problem based upon the belief that borders were incorrectly 
determined by the communist regime. This is a problem addressed by 
many who give expression to isolationist Russian nationalism. 
Solzhenitsyn's main aim appears to be to physically unite the Russian 
(and/or Eastern Slavic) people and' cultivate them under a unique 
national development. 
Organizations 
Although Solzhenitsyn's programme aroused interest among several 
Russian nationalist figures, there were very few movements committed 
solely to an isolationist programme. Some of the smaller, insignificant 
groups advocating a fundamental 'Russian way', (governed, perhaps, by 
the influence of Russian Orthodoxy) were tending towards isolationism, 
but were troubled by unease about the future of a divided Union. Several 
groups viewed the Russians as a triune people of the Eastern Slavs, but few 
opted for a unique Russian political solution for either this 'triune' 
Russian people or a narrower concept of the Russian nation. 
The following are three examples of parties which, to some degree, 
reflected isolationist Russian nationalist values. 
Respublikanskaia narodnaia partiia Rossii, RNPR (The Republican 
Popular Party of Russ ia)/Natsional'no-respublikanskaia partiia Rossii, 
NRPR 
This party numbering 2500 members in the summer of 1990 grew out of 
the Russian National Patriotic Centre (RNPTs)11 led by former Pamiat' 
member Viktor Antonov. It held its founding conference on 
8 April 1990 
in Leningrad with delegates coming from several regions of Russia. 
By 
the end 1991 its membership had risen to around 
3500 activists and 
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supporters. 
The RNPR represented one of the first organised efforts to create a Russian 
party which could: 
provide the genuine revival of national Russian statehood on the basis of 'a sensible 
combination of democracy and patriotism' and the establishment of a new national Russian democracy. To develop a genuinely free popular national life for Russians in Russia as the 
core ethnic group of the Russian peoples. 12 
The establishment of a state and democracy with Russian national 
characteristics would be achieved by isolating Russia from its periphery. 
RNPR believed that the imperial thinking of Russian nationalists who 
held that the USSR was the successor to the Russian empire was a mistake. 
Russia's revival required an approach which would take 'economic, 
cultural and demographic' factors into account. According to the party 
programme, one of the first tasks of the party was to: 
... separate Russia from the three Baltic republics, the three Caucasian republics, the four 
Central Asian republics and Moldavia. " 
However, the Party wished to join with Ukraine, Belorussia and 
Kazakhstan in a federation or confederation of sovereign republics known 
as 'the Russian [Rossiiskii] Union'. This was similar to Solzhenitsyn's 
proposal in Kak nam obustroit' Rossiiu? to create a union of Slavic 
republics. 
The party programme drafted in October 1990 gave its reasons for 
separation from the aforementioned non-Slavic republics: 
existing political realities and the economic and demographic problems of the country 
allow us to declare very openly that the presence of Russia within the USSR is the direct 
and quickest route to the liquidation of Russia as a state and as an important geopolitical 
factor; as well as to bringing about the erosion and imminent disappearance of the Russian 
[russkaia] nation and other Russian [Rossiiskie] peoples. 
14 
A strategic aim was. to prevent the return of communist fundamentalism. 
The party rejected socialism as an official ruling ideology with Antonov 
claiming that the Western model introduced in 1917 was an ideology 'alien 
to our national traditions'. " Literaturnaia gazeta reported that Antonov's 
party: 
.. opposes left-radicals and social extremists 
and upholds the idea of maintaining the 
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moral and religious values of the Russian Orthodox Church. 16 
Antonov called for a restoration of centuries-old statehood and of its 
traditions, vowing to fight anti-national forces. " 
The party platform in 1990 claimed that the reforms of perestroika were 
being carried out without a clear plan: 
without taking into account Russia's national peculiarities and the historical experience of her statehood. 18 
The suggestion was that the reforms were inappropriate, governed by an 
alien influence: 
These poorly thought-out reforms are in essence only a superficial copy of Western models 
for solving particular state problems. To a large extent this relates to the development of 
democracy - to the formation of new power structures which often mechanically copy 
Western forms, while they are by far not the best examples. 19 
At the Founding Congress, Antonov vowed that the party would: 
... fight for the institution of new state structures which would first of all respect the 
people's traditional way of life and culture. 20 
In June 1990, Antonov resigned as temporary chairman of the party's 
Central Council and Nikolai Lysenko, another former Leningrad Pa mis t' 
member, automatically took his place. The new party programme which 
was produced under Lysenko removed all remarks about Zionism and 
included many of the points made in Solzhenitsyn's Kak nam obustroit' 
Rossiiu ? At the First Congress, the Party approved the new programme 
and declared itself 'the party of Solzhenitsyn's ideas. '21 
The new programme favoured the convocation of an All-Russian 
National Assembly to establish the legal forms of Russia's state structure. It 
also suggested that the RSFSR be renamed the Russian Federal Republic 
and, yet, divided into territories on a geographical rather than nationality 
basis. Like Solzhenitsyn, the RNPR favoured the revival of the zemstvo 
system of local government. 
Besides the establishment of a national media, the RNPR sought to shape 
Russian identity by restoring Russia's national state symbols as well as 
establishing a professional Russian army with the restoration of 'the 
military ranks, awards and fighting traditions of the Russian Army. 
' 
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On an economic level the party advocated immediate withdrawal from 
imbalanced trade with foreign countries, the cessation of aid to foreign 
governments and the suspension of trade with debtor-countries. A 
government commission would keep tight control on exports with 
licences and quotas kept to a minimum. Although the Party wished to 
encourage foreign investment in joint ventures and ailing state industries, 
it advocated a policy of protectionism which would prevent foreigners 
from buying up 'businesses, valuable papers and inventions'. 
The programme declared that the RNPR considered religion to be the core 
and an essential side of national life. On the subject of Russian Orthodoxy 
the programme stated that: 
Recognising and respecting the rights of other Chrisitian and non-christian denominations, 
the RNPR nevertheless stresses that over the course of centuries, the majority of Russian 
peoples practised Orthodoxy which in many ways defined their spiritual and 
psychological peculiarities, the character of the culture and everyday life. Therefore one 
of the RNPR 's most important tasks is to restore the canonical freedom of the Russian 
24 Orthodox Church. 
It was also suggested that Russian Orthodox religious holidays be observed 
as national holidays and that representatives of the Russian Orthodox 
Church and 'other Russian denominations' be allocated a quota of places 
on the local zemstvo bodies. However, despite the special status given to 
the Russian Orthodox Church, the Party supported Church separation 
from the state and the following year Lysenko was careful to point out that 
Russia did not need a state ideology based on religion or any idea other 
than the principle of Russian statehood itself. ' 
Having recognised the inalienable right of the Russian [russkii] people to 
independent statehood within the Russian federal Republic, the Party 
expressed support for those Russians and Russian speakers in non-Russian 
republics who might want to emigrate to Russia. A resolution passed later 
in the year at the First Congress called on the authorities to create 
conditions suitable for the return of Russians from other republics and to 
facilitate the return of 'non-indigenous settlers' in Russia to their 
'historical motherland'. " 
One would expect 'isolationist nationalists' to follow a 'third way' or 
national ideology. The RNPR's third way is very vague - it amounts to 
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little more than the renaissance of a non-imperialist Russian state, based 
first and foremost on the Russian people. In an article in the Party's 
newspaper, Golos Rossii, Lysenko declared that the RNPR's state ideology 
should be 'the idea of the salvation of Russia, the resurrection of the 
Russian [russkie] and other Russian [rossiiskie] peoples, the idea of 
removing the threat of the dismemberment of Russia, the idea of building 
a genuinely independent national state. He rejected communist, 
'democratic', imperialist, monarchist and Orthodox Christian ideologies, 
claiming that such ideologies were responsible for all Russia's past and 
present problems. 2' However, this did not rule out acknowledging the 
significance of Russian Orthodoxy's historical, cultural contribution to the 
development of the Russian people and state. 
The Party's brand of Russian nationalism displays certain features which 
are, arguably, 'imperialist' - one might argue that there was a Pan-Slavist 
dimension to this 'isolationist' Russian nationalism, because the RNPR 
wished to form a loose union with the Slavic republics and Kazakhstan. 
In addition, it should be noted that the party programme claimed that the 
borders between republics had been established by communist power and, 
therefore, were invalid and subject to review. An appeal from the RNPR's 
Central Council to the Russian officer corps and the army in 1991 took a 
much harder imperialist line. It stated that: 
... this government must... fulfil its main historical mission - to tear Russia from the 
criminal Leninist system [set'] destroying her - to wipe out the artificial 'state' borders 
between the present 'sovereign' republics. State sovereignty is one and indivisible, there 
can be no other 'sovereignties' within a sovereign state..., besides cultural and national 
autonomy.. . The revival of national Russian statehood in no way means that the right to secession 
which peoples in the periphery fiercely seek will be encroached upon. Acting first and 
foremost in the interests of Russia, the Russians [russkie] and other Russian [rossiiskie] 
peoples, we can and must review the external borders of our country. 
... We will grant our 'sovereingty' to a 
'sovereign' Georgia, Armenia and Azerbaijan, we will 
create an independent Moldovan state, protecting the genuinely Russian left bank of the 
Dniester owed to us. Finally, we will fulfil the long-standing dream of Sajudis of a 'Great 
Lithuania' in Kaunas, of course, minus the Vilensk area, Palanga and Memel'. We will give 
everyone what he wants [if it is in Russian interests], but the recipe, the sizes, the period 
and cost will be decided by us! "' 
The 'dismemberment' of the RSFSR or Russian state was also out of the 
question. As already mentioned, the party wished to re-arrange 
Russia on 
territorial-administrative lines - the First Congress even passed a 
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resolution on the territorial integrity of Russia, opposing the potential 
disintegration of the Russian Federation into independent states. Action 
was even taken to this effect when the party was instrumental in setting 
up the Russian national legion (which was later sent to fight in South 
Ossetia). "' 
In October 1991 the RNPR was renamed Natsional'no-respublikanskia 
partiia Rossii, NRPR (the National-Republican Party of Russia), marking 
its 'national' rather than 'popular' orientation. As the year approached its 
end and the break-up of the Soviet Union became more likely, NRPR's 
ideas of a Russian solution for an isolated Russia became more 
conceivable. However, this did not increase the Party's appeal to any 
significant degree. 
The Russian General National Union (Russkii obshchenatsional'nyi 
soiuz - RONS) 
RONS was formed in December 1990 in Moscow, but the Founding 
Conference was attended by representatives from several cities. It 
consisted of around 15 organisations and had around 70 activists. One of 
its closest allies around the end of 1991 was NRPR. 
RONS declared that it was necessary to create a political organisation 
which would stand up for the rights of the Russian [russkii] people, which, 
in its opinion, consisted of 'Great Russians', Ukrainians and Belorussians. " 
RONS stated that neither the communists nor the 'democrats' were able to 
lead the country out of its crisis and that the most pressing question was 
the 'national' [natsional'nyi] question. Communist politics were described 
as 'Soviet', whilst the policies of the democrats were described as the 
'politics of the common European home'. RONS aimed to introduce 
Russian politics for the national salvation of Russian people. 
The Union's aims included the 'spiritual and political unification of the 
Russian people' and to restore to the Russian people its 'national dignity 
and way of life'. The unification and revival of Russians was only possible 
if based on the 'traditional Russian values' of 'God, the Fatherland, the 
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Family and the Individual [Lichnost']'. 
RONS's vision of the Russian state was one which included Russia, 
Ukraine, Belorussia and areas of other republics where there was an 
overwhelming Russian/Slavic population: North Kazakhstan, Northern 
Kirgiziia, Transdniester. The latter territories would only be included 
subject to referenda. The Union programme stated that it supported the 
voluntary self-determination of the peoples of Central Asia, the Caucasus, 
the Baltic and Moldavia, but that conditions should be created to help all 
Russians to return to their historical motherland, should they so desire. 31 
When the referendum was held on 17 March 1991 on the maintenance of 
the USSR, RONS stuck to the idea of an independent Russian Union 
[Rossiisskii Soiuz] comprising the abovementioned Slavic areas. Its 
referendum leaflet urged the people to boycott the referendum, because a 
vote either way would be a vote for maintaining the Union as it was, or for 
a Russia separated fom its blood brothers of Ukraine and Belorussia. " 
The form of Russia's state structures would be decided by national 
referendum or by specially chosen representatives in the 'highest organs of 
power', which might be a Land Assembly [Zemskii Sobor] or a State Duma. 
The suggestion of a Zemskii Sobor brings to mind Solzhenitsyn's 
somewhat authoriarian concept of a unique 'Russian' democracy. 
The Union supported the establishment of a strong, independent national 
economy which would conduct business with the world market. The 
national income would be spent on the needs of Russians rather than 
maintaining the 'fraternal republics' of the USSR. ' RONS aimed to 
establish a mixed economy, combining various forms of ownership. 
However, it added that economic problems would not be solved without 
'moral' solutions. The Union believed that the economy should be 
independent/self-sufficient and not subject to the mercy of Western 
capital. 
RONS declared that it aimed to establish a Russian army for the territory 
of the Russian Union. National minorities would be able to form national 
sub-units within the army. Although RONS had stressed that it aimed to 
protect the rights of Russians outside Russia (and had passed a resolution 
to such effect at a regional conference in March 1991), it rejected the use of 
the Russian Army in solving 'international' conflicts outside the Russian 
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Union. It added that the Army would be used to protect the Slavic 
population in such instances only when all diplomatic measures had 
failed. 
Despite RONS's support for the independence of the non-Slavic republics, 
it was unwilling to give up any territory which belonged to the Russian 
republic. To this end, it supported the integrity of the RSFSR and took part 
in a protest against transferring the Kurile Islands to Japan' 
RONS was due to hold a Congress in September/ October 1991, but this was 
delayed until the following year. The programme ratifed at this Congress 
says much about RONS's belief in a unique Russian path. It declared that 
the organisation's values were influenced by the Orthodox faith and 
historical Russian statehood. In a section on 'Spirituality and Culture', the 
programme referred to the uniqueness of the Russian person: 
The historical existence of an Orthodox Russia between Catholic Europe and Islamic Asia 
and the unique nature of the country, with its relatively thin population inhabiting huge 
expanses, have helped bring about a single cultural-historical type of Russian [russkii] 
person amongst the ethnic variety of Russians [rossiiane]35 
It also suggested that the Russian people needed to devise a society in 
which its national characteristics would flourish: 
The restoration of Russian cultural and historical tradition requires the unification of all 
the national forces of the Russian people, in order to work out those forms of public and state 
life in which historical tradition will develop naturally under modern conditions. 36 
The section of the programme concluded that the Russian Orthodox 
Church had maintained the truthful essence of the Russian tradition 
during times of trouble and that it had been the 'bulwark of the faith and 
strength of the national spirit'. 
RONS's 'third way' clearly rejects both Western democracy and 
communism. It believed that the Russian/Slavic unique development 
could be guaranteed by shedding the non-Slavic periphery. In many ways 
it was trying to re-invent the Russian nation and looked to the past for its 
answers. This included the revival of the 'national-cultural peculiarities 
and traditions of Russian towns, villages and localities', as well as the 
return of historical names and symbols. The revival of Russian 
'spirituality' had as much to do with the essence of the Russian nation as it 
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did with Christianity. 
Although it was only a relatively small group, RONS was active in 
participating in conferences, meetings and distributing printed matter. 
This activity continued after 1991, when the organisation continued to 
develop its ideas. 
The Russian Party (Russkaia partiia ) 
The Russian Party, or the Russian Party of the RSFSR, was formed on 17 
May 1991. It was not a large party, but had a following of around five 
thousand supporters by spring 1992.37 Its leader was Viktor Korchagin who 
described himself as a 'Russian' [russkii] from a 'family of exiled, repressed 
peasants'. ' 
The Party's draft programme was re-worded a number of times, but the 
document that resulted from the Founding Congress listed the 'revival of 
the Russian state, Russia' as its priority. The programme accepted that this 
would not be a simple reconstitution of the USSR, but demanded the 
incorporation of 'places where Russians have historically lived' and listed 
the following areas: the RSFSR, Northern Kazakhstan including Alma 
Ata, Northern Kirgizia including Frunze, the left bank of the Dnieper, 
Crimea and other territories subject to the choice of the people. " 
Therefore, whilst pursuing the institution of a Russian state separate 
from non-Russian republics, the party had territorial designs on areas 
inhabited largely by Russians (this situation was somewhat alarming when 
one considers that a large number of its support was from officers and 
retired servicemen). " Despite this desire for a greater Russia, it is still fair 
to say that the Russian Party displayed an isolationist nationalist tendency - 
it did not wish to reconstitute the whole of the Soviet Union, it merely 
wished to encompass areas in which ethnic Russians constituted the vast 
majority of the population. 
The Russian Party opposed Marxism-Leninism and dubbed the 1917 
Revolution a 'criminal' act perpertrated by 'Bolshevik-Zionists'. 
It accused 
the Bolsheviks of 'dismembering Russian lands' and transforming 
Russians into 'slaves in their own land'. The CPSU was" called an 
'anti- 
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Russian party and a tool of Zionism'. At the same time, the Party opposed 
the 'democrats', accusing them also of 'Zionism' and of attempting to 
destroy the protector of the Russian peoples - the Army. 41 The Party 
appeared to blame most of Russia's ills on 'Zionism' and offered to 
'repatriate Jews if they should so choose'. ' 
The Party programme focussed on a russkoe rather than rossiiskoe state, 
declaring that it stood for the: 
revival of the greatness of the Russian nation 
In addition to this, the Party aimed to protect the 'lives, honour, dignity 
and rights of Russians in union republics', using economic or other 
sanctions if necessary; facilitate the revival of the Russian nation's 
national consciousness, its culture, traditions and customs; to form 
Russian national cadres; and introduce a law against 'Russophobia'. 
The administrative structure of the country would be based not on 
national autonomy, but on the basis of provinces [gubernii[ (this form of 
territorial administration was also advocated by Vladimir Zhirinovskii, 
but his 'Russia' would include all the union republics). The Party 
proposed the establishment of a national legislature chosen on the basis of 
multi-party elections. It also suggested that a Russian national 
government would be formed 'in accordance with quota, taking into 
consideration Russia's multinational composition'. 
The Party rejected the idea of privatisation and supported the re- 
nationalisation of property already sold, without granting compensation. 
The sale of property was described as 'robbery of the Russian people'. 
However, the Party did support the principle of private property - it 
preferred the free transfer of equal shares [pai] to each worker in every state 
enterprise. It also declared that state-owned housing should become the 
private property of the occupants. The Party supported a 'mixed economy' 
similar to the system 'before the 1917 October Revolution' and the idea of 
returning land into private hands to create small family farms. 
In the area of social policy, the Party aimed to stop the 
'demographic 
genocide' of Russians by allowing women (who so wished) to return to the 
home to raise children (and provide them with extra 
financial assistance 
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for second and third children). It also aimed to fight alcoholism by using 
what it claimed to be the best method: to remove the state monopoly on 
alcohol sales and allowing the free sale of alcohol. On the question of 
religion, the Party supported freedom to practise one's faith. However, it 
also demanded that Christianity, which 'propagated the idea of the Jews as 
the chosen people', be recognised as a 'religion of slaves, originating from 
Judaism' and added that Orthodoxy was a 'branch of Christianity'. 
Clearly, Korchagin's Party wished to create a Russian state based upon 
ethnic Russians [russkie] and what it envisaged to be 'Russian' traditional 
values. However, these values were not based upon Russian Orthodoxy, 
but upon the unique innate qualities of the Russian ethnic nation. 
Despite advocating a multi-party system and a mixed economy, the Party 
displayed an authoritarian tendency. By the end of December 1991, it was 
calling for the introduction of a state of emergency for the period of one 
year to overcome the 'general crisis' in the USSR. This involved: the 
suspension of all political parties; the suspension of soviets at all levels; 
and the transfer of executive power to representatives of a Russian 
[russkii] national government and to officers of the armed forces, who 
would both have the right to intern people. 
The Russian Party's vague 'third way' was based upon the regeneration of 
ethnic Russians and a struggle against 'Zionism'. Appealing to the army 
for support, it appeared to present a quasi-Nazi programme for Russian 
ethnic statehood. 
Conclusion 
Despite the enthusiastic response which Solzhenitsyn's pamphlet received, 
there was only one group, RNPR, which adopted 
(or claimed to adopt) his 
ideas. It appeared that Solzhenitsyn's programme 
became just what he had 
declared it was -a starting point 
for discussion. Some imperialist Russian 
nationalists warmed to the idea of a 
Russian path, while more liberal 
Russian nationalist figures were intrigued 
by the marriage of the 'Russian 
idea' with a concept of democracy. 
Liberal Russian nationalists were also 
responsive to the idea of national-separatism 
for the republics. 
The three aformentioned parties arose at a 
time when the imperial idea 
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was strong among Russian nationalists and when democracy was the force 
identified with the idea of national-separatism. The parties have four 
things in common: a loathing for the West; a rejection of the 'alien' 
ideologies of communism and liberal democracy; a belief in the innate 
virtues of the Russian people; and a desire to unshackle themselves from 
the financial, political and cultural burden of the non-Russian republics. 
RNPR wished to enter into a federation or confederation with the other 
Slavic republics, whilst RONS viewed the Russians as a triune people. 
The Russian Party placed its beliefs firmly in the virtues of ethnic 
Russians. One might argue that the former two organisations were 
advocating a 'pan-Slavic', rather than 'Russian' nationalism, because they 
wished to bring the Eastern Slavs together. However, RNPR's priority was 
to establish a sovereign Russian Federal Republic with Russian 
institutions - Russia would merely 'propose' to the Slavic republics and 
Kazakhstan that they enter into the 'Russian Union' favoured by the Party. 
RONS firmly believed that the Eastern Slavs were the Russian people: 
'veliko, -malo, - and belo-russy'. This idea of a broader, 'triune' Russian 
[russkii] people was common to one or two other groups. 
The idea of a fundamental Russian way for an isolated Russian state was 
relatively unpopular for the following reasons: many Russian nationalists 
could only identify the Russian state with the whole of the USSR's 
territory; it was difficult to imagine an isolated Russia with its own 
peculiar path solving economic problems; although they might have 
referred to the institution of democracy (or narodovlastie), the 
aforementioned parties all contained authoritarian elements in their 
programmes for development. 
The obvious appeal of isolationist Russian nationalism was that, although 
Russia would still be a multi-ethnic state, the vast majority of the 
population of a reconstituted Russia would be ethnic Russians. This 
would allow the state to pursue and develop the interests of ethnic 
Russians. In addition, the Russian state would, supposedly, be able to 
spend most (if not all) of its national income/ resources on itself, rather 
than subsidising the economies of the non-Russian republics. 
The idea of a fundamental way for a Russian people largely isolated 
from 
the non-Russian influence of the periphery 
did not have great appeal. 
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However, I suspect that many of those who favour both a Russian 'third 
way' and an imperialist Russian nationalism will gradually adopt an 
isolationist Russian nationalism when the idea of non-Russian nation- 
states in the 'near-abroad' has become established sufficiently in the minds 
of the Russian people to be accepted as the norm. 
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Conclusion 
Until the advent of Gorbachev, Russian nationalism existed on two major 
distinguishable levels: within the establishment and outside the 
establishment. It was difficult for those within both camps to articulate 
their views to a broad audience and subject them to discussion. The 
establishment figures were restricted to writing fiction or veiling their 
beliefs in Marxist-Leninist or internationalist terms, whilst the dissidents 
were restricted to the low circulation of samizdat and subject to 
harassment by the authorities. The expressions of Russian nationalism 
available for mass consumption during the seventies and early eighties 
dealt with issues which were isolated from a broader picture of the 
author's beliefs and did not necessarily indicate how the author viewed 
the Russian state or how that state should be run. 
During the first years of Gorbachev's rule many of the nationalist- 
orientated writers stuck to safe topics such as the state of rural Russia, the 
environment and discussions of the Russian character. However, glasnost 
released a stream of views which revealed not only what people thought 
characteristic of the Russian national identity, but how they envisaged the 
continuation of the Russian state. 
The three tendencies which I have named in this work aim to show the 
relationship between ideas of what constitutes a Russian and the type of 
state in which that Russian would live. Imperialist Russian nationalism 
views the ethnic Russian as a leader, an elder brother in a vast state which 
embraces many nationalities. It views the Russian nation as the backbone 
of a greater power which must be maintained in order to maintain the 
very essence of the Russian nation. Isolationist nationalism believes that 
the Russian nation must be isolated from foreign influences in order to 
survive. It advocates the establishment of a Russian state which is 
prepared to cast off the periphery and concentrate on a social and political 
system where Russian values have primacy. Liberal nationalism 
concentrates on the establishment of a Russian state independent of 
those 
: republics which wish to secede. It accepts the viability of 
foreign ideas, but 
aims to establish a Russian identity based mainly upon citizenship, 
but 
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also paying lip-service to the ethnic Russian dimension. 
The majority of Russians were not Russian nationalists. Many felt 
themselves to be Soviet nationals and the desire to assert their 
Russianness or fight for the special place of Russians in Soviet society was 
unimportant (e. g. M. Gorbachev). Others were more concerned with the 
democratic changes taking place in Soviet/Russian society and were 
concerned primarily with instituting a system which would guarantee 
their civil rights, introduce pluralist politics and allow them to express 
their beliefs and ideas freely. The complexion of the economy and 
property relations were also matters of interest which were not necessarily 
connected with the national question. However, Russian nationalism 
became a phenomenon which touched many political organisations, 
particularly between 1990-1991 and, to a certain extent, aspects of Russian 
nationalism became central to the struggle against the Soviet centre from 
both conservative quarters and democratic forces. 
Of all the tendencies, imperialist Russian nationalism was at first the 
strongest, expressing itself through the influential RSFSR Writers' Union 
and then through 'cultural' organisations such as Pamiat'and Otechestvo. 
The Writers' Union sponsored its own 'cultural' organizations, which, like 
Pa m is t', spoke with an increasingly political voice. The likes of Edinenie 
and the Association of Russian Artists simultaneously supported the 
stimulation of Russian culture and the maintenance of a Russian state 
coterminous with the Soviet borders. Russian writers were prominent 
advocates of imperialist Russian nationalism right up until the end of the 
Soviet Union. They were constant signatories to appeals to maintain the 
Union and many of them joined or formed parties or groups of an 
imperialist Russian nationalist persuasion. Representatives of the 
creative arts, Iurii Bondarev, Eduard Volodin, Aleksandr Prokhanov and 
Valentin Rasputin, were amongst the twelve signatories to the Slovo k 
narodu letter which served as a warning of possible action by statists 
shortly before the attempted coup of August 1991. ' 
Imperialist Russian nationalism, was in some cases, allied to central 
government in Moscow. For instance, the 'international' movements 
which arose in the non-Russian republics were supported 
by the centre, 
whilst Nina Andreeva's Edinstvo was backed 
by patrons in the CPSU such 
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as Egor Ligachev. 
It might seem that there were large political differences between groups 
such as Edinstvo and Mikhail Antonov's Soiuz dukhovnogo 
vozrozhdeniia Otechestva, or even Pamiat' , but the uniting factor was 
their adherence to imperialist nationalism and their political differences 
were secondary to this. This is reflected in an item in the independent 
Russian nationalist newspaper, Nashi. in 1991. It was describing a 
conference of imperialist Russian nationalist-orientated groups and 
figures (including writers Belov, Prokhanov, Kozhinov, Balashov, M. 
Antonov) who discussed the 'Russian idea and modernity': 
They discussed the contradictory problem of reviving Russian statehood. Fundamentally 
different points of view were expressed. However, the participants agreed that the 
interests of saving the Fatherland were higher than individual, or narrow-minded party 
and group interests. 2 
Imperialist Russian nationalism was the strongest of the tendencies at 
first, probably because of the strong Soviet patriotism which had been 
promoted prior to the mid-eighties. This had developed a pride in the 
unitary state and, to some extent, must have reassured Russians of their 
security as first among equals in a multinational state. Some objected to 
the idea that Russians had benefitted as a nation from the Soviet state, 
pointing to perceived inequalities and disadvantages, but imperial 
thinking prevailed. Imperialist Russian nationalism also surfaced in 
reaction to republican national fronts. Russian populations in the 
republics felt insecure and some Russians, perhaps, resented the 
'ingratitude' of the non-Russian populations for wishing to break away 
from Russia and the Soviet Union. This was ingratitude for what 
Russians perceived to be the physical security and subsidies that Russia 
had given to the republics. 
Gorbachev supported the maintenance of the Union, but there appeared to 
be very little Russian nationalist content in this. He did say: 
I cannot imagine the Union without Russia. Without her it simply cannot exist. 
But in 
exactly the same way, Russia needs the Union. It is worth saying this over and over again. 
3 
These are the words of a Soviet leader who was used to the 
idea of a Soviet 
Union, who had not contemplated the disintegration of the 
Union and 
certainly did not want to go down in history as the man responsible 
for 
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that break-up. He did make concessions to Russian nationalist-orientated 
figures and tried to involve them in the overall process of perestroika. At 
the beginning of his reforms, he did try to harness some of the positive 
energies of Russian nationalism through such figures as Dmitrii 
Likhachev and Sergei Zalygin and a little later, he included the more 
imperialist nationalist-orientated Rasputin and Veniamin Iarin in his 
advisory body, the Presidential Council. However, in the final analysis, 
Gorbachev did not harness Russian nationalism to the degree and effect 
that his political rival, Boris El'tsin did. 
Isolationism and separatism were trends which appeared in Russia in 
1990. The idea of separatism appeared to be a platform of both liberal and 
isolationist Russian nationalism. Marina Sal'e at the beginning of the year 
had spoken of the idea of creating a democratic Russian national party, 
based on a 'healthy national idea', suggesting that it was a good idea for 
Russia to focus on its own affairs, but at the same time upholding 
democratic values - Russia could pursue politics within a Russian 
national framework, but did not need to institute a special Russian idea. 
Solzhenitsyn's programme surfaced in 1990 and attracted plenty of 
interest, but there did not seem to be a large number of people forming 
political parties based on Solzhenitsyn's ideas. Isolationist Russian 
nationalism was to sit on the sidelines to a large extent, but it could be 
detected within the ideas and expressions of those who adhered to the 
other two tendencies. Nevertheless, there were a handful of parties which 
probed the remote possibility of creating an isolated Russian 
fundamentalist state. Isolationist nationalism was probably the tendency 
to benefit most from the break-up of the USSR. As the democratic 
Russian state becomes the norm and the idea of a Russia independent 
from the other republics becomes commonplace, people might 
look to a 
fundamental Russian way for the Russian Federation as an alternative in 
the future. 
The break-up of the Soviet Union was met with the biggest outcry 
by 
imperialist nationalists within groups such as Nashi 
(late 1991) and the 
National Salvation Front (which appeared in early 1992). For a while after 
the August putsch, supporters of imperialist nationalism such as 
Viktor 
Alksnis and Aleksandr Nevzorov, who 
had been prominent in 1991, 
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raised their profiles. However, it is difficult to imagine that Russian 
imperialist nationalism will rally the nation to reincorporate the former 
Soviet republics into a Russian state. 
Liberal Russian nationalism came into its own as a force in 1990-91. It had 
existed within the ranks of a few intellectuals up until then, but received a 
boost with the rise of the democratic movement. To a large extent, liberal 
Russian nationalism was a fellow-traveller of the democratic movement, 
supporting the institution of democratic values and a civil society, but 
paying attention to 'specific Russian characteristics' [russkaia spetsifika] 
and the institution of Russia-wide structures. In some instances, there 
was additional concern for the future of ethnic Russians outside the 
Russian state (RSFSR). 
The reasons for the rise of Russian nationalism 
There was a certain amount of Russian nationalism in the Soviet Union 
before Gorbachev came to power. Glasnost released much of the latent or 
subdued nationalism as it stimulated intellectual thought and allowed 
broader, in-depth discussions of the Russian national identity and Russian 
national issues. The initial discussion took place within certain thick 
journals, the RSFSR Writers' Union and the established press. However, 
by 1988-1989, material was beginning to appear in the form of sa m izda t 
publications and leaflets. 
The discussions sparked by glasnost and the questions posed in the pursuit 
of perestroika led to the relaxation of certain ideological taboos, including 
questioning the principle of internationalism. As Popular Fronts 
appeared in non-Russian republics, Russians responded with their own 
representative organisations, some of which claimed to be 
'internationalist' in their orientation, but clearly represented the interests 
of Russians or Russian-speakers. These organisations were not supported 
by all Russians in the non-Russian republics and they 
did not receive 
overwhelming support from the Russian population 
in the Russian 
republic. Russians, themselves, questioned the principles of 
internationalism and some (e. g. KhPS) decided that it was time to 
focus on 
a Russian spiritual and physical 'revival'. 
Certain Russians (e. g. V Belov) 
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were sensitive to suggestions that they were associated with the 
'internationalist' Soviet centre and sought refuge in Russian nationalism 
as a way of deflecting from the Russian nation the blame for the ills of the 
Soviet peoples. 
The appearance of national-separatist movements and declarations of 
sovereignty in the Union republics provoked Russian nationalist activity 
from both imperialist Russian nationalist groups opposed to the break-up 
of the unitary (Soviet) state and other Russian nationalist organisations 
which perceived an opportunity to follow suit. However, it was not only 
the break-up of the USSR which cast a focus on Russian national issues - 
the possible break-up of the RSFSR was of concern to practically all 
Russian nationalists, who could not conceive the dismemberment of the 
Russian republic. Some accepted the principle of political and cultural 
autonomy of the minority nationalities in the Russian republic, but none 
of the Russian nationalist-orientated organisations advocated secession of 
territories situated within RSFSR borders. 
Some manifestations of Russian nationalism reflected resistance to the 
changes instituted by Gorbachev, many of which were regarded as the 
introduction of 'Western' influence. Members of the USSR/RSFSR 
Writers' Unions objected to the influence of 'mass culture' which was 
regarded as an alien, Western import. This condemnation of 'mass 
culture' was repeated by members of the Russian Orthodox Church and by 
organisations such as, for example, Otechestvo, SDVO, Otchizna and even 
the 'neo-Stalinist' Edinstvo. 
In 1990-1991, the gradual collapse of communism led to the search for 
alternative ideologies. Some resorted to Russian nationalism as an 
alternative to liberal democracy - even the Russian 
Communist Party 
adopted a Russian nationalist, rather than an orthodox 
Marxist-Leninist 
position and members were seen to embrace not only ethnic 
Russian 
issues, but also Russian Orthodoxy, which had earlier 
been taboo. As the 
democrats tightened their grip on the levers of power, groups such as 
Otchizna and ROS adopted Russian nationalism as the 
ideological glue to 
unite people against the democrats and support 
the maintenance of the 
unitary greater Russian/Soviet state. 
The reform process had significant effects upon 
the growth of Russian 
359 
nationalism. Gorbachev and the central authorities realised that Russian 
nationalism had potential and attempted to develop a modus vivendi 
with some of its leading adherents before the appearance of 'informal' 
movements. However, the consequences of Gorbachev's reforms meant 
that Russian nationalism became the force behind opposition to the 
Soviet leader. 
The successes and failures of Russian nationalism over the Gorbachev 
period 
It is difficult to assess the success of Russian nationalism over this period, 
but according to Lev Gudkov of the opinion-monitoring organisation, 
V TsIOM, the level of Russian national consciousness reached a high in 
1991.4 However, he added that the Russian people had the lowest level of 
national consolidation of all the peoples of the USSR. Certainly, there was 
reason to suggest that Russians had a dual, if not indifferent approach to 
the idea of the Russian nation. In 1991,78% of Russians [rossiiane] 
considered themselves to be citizens of the Soviet Union, ' whereas, in 
1990, a poll had revealed that 'the overwhelming majority favoured an 
expansion of the independence of Russia and a corresponding reduction 
in central controls'. " This suggests that the democratic message and 
opposition to central control was stronger than the Russian nationalist 
message, for whilst Russians identified with the Soviet Union, they still 
wanted political independence from the centre. This is reflected by the 
support which Russian nationalist-orientated groups enjoyed. 
The democratic movement did not take up the national idea as a 'weapon' 
until 1990. From this point on, liberal Russian nationalism, as a 
fellow 
traveller of the democratic movement, appeared to be the most successful 
tendency in Russian nationalism. The failure of other 'patriotic' groups, 
which had broadcast a much more overt 
Russian [russkii] nationalist 
message at the beginning of the year, 
had been demonstrated by their 
failure in the March 1990 elections. However, it was not only 
the 
democrats' ability to occupy the middle ground and 
to identify itself with 
the Russian [rossiiskaia] national idea which contributed 
to the downfall 
of other Russian nationalist groups. 
Self-proclaimed 'patriotic' groups 
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were plagued by: bad organisation; irreconcilable political differences; the 
inability to create a broad platform through the narrow personal ambitions 
of leaders; and lack of public support through the negative images of 
groups such as Pam ist'. 
A poll in 1990 suggested that the larger and more organised 
parties /movements drew bigger support. ' Thus, the DPR the CPSU and 
the Social Democratic Party fared relatively well. The poll also revealed 
that 'it is not what, but who, suggesting that personalities drew significant 
support. The organisational structures of imperialist and isolationist 
Russian nationalist forces did not compare with those of Democratic 
Russia (or the CPSU) and there was no recognisable political leader 
representing a 'patriotic bloc'. Imperialist Russian nationalism 
represented a diverse range of political views and was unable to organise 
itself as a unified umbrella movement dedicated to preserving the Soviet 
Union as a unitary state in which Russians held a dominant position. 
Despite the alliances and coalitions which existed, there were political 
differences between the groups in this tendency which, sooner or later, 
would have led to disunity. 
The political ambitions of party leaders also contributed to the inability of 
imperialist Russian nationalism to create a broad platform. This 
phenomenon was not confined to imperialist Russian nationalism, but 
reflected Russian politics as a whole. The style of leaders such as Travkin, 
Skurlatov, Zhirinovskii, Vasil'ev and Osipov led to splits in, and 
defections from their organisations which would never heal. The 
principle of 'divide and rule' operated by the KGB also had a detrimental 
effect upon the unity of Russian nationalist-orientated organisations, 
especially Pam is t'. 
The image of organisations such as Pamiat' was another factor which 
discredited Russian nationalism. The virulent anti-Semitism displayed by 
the movement was fanned by the KGB and created a 
lasting association 
between Russian nationalism and anti-Semitism. 
The central authorities tried various tactics to either control, or 
harness 
the co-operation of Russian nationalism. They may well 
have tried to 
discredit the democratic movement by infiltrating or supporting groups 
such as LDP and R NF which, at first, referred to 
themselves as 'democratic' 
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movements, but soon developed imperialist Russian nationalist agenda. 
However, the central authorities were eventually powerless in preventing 
a partnership between the democratic movement and the Russian 
national idea. It was the democratic movement's development of a 
Russian [ ro ssiiski i] national identity and state structures which enabled it 
to challenge the centre successfully. 
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1 "Slovo k narodu", Sovetskaia Rossiia, 23/7/91, p. 1. 
'E. Troitskii, "Russkim nuzhna gosudarstvennost, ", Na shi, No. 1(3), 1991, p. 3. [SSEES 
Informal Newspaper Collection] 
3 "Radi mir i soglasiia" (Interview with M. S. Gorbachev by Soviet journalists), 
Sovetskaia Rossiia, 13/6/91, p. 1. 
'L. D. Gudkov, "Russkoe natsional'noe soznanie: potentsial i tipy konsolidatsiia" in T. I. 
Zaslavskaia & L. A. Arutiunian (eds. ), Kuda idet Rossiia?... Al'ternativa 
oshchestvennogo razvitiia, No. 1, Moscow, Interpraks, 1994, p. 176. 
S Ibid., p. 179. 
6 Cited in Graeme Gill, The collapse of a single-party system: the disintegration of the 
Communist Party of the Soviet Union, CUP, 1994, p. 126. 
7 Gospodin narod, No. 1,1990. [SSEES New Political Parties Archive] 
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